



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Memorandum for the President

Memorandum:

United States Initiatives at the 16th General Assembly

Tab A. Memorandum to the Secretary from Harlan Cleveland:  
United States Strategy at the Sixteenth  
General Assembly

Tab B. Predictable Major Issues in the 16th General Assembly  
of the United Nations

Tab C. Joint Declaration on Disarmament:  
A Program for Total Universal Disarmament in a  
Peaceful World (July 28, 1961)

Tab D. The Development of U.N. Capacity to Act for Peace and  
Security

Tab E. Plan for United Nations Activities in Outer Space

Tab F. United Nations Development Authority

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UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS  
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Background Papers for Preliminary  
Discussion on 16th General Assembly

As you requested, I am sending you herewith a number of background papers for your August 5 meeting with Ambassador Stevenson at Hyannis Port for a preliminary discussion of United States strategy for the 16th General Assembly.

The Secretary and I have read these papers and believe they can form a useful basis for preliminary discussions. I should emphasize, however, that they are still in the process of review within the Department of State as well as in the other Departments of the Government. Certain of the specific proposals may have both advantages and disadvantages that have not been fully explored. There are, for example, serious questions in the State Department with regard both to the proposals in the field of outer space and in connection with the suggested United Nations Development Authority.

I certainly agree that it is desirable for us to take the most positive possible stance and to try to seize the initiative in the course of the 16th General Assembly. But particularly with respect to the outer space proposals, I think we should be on guard not to put forward programs until we are clear that we will be in a position to carry them through. Both President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace proposal and his proposal

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-2-

for a general African development program fell very short of the expectations they aroused.

I would have joined you for the discussion at Hyannis Port, but the Secretary felt that, with several crises pending, it would be better for me to remain in Washington.

*Langston Ball*  
Acting Secretary

Enclosures:

Background papers.

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MEMORANDUM

Subject: United States Initiatives at the 16th General Assembly

Two basic considerations suggest the need for important United States initiatives at this Assembly:

The first consideration is the ugly cold war environment. The Assembly will find the world closer to war than any Assembly session in recent years. The United States and its allies will be in a number of defensive postures on such subjects as Berlin, Laos and Chinese representation. Exclusive attention to these and other crisis areas could deprive United States foreign policy of a visible constructive content, with resultant losses to United States prestige abroad and public confidence at home.

The second consideration is the crisis in the United Nations itself. The world organization is under sustained attack from the Soviet bloc which seeks nothing less than the destruction of the integrity of the international secretariat and of the capacity of the institution to act in the field of peace and security. Moreover, the increasing number of new members in the United Nations has altered its character and seriously alienated two or three of our European allies. Without important United States initiatives to defend the organization's integrity and to strengthen its operational capacity, the United Nations will gradually lose its value as a shield for free countries which do not want to be coerced by Communist aggression and subversion.

A more detailed outline of proposed U.S. strategy at the forthcoming United Nations General Assembly is contained in Tab A; a discussion of some of the major issues which will be before the Assembly is contained in Tab B.

It is suggested that the President make a major foreign policy address to the Assembly presenting U.S. initiatives designed to

strengthen

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- 2 -

strengthen the United Nations. This is the first regular Assembly session to occur during his Administration. So far as we are now aware, the session will not be attended by the large number of Heads of State which attended the last session; Khrushchev will probably be detained in Moscow by the Communist Party conference. In any case, as was demonstrated last year, a one day Presidential visit to New York need not involve embarrassing confrontations. It would provide a unique opportunity to emphasize the commitment of the United States to a stronger United Nations and to launch the specific proposals designed to strengthen it.

In an address to the Assembly, the President could put the challenge of an open world--a world in which free choice would be an inherent right of all men--not something rationed, as now in certain parts of the world, by reluctant and fear-ridden governments.

In illustrating this theme, the President could refer to a number of cold war issues. Foremost among these is that of indirect aggression. The concepts of territorial integrity and political independence are central in the thinking of the newer states. For them these concepts are central to self-determination. This subject could lead them into the question of Berlin. In his speech he might announce that the Big Four Foreign Ministers would meet in October to deal with the Berlin crisis. Thus the United Nations would have no occasion to deal with the matter itself unless the parties failed to reach agreement.

The major part of the President's address would be concerned not with particular cold war crises, but with the initiatives put forward by the United States. The first initiative would be the United States program for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world (Tab C). This initiative would provide the central theme for his address--that progress toward general and complete disarmament requires the building up of more effective international institutions to settle international disputes, prevent aggression, and husband the resources of the world for economic and social progress. The remaining three initiatives would be specific proposals to develop such institutions: a proposal for the immediate strengthening of the United Nations capacity to act in peace and security matters (Tab D); a proposal for a comprehensive program of United Nations operations in outer space (Tab E); and a proposal for an expanded United Nations role in the economic development of less developed countries (Tab F).

The

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The Secretary of State is expecting to spend several days at the opening of the Assembly and meet with Foreign Ministers in attendance at the session. If the President decides to make a major address along the lines suggested, the Secretary could follow with a speech explaining the United States plan for general and complete disarmament and give general support to the development of the initiatives.

The following is a brief summary of the four initiatives which would be set forth in the President's address.

I. Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World

The United States would present its program for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. The goal of this program is a free, secure and peaceful world in which nations in their relations with each other adhere to common standards of justice and international conduct; a world in which adjustments to changes in international life are achieved peaceably in accordance with the principles of the United Nations; a world in which general and complete disarmament under effective international control has been achieved and the resources of nations are devoted to the fulfillment of man's material, cultural and spiritual needs.

One of the central elements in such a program would be the progressive development of United Nations machinery for settling disputes, checking aggression (including the indirect variety), and promoting economic and social progress.

II. The Development of United Nations Capacity to Act for Peace and Security

The United States would emphasize the developing capacity of the United Nations to mount and sustain difficult international policing operations, citing the examples of UNEF and the United Nations force in the Congo. It would propose the reinforcement of this capability through the following steps:

1. Protection of the integrity of the international secretariat against the Soviet "troika" proposal; further strengthening of the executive function of the United Nations.

2. Initiation



2. Initiation of preparations at UN headquarters and in national armed forces to facilitate the speedy establishment of international police operations, tailored in each instance to the nature of the military problem the UN is called upon to tackle.

3. Solution of the immediate financial crisis of the United Nations. On present projections, and barring any major new field operations, a loan by the United States and other countries of approximately \$30 million toward the end of 1961 would enable the United Nations to meet its financial commitments until early in the summer of 1962.

4. The eventual establishment of new methods of financing United Nations peace-keeping operations. Although the United States should probably not make any specific proposals on this subject at the 16th session, some reference might be made to the long-term problem. Ultimately the most viable proposal would probably be the establishment of a United Nations Peace and Security Fund of between \$300 million and \$500 million, financed through interest free loans from the United States and other governments. These loans would be repaid through a special scale of assessments which would take into account the particular responsibility of the permanent members of the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security and the fact that, in many instances, it will be the small powers which provide the military contingents for UN policing operations.

III. United Nations Program in Outer Space

The United States would propose a General Assembly Declaration which would establish the following principles:

- 1. All nations should be free to use outer space and share in the benefits of space activities.
- 2. All nations should renounce claims of sovereignty in outer space and on celestial bodies.
- 3. Outer space comprehends an area from infinity to the point nearest the earth's surface where a satellite can be maintained in orbit.

4. The



4. The United Nations should be given prior notification of the launching of all space vehicles.

The United States would propose the establishment of a United Nations satellite weather forecasting system under the auspices of the World Meteorological Organization and offer to make United States weather satellites available to such a system.

The United States would describe its progress in space communications and state that it wishes to make such progress available to all through a global system in which all UN members are free to participate in ownership, regulation and use.

#### IV. Proposal for a United Nations Development Authority

The operational activities of the United Nations in the field of technical assistance are presently carried on primarily through the Expanded Technical Assistance Program and the United Nations Special Fund. ETAP is a program for financing and coordinating in a somewhat decentralized manner the various functional technical assistance activities of the specialized agencies of the United Nations such as FAO, ILO, UNESCO, ICAO, WHO, et cetera. The Special Fund is a semi-autonomous body in the UN which finances "pre-investment" activities--resource surveys, research, and technical training centers.

The United States would now propose the expansion of the Special Fund into a United Nations Development Authority (UNDA). The United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance might ultimately be merged with UNDA. In addition to carrying on the functions of these two UN programs, the new agency would, in cooperation with the regional commissions:

1. Provide assistance in drawing up national and regional development plans.
2. Serve as a clearing house for the financing of projects and plans which had received its approval.

UNDA would have no funds of its own for capital investment and would require no new authorization or appropriation from the United States Congress. United States support of UNDA-approved projects would come from foreign aid funds made available pursuant to the Act

for

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


for International Development and the surplus commodities available under the Food for Peace Program. The United States would not be committed to finance any particular project. Execution of projects would be carried out by existing international agencies or by agencies of national governments.

All countries would be asked to support UNDA-approved projects in proportion to their capability. Although UNDA would not be additive to the existing flow of foreign aid, it would put a United Nations umbrella over certain bilateral projects and would thus provide a format more attractive to some less developed countries and more conducive to the achievement of necessary reforms in the domestic policies of countries receiving assistance.

Enclosures:

- 1. Proposed U.S. Strategy (Tab A).
- 2. Major Issues (Tab B).
- 3. U.S. Program for Disarmament (Tab C).
- 4. UN's Capacity to Act (Tab D).
- 5. UN Operations in Outer Space (Tab E).
- 6. UN Role in Economic Development (Tab F).



TAB 1



August 5, 1961

TO : The Secretary  
 THROUGH: S/S  
 FROM : IO - Harlan Cleveland  
 SUBJECT: UNITED STATES STRATEGY AT THE SIXTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

I.

On September 19, 1961, nearly every major issue of American foreign policy will be before the Sixteenth General Assembly of the United Nations.

This would be largely true even if we did not want it that way. It is all the more true because we have deliberately decided, on some very important matters, that the United Nations must be the central forum in which to pursue our objectives.

Our philosophy is well expressed in statements by the President and the Secretary of State: it is to protect and develop the "world of free choice and free cooperation", and undermine and subvert by freedom's contagion "the world of coercion."

II.

United States strategy at the Sixteenth General Assembly derives from these three imperatives about the United Nations:

1. The United Nations is the only loom on which the western world and the Southern Hemisphere can "weave the fabric of common interests" so wide and so strong that it can some day contain -- and then suffocate -- the East-West struggle.
2. The Soviet Union wants a United Nations with a capacity limited to debate; the majority outside the communist bloc want a United Nations able to act. Common interests are woven together through action, not words.
3. If the United Nations is to build its capacity to act, there is no substitute for United States leadership.

The Organization on which we place this important bet is a fragile instrument. Its size and power are limited both by the nature of international committee work and by limitations contrived by those who think international operations are dangerous to their national interests. It has a large number of members with power to do little but vote. Their

delegations

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delegations are often manned by men of limited experience and correspondingly limited sense of responsibility for the use of that vote. Ten Communist governments are members, and work hard at using the UN as an instrument of their foreign policies. Executive staffs are international in composition, but sometimes subject to deep penetration by member nations that do not believe in the key concept of an international civil service. Governments are not used to making large contributions to international organizations, which makes it difficult to build very rapidly the United Nations' ability to do things in addition to talking about them.

Yet despite the UN's spotty record and the limits on its capacity to carry burdens, the United States has a deep national interest in building and using the United Nations, particularly as a channel for reaching out to the weaker half of the world which has more natural confidence in an international organization than in a big-power-small-power relationship in which the big power is not restrained by the presence of many onlookers and a body of common doctrine about such relationships.

Our strategy at the General Assembly is thus to exercise United States leadership with the objective of expanding the UN's capacity to act in ways that will bind together the non-communist world; contain the communists if they want to play, and get along nicely without them if they don't; and prove to the last dogmatist the proposition that "those who would not be coerced" will not, in fact, be coerced.

This is an objective which could be embraced by every member outside the Soviet bloc. It is not just the symbolic stuff of which ringing promises are made; it is an objective pursued in actions by operating international bodies. If the leadership is there, then the fundamental condition is favorable and the objective realistic -- because the United Nations Charter and the constitutions of other major international organizations are vivid expressions of the philosophy of "free choice and free cooperation." Thus a willingness to lead is a prior decision -- transcending by far the importance of the specific initiatives selected on which that leadership makes itself known.

"Leadership" of course does not usually -- or even often -- mean the insistent noisiness of the pitch man. What is involved is something more subtle and more effective: an activist attitude and a sense of direction, a willingness to be caught in the middle because the middle is where power has to be exercised.

### III.

The General Assembly increasingly mirrors the international climate; reflects the total policies of nations, particularly of the US and the USSR; and provides the institutional framework within which the members

pursue

pursue their respective national interests on the greatest issues of the times.

That the Sixteenth Session will meet in a climate of crisis hardly makes it unique. In 1950 it was Korea; in 1956 it was Suez and Hungary; in 1958 it was Lebanon; and last year it was the Congo. But if tension is not new to the UN it is likely to be unusually high this year. Berlin, whether or not it is formally on the agenda, will provide a principal backdrop for the Assembly.

Along with this impending threat to peace and security will be the lack of progress toward resumption of disarmament negotiations and the impasse at Geneva on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. Great pressure may be expected from the smaller powers, and particularly from the under committed, for reinvigorated efforts on these matters. We ourselves have already decided the UN is the best educational forum in which to state our case and build international support for it.

This is the first year in more than a decade in which a full debate on Chinese representation can be predicted with near certainty. The moratorium is too precarious to try again. To keep the Republic of China in the UN and the Chinese Communists out will require a much more flexible and imaginative kit of tactics than has ever before been required. Since the US is determined not to lose on this issue, the issue itself will ramify all through the other items on the agenda as we trade US performance in other fields for votes on the Chinese representation issue. (We have already seen how "Chiirep" reaches into Central Africa via Outer Mongolia.)

China and related items will be used by the Communists to attack our entire position in the Far East, the SEATO alliance, the off-shore islands, and our policy in Korea and in Laos. They will press these issues because on them they find members of the Atlantic community dangerously at odds with each other. With the exception of Tibet, we are defending, not pressing forward in East Asia.

As in



TAB A

As in several past Assemblies, there will be "colonialism" in its various guises, including the questions of Angola, Algeria, and New Guinea. Pressure for unrealistic "target dates" for independence will again be a predominant problem. As in the case of China policy, the "colonialism" issue lends itself to exploitation by the USSR because the free world can sometimes be split apart on questions about which political leaders feel strongly.

There will be a number of issues relating to the needs of the less-developed areas for economic and technical aid; the dominant theme will again be the demand for a capital fund directly under UN auspices. One way of turning this recurrent demand toward a useful and flexible system, and also achieving a better relationship between our bilateral aid and our multilateral contributions, is outlined in one of the proposed Presidential initiatives (TAB F).

There will finally be the crisis of the UN itself -- epitomized by the facts that success is not yet assured in the Congo; that the office of the Secretary General is sustained but not yet secure against "Troika"; that ways must be found to put UN finances on a more stable basis; that the Councils and the UN Secretariat must soon reflect the changed composition of the Organization. Overhanging the whole Assembly will be a question not yet on the agenda: what to do next year to prepare for the end of Mr. Hammarskjold's term as Secretary-General in April 1963

IV.



Beyond the issues of global concern are the nasty, embarrassing regional conflicts -- each embarrassing to a special group of countries of which the United States is (because of its power not its wisdom) nearly always a member. Most of these issues are now outside of Europe, though the Alto Adige dispute is troublesome. The "German question", including Berlin, is regional in geography but global in its inter-action on all other issues.

In the Pacific, West New Guinea is a regional conflict which both the Dutch and Indonesians see some advantage in throwing into the United Nations -- with very different ends in view. Farther north in the Pacific area, Okinawa could become an ugly symbol and the development of the United States trust territory has suddenly come to critical notice as, near the end of the colonial era, the United States is revealed to everybody's surprise as among the last of the colonial powers.

On the Asian continent, the Laotian civilwar is already deeply penetrated by major-nation power on both sides; the United Nations "presence" there is on vacation but it could still become at a later stage the middleman in the process of building in Laos something resembling a national government. There is a United Nations political presence in Cambodia too -- with a refugee hat on. The actuality of indirect aggression in South Vietnam may require a more direct application of the "conscience of the world community" before we get through.

The United Nations has been "seized of" Kashmir, that stickiest leftover of the partition of British India, for more than a decade. We may be due for another seizure on that front this year. On the other side of Pakistan, the Afghans are showing signs of pressing again the ancient claim of nationhood for "Pushtoonistan".

In the Middle East, the temporary calm has been maintained partly by the presence of the United Nations -- a sometime political representative in Amman, the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization, a massive relief program for a million Palestine refugees and a 5,000-man United Nations Emergency Force in the Gaza Strip. But the storm is gathering, sparked by Egyptian and Iraqi ambitions, the prickly defensiveness of Israel, and the endless running sore of the Palestine refugees. The United Nations relief agency for the refugees is up in this year's assembly for abolition or continuation; in the resulting debate the refugees may be almost forgotten in the political clamor.

In North Africa, the Bizerte affair will still be on everybody's mind -- and still on the United Nations' agenda, at least through the involvement of the Secretary General as mediator. Bizerte, in turn, may bring Algeria back into the United Nations, as a sign that hopes for a bilateral settlement are slimmer than ever. These two cases, plus the French boycott of the

Congo

Congo operation, raise a special problem for the West: how to use the United Nations effectively in situations where France has to be involved, if DeGaulle maintains his simple policy: "Je n'aime pas l'ONU."

South of the Sahara, the opera bouffe of Congolese politics and the difficulty of maintaining under United Nations auspices a large and complex nation-building operation will continue to interact. Because it is large and expensive, the United Nation's Congo operation may once again be a major issue in the Assembly, but on a much more favorable basis now that a duly appointed government has been legitimized by the locked-in Parliament at Louvanium. Angola, apartheid in South Africa, and the status of Southwest Africa will doubtless be debated again in an atmosphere enflamed by the colonial reluctance of the Portuguese and the continued intransigence of the South African nationalists. The hard-core British "white settler" areas may also come up for debate, at least in connection with the target-dates issue.

Just under the surface in Africa, the Secretary General is extending his capacity to act as political adviser and technical consultant to new nations on a wide range of matters on their agenda of nationhood. In Togo a Special Representative of the United Nations regularly commutes from Geneva to talk to Olympe. In Somalia an informal political adviser operates from a base as resident representative of the Technical Assistance Board. In Tanganyika, the Secretary General has just completed arrangements with Nyerere to provide a similar service. The independence of Ruanda-Urundi is being arranged now by a United Nations Commission set up at the Fifteenth Assembly; some continuing United Nations concern for internal security and governmental institution-building is inevitable after the formal grant of independence, scheduled for next year. (Soon, perhaps -- hopefully not too soon -- the role of the United Nations in the internal development of new nations will be defined further in General Assembly debate. Meanwhile the United Nations crops up in many parts of the newly-developing world, because there is so often no bilateral alternative.)

In Latin America, the United Nations presence has been less apparent, and from the United States point of view less useful, than in other parts of the world. Where international cooperation turns out to be feasible, the inter-American system has been used; debates in the United Nations, notably in the last couple of years on Cuba, have symbolized holes in the inter-American system. But with the penetration of Soviet power into the Hemisphere, an unnoticed rule of international politics may once again be evident: when it comes to tackling substantial security problems, the weaker nations are least courageous in applying their collective power to nearby situations, most courageous in applying it far away. To deal with Cuba, we may eventually need a vehicle (the United Nations?) with which to apply collective restraints from outside as well as inside the Hemisphere.

V.

Mr. Khrushchev said on July 10 that the Soviet Union would not accept any decisions of the United Nations which the Soviets consider contrary to their interests and that he would use force to oppose such decisions if necessary. This new law of the unilateral jungle would indicate that the general Soviet posture will be one of belligerence rather than accommodation in the Sixteenth General Assembly.


The Soviets are likely to have three principal objectives: (a) to exploit the colonial question by every means, using as a basis the Soviet declaration of last year supporting the immediate independence of all colonies; (b) to project an image of the Soviet Union in favor of disarmament and to place the onus on the United States for failure to achieve progress in this crucial field; (c) to press its "Troika" concept across the board in a stepped-up effort to paralyze the Secretariat and the insure against any United Nations action anywhere except on Soviet terms. In this connection it is not unlikely that the Soviet Union will pursue in some form its proposal to move United Nations Headquarters out of this country.

Judging from past experience, the reaction of many of the uncommitted countries of Asia and Africa to the Soviet-created tension will be to urge the West to compromise. At the same time, the United States is in a good position on the test ban issue and should develop the wit to acquire the initiative on general disarmament; the Soviet attack on the United Nations itself is extremely unpopular; and the colonial issue will burn itself out before long. Thus if the United States, both inside and outside the United Nations, takes specific constructive initiatives and generally displays speed, flexibility and self-confidence, Soviet hostility in the United Nations can mightily assist in "weaving the fabric of common interests" between the western world and the southern hemisphere which "by reaching beyond the cold war, may determine its outcome."

VI.

There is a truism regarding the 99-nation United Nations which is as significant today as it was in the 51, 60 and 82-nation Organization: there is no substitute for United States leadership. We can still mobilize required majorities, and we can prevent adoption of unacceptable proposals; but to do so we have to keep everlastingly at it. The luxury of sitting out every second dance is not for the leaders. The United States is still the number one power in the United Nations when it wants to be. Too often in past years, it hasn't wanted to lead early enough and vigorously enough to be fully effective.

In more





In more specific terms our aims at the coming Assembly should be:

(a) to dramatize in speeches throughout the Assembly committees the advantages of open society versus closed society, world of free choice versus world of coercion;

(b) to adopt a posture of evident reason and firmness on political and security issues, such as Berlin and disarmament, which affect our vital interests;

(c) to press for the further strengthening of the executive capacity of the United Nations;

(d) to mobilize the moderate elements in the Assembly on colonial and other issues to deflect the initiatives of the Soviet bloc and other extremists;

(e) to offset the defensive United States position on certain issues by taking constructive initiatives of our own including a new Western disarmament plan, a program for the development of the United Nations capacity to act for peace and security, a new U.N. program for outer space, and a United Nations Development Authority;

(f) to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities on issues where this is possible, such as the test cessation talks, the Congo, U.N. financing, Tibet, Hungary, Soviet unwillingness to cooperate in the United Nations Outer Space Committee, and the enlargement of the Councils;

(g) to lay firmer groundwork for retention of the one Secretary General principle, to promote discreetly the idea of extending Dag Hammarskjöld for another term and to bolster support for retaining the United Nations in the United States; and

(h) to press for more orderly procedures in the Assembly as a means of expediting constructive business and of recovering from the shambles made of such procedures by Khrushchev's shoe pounding and other efforts to degrade an Assembly that must operate in a civilized manner if it is to serve effectively as a school for political responsibility.

## VII.

To carry out the strategy outlined in this memorandum, the United States effort at the United Nations needs to have certain special characteristics.

First.

First, the President should be represented by a fully professional Delegation. On present plans, previously discussed in Washington by Ambassador Stevenson, the members of the Delegation will substantially meet this test; in future Assemblies the criterion of experience might be given even more weight than has, in the nature of things, been possible this year. Assignment of the delegates will also be important; for example, the strongest possible delegate should be assigned to the Fifth Committee which will deal with both the financing of the United Nations and with the politically explosive question of re-organizing the Secretariat.

Second, we should assign at least two key officers, the best tacticians we have, to deal full time with the Chinese representation question.

Third, we must step up our liaison activities during the Assembly; we made some progress at the Resumed Session in this regard. Parties and receptions must be systematically covered. African delegates must be helped with their housing problems and protected from discriminatory practices. Liaison officers from the Department's regional Bureaus who are assigned to the Delegation must remain full time; there should be no "split terms". Moreover, liaison officers should be sought who have had previous experience with the Delegation.

Fourth, the United States should engage its full prestige only on issues which are really important to us. We can distinguish in resolutions between the less essential symbolism of language and reality of substance. We will have to temper our sense of legal exactitude with a politician's feel for useful ambiguity.

Fifth, we should be procedurally alert, to counter or at least protest strongly and consistently any unparliamentary practices within all seven committees of the Assembly and its plenary body. The Delegation was too lax on this during the first part of the Fifteenth Session. We must apply a firm hand on this if the Assembly is to be restored as a properly functioning parliamentary body. Unparliamentary behavior serves Soviet interests in the General Assembly.

Sixth, we should lead and encourage the "fire brigade" group of moderates (Norway, Canada, Japan, Argentina, and others) to develop proposals before the Soviets do, to move first and effectively and therefore channel constructively the action of the Assembly, otherwise the extremists take over and we are confronted with issues that force us to choose between holding our nose and holding our allies.

VIII.

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VIII.

There will be about eighty items on the agenda of the Sixteenth General Assembly. Of these, some twenty are of key concern to us, or confront us with particularly delicate problems. The following memorandum is an interim status report on the main items of this kind that are now predictable. There will eventually be full position papers for the guidance of the Delegation on each of these items and any other major topics that may come to the surface in the six weeks that remain before the General Assembly opens on September 19th.

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