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EXCISE

TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: A/S
FROM: SE - W. Overall Harrison
SUBJECT: General Lines of Policy for South Pacific Island Territories

At the ANZUS Council Meeting on May 9, 1962, you and Messrs. Barwick and Molyneux agreed that the problem of the future of the non-self-governing territories in the Pacific should be the subject of joint consultation, and that you would meet with the Australian and New Zealand Ambassadors in Washington to work out procedures.

In your meeting with Ambassadors Deale and Laking and with Viscount Hood on June 1, agreement was reached that an informal study group should be set up in Washington to exchange information and views on policies and plans for the Pacific Islands region.

As to the desirability of French participation, this question was subsequently resolved in the affirmative, and you mentioned the proposed study group to Couve de Murville during your visit in Paris in June. Couve agreed that the French would participate. In fact, the French attended only the first two meetings and we have been informally told that, on further examination of the question, the Foreign Minister decided against participation on the grounds that the French areas in the South Pacific are not under law "non-self-governing territories", and that the study group might make recommendations which could not be considered as applicable to French Pacific areas. We continued to invite the French to all meetings, have provided them with copies of all agenda and papers prepared in the group, and have summarized the outcome of the meetings for them.

The Study group held a series of 10 meetings in Washington between July 5 and November 29, starting with the formulation of terms of reference and proceeding to the preparation and discussion of a series of papers on each of the non-self-governing territories involved. Attention was also given

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to the possibilities of sub-regional political groupings, to the security of the area, and to such related questions as Sino-Soviet interest in it. This phase of the group's consideration concluded with a three-day meeting in late November which was attended by senior representatives of the Australian and New Zealand Departments of External Affairs, of the United Kingdom Colonial Office, and of the Department of the Interior.

While the participants spoke informally and without instructions from their Governments, there appeared to be a wide area of general but significant agreement on certain lines of policy or contemplated action. All thought that it would be useful if a summary of the conclusions could be prepared for submission to the Governments concerned. It was hoped that, if accepted, these conclusions would serve as the basis for the formulation of individual national policies which would have common long-range goals on most major questions.

This paper is attached and is identical with the version which is now under study in London, Canberra and Wellington. I believe that the several points made are both acceptable and desirable as expressions of United States interests and responsibility. The implications for the United States are (1) that the South Pacific area is strategically vital to our defense and to our ability to fulfill our defense undertakings in Asia and the Southwest Pacific and that it must, therefore, remain under or be closely associated with Allied control; and (2) that all of the administering powers must move their territories toward some form of self-government and the end of colonial status.

If you approve the attached paper as a general statement of policy, FE would plan to use it (1) as the basis for further talks; (2) for the preparation of a United States position in regard to a revision of the South Pacific Commission Agreement of 1947; (3) for the eventual preparation of a guidelines paper on the area including the provision of economic and technical assistance to the region; (4) for guidance to the Task Force on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (established by NSC Action Memo. 145) which is to develop action programs for political, economic and social development

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there; and (5) as the basis for possible planning of tentative timetables for political transition in United States territories.

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Attachment:

Summary of Conclusions Reached at
Meeting of Pacific Study Group,
Washington, November 26-29, 1962.

Clearances:

IO -

EUR -

S/P - Mr. Lindley


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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS REACHED AT MEETING OF PACIFIC STUDY GROUP
HELD IN WASHINGTON, D.C. -- NOVEMBER 26-29, 1962

1. While independent sovereign status can be envisaged for 2 or 3 bigger places, other solutions short of sovereign independence will have to be sought for the remaining territories. Such solutions might include integration, free association (Puerto Rican example) and transfers of sovereignty with the consent of all peoples concerned.

2. The possible candidates for independence were:

- a. Fiji (if internal problems can be solved).
- b. Tonga (for historical reasons and the example of Western Samoa).
- c. Papua and New Guinea (with Solomons possibly included).

Independence might be acceptable to these territories on the Western Samoan pattern.

3. Further measures of practical cooperation are desirable and island leaders and administrations should be encouraged to extend them but artificial political groupings should not be pursued for their own sake.

4. Territories in which independence is not desired by the inhabitants or is not appropriate to their circumstances should not be forced to accept it as the result of outside pressure. All possible steps should be taken to anticipate and avoid such an outcome. The onus must be on the administering powers to formulate plans well in advance in order to provide a framework of self-government within which the aims of the islanders can be fully realized, and the acquiescence of the United Nations in the arrangements obtained if possible.

5. A determined effort should be mounted to secure the maximum degree of acceptance in the United Nations of solutions short of independence.

6. The four UN Missions should be invited to assess present and prospective attitudes of UN members and suggest the means by which the necessary acceptance might be secured. Possible methods for consideration might include the careful cultivation and education of potential supporters especially in the Afro/Asian group.

7. Where independence is the final solution the greatest care should be taken to ensure that the maintenance of security in the area will not be placed in jeopardy after the transfer of power to the territory concerned.

8. Consistent with security requirements, Japanese economic activities in the area should not be discouraged but should be a subject for continuing consultation in the study group.

9. Indonesian

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9. Indonesian membership in the South Pacific Commission and influence in the area are undesirable.
10. It was thought that the French probably could not be dissuaded from conducting nuclear tests in the South Pacific, but that the net result would be to attract unwelcome attention to the area. Additional monitoring stations might offer some means of reassurance to the islanders.
11. Missions in Asian and African countries should keep a special watch for and exchange information on any display of interest in the South Pacific area.
12. There are no signs at present of significant Sino-Soviet activity in the area, but a close watch should be kept for signs of it.
13. It was agreed by the experts that the Study Group is a useful informal point of contact. It should continue in existence and meet from time to time.

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