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THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

October 9, 1963

Dear Mr. President:

Pursuant to your instructions through National Security Action Memorandum No. 243, dated May 9, 1963, I am submitting on behalf of the members of the U. S. Survey Mission our report on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

Accompanying the Mission and greatly aiding in our work were Mr. Richard Taitano, Director of the Office of Territories in the Department of the Interior, and Commander Charles Chamberlain from CINCPAC.

The members of the Mission were: Mr. Richard Cooper from the Council of Economic Advisers; Mr. Paul Daly from the Peace Corps; Mr. Donald Lindholm from the Bureau of the Budget; Professor Gerard Mangone from the Maxwell School, Syracuse University; Dr. Pedro Sanchez, Commissioner of Education in the Virgin Islands; Mr. Howard Schnoor from the Bureau of the Budget; Mr. Cleo Shook, Consultant.

My colleagues join me in urging that if the recommendations of the report meet with your approval they be implemented rapidly in the interests of the United States and the people of the Trust Territory.

Respectfully,

Anthony M. Solomon

Chairman

The President
The White House
Washington

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REPORT BY THE U. S. GOVERNMENT SURVEY MISSION
TO THE TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

Volume One

Introduction and Summary
Part I. The Political Development of Micronesia

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A Report by the U. S. Government Survey Mission to the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

The Setting

1. The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands -- or Micronesia -- comprises the former Japanese mandated Caroline, Marshall and Mariana Islands. Scattered over an area as large as the mainland of the United States, those 2,100 islands, less than 100 of which are inhabited by the territory's 81,000 people, came under United States control first by conquest and then, in 1947, under a trusteeship agreement with the Security Council of the United Nations. The islands vary from low coral atolls to higher islands of volcanic origin, the largest land masses being Babelthuap in the Palau district with 153 square miles, Ponape with 129 square miles and Saipan with 46 square miles. Population distribution ranges from islands with a few families to Saipan with 7,800, Ponape with 11,500 and Truk with 15,500.

With a variety of racial mixtures, languages and cultures, essentially a series of individual island communities rather than a unified society, a lack of human and natural resources, tremendously difficult communications and transportation, the area has presented very serious administrative and developmental problems to the United States. Historically, life has centered around the village, the extended family or clan and its lands. The traditional systems of communal, rather than individual land ownership, of inheritance through matrilineal lines and of the selection of native chiefs continue side-by-side with the forms of democratic institutions introduced by the United States.

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For a variety of reasons, in the almost twenty years of United States control, physical facilities have further deteriorated in many areas, the economy has remained relatively dormant and in many ways retrogressed while progress toward social development has been slow. The people remain largely illiterate and inadequately prepared to participate in political, commercial and other activities of more than a rudimentary character. The great majority depend largely upon subsistence agriculture -- fruit and nut gathering -- and fishing. As a result, criticism of the trusteeship has been growing in the United Nations and the United States press -- and in certain ways, among the Micronesians.

2. Despite a lack of serious concern for the area until quite recently, Micronesia is said to be essential to the United States for security reasons. We cannot give the area up, yet time is running out for the United States in the sense that we may soon be the only nation left administering a trust territory. The time could come, and shortly, when the pressures in the United Nations for a settlement of the status of Micronesia could become more than embarrassing.

In recognition of the problem, the President, on April 18, 1962, approved NASM No. 145 which set forth as United States policy the movement of Micronesia into a permanent relationship with the United States within our political framework. In keeping with that goal, the memorandum called for accelerated development of the area to bring its political, economic and social standards into line with an eventual permanent association.

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The memorandum also established a Task Force to consider what action might be taken to accomplish our goal and to provide policy and program advice to the Secretary of the Interior who is responsible for the administration of the Trust Territory. The Task Force, consisting of representatives of the Departments of the Interior, Defense, State and Health, Education, and Welfare and observers from the NSC and Bureau of the Budget, has considered and recommended several steps for greater aid to the area, both through the increased appropriation ceiling (from \$7 to 17.5 millions) and in legislation (H. R. 3198) now pending in the Congress. It also proposed the sending of a survey mission to the Trust Territory to conduct a more thorough study of the area's major problems.

3. The Mission's formal instructions from the President (through NASM No. 243 of May 9, 1963) were to survey the political, economic and social problems of the people of the Trust Territory and to make recommendations leading to the formulation of programs and policies for an accelerated rate of development so that the people may make an informed and free choice as to their future in accordance with United States responsibilities under the trusteeship agreement.

4. The Mission consisted of nine men, both Government and non-Government, selected by its chairman and serving for differing periods of time up to six weeks in the Trust Territory during July and August 1963. The Mission visited the six district centers in the territory and a representative sample of the outlying islands containing in all a majority of the area's

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population. Discussions were held throughout the area with seven assemblies of local people, eight legislative committees, seven municipal councils and three women's associations; about twenty-five interviews with American missionaries and over forty-five interviews with Micronesians were held. There were also briefings by Headquarters personnel of the Trust Territory government and the six district administrators and their staffs. Wherever possible roads, communications, transportation facilities, agricultural developments, schools and other facilities and enterprises were examined and evaluated. Several additional weeks were spent in the United States preparing the final report of the Mission.

Major Objectives and Considerations

1. Working within its broad frame of reference, the Mission's major findings relate to three key sets of questions that it attempted to answer:

- a. What are the elements to consider in the preparation for, organization, timing and favorable outcome of a plebiscite in Micronesia and how will this action affect the long-run problem that Micronesia, after affiliation, will pose for the United States?
- b. What should be the content and cost of the minimum capital investment and operating program needed to insure a favorable vote in the plebiscite, and what should be the content

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and cost of the maximum program that could be effectively mounted to develop the Trust Territory most rapidly?

- c. What actions need to be taken to improve the relationships between the current Trust Territory government and Washington and to insure that it can implement any necessary political strategy and development program with reasonable efficiency and effectiveness.

2. The Mission's findings and recommendations on these three sets of questions correspond to Parts I, II and III of its report. Those recommendations sum up to an integrated master plan which, if accepted, would provide guidelines for Federal action through fiscal year 1968 to secure the objectives of:

- a. Winning the plebiscite and making Micronesia a United States territory under circumstances which will: (1) satisfy the somewhat conflicting interests of the Micronesians, the United Nations and the United States along lines satisfactory to the Congress; (2) be appropriate to the present political and other capabilities of the Micronesians; and (3) provide sufficient flexibility in government structure to accommodate to whatever measure of local self-government the Congress might grant to Micronesia in later years.

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b. Achieving rapidly, minimum but satisfactory social standards in education, public health, etc.

c. Raising cash incomes through the development of the current, largely crop-gathering subsistence economy.

3. There are, however, unique elements in the delicate problem of Micronesia and the attainment of our objectives that urgently require the agreement now of the President and the Congress as to the guidelines for United States action over the next few years. First, the United States will be moving counter to the anti-colonial movement that has just about completed sweeping the world and will be breaching its own policy since World War I of not acquiring new territorial possessions if it seeks to make Micronesia a United States territory. Second, of all eleven United Nations trusteeships, this will be the only one not to terminate in independence or merger with a contiguous country, but in a territorial affiliation with the administering power. Third, as the only "strategic trusteeship," the Security Council will have jurisdiction over the formal termination of the trusteeship agreement, and if such a termination is vetoed there, the United States might have to decide to proceed with a series of actions that would make the trusteeship agreement a dead issue, at least from the Micronesian viewpoint. Fourth, the 2,100 islands of Micronesia are, and will remain in the now foreseeable future, a deficit area to be subsidized by the United States. Fifth, granted that this subsidy can be justified as a "strategic rental," it will amount to more than \$300 annually per Micronesian through 1968 and

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any reductions thereafter will require long-range programming along the lines of a master development plan as proposed in the Mission report. Finally, this hoped for long-range reduction in the level of subsidization and the implementation of the political strategy and capital investment programs through fiscal year 1968 require a modern and more efficient concept of overseas territorial administration than is evident in the prevailing approach of the quasi-colonial bureaucracy in the present Trust Territory government.

Part I. Political Development of Micronesia

1. The Washington policy, adopted last year, of having the Trust Territory affiliate permanently with the United States has not had an observable impact on the Trust Territory government. American and Micronesian officials in the area appear still to be thinking in terms of independence for Micronesia as an eventual, distant goal and there appears to have been little attempt to direct Micronesia toward thinking about eventual affiliation with the United States. In the absence of further action, the Mission believes that the momentum of previous attitudes and policies which did not involve the concept of affiliation will be hard to overcome.

2. It can be stated quite unequivocally that the masses of Micronesians are not only not concerned with the political future but also are not even aware of it as a question. They simply live in the present reality of the "American time" that has replaced the "Japanese time." The earlier German and Spanish times are dimly, if at all remembered.

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3. The situation is not quite the same among the political elite. Political power among the Micronesians is in a triumvirate of the traditional clan chiefs, the educated younger bureaucracy working in the Trust Territory government and the small but powerful group of businessmen operating trading companies. These groups are aware that their political future is still to be resolved, but even they generally shy away from actively concerning themselves with it. The reason lies in their belief that: (a) they cannot stand alone now and that independence, even if they want it, is so far distant that meaningful consideration is not practical; (b) there has been no indication from the United States of an alternative to independence -- they do not know that the United States may desire affiliation; and (c) even if affiliation were possible, the prospect creates feelings of uncertainty and insecurity that they would rather not face.

4. These insecurities arise from general ignorance as to what affiliation means and what it would do to their lives as they know them today. The more important of the traditional chiefs are especially concerned whether "coming under United States laws" would invalidate the present restrictions against non-Micronesians owning land and whether it would affect their complicated communal land-tenure systems on which their social organization and customs and the chiefs' powers are based. The merchant businessmen, even though they want more economic development, react against the prospect of a flood of American businessmen with whom they believe they cannot compete. The Micronesians in the government bureaucracy are less fearful of

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permanent affiliation but they also share in the general concern among the political elite that they don't want to be swamped by Americans and lose their status "as the Hawaiians did."

5. On the other hand, there is a sophisticated awareness among a goodly number of the Micronesian elite that their own interests are not best served by the United Nations trusteeship simply because, as a provisional non-permanent arrangement, it perpetuates the excessively dependent psychology and habits of a people who have been handed around among four major powers in the last 65 years. There also appears to be an unexpressed but fairly widespread and awakeable emotional feeling among these more sophisticated Micronesians that they want an "identity" and a permanence of status that is not compatible with the implied impermanence of the trusteeship.

6. Another disadvantage of the trusteeship is its protective and custodian nature, a carryover from the philosophy of the League of Nations mandates, which is not fully compatible with the more recent emphasis on modernization and more rapid development of peoples under trusteeship. Most policies which try to be both development-minded and protective do not seem to do a good job of either. However, a conflict between development objectives and protective attitudes characterizes the current administration of the Trust Territory. Although it has become fashionable for American officials connected with the Trust Territory to disclaim any desire to maintain an "anthropological zoo," in reality protective and custodial policies are

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very prevalent. This conflict within official thinking faithfully mirrors the dilemma of the Micronesians themselves. They desire urgent economic development, but want to retain, at the same time, restrictions on non-Micronesians immigrating, occupying land and starting businesses. The Mission believes that, if for no other reason than that of the impending plebiscite, the Micronesians need reassurances on the continuance of those restrictions but, at the same time, we are recommending certain modifications which will initiate long-run liberalization of those restrictions.

7. Another factor of importance affecting the plebiscite is the economic stagnation and deterioration of public facilities that has characterized the United States administration of the Trust Territory in contrast to that of the Japanese. The rapid growth under the Japanese was due not only to their large capital investment and subsidy program, but to Japanese government-directed colonization by Japanese and Okinawans. The fact that it was the Japanese rather than the Micronesians who supplied the labor for the then flourishing sugar cane and commercial fishing industries and who benefited most from the Japanese government's subsidization of the area does not alter the fact that per capita Micronesian cash incomes were almost three times as high before the war as they are now and that the Micronesians freely used the Japanese-subsidized extensive public facilities. For the outcome of the plebiscite to be favorable, the Mission believes there must be an effective capital investment program before the plebiscite

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to give the Micronesians a sense of progress to replace the deadly feeling of economic dormancy.

8. While more than 95 percent of the budget of the Trust Territory government is financed by the United States and the importance of those funds in influencing a favorable plebiscite result is obvious, the impact of United States funds has been lessened by: (a) considerable feeling among Micronesian bureaucrats that a large part (actually over \$2 million) is spent on high salaries for United States personnel in Micronesia; (b) numerous complaints about, and dissatisfactions with the competence of the Trust Territory government (one district congress advised the Mission that, despite area needs, they did not want more United States funds if they were not "properly administered by real experts who should be brought in"); and (c) some belief that United States aid results only from United Nations action and that Micronesia might not do as well as a United States territory.

9. The Trust Territory government gets good marks from the Micronesians, however, for its genuine fostering of democratic civil liberties and increasing the participation of Micronesians in various levels of local government (a territorial advisory council, six district legislatures and a multitude of municipal governments). However, Micronesia is still a long way in terms of experience and funds from being able to mount a viable local government. The very multiplicity of local governmental levels is beginning to cause problems, particularly at the municipal level where

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there is much dissatisfaction because of the realization that, in a large majority of cases, the "U. S. imposed" municipal taxes produce only enough revenue to pay salaries to municipal officials and councilmen for making decisions that the village elders previously made free as a public service. This is a clear case of too much government.

10. The great distances, cultural and linguistic barriers separating the six districts of Micronesia also have special implications for a plebiscite. The Mission found little consciousness among the people of the Trust Territory of themselves as "Micronesians" and no emotional nationalistic feelings. There are no traditions of unity but rather a history of individual island cultures. There is almost universal ignorance in each district as to who are the leaders, political or otherwise, of the other five districts, and there is little inclination to compromise on a district's special interest in favor of the territory's advancement as a whole. This regional separation is strengthened by the existence of separate district legislatures, and to date only minor progress has been made toward a centralized indigenous government. The district legislatures function reasonably well given the small revenues they can command, but they represent conservative bastions for the maintenance of traditional policies, and land and social customs. Within some districts, especially Yap and Ponape, there is the additional complication of the outlying island groupings resenting the domination of the islands nearer to the district centers. This situation requires the most carefully impartial handling by the United States in the period before the plebiscite and the avoidance in the

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plebiscite of questions of special interest to particular districts, such as "union with Guam" which is an issue in the Marianas. It also creates the need for the right mix of political compromises in the organization of the territorial legislature. (The Mission's report, in Part I, identifies for each district the particular issues, political groupings and key people of importance in that district.)

11. The Mission has no difficulty in concluding that there is little desire for independence in the Trust Territory. It would go so far as to say that even if a plebiscite were held today without preparation, the total vote for independence would probably be only from 2 to 5 percent. The Mission also concluded that there is no hard core of feeling against permanent affiliation with the United States but, as described earlier, an inchoate insecurity among a substantial number of the elite that can be allayed only through certain actions recommended below.

12. The Mission recommends that the plebiscite be held in 1967 or 1968 because:

- a. Our timetable calls for creation of the true territory-wide legislature in the fall of 1964 and having its members serve out an initial three-year term before the plebiscite, during which the members from the different districts can develop more political experience working together than was possible in the present territory-wide advisory council.

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- b. The maximum impact of the recommended capital investment program will not be felt until late 1967 on the one hand, nor will it be felt as strongly after 1968, since the Mission does not expect the development process in the private sector of the Micronesian economy to be strong enough to offset the anticipated cutback in the capital investment program after fiscal year 1968 (by which time the higher priority capital needs of education, public health and public works will have been met).

- c. The early definitive resolution of the political future of Micronesia as a United States territory will make it easier for the United States, if it so decides, to permit Japanese businessmen, technicians and fishing vessels into non-sensitive areas of the Trust Territory which would supply a very great stimulus to economic development at no cost to the United States and thereby permit reductions in the United States subsidization of the territory.

If necessary, the plebiscite could be advanced to as early as 1966 by compressing the schedule for the development of the legislature. The legislature could be created by the spring of 1964 if the High Commissioner were instructed to do so. However, such an advance in the plebiscite timing would be at the expense of giving the legislature less experience and not waiting for the capital investment program to have its full impact.

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13. The questions offered in the plebiscite to the Micronesians should be confined to two in number with some such general wording as follows:

- (a) Are you in favor of becoming an independent nation?
- (b) Are you in favor of a permanent affiliation with the United States of America?

There will be some nations in the United Nations which, sensing our objective, will claim that the plebiscite should be confined to the single option of independence since the basic idea of trusteeships is that they should terminate in independence. There may also be some nations which will claim that, in its 1967-68 state of development and dependence Micronesia cannot realistically choose independence and is therefore not being given real alternatives. To some extent, this latter argument could be nullified by including a third plebiscite option -- namely, continuation for the time being of the status quo of the trusteeship with the United States as the administering power. From our viewpoint, this would reduce the vote for permanent affiliation from 95 percent of those voting to a substantially smaller percentage, although still a majority.

14. The Mission recommends the following steps as part of the overall program to achieve our plebiscite objective and at the same time promote the longer run political development and general advancement of the Micronesians:

- a. A qualified American should be appointed in each of the six districts to develop and maintain continuous liaison with the various leaders of the three politically critical

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groups. His main job would be to develop, in a gradual way, interest among these people in his district in favor of permanent affiliation by supplying the information needed to eliminate their ignorance and allay their fears as to what the affiliation would entail, as well as its advantages. He would also administer useful adult education and United States and world information programs, as well as the local radio programming now handled by the district director of education. These six information officers, in whose recruitment United States Information Service should cooperate, would also perform through their supervisor at Headquarters the regular political reporting function so acutely lacking at present.

- b. Washington should facilitate the general development of Micronesian interest in, and loyalties to, the United States by various actions, three of which are:
- (1) Sponsorship by the Department of State of Micronesian leader visits to the United States.
 - (2) Introduction in the school system of United States oriented curriculum changes and patriotic rituals recommended in the section of the Mission's report dealing with education.

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- (3) Increasing the number of college scholarships offered to Micronesians, a highly sensitive issue in the Trust Territory.
- c. The Community Action Program by the 60 Peace Corps Volunteers recommended in the Mission report should be begun because it is of critical importance to both the plebiscite attitudes and the overall advancement of the majority of Micronesians living on islands outside the district centers. The program as recommended (which excludes use of Peace Corps Volunteers as teachers in the school system) and the realities of Micronesian needs contain all the probabilities of a spectacular success for the Peace Corps.
- d. Preparations should be taken to offer Micronesian government employees and other wage earners two specific inducements to seek affiliation with the United States. First, after such an affiliation Micronesian and United States personnel basic pay scales would be equalized. Since the inequality exists only in the professional and higher administrative echelons, the cost would not be excessive. Second, rather than introduce a retirement program for Micronesian government employees, the Social Security system should be extended to all wage and salary earners in Micronesia (most of whom are government employees) with possible consideration of a more general inclusion simultaneously or at a later time.

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15. The final factor of importance to the outcome of the plebiscite will be the Micronesian leaders' insistence on knowing the proposed organization of Micronesia's post-plebiscite territorial government. The Micronesian leaders are intelligent and in many cases quite sophisticated, and they have been led to expect eventual independence; their willingness to produce a large popular vote for permanent affiliation will partially depend on the measure of self-government to be given them within the structure of territorial affiliation. This will also be of critical importance in the United Nations since the trusteeship agreement requires "independence or self-government" as the terminal objective. On the other hand, consideration must be given to the need for continued adequate control by the United States and the traditional attitude of the Congress toward the organization of territorial government. Also, there are clear limitations on the present-day ability of the Micronesians to govern themselves.

As the practical solution of this many-pronged dilemma, the Mission recommends a government organization for the Territory of Micronesia that gives, on the one hand, a reasonable appearance of self-government through an elected Micronesian legislature and a Micronesian Chief Executive nominated by and having the confidence of the legislature, but on the other hand retains adequate control through the continuation of an appointed United States High Commissioner. (This arrangement is similar to that now operating in the administration of the Ryukyu Islands.) The powers of the High Commissioner could range from:

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- (a) The minimum of being able to withhold all or any part of the United States funds going to the Micronesian government and the authority to declare martial law and assume all legislative and executive powers when the security of the United States so requires; to
- (b) the maximum additional power of vetoing all laws, confirming the Chief Executive's appointments of key department directors and dismissing the Chief Executive and dissolving the legislature at any time.

16. The Mission also recommends that, after the plebiscite, the Congress recognize the expressed desire of the people of Micronesia to affiliate by granting them the status of United States nationals but that action on an organic act be deferred until Congress judges that the development of the territory has sufficiently advanced, and the territorial legislature has had a chance to take action on the local customs and laws which now protect the lands and businesses of Micronesians. Once the people of Micronesia have expressed their desire to affiliate, it is highly advisable that they feel that the question of their political future has been definitely resolved by having the Congress grant them without delay the status of U. S. nationals even though there may be subsequently protracted debate in the Security Council over the termination of the trusteeship agreement. It is worth pointing out that the extension of the status of U. S. nationals appears to the Mission, although questioned by State, to be legally possible under the trusteeship agreement which permits the extension of all the

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administering authority's laws to the Trust Territory, and that this could be the first in a series of steps that could make the trusteeship agreement an academic issue, even if the Security Council were not willing to terminate the trusteeship agreement.

17. Looking beyond the plebiscite and the subsequent achievement of territorial status for Micronesia, what seems to be the possible long-run political future of the area? First and most essential consideration might be given to the union of the two territories of Micronesia and Guam which would produce (a) economies of overhead in regular governmental administration, transportation and other facilities, (b) a more economically viable area along with a new stimulus to its economic development, and (c) the more rapid modernization and Americanization of this United States frontier in the Pacific. Such a union would involve a very delicate problem of negotiation and would require consistent pressure. However, the payoff would be a substantial reduction in the need for appropriations as these deficit areas came to stand more and more on their own feet. (Part II of the Mission report includes recommendations for immediate action to develop the economic interrelationship between Guam and the Trust Territory.)

The even more distant problem of what ultimately, if anything, could or should be done with the unified territory of Guam and Micronesia is at present too much in the realm of clouded crystal ball gazing. Incorporation as a county into the State of Hawaii has been suggested in various places,

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and the Governor of Hawaii apparently feels that it is very much a possibility, but the Guamanian and Micronesian leaders' long-run political speculations definitely do not contemplate this degree of absorption and loss of political independence. Furthermore, the ultimate status of this territory may very well not be decided separately but as part of a general solution devised by the United States for all our remaining territories.

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Part II. The Capital Investment Program for Overall Development

1. Until fiscal years 1963 and 1964, when the Congress authorized an appropriation of \$17.5 million for the Trust Territory and appropriated \$15 million for each of those years, the level of United States appropriations for Micronesia had averaged slightly under \$7 million annually. Outside of new transportation facilities, few new capital investments were possible within this budget and those were achieved at the expense of an overall net capital disinvestment -- that is, by permitting the deterioration of buildings, machinery and public facilities. The running down and eventual destruction of much of the physical plant inherited from the Japanese and Navy administrations, which is amply evident in all the districts, has proved to be a very expensive "economy".
2. The decision by the United States to bring about the permanent affiliation of Micronesia requires the formulation of programs that will have both the maximum political impact in the plebiscite and will also advance the Micronesians in the long run as rapidly as possible toward satisfactory living standards. A successful initiation of the economic development of the area is critical not only to the plebiscite and the living standards of the people who would become United States nationals but also to eventually relieving the United States of the financial burden of subsidizing those living standards.
3. The bulk of the increased funds in fiscal years 1963 and 1964 is being used in a program just starting for the construction and operation of an

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expanded and accelerated elementary school system. In view of the remarkable degree to which educational opportunities are almost desperately wanted by all classes of Micronesians (including surprisingly the most traditional-minded clan chiefs) this priority of funds was exactly right by every criterion of United States objectives.

4. The Mission found, however, an unsatisfactory state of affairs in the Trust Territory government with respect to the development of the overall size and the components of an integrated capital investment and operating program (including the educational sector) that would meet Trust Territory needs in the framework of United States objectives. The High Commissioner himself believes that the \$57 million long-range capital program briefly presented by him to the House Interior Committee last year was not based on an adequate study of sectoral needs and priorities within those sectors to achieve the most favorable developmental and political impact.

5. The Mission members therefore proceeded within the short time available to identify the specific sectoral social and economic capital need and feasibilities in the survey of each of the six districts. Simultaneously, the Mission members surveyed the policies and administrative problems specific to each of the sectors and those that could probably arise in connection with an overall capital investment and development program. The Mission then worked out the overall priorities and their interrelationship and formulated the optimal program it judged to be a feasible and efficient maximum, given the differing district labor availabilities and

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other resources. This maximum program totals \$42 million of capital investment over the four fiscal years from 1965 through 1968 with annual operating costs ascending from \$14.5 million in 1965 to \$15.9 million in 1966, \$18.5 million in 1967 and \$20.2 million in 1968. The Mission also presents, at the other end of the scale, the minimum program it believes sufficient to achieve United States political and developmental objectives which involves somewhat inferior educational and other standards and slower economic development. The minimum program totals \$31 million of capital investment over the four-year period and somewhat lower operating costs than the maximum program.

6. To look at it in various perspectives, the maximum program is a small program, except in education, relative to the investment made by the Japanese government before World War II. The \$360 average per capita annual expenditure that it represents is not very meaningful in the Trust Territory with its 81,000 people scattered through a vast area, but it is closer to the small per capita expenditure of Britain and France in their Pacific colonies (under \$60) than it is to the high per capita expenditure (\$1,300) of small Denmark for the 23,000 inhabitants of Greenland. Also, in view of our political objectives, the program should be viewed in relation to the Micronesians' average per capita income of about \$80 per year -- the equivalent of \$36 in 1939 prices -- compared to the comparable 1939 Micronesian average of about \$100. Given the rate of increase in the population of Micronesia (about 3.5 percent annually) and the almost negligible impact of current technical assistance efforts, the economic

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development problem will not be solved except with some such capital investment program such as that presented in the report.

7. The major items in sectoral breakdown of the optimal capital investment program from 1965 through 1968 are:

Education	\$9.9 million
Health	2.4 "
Public safety and judiciary	0.9 "
Economic Development Fund	5.0 "
Transportation	1.5 "
Communication and radio	2.7 "
Public Works	13.0 "
Equipment replacement	2.5 "
Housing assistance	1.2 "

The small percentage of the proposed program devoted to economic development projects -- which would be administered through a recommended Economic Development Fund -- is due to some extent to the anticipated response of private Micronesian and United States capital. However, it is primarily a reflection of the Trust Territory's very limited ability to use such funds effectively, given its meager production resources and tiny, dispersed markets. The limited prospects for the growth of the private economy dictate that for the foreseeable future this will continue to be a deficit area notwithstanding the development that will result from the proposed program. Prospects would be brighter, and the post-1968 need for subsidization reduced if Washington would be willing to cancel United

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States import duties on processed fish (a privilege enjoyed by American Samoa) and to eliminate, after the plebiscite, entry restrictions (except in the Kwajalein area) on Japanese businessmen, technicians and fishing vessels. And, in the still more distant future, although not now foreseeable, what looks like a "Micronesian Folly" -- justifiable only for its strategic value -- may very well develop into a viable economy based on American residents and tourists.

The large part of the capital investment program, and the even larger part of the annual operating program, devoted to education reflect the acute need and the critical importance of that program. But, given the limitations on the feasible rate of economic development, it also poses a dilemma. Modern education, particularly secondary education, will create a demoralizing unemployment problem as graduates refuse to return to their primitive outlying lands and to the extent that they are not aided to continue on to college. It is essential that the safety valve of legally unlimited (and possible financially-aided) immigration to the United States be established. Fortunately, that would come to pass when the Micronesians are given United States national status, if not sooner.

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Part III. Administration in the Trust Territory

1. The Mission regrets to report that a major obstacle to the overall development of the Trust Territory is the creaky functioning of the quasi-colonial bureaucracy in the Trust Territory government. Unqualified American officials with remarkable long periods of bureaucratic longevity, many from the days of Navy military government, are more the rule than the exception. There is a real and present danger that increased appropriations by the Congress will not be used with maximum effectiveness and that the Trust Territory government cannot implement the program needed in the area. Increased numbers of permanent personnel in the Trust Territory government staff are assumed by too many department heads in too many cases to constitute the needed "expansion of programs".

2. The Mission believes that a new approach to territorial administration is required if the Executive and the Congress want results. This should be the conscious effort to utilize the services of other Federal agencies or to contract out the implementation of the new and expanded programs recommended in this report. Based on its survey the Mission is convinced that results will be quicker and the overall and long-run costs of such a policy cheaper. To list just a few examples, the Mission recommends that the recruitment of American teachers be provided for through a contract between the High Commissioner and the State of Hawaii, that the provision of American physicians be contracted for with "Medico", that a private consulting organization provide advisory services in connection with the administration of the proposed Economic Development Fund and that the

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Immigration and Naturalization Service take over immigration functions in the area.

There has been sufficient exploration by the Mission to be reasonably sure of the general flexibility, and in most cases the particular willingness, of the suggested agencies and contractors to undertake those functions. Contract supervision will pose its own set of problems for the Trust Territory government, but it can handle these problems more readily. To charge the Trust Territory government with the task of implementing with its own staff a relatively large and complicated program will not only involve many years' delay and much waste, but will saddle that government (and the United States) with the costs of permanently swollen bureaucracy necessarily recruited in many cases without full qualifications owing to the pressure of time. The need for many of these contractual services will disappear as certain programs are completed and others are increasingly staffed by qualified Micronesians.

3. The Trust Territory governmental organization of functional departments at headquarters in Saipan and in the six district administrations headed by district administrators is basically sound. However, there is a serious problem of communication between headquarters departments and their district counterparts partially arising from the over-centralization of authority in the High Commissioner's office. Essentially, the High Commissioner uses his department heads as staff officers, and they have no real operating authority delegated to them, nor are they permitted to deal directly

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with their district counterparts nor with the district administrators. Furthermore, it is alleged that the district administrators frequently alter professional technical policies and programs. The Mission believes that in the interests of better administration of both the pre-plebiscite "master plan" and the particular nature of the post-plebiscite territorial government, that the delegation of powers by the High Commissioner to his department heads be permanently clarified. The headquarters department directors should be given professional and technical responsibility for their programs, beginning with Departments of Education, Health and Agriculture, and a management specialist should be sent to the Trust Territory to spell out the specific steps to accomplish this objective.

4. Budgeting in the Trust Territory government is simply a means of setting a ceiling on expenditures rather than a planning mechanism through which programs are developed and carried on effectively. There are numerous and serious deficiencies in both budget formulation and execution, and the accounting of expenditures. The Mission recommends various specific measures among which are requiring the full funding of construction projects starting in the FY 1965 budget and separate accounting for business-service operations including payment for such services as the Trust Territory government receives.

5. Due to the long supply lines back to the United States and inadequate funds, the Mission found serious supply deficiencies (particularly in medical supplies and spare parts) at various points through the system. The Mission recommends certain funding and management actions.

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6. Under United Nations pressure and our own response to it, the policy of replacing American officials with Micronesians has been pressed to the point of using poorly qualified Micronesians. The Mission has investigated various possible training programs to meet this problem and makes specific recommendations regarding training for public administrators, teachers and medical practitioners.

7. The Mission recommends in regard to American personnel that minimum professional qualifications be formulated, that the Department of Interior adopt a compulsory rotation program and that the directors of education, public health and engineering and construction be upgraded.

8. The ultimate objective should be a single personnel system where American and Micronesian officials in similar positions receive equal basic pay. In the interim and as a measure to reduce friction and encourage Micronesians to complete their full education, the Mission recommends the adoption of a new transitional schedule in the Micronesian pay scale for senior professional officials who meet every qualification requirement for comparable grades in the Federal civil service. Once a unified personnel system is established and the Social Security system is extended to territorial employees, the new American employees entering after that date should have territorial-employee status rather than Federal employee status, unless they are detailed from a Federal agency.

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9. The policy and administrative relationship between Washington, especially the Department of Interior, and the Trust Territory government must be sharply improved. There has been, on the part of Washington, both insufficient guidance as to new policies and program objectives and a lack of review in depth of the Trust Territory government's administrative implementation of them. A major reason seems to have been the tradition of treating the Trust Territory government somewhat as a sovereign foreign government. This is in the Mission's opinion an unnecessary and inadvisable interpretation of the administering power's role in the Trust Territory. One important example of these deficiencies is the lack of familiarity by many high officials in the Trust Territory with the policy shift contained in NASM 145 and the marked failure of that Presidential policy statement to have sufficient impact on Trust Territory government policy. To correct the general problem, the Mission recommends:

- a. The Task Force created by NASM 145 should continue up through the plebiscite as a program and policy advisory group to the Secretary of the Interior. They should be involved in the adoption of a "master plan" of priority programs and periodic review in Washington of the progress of these programs as well as approving any later modifications.
- b. Annual visits of an evaluation team to the Trust Territory to ascertain by field inspections that the "master plan" is being implemented in accordance with the terms of reference approved by Washington. The team

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should serve the Secretary of the Interior, but the Task Force might aid the Secretary of the Interior in nominating the membership of the team, and should of course have full access to the report of the team for such action as it considers appropriate. If the team's annual visits were to coincide with the Trust Territory government's budget formulation, it would further insure the implementation of the "master plan" and would facilitate the more intensive budget examination by Interior that is needed.

c. The High Commissioner should be appointed by the Secretary of the Interior rather than the President partially because of certain legal anomalies involved in the position being filled through a Presidential appointment, but primarily to focus responsibility on the Secretary for the continuing guidance of the administration of the Trust Territory.

d. The Secretary of Interior should issue an order clarifying the exact powers delegated to the High Commissioner and those reserved to the Secretary in accordance with the draft appended to the Mission report.

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PART I

THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MICRONESIA

Talking about United States policy for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, a young Micronesian on the boat from Kwajalein to Ebeye burst out, "I feel blind". Many Micronesians and Americans are wondering about the present and future status of the Trust Territory, but virtually no one has focused upon the idea and the need for a plebiscite in Micronesia in the near future that would propose permanent affiliation with the United States. The Washington policy formulated last year of bringing about the permanent association of the Trust Territory with the United States has not had an observable impact in Micronesia.

It has generally been accepted instead that it will take many years of tutelage under an indefinite United States trusteeship for Micronesia to develop to the point where it can be an independent or self-governing, economically viable entity capable of determining its own status and future. Because we have not come to grips with the problem of international trusteeship and political reality, policies for the Trust Territory have been hesitant and planning uncertain, while the lack of a definite objective has not only confused the Micronesians, but hampered the administration of the Americans.

A. Problems of the Trusteeship Status

Little blame for the lack of a definite goal can be levied upon individual officials in the Trust Territory, most of whom have performed their tasks

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under arduous physical handicaps, with pitiful resources and an extraordinarily difficult transport-communications system. The fault to date lies instead in the conflicting interest of the United States with regard to the Trust Territory and the concept of an indefinite trusteeship itself.

The United States has been torn between the need to retain full control over Micronesia for American security interests and its anxiety to abide by a progressive international philosophy toward dependent territories. The conflict was evident in the decision to place Micronesia under the United Nations trusteeship system, but in a special agreement with the Security Council that permits the United States to close off any area at any time from UN inspection for security reasons.

Since the initiation of the trusteeship, we have continued to equivocate. On the one hand, based on the understanding that the area might someday become independent, we have been attempting to be scrupulously neutral in our limited action to develop a self-sufficient and self-governing Micronesia. The United States has been celebrating United Nations Day throughout the Trust Territory, while the Fourth of July is generally ignored; the Trust Territory flag is given as much, if not more prominence than the American flag; we have been reluctant to force the use of English upon the natives in order to give full respect to the nine major languages of Micronesia, none of which is spoken by more than 25,000 people; we have delivered the care and treatment of the sick to native practitioners, although no Micronesian has a degree of doctor

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medicine; we have encouraged down to the smallest village the practice of local representative government, despite doubts as to its utility and acceptance; we have promoted the development of native legislatures and courts, despite an obvious lack of native leadership, experience and ability; and we have restrained the free entry into the area of American investment and American private enterprise.

On the other hand, we have had to face the practical realities of the situation and the need to preserve American security interests. The Defense Department is expanding rather than reducing its activities in the territory; almost as many Americans work in the Trust Territory administration now as five years ago, and the reality is that additional rather than fewer Americans are needed; all major positions of authority are still held by Americans; and the United States continues to finance well over ninety percent of the cost of government in Micronesia.

The dichotomy in United States interests is also reflected in the frequent shifts of responsibility that have occurred between the Navy and the Department of the Interior for the administration of all or portions of the territory. These shifts have resulted in unfortunate breaks in the continuity of administration, planning, and development.

In the confusion over American goals for the Trust Territory, our policy has been to "stimulate and promote the attainment of self-rule among the Micronesians" within some undefined framework. The resulting attitude, at least until 1962, was largely that of a custodian,

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protecting, preserving, and maintaining the territory, with insufficient emphasis on, or interest in development for the future. The tendency to hold the line is evidenced by the stability in the annual appropriations for the Trust Territory between 1952 and 1962 - - ranging between \$4.3 million and \$6.8 million - - during a long period of rising prices and expanding international commitments by the United States. The limited appropriations also reflect the policy that the United States ought not to finance a level of government services in the territory which the local economy could not support in the event of eventual independence.

Americans in Micronesia have marked time in self-conscious uneasiness while watching the deterioration of roads, schools, hospitals and other public works, and the continued stagnation of the local economy. As a result, we have wound up with a run-down physical plant, a poor showcase of American administration and a Micronesian people who are non-aggressive, but rather apathetic, willing to follow, but timid in accepting obligations and responsibility, and making minimum use of their potentialities. Without clear political objectives, the economic and political development of Micronesia cannot move forward with much vigor, for initiative will be stifled and administration will remain a routine servicing affair rather than an imaginative tool for progress.

Background on Trusteeship

Pending the arrival of that day in the distant future when an undefined something will happen as the result of Micronesia's development toward self-rule, we have continued to assume that the present trusteeship

agreement will continue for an indefinite period despite some technical

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from the unfriendly members of the United Nations. The fact is that trusteeships are out of date. The legal status of trust territories actually contributes to the drift in which we and the Micronesians find ourselves, and the United States may soon be in the embarrassing position of administering the only area under a UN trusteeship in the world.

The concept of mandates and trusteeships evolved during World War I from a disenchantment with the exploitation and trading of colonies by the great powers. Rather than treat the weaker peoples of Africa, the Middle East and the Pacific that were detached from Germany and Turkey as mere spoils of war, it was agreed to place those dependent areas in the care of "mandatory" or administering powers, which would exercise sovereignty over the areas subject to the guiding principles of the League of Nations. While independence was recognized as a possibility for the mandated former possessions of Turkey, the emphasis in Africa and the Pacific was upon protection and tutelage by an advanced nation.

The United Nations inherited and endorsed this philosophy during and after World War II, but added to the responsibilities of each administering power the promotion of self-government in the dependent territories. Under the United Nations Charter, the administering powers transferred their mandates into "trusts", and a Trusteeship Council was established as the principle organ of the new organization both to receive reports and petitions and to supervise the regular visits of inspection to the trust territories.

Japan had seized Micronesia--the Mariana, Caroline and Marshall Islands-- from Germany in 1914. By the Treaty of Versailles, however, Japan was denied title to the islands and, in keeping with the Covenant of the League of Nations, instead received a class "C" mandate to exercise sovereignty over the area. In keeping with the letter of the mandate, Japan essentially governed the islands as an integral part of its own territory. It violated the spirit of the mandate, however, insofar as it proceeded to fortify and heavily colonize the area.

The United States occupied Micronesia by conquest during World War II, and, immediately after the war, the military forces urged the retention of the area as American territory by virtue of that conquest. No public doubt existed that the United States had a paramount interest in the islands, and that they could not be left to go their own way or be returned to Japan. The position of the military, however, contradicted the non-aggressive war aims of the United States and came at a time when American support for the principles of the United Nations to maintain peace and promote international justice ran high.

Because of these conflicting interests, the United States entered into a unique agreement with the Security Council of the United Nations, under Article 82 of the United Nations Charter, for a "strategic" trusteeship over Micronesia. The trusteeship differs from others in that, under Article 83(1) of the Charter, the Security Council, rather than the General Assembly exercises the functions of the United Nations relating

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to the area, including action on "the terms of the trusteeship agreement and their alteration or amendment". Both the Security Council and the General Assembly, however, make use of the Trusteeship Council to assist them in carrying out their responsibilities for trust territories.

While the basic objectives of the trusteeship system, set forth in Article 76 of the Charter, apply in the strategic trusteeship as well, the United States is authorized, under the terms of the agreement, to close all or portions of the Trust Territory for security reasons and to determine the extent to which it will report on such areas or open them for inspection. The agreement was approved by the Security Council on April 2, 1947, and by a Joint Resolution of the Congress on July 18, 1947.

In 1947, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands was one of eleven United Nations trusteeships. However, with the rapid postwar movement toward independence for former dependent areas, only three trusteeships remain today. In addition to our own, there is Nauru, a small island south of the Marshalls which is inhabited by only 2,000 people whom Australia plans to evacuate to its own shores in the near future thus terminating the trust. Finally, there is a trust area in northeast New Guinea, which Australia administers jointly with its own territory of Papua on the same island, all of which, according to reports, Australia is steering toward independence under an arrangement in which Australia would be responsible for the new nation's defense and foreign relations.

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Thus, looking at the events of the past decade and a half, international trusteeship has almost become extinct as a device for fostering the development of dependent peoples.

The Need For a Plebiscite

Mandates and trusts have played a useful role in the development of the new world community. They have had an effect upon the improvement of all colonial policy. But it would be difficult to demonstrate that the administering powers have done more or less for their trust territories than they have done for their own colonies or possessions.

There is, therefore, a fundamental question as to whether trusteeship remains the best device for integrating the Micronesian people into the strenuous political and economic conditions of the modern world. The emphasis of our trusteeship has been on protection, not adaptation and development, for example, the protection of local languages against English, which offers superior means of communication in the world today; the protection of local subsistence economy against American capital and management that could improve low-income levels, inadequate transportation and wretched housing. The indefinite, but obviously long-term nature and vague goals of the trusteeship contribute greatly to that protective attitude.

The true responsibility of the United States is to provide for a rapid systematic adaptation of Micronesia to the environment of modern society. It is a fundamental conclusion of the Mission that international trusteeship, as applied to Micronesia, is not suited to the achievement of that

end because it has resulted in an aimless drift in which no goal is immediately or readily apparent. It does not excite the energies of the people themselves, and it has actually retarded the development of institutions and resources that permit the people to take their best place in the modern world because of its resulting emphasis on protection. The legal form of trusteeship is a delusion if it condemns the Micronesians to live in poverty without the stimulus of outside aid or contact. The administrator who works in the drift of trusteeship, with the possibility of independence in the distant future, is confounded. The less sophisticated Micronesian simply wonders where all the fuss is leading him.

It is true that the United Nations has--through its debates, criticisms and other pressures--sought to use the trusteeship vehicle to push the more rapid development of Micronesia. But, insofar as the United Nations pressures are aimed at eventual creation of an independent Micronesia, we believe that they will sooner or later result in even greater frustration and will postpone work toward a realistic goal. Independence of Micronesia would only be possible, given the various United States and Micronesian needs, on the unreliable and un dependable basis for both parties of an arrangement involving continuing United States subsidies on the one hand and "permanent" ceding by Micronesia of exclusive defense and military use rights to the United States on the other hand. Nor will continuing United States subsidies alone satisfy the Micronesians in the long run because certain inflexible economic limitations

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of the area and the increasing population pressure must eventually compel substantial emigration of Micronesians.

Thus, the Micronesians would inevitably end up pressuring the United States, or if refused by the United States, some other major power for a special association that would involve both parties in the substance of a territorial relationship, but would not satisfy either party's need for a permanent dependable association.

There is also, of course, the further likelihood that the continuation of the United States trusteeship will be seriously challenged in the United Nations. If we are left with the sole trusteeship in the world, the United Nations pressures for action will grow. Both our enemies and the uncommitted or emerging nations can be expected to become increasingly critical. Our embarrassment could become acute and our prestige in the world community is certain to suffer; a very difficult situation might result over which we would have little or no control.

Given the factors outlined above--(1) the United States need to retain control of Micronesia for security reasons; (2) the increasing possibility that our trusteeship will be challenged; (3) the lack of a clear United States policy and the need for a goal around which to build a realistic development program; (4) the conclusion that continuation of the trusteeship tends to reinforce our present custodial attitude and aimless policy; and (5) the impossibility of true independence for Micronesia--it is the conclusion and recommendation of the

Mission that the United States should take the initiative now in action that would result in a termination of the trust agreement and the permanent affiliation of Micronesia with the United States. A plebiscite among the Micronesians is essential to such action and should be held as soon as possible in the interests of the Micronesians and the United States.

B. Territory-wide factors affecting a plebiscite

Before any meaningful discussions can be presented regarding the timing, terms, and mechanics of the plebiscite and the steps required to bring about the desired result, it is necessary to take into account six major factors that shape the current attitudes of Micronesians and the present and future development of political institutions and leadership in Micronesia. These interrelated factors essentially affect any analysis of political forces, their care, capture and control.

1. Existing governmental organization

The government of the Trust Territory, with the exception of the clan and familial government traditionally exercised by the chiefs, has been created under the authority of the trusteeship agreement with the Security Council (approved by a joint resolution of the Congress on July 18, 1947) and the Act of June 23, 1954, as amended (48 U.S.C. 1681), of the Congress. Article 3 of the agreement provides that the United States will "have full powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory" subject to the provisions of the agreement. The Act of Congress vests all executive, legislative and

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judicial authority necessary for the civil administration of the territory in, and provides for the exercise of that authority by such persons and in such manner as the President may direct.

The President currently, under Executive Order No. 11021 of May 7, 1962, has delegated his authority to the Secretary of the Interior subject to certain policy guidance from the President and collaboration with other departments with respect to carrying out the obligations of the United States under the trusteeship agreement. Previously, the President had vested authority over first all and then parts of the Trust Territory in the Secretary of the Navy. The 1962 order brought Saipan and the northern Marianas under Interior and again united the Trust Territory under one agency.

The Secretary of the Interior, in turn, has delegated his executive authority to the High Commissioner of the Trust Territory and his judicial authority to the Chief Justice of the Trust Territory. The former has been appointed by the President, the latter by the Secretary.

The High Commissioner has, through the years, issued various orders and a code for the Trust Territory which comprise the basic laws of the area (the need to clarify his legislative authority is discussed in Part III of the report), and he and his staff have served as the executive branch of the government. This central government, with headquarters now in Saipan, has been organized around its major programs to include the departments of public safety, public works, education, public health, agriculture and fisheries, communications, property and supply and various staff offices.

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provide the possibility for financing significant programs and are generally used for local education, to supplement particular territorial government activities, or support small projects of interest to the legislatures. All their legislation is subject to the approval of the district administrator or the High Commissioner.

A major campaign has been underway to complete the chartering of all Micronesian municipalities with the objective of having a complete system of local government throughout the Territory. They vary in size, from Saipan which constitutes one municipality with 8,000 people, down to communities of less than a hundred souls. Generally, their charters provide for an elected magistrate with minor powers and a council, also with taxing and other powers. The exercise of those powers is severely limited in most areas of Micronesia since such municipal governments are operated at a level where the existing clan government usually prevails.

At the territorial level, the Council of Micronesia has now been created, evolving out of an interdistrict advisory council of Micronesian leaders that began meeting regularly in 1956. The Council is composed of two representatives elected by popular vote from each district (except in Pohnpei they are selected by the legislature, and in the outer islands of Yap and Chuuk they are selected by the Chiefs or the district administrator). The Council held two sessions in 1962 and 1963. It passes declarations, resolutions, and recommendations for such action as the High Commissioner deems appropriate but it has no legislative powers.

2. Distance, transportation and communications

Micronesia consists of a series of small islands scattered over an area of the Pacific as large as the mainland of the United States. Even in the best of circumstances, this means that the islands and districts of the area are isolated little communities. The largest center of population is the Truk atoll with some 15,000 inhabitants. Other relatively sizeable district centers exist, such as Ponape with 11,500 people. Saipan with almost 8,000, Koror with 4,100 and Majuro with 4,000, but they are remote from one another, the outside world and the other half of the Trust Territory population which lives in smaller communities in the outlying islands.

Saipan, the headquarters of the Trust Territory government, is less than an hour's flight from Guam, the gateway to the Territory, but it is necessary to go through Guam at present to go from headquarters to any of the other district centers by Trust Territory plane. To go from Guam to Yap, the nearest district center, it is necessary to fly 460 miles, and from Yap to Palau another 253 miles must be covered. In another direction from Guam lies Truk, 554 miles away, thence to Ponape, another 382 miles, Kwajalein, another 583 miles, and finally Majuro, the district center of the Marshalls, another 263 miles.

The problems of transport and communications from a technical point of view are discussed more fully in another part of the report, but the great distances separating the islands, the slowness and infrequency of transportation from one district to another and the awkwardness and expense of wire

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and radio communication, almost all of which is governmental, frustrate a reasonable integration of the economy, political and social life and prevent a normal diffusion of central ideas that might serve as unifying political principles. There is a danger of continued provincialism and separatism unless transport and communications difficulties can be overcome.

3. Diversity of cultures

The historical remoteness of the islands from one another has produced a diversity of cultures in Micronesia. Political, social and economic patterns and institutions vary significantly almost on an island to island basis. Nine major languages and several dialects are used. Until recently, even the concept of a single united district comprising a group of neighboring islands was foreign to their traditions.

Neither the Spaniards nor the Germans, although exercising sovereignty over the islands, brought them under a cohesive administration; while the Japanese, except for teaching their language in the lower grades, created no political or social institutions that would stimulate the self-consciousness of the Micronesians as a related people. The Japanese governed the mandated territory from Koror in Palau, making it an attractive, prosperous capital; the United States, mixed up between Navy and Interior Department administration, has governed the Territory from Honolulu, Guam, and now rather awkwardly from Saipan where the people have an intense attachment to Guam but rather little regard for the culturally different people of the other districts. However, the United States, in its action to establish a territory-wide Council of Micronesia, the first in all Micronesian history, has begun to bridge the traditional isolation of the islands.

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Given the conglomeration of peoples, languages, cultures, isolated atolls and islands, the subdivision of the area into district administrations, first by the Germans and Japanese, and now by the United States, has had to be rather arbitrary. The present districts are not culturally homogeneous. The Marianas are most homogeneous, despite a Carolinian minority that remains somewhat culturally and politically distinct from the Chamorro majority. But the Ponape District, for example, contains two Polynesian, rather than Micronesian, islands, and Kusaie, which speaks a different language than Ponape Island, believes it is equal to, or better than Ponape and has petitioned for a district of its own. In some cases, especially in the eastern Carolines, the outlying islands near district boundaries have a closer affinity for the neighboring district than they do for parts of their own.

The selection of district centers and their consequent, more rapid advancement and closer ties to transport and communications facilities has also resulted in friction with the outlying islands. Significant differences in levels of development now exist, for example, between the Palau district center at Koror and the outer islands such as Peleliu. In the Yap District, the outer islands have yet to gain representation in the district legislature. In many ways, the outer islands have come to feel that they are being outdistanced and overwhelmed by the district centers.

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What Micronesia lacks most is a long common experience with shared institutions. To be under four foreign powers in less than seventy years, each using its own language, economic and political standards, and to have four capitals in thirty years hardly helps develop that necessary experience and denies any hope for the immediate cultural cohesion of Micronesia.

4. Familial and clan patterns

Except in the Marianas, the familial or clan patterns of life throughout Micronesia are an important political factor. Families and clans are the objects of primary allegiance in many areas and the centers of basic authority. Large areas of land, indeed, sometimes whole islands, often classified as in "private ownership," are in reality controlled by a clan, with use rights being apportioned through historical practice, communal agreement and the intervention of the elders or chiefs of the clan. (A curious and important factor tending to perpetuate the power of the traditional chiefs in many communities where terribly complicated structures of land rights exist is their uniquely authoritative knowledge of boundaries and rights.) Land is the tie that binds families and clans together; the right to occupy and use land, guaranteed by family membership, is the security of young and old, and the index of hierarchical patterns. In Yap, for example, all useful land is held by the families except for a little held by religious missions and used by the government--the public domain land consists of mangrove swamps.

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In the Marshalls, Ponape, Truk and Palau, although the United States is encouraging homesteading of the public domain, leasing and registering of private land transactions and other devices designed both to clarify title and increase individual ownership of homes and farms, the family-clan pattern with its many chiefs is omnipresent. Urbanization, with the movement of young men to district centers and the increase in a cash economy, of course, tends to break down clan and chief authority. But the young men working for the government and the trading companies, speaking English and absorbing western ideas still have an emotional attachment to their family and clan, and to their chiefs who, after all, are relatives, often close ones, and often men of character and leadership.

Whereas the Germans and Japanese tended to utilize the chiefs as their agents in the administration of the territory, the United States has attempted increasingly to introduce representative, democratic government based on the electoral process. Even in this new system, the chiefs, in many instances, have simply become the magistrates, being "elected" by their clans. The tendency to select men other than the chiefs as magistrates occurs mainly in the larger, more urbanized municipalities. Nevertheless, when this occurs it is still generally true that the elected magistrates must be sure to retain the traditional chiefs' support.

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The traditional chiefs tend to be men over 45 years old; they are not likely to have a working command of English, although they may speak Japanese; they are naturally more conservative and rooted in local interests than the younger Micronesians working for the government. This does not mean that they are reactionary, particularly in their concern for "more education" for the younger people which all Micronesians feel is the magic key to raising their incomes; indeed, a number of them have extraordinary leadership qualities and receive profound respect from the people. In many responses from ordinary, non-English-speaking Micronesians, and in rank and file conversations with Micronesian women, it was obvious that they knew their chiefs and magistrates personally and by name, whereas they did not usually know their representative in the district legislature unless he was the same man. Such people rarely knew anything about the Council of Micronesia and the delegates to it from their district. They never knew the names of the delegates from other districts.

5. The Young Leaders of Micronesia

According to the figures in the 15th annual report to the United Nations in 1962, the Trust Territory government and other United States agencies in the area employ 65 percent of all the Micronesians who work for wages, and this figure excludes elementary school teachers, the majority of whom secure supplementary bonuses from the

Trust Territory government. In this pool, occupying positions as department heads or assistant department heads in the district administrations and special staff positions in headquarters are the overwhelming number of potential leaders of Micronesia. Many of these men, mostly in their thirties and selected for their knowledge of English and their formal high school education, are also doing double duty as members of the district legislatures and the Council of Micronesia. In fact, they dominate most of those bodies.

These are the men who are most fluent about western ideas and American administration; these are the men who are easiest for Americans to talk to and who seem to deal in concepts meaningful for an American investigator. Neither their capacities nor their influence in Micronesia, however, should be exaggerated. First, they are young by Micronesian standards, so that neither their age nor clan status carries much weight with the masses of the people. Over the next few years, of course, as they enter into positions of larger responsibility in the administration, or as the legislatures in which they serve stabilize and increase their functions, these men, growing older, will increase in influence. Some will also achieve increasing importance in their clans. Second, their education and experience is quite limited. A mere handful have college degrees and none, it is believed, from a mainland United States college. In Truk, for example, there is not a single Micronesian with a Bachelor of Arts

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degree. In 1962, there were 78 Micronesians studying at the College of Guam, 13 at the University of Hawaii and 12, of which 2 were girls, in mainland colleges. Out of that group, of course, many will not have political leadership capacities. It must also be recognized that the high school education of those young Micronesians who were snapped up by the Navy and Interior administrations was hasty and laid upon a weak base of elementary school education during and just after World War II.

Despite those drawbacks, the best leadership potential exists in this group. What is required now for them is not more formal education, but rather special training and development through visits to the United States, visits to other districts and to headquarters for discussions of common problems such as health, public works and education, and improved tutorial relationships between themselves and their American supervisors. In too many cases, these people have been moved into what would appear to be fairly responsible jobs only to be assigned year after year routine repetitive work.

6. Interest Groups in Micronesia

Because of the wide-scale subsistence economy, because of the paucity of private businesses and individual merchants, because there is no organized labor, because of the lack of professional persons, with no Micronesian lawyer in practice, and because the religious orders are dominated by Americans, it is almost impossible to speak in

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western political terms of Micronesian "interests." The execution of an economic development program and the improvement of education will in the course of time contribute much to the diversification of life in Micronesia and, by creating institutional changes, begin to create other sources of independent leadership and foster interest groups.

However, one group which deserves special mention at this time is the trading companies. Apart from one shipping company, all the principal private businesses in the Trust Territory are import and export firms. In the Marshall Islands Import-Export Company, the Truk Trading Company, the Yap Trading Company, and so forth, are to be found men who have an important standing in their community and earn their income from private enterprise. In several cases, they have traveled outside Micronesia to the Philippines, Japan and the United States. The best of them have participated in government as magistrates, members of district legislatures and delegates to the Council of Micronesia. They bring to government an outside view, considerable experience, and a perspective typical of their financial independence, as well as a realistic appraisal of the economy and the community with which they deal every day on a bread-and-butter basis. In light of the absence of any other interest group to balance the galaxy of government employees now occupied with legislative work, it is sound political sense for the United States to encourage their training and participation in public affairs.

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C. District Political Patterns, Problems and People

Generalizations about an area so geographically vast and culturally diverse as Micronesia are bound to be roughly approximate. Even forthright statements about districts, which comprehend many islands, some of which see a ship three or four times a year, and which contain very small, scattered populations, can also be misleading. There are in each district, however, a few key political problems and a few key political figures.

THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

The most dramatic impact upon Micronesia by Americans has been in the Marshall Islands. With good reason, for no other district has had so much cause for suspicion, doubt and resentment toward the United States. In 1946, the United States transferred 167 people off Bikini in preparation for nuclear tests; in 1947, another 137 people were moved from Eniwetok; and in 1954, the people of Uterik and Rongelap were affected by radioactive fallout from nuclear tests, so that 236 of these Islanders were transferred to other places. Resettlement of the Bikini and Eniwetok people has since taken place in Kili and Ujelang, while the Uterik and Rongelap people have returned to their islands.

To make room for a military base, the people of Kwajalein Islands have also been removed to a barren, dirty slum on another islet in the atoll Ebeye, some thirty minutes away, where a polio outbreak

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last year, allegedly left to run rampant for lack of vaccines, attacked infants and children. Twenty are still crippled. Moreover, no settlement has been reached between the natives of Kwajalein Island and the United States on the terms of the Navy's lease of their homeland. This constantly rankles feeling. They can work on their home island, but they cannot live there. It is ironical that the Trust Territory government has the poorest public relations on Kwajalein where the Federal Government's payroll supports an above-average Micronesian standard of living. The territory's resident representative lives in the Federal base at Kwajalein Islands, goes to Ebeye infrequently and has little rapport with the people.

Fortunately, the Marshalls contain some of the ablest political leaders in the entire Trust Territory. The Iroij Laplap, the noble chiefs of the islands, not only have considerable power growing out of their traditional roles of clan leadership and land disposition, but their ranks contain keen men in their own right. Kabua Kabua, Lejelon Kabua and his son Amata Kabua; head of the Marshall Islands Import-Export Company and a delegate to the Council of Micronesia, are outstanding. Other Iroij, like Andrew of Maloelap, are wealthy, shrewd, albeit old and non-English speaking, and they possess much influence.

The man who stands far and away ahead of all other Micronesian leaders is Dwight Heine, the head of the educational department in

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the Marshalls district. He is the only one with a territory-wide reputation among the politically conscious and is respected equally by the Americans and natives. Unfailingly, he comes to the top of the list when open inquiries are made about leadership potentiality whether in the Marshalls or elsewhere. One of the clues to his stature, apart from his age (late forties), his German grandfather, his status as an Alab (a landowner and lesser noble) and long association with the Americans, is his ability to bridge the gap between the Troij and the able young men of the district administration. This is the key to all Micronesian politics.

Next to Heine, men like William Allen and Oscar de Brum represent the next echelon of intelligent support, political sensitivity and capable administration. Both of them have had some years of college in Hawaii. Finally, there is the third type of leader represented by a man like Adjidrik Bien, a part-Chinese, intelligent and wealthy merchant in the export-import business who takes an interest in public affairs and is a member of the municipal council on Majuro Atoll. Kabua, Heine and Bien epitomize traditional authority, modern bureaucracy, and trading enterprise, the triumvirate of present political forces in Micronesia.

PONAPE

Roads, water, power, and improved hospital care are the key issues in Ponape. Traditional authority is represented by Heinrich Iriarte,

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whose brother is the Nanmarki, or "king" of the municipality of Net on Ponape Island. Modern bureaucracy is represented by either Bathwel Henry, a teacher and vice-president of the Ponape district legislature, or by Gaius Edwin, the political affairs adviser in the district administration, although neither compares well with the Marshallese. A young man highly regarded for leadership is Bailey Olter who was at the University of Hawaii at the time of the Mission's visit.

Strik Yoma and Edwel Santos, the clerks of the district court, seem to have intelligence and the capacity for growth. A businessman of manipulative capacity, but dubious virtue is Martin Christian, the mayor of Kolonia, the crudely urbanized district center of Ponape Island laid out in the municipality of Net and containing a number of out-landers. There is friction on the island between the town and the country people. Moreover, just outside of Kolonia is an enclave of about 200 Polynesian settlers from Kapingimarangi with a chief and problems ranging from a weak water supply to a lack of fishing equipment.

Kusaie, within the Ponape district, seeks to become a district of its own, for the people feel that the island has not had a fair share of the economic benefits coming into the Ponape district. The island is largely dominated by the Sigrah family. Paul Sigrah was the hereditary king of Kusaie and its magistrate until he was defeated for reelection by his brother, Shiro Sigrah. Paul's son,

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Joab, was made principal of the new intermediate school on the island, but showed little talent for it. However, he is a member of the district legislature and the Council of Micronesia. He has attended the University of Hawaii. Kusaie is not without other intelligent people, such as the mayor of Utwe, but they are largely uneducated and live in simple villages.

TRUK

Truk, with the heaviest population pressure on the land, has problems which are largely economic -- poor transportation, low per capita food supply and small cash incomes. The district contains the Mortlock Islands which are distant from the district center and possess a cultural unity of their own. There is excellent potential political leadership in Truk atoll. The representative of traditional authority is Chief Petrus Mailo, a man of 60 and President of the Truk Trading Company. Like him, the chief and magistrate of Lukenor, Ring Puas, possesses genuine qualities of leadership, with bright perceptions and warm human relations. He obviously holds the respect of the community. Truk is also fortunate to have some highly capable men in the young bureaucracy like Tasivo Nekayama, the political affairs officer. He is an excellent technician is not a public figure. He has been to college in Hawaii, advised the United States delegation to the United Nations and lately visited

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Japan. Andon Amaraich, the public defender, is another young leader and a member of the district legislature. Raymond Setig of Iukonor, who owns two retail shops and is the finance officer of the district administration, is also the President of the Truk District Legislature. There is considerable vocal concern in the Truk bureaucracy with the "discriminatory" pay scale for Micronesian employees relative to those of the American employees.

In Truk, the Mission ran into the only boisterous and disgruntled outburst with anti-American overtones from Nicholas Eassy, a territory employee who felt he had not been properly assigned after training and made loud complaints about the administration and American behavior. He alleged that no progress had been made in Micronesia despite many petitions and missions. His record and reputation are poor; but he is shrewd, has just been elected to the Truk District Legislature and could become a rabble-rouser.

PALAU

Two political parties have recently been organized in Palau, but there is little consensus as to differences in their platforms or whether the members of the legislature belong to one or the other party. It has been a technical exercise stimulated by the local political affairs officer on the assumption that if Palau has a legislature it ought to have political parties. The difficulty in Palau, as elsewhere in Micronesia, is that until some basic economic or

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social issues have crystallized or enough competitive personalities are available for elective posts in which some executive power is at stake, the establishment of parties is largely academic. In Palau there is also a nonviolent religion (Motekgnei) which has somewhat anti-foreign and anti-modern overtones, but it hardly seems to be a political movement even though it is tending to vote as a bloc representing 25 to 30 percent of the electorate.

Koror Island, in the Palau district, once was the thriving capital of Micronesia; it has memories of fine buildings, good roads, shops and bustling urban life under the Japanese. All these are largely gone. Across a narrow stretch of water from Koror, thirty minutes by boat, lies the largest island of Micronesia, Babelthaup, with space for expansion and economic development. But transportation and communication pose a bottleneck to action.

Traditional authority in Palau is represented by the two paramount chiefs, the Aibedul (High Chief), T. R. Ngoriakl, and the Kedlai (High Chief), Reklai Brel. Ngoriakl ran for the magistracy of Koror but was defeated. Men like Lazarous Salii, the political affairs officer, David Ramizai, the district education officer and head of one of the political parties, and Roman Tmetuchel, the administrative assistant to the district judge, all members of the district legislature, stand out as potential. Tmetuchel is the president of the legislature and has had a year of law training in the Philippines.

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He is extraordinarily quick, articulate, and independent minded. Allegedly discrimination aboard an American ship somewhat embittered him, but he showed no evidence of it to the Mission. No doubt he can be outspoken, but he has convictions and could be an important leader in Micronesia. The vice-president of the legislature is Benjamin Mersai who is said to have organized one of the political parties and who represents business. About 50, intelligent, self-possessed and respected, he is probably the wealthiest man in Koror. His daughter is the secretary of the District Administrator.

YAP

Yap is the least developed district and the most conservative in its ways. While the district has a legislature, the outer islands, still under their chiefs, are not represented in it. Negotiations are under way to charter a new legislature to include all the Yap Islands, but there is friction between Yap proper and the outer islands which are beginning to resist the ancient claims to overlordship by Yap proper.

Traditional authority in the district is represented by a man like Judge Fanechoor, reelected for 14 years as magistrate of Gagil and also the district judge for Yap. The president of the legislature is Joachim Palamos, who works in the district administration in public works and seems moderate, affable, and hard-working rather

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than a good leader. More representative of the young bureaucracy is Edmund Gilmar who is continuing his college education in Hawaii with above-average grades, but rather hazy judgments about the future of Micronesia. From the business sector there is Joe Tamag, assistant manager of the Yap Trading Company, who spent a year in San Francisco in business, a member of the legislature and the Council of Micronesia. A complete maverick is Carmen Chigii, a highly intelligent, sensitive Yap woman, formerly employed by the administration, who spent two years at the University of Hawaii where she married a fellow Yapese student. She is young, but highly respected for her knowledge and interest in Yap affairs.

MARIANA ISLANDS

The Mariana district is dominated by Saipan with almost 3,000 of the district's 9,500 inhabitants. District and territory headquarters are located there, and the Council of Micronesia meets there. In addition, the entire island is one municipality making for one of the few viable local governments in Micronesia. It is here that the only really active political parties have been organized around the issue of union with Guam. The Popular Party, representing generally the lower income people and the Chamorro majority in the district favors immediate affiliation with Guam and the termination of the trusteeship. The Democratic Party, representing some businessmen

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who fear domination by more competitive Guamanian enterprises as well as the Carolinian minority which would like to retain its ties with the large Carolinian majority in the rest of the Trust Territory, generally prefers affiliation with the United States, but not as a part of the Territory of Guam.

In a vote held in 1961 under the auspices of the Saipan legislature, about 63 percent of the voters favored becoming United States citizens in affiliation with Guam, 36 percent favored becoming citizens in a separate territory and only one percent favored the status quo.

While the Mission was in Saipan, the district legislature again passed by a large majority a resolution asking for affiliation with Guam and termination of the trust.

The Marianas' desire to join Guam and the United States is not matched by any feeling of kinship or community with the rest of the Trust Territory. They will need to be persuaded (and this should not be difficult) that the territory cannot be dismantled piece by piece and that a plebiscite on the general question of terminating the trusteeship and affiliating with the United States is necessary to discharge our obligation to the United Nations. Further, if the United States Congress were to contemplate the eventual unification of Micronesia and Guam in order to consolidate and simplify their administration, it would be far better politically to keep Saipan with Micronesia as a bridge to join the two areas later.

With the concentration of district and territory headquarters in Saipan as well as a large municipal government, there are, of course, quite a few able young bureaucrats in the area. Perhaps most representative is the President of the district legislature, leader of the Popular Party, and teacher in the district department of education, Vincente Santos. Although in favor of union with Guam, he leads the more moderate elements in the party, unlike Joe Cruz who is quite literally a rabble-rouser in this matter and who talks in terms of "revolution" if the petitions for merger are not acceded to. Key people in the Democratic Party are businessman Joe Tenorio, High School Principal Ada and Land Claims Officer Elias Sablan. Another leader in the Democratic Party is Dr. Benusto Kaipat, a medical practitioner and leader of the Carolinian community. As mentioned earlier, communal land tenure systems and traditional clan chiefs do not exist in the district, the entire district being quite Americanized in its customs and attitudes.

D. Attitudes Toward Affiliation

How do the individuals and groups identified in the preceding pages see the future government of their people, and where do they believe that their interests lie?

First, common throughout the triumvirate of traditional chiefs, the younger bureaucracy and the businessmen is the strong conviction

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that Micronesia cannot "go it alone" and that the United States is the source to which they must look for aid. Second, they all generally feel that education oriented to the modern world is the key to a better future, which is generally equated with higher cash income and less dependence on a subsistence economy. (In this connection, the NSC Task Force and the Congress made a wise choice in selecting education as the initial area for mounting a large-scale United States development effort in Micronesia.) This "better future" is at present rarely equated with the concept of an eventually independent Micronesia since the time involved before serious thought could be given to independence is believed to be so great that even those who might emotionally be disposed toward the idea shy away from any real consideration of it. Third, these people are generally confused as to the relationship between Micronesia and the United States in a variety of ways. They do not know whether our interest in the area is permanent or temporary. If our interest is permanent, they do not know whether the United States wants Micronesia to join it, and, if they were to join the United States, they are not clear as to what that would mean to their present vested interests. There is a tremendous area of underlying, inchoate uncertainty and fear that is formulated only when they are forced to face the issues. They would prefer to think of these matters as too far distant in time to be considered.

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The traditional chiefs feel ignorant of what "coming under American laws" would mean to their restricted land tenure systems and the associated social structure and culture in which they have so prominent a role. The younger bureaucrats are more concerned with the highly emotional and tangible issue of equalizing the Micronesian and American pay scales in the Trust Territory government, but they have few views as to how joining the United States might affect that issue. The businessmen are concerned that affiliation with the United States would mean that they would be swamped by American business with which they could not compete. Both the chiefs and businessmen frequently referred to the case of the native Hawaiians who lost control of their lands and were displaced in the commercial and political arena. They believe they must be better educated before they can be expected to compete.

Fairly widespread also, although varying from district to district in intensity -- with the strongest emphasis in the more aggressive districts of Palau and Marianas, is doubt as to the quality of individual American administrators. The leaders are confused, particularly by the administrators' great concern with fostering numerous local political institutions and their lack of concern in the eyes of the Micronesians with more immediate and tangible problems and needs. Although much of this "strangeness of American ways" cannot be blamed upon American officials, the Mission was

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offered and has information in its files on quite a few cases of officials misdirecting their own and community efforts and funds in ill-planned projects with unfortunate political impact.

The man-in-the-street has also given little thought to the future status of Micronesia, while the Trust Territory government has done nothing so far to suggest any potential course of action. As one woman on Yap replied to a query about the future, "That's a far, big question." Again and again in discussions with Micronesians when asked about the next five or ten years, the reply never left the range of local economic problems: "Things are getting better"; "We need more money for our copra"; "Better roads and more ships would help" -- or the range of social improvements: "Education is better in American times"; "More business in Japanese days, but we like the American way, American schools, letting us into government" -- or the range of local political changes: "We're learning about government"; "It'll take a long time"; "The people don't know much about their district legislatures yet". Only after tedious and delicate questioning could most Micronesians be led to frame for themselves the possibility of changing the status of the Trust Territory and then it was obvious, except for the Saipanese and very few elite Micronesians, that the chance of becoming part of the United States had simply not entered into any rational analysis.

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On the basis of six weeks of traveling to some eighteen islands in the Trust Territory, discussions with seven assemblies of local people, eight meetings with legislative committees, seven meetings with municipal councils, three meetings with women's associations, at least twenty-five interviews with American missionaries, and no fewer than forty-five private interviews with Micronesians, as well as complete briefings by the High Commissioner and the six district administrators, it is the conclusion of the Mission that there is no important hard core of resistance to affiliation with the United States either among the leaders or the people of Micronesia. If the people of Micronesia were offered a simple choice between self-government in affiliation with the United States or independence, we believe an overwhelming majority would favor self-government in affiliation with the United States. Because of various concerns and fears that have been expressed by Micronesians, however, there might be considerable abstention from a plebiscite unless attention is focused on the issue and the meaning of affiliation with the United States is clarified.

E. Timing and Terms of a Plebiscite

Having concluded that a plebiscite leading to permanent affiliation with the United States in the near future is in the best interests of the Micronesians and the United States, and having identified the factors that would most affect it, consideration must be given

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to the key questions of timing and the actions needed to prepare the Micronesians for the plebiscite, including the inducements required to secure a highly favorable result. Study must also be given to the actions needed to prepare the United States and United Nations for the plebiscite.

While it is the opinion of the Mission that the great majority of Micronesians would favor affiliation at this time, we must overcome the Micronesians' doubt about the unknown and overcome their natural fears regarding their status and their future in any affiliation with the United States. We must also take into account the interests of the United States and the United Nations.

In that regard, we may be in somewhat of a dilemma since it is difficult to provide an arrangement and program which will, on the one hand, satisfy the United States -- particularly the Congress -- and, on the other, be acceptable to the Micronesians and the United Nations. The Congress -- indeed the Federal Government as a whole -- will require adequate protection of the United States interests in the area and an assurance that effective use is made of Federal resources. However, we must also assure the Micronesians and the United Nations that adequate provision will be made for the development and interests of the native population. This will require fairly concrete action, before the plebiscite, to make known the form of territorial governmental organization which would apply under affiliation with the United States.

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The Mission has aimed at presenting an integrated and realistic program -- in the political, social and economic area -- to be followed in the next few years leading up to and subsequent to the plebiscite. Our basic objectives have been to maximize our chances of securing a favorable vote at an appropriate time, to provide a program acceptable to all the parties concerned, and to produce in the Trust Territory the most effective situation and machinery for the further development of its people and resources.

Timing

Micronesia has been under United States control since shortly before the end of World War II, a period of almost twenty years, and under the trusteeship agreement for over sixteen years. As was pointed out to the Mission by several Micronesians, during a comparable period, the Japanese were able to create a relatively prosperous economy and a more developed infrastructure of public works than now exists.

We have noted that our attitude in Micronesia has tended to be largely custodial, that initiative has been stifled, and that our administration and the indigenous population have drifted rather aimlessly. All of these factors argue for a plebiscite in the immediate future, the next few years, not the next decade. In the Mission's judgment rapid action is now required to check the ever-increasing apathy in the area and the psychological pattern of dependency and feeling of transiency on the part of Micronesians.

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We have noted too that both the Nauru and New Guinea trusteeships are on their way towards termination and that the United States might be left as the sole administering power of a United Nations trusteeship. This politically embarrassing situation ought to be avoided as early as possible.

However, we cannot act immediately, for there has not been sufficient preparation in the Trust Territory. A period of some years will ideally be required for preparation for the plebiscite by the implementation of the Mission recommendations which we believe are prerequisites. Some years, moreover, will be needed to convert the Council of Micronesia into a true legislature with some experience with legislation and to establish a solid basis for a Micronesian administration along the lines of the Mission's recommendations. If those steps are not taken first, the Micronesians will still have considerable doubts as to the meaning of "self-government in affiliation with the United States" and the United States might be unable to persuade the United Nations that the area has achieved a sufficient degree of self-government.

Finally, it will take several years to implement the higher priority capital investment programs for economic and social development proposed in this report. Those programs would be largely implemented by 1968 if the Mission's recommendations are followed. As is pointed out elsewhere, however, it is the Mission's conclusion that those programs and the spending involved will not set off a self-sustaining

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development process of any significance in the area. It is important therefore, that advantage be taken of the psychological impact of the capital investment program before some measure of disappointment is felt.

Therefore, it is the recommendation of the Mission that the plebiscite should be held early in 1968. The time could be advanced to 1966 by compressing the schedule for the establishment of the Micronesian legislature and reducing the period in which it would gain pre-plebiscite experience. A 1966 date would be feasible, but not ideal.

Announcement:

One of the most critical questions to be answered in the very near future is the timing of the announcement of the plebiscite. From a strictly Micronesian point of view, the Mission would recommend that the plebiscite should be publicly announced only a few months in advance. This would provide time for most of the preparatory ground-work needed to reduce the shock of the announcement. It would also reduce the time in which any opposition -- either in Micronesia or the United Nations -- could campaign against affiliation.

On the other hand, we believe it would be advantageous if the entire program leading up to the plebiscite could be laid before the Congress when it is asked to authorize and appropriate the increased funds that will be required to carry out the recommended development program. If that advantage, or strategy with respect to the United Nations requires

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an announcement in 1964 of the timetable leading up to a 1968 plebiscite the anticipated shock in Micronesia should not block that action.

Terms to be Offered:

Given the operation of the trusteeship system of the United Nations, it is essential that the Micronesians be offered a choice of complete independence versus affiliation with the United States. The Mission has no doubts about the outcome, but we must take into account the attitudes of the United Nations, our friends as well as our enemies and the developing nations. It is extremely doubtful that they would accept any more limited choice. Our friends could not defend it, nor could we, and our enemies would have a prime opportunity to denounce the United States as a colonial power.

It would also be possible to introduce alternatives which go beyond the simple issue of affiliation with the United States, such as, for example, the question of affiliation with Guam or even Hawaii. In our judgment, those options should not be considered, first, because they introduce complicated factors regarding which no guarantees can be made. Second, such alternatives would introduce side issues into the plebiscite which are apt to create confusion and, in certain districts, negative attitudes. Certainly, the Carolinian majority in Micronesia (which constitutes roughly two-thirds of the total population) would be influenced by the present reaction of the Marianas Carolinians against merger with Guam.

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It would also be possible and perhaps necessary to offer a third choice in the plebiscite: continuation of the trusteeship. Such an addition, we believe, would reduce the majority in favor of affiliation by a substantial portion of the total vote because it would be attractive to those who would still have doubts regarding affiliation and who might shrewdly conclude that trusteeship offers the Micronesians the greatest leverage in dealing with the United States. However, because of the constant UN pressure to end trusteeships, it presumably would be most difficult for the UN to insist on adding the third choice.

Given the above factors, it is the recommendation of the Mission two alternatives should be offered in the plebiscite: (1) Do you wish to become an independent nation?; and (2) Do you wish to become permanently affiliated with the United States? If required by the United Nations, the second question might be made more specific by including a simple or descriptive reference to the proposed post-plebiscite form of local government organization discussed below.

F. Preparation for a Plebiscite:

The Congress and the United States

Nothing, of course, could be worse than an adverse congressional reaction after the plebiscite is announced and before it is held -- or, assuming a favorable result in the plebiscite -- if the Congress

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were to fail to take action to recognize the results. Failure to recognize in some appropriate form the outcome of the plebiscite could place the United States in a difficult position and would have a devastating effect among the Micronesians. As will be discussed below, it is recommended that the minimum action of the Congress would be to grant to the Micronesians the status of United States nationals to provide clear evidence of their acceptance within the American system. The indispensable need for consultation with the appropriate committees regarding the proposed program need not be further stressed.

As an alternative, it would, of course, be possible to involve the Congress directly now, before or immediately after the plebiscite in enactment of organic legislation for the territory. An organic act was actually before the Congress in the late 1940's and early 1950's but failed of enactment. The High Commissioner has suggested that it might be appropriate again to approach the Congress with an organic act at the time the Council of Micronesia becomes a legislative body in 1964 or 1965, thus giving the Congress the opportunity to ratify the arrangement and give the Micronesians the assurance of law regarding the organization of Trust Territory government.

However, it is the recommendation of the Mission that such action not be taken in the near future because it might pose later difficulties, largely because of the rapidity with which events would be taking place in the Trust Territory in the next few years. An

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initial congressional enactment and subsequent delays in amendment would prevent the accomplishment of later steps in the process of developing the government of Micronesia. Such delays might also have an adverse effect on Micronesian attitudes. Presidential and Secretarial orders have been utilized to date (and are also the source of action in American Samoa) and provide the necessary flexibility to meet the expected rapid changes in governmental organization. The submission to Congress of an organic act, which should be the culmination of Micronesia's movement toward affiliation, should come after the plebiscite when it is judged appropriate in view of the territory's development.

In addition to the consultations with the Congress regarding the program for Micronesia, the White House and the Executive Branch should begin to prepare the American people for the forthcoming affiliation long before the plebiscite is publicly announced. Few Americans know where the Trust Territory is, let alone have judgments about its people, their resources and the advisability of making Micronesia a territory of the United States. Without a planned information program, some American critics might be able to discredit the idea of affiliation on the basis of "colonialism" and the subsidization costs that are involved. Others might unknowingly assume that the plebiscite would lead to independence and criticize accordingly.

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The Mission recommends that responsibility for developing and carrying out a necessary program of informing the American people about Micronesia should be assigned by the White House to the Departments of the Interior and State and such other agencies as may be able to provide useful services. The program might include the mentioning of Micronesia and its importance to the United States in public addresses by the President and other officials, circulating to American interest groups and civic associations literature and pictures about Micronesia, making arrangements for an increased number of visits by Micronesian leaders to the United States and giving them the opportunity to talk to American groups and publicizing their visits, possibly arranging for visits by Micronesian choral groups, some of which are excellent and, if thought advisable, having the Department of Defense stress United States security interests in the area through its information programs.

The United Nations

While Article 83(1) of the Charter reserves to the Security Council the exercise of all United Nations functions relating to strategic areas such as Micronesia, including the alteration or amendment of trusteeship agreements, it is silent on any steps -- such as a plebiscite which might be taken prior to an alteration or amendment of the agreements. The Charter says, however, the Security Council "shall call" upon the Trusteeship Council for assistance in carrying out its responsibilities. Article 76 of the Charter, moreover, distinguishes

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self-government from independence and states that the objective of the trusteeship system shall be to promote the progressive development of the territories "towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned. . . ." Thus, the views of the Micronesians clearly are to be freely expressed and taken into account, but the machinery for determining those views is apparently left to the discretion of each administering power in the absence of any restriction in the Charter.

Based on an examination of previous UN trusteeship plebiscites, the Mission sees no reason why the Trusteeship Council would not as usual authorize the framing of the alternatives to be offered in the plebiscite and join the United States as the administering authority in setting up the plebiscite machinery. If, after the plebiscite, a Security Council resolution recognizing the freely expressed act of Micronesian self-determination and formally terminating the trusteeship agreement were to be vetoed, the United States would presumably take certain actions. It is not the Mission's province to recommend over-all tactics in the UN, but it should be stressed that from the Micronesian viewpoint reasonably rapid recognition of their act of self-determination should be taken by the United States without awaiting the results of a drawn out debate in the United Nations.

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At a minimum the granting of United States national status (which on the surface appears permissible under the wording of Article 3 of the trusteeship agreement although there is some question by legal counsel of state) is necessary to give the Micronesians the assurance that their political future has been resolved. The question of additional steps to make the trusteeship agreement a dead issue (such as the discontinuation of reporting to the UN completely or by reporting to the Committee on Non-self-governing Territories rather than the Trusteeship and Security Councils) is one that can be decided only at the appropriate time given the over-all situation at that time.

The Micronesians

The United States must begin preparing the Micronesians for the plebiscite immediately. Our preparation must take into account the factors and attitudes previously discussed in section B:

(1) The fact that essentially all legislative powers for the territory are still concentrated in the High Commissioner, that the all-important central and district administration is still in the hands of Americans, and that existing local legislatures are lacking in power and resources;

(2) Distance, transportation and communications problems frustrate a normal diffusion and exchange of ideas;

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- (3) The islands of Micronesia are culturally diverse, essentially still quite provincial in outlook, segregated into artificial districts and lacking in common experience;
- (4) In most islands the hold of the traditional chiefs and land tenure systems remains strong and respected;
- (5) While young leaders are emerging in the bureaucracy, they require additional development and training;
- (6) Normal "interest" groups are lacking save for a small business community generally engaged in export-import enterprises;
- (7) Special local problems exist such as the question of land rights in the Marshalls and the Marianas' desire to affiliate with Guam; and
- (8) While there is no hard core of resistance to affiliation now, there has been very little thought given to the possibility, and what little thought is given raises concerns, doubts and fears about the unknowns of affiliation and what it would mean to vested interests.

It is obvious that the problems implicit in the above listing cannot be solved overnight and that some of them require very delicate handling so as to lessen fears rather than heighten them. It is also in the United States interest, we believe, to proceed in stages to solve some of the problems so as to secure the maximum propaganda advantage out of the moves made to solve the problems. Further, while

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it would be wise and indeed necessary to indicate by concrete action our good intentions with respect to the development of Micronesia, and, for example, to spell out clearly the type of government that would exist under affiliation with the United States, it also makes good sense at the time of the plebiscite to have some inducements left to offer as a reward for a favorable vote.

Thus, as will be detailed in the next section, we believe action should be taken in 1964 to convert the Council of Micronesia into a true legislative body. This action is a necessary first step in the time-table of Micronesian political development. Subsequently, when the plebiscite is announced, a Presidential Executive order (see Appendix B for proposed draft) could be issued promulgating the Micronesian government to take effect on a specified date after the plebiscite (irrespective of the plebiscite results). The creation of the office of the Chief Micronesian Executive in that order, even though subject to limitations explained later in this report, together with the promise of recognition of the areas as a United States territory and a grant of the status of United States nationals to the citizens of the Trust Territory would constitute a set of generally attractive inducements for permanent affiliation with the United States. The other more specific inducements and reassurances that would impel the three groups of political leaders to organize a large favorable vote and that the Mission believes are appropriate are described below.

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The other factors which pose problems in preparing Micronesia -- the lack of common experience, provincialism, the diversity of cultures and the lack of trained personnel, can largely be solved only by time and experience. However, certain steps can be taken now to broaden the perspectives of the Micronesian leaders and people and to correct a general unawareness of the possibility of union with the United States. In this regard the Mission recommends that there be a concentrated effort made to bring the leaders of Micronesia together for discussions and conferences on matters of broad interest and for the exchange and dissemination of information, including information about the United States and its interests and activities in the Trust Territory. To the extent possible, these men and women should be exposed to the affairs of the territory as a whole and to the districts other than their own. Special emphasis, we believe, should be given to the promising young bureaucrats and younger businessmen who are the major potential for Micronesian leadership. It is recommended that the young leaders of Micronesia should be given further opportunity to develop through leadership grants which will enable them to go to the United States. An administrative training program should be established in Micronesia by contract with an American university noted for its work in that field. Also groups of Micronesians should be selected by the High Commissioner and the district administrators to be sent as a group to an American university to be trained for political and administrative leadership.

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At the same time the United States must create in the average people of Micronesia a political consciousness about the United States, its strengths, interests and concerns. The people of Micronesia are not unintelligent -- far from it, even among those living in small villages, under thatched roofs, without water or electricity or toilets and only half-dressed by American standards. There is a good native intelligence, a dignity of person and high standards of civil behavior. But there is little or no understanding about the United Nations trusteeship, the role of the United States or the possibilities for future political development.

Knowledge about the United States, of course, is greater in the urbanized district centers where some of the best educated Micronesians work. The ways of the West, with alcoholic beverages, cha-cha dancing, cowboy movies, supermarket grocery stores and the habits of American family and social life are evident there. On Kwajalein Island, hundreds of Marshallese can see a full-blown American community, almost a reproduction of a California suburb. But, the majority of Micronesians, outside the district centers, have had little or no contact with world news, United States policy and the American government.

In developing the educational curriculum, the United States has studiously avoided pressing knowledge about the American political system. Perhaps indicative of the attitude is the lack of American flags, pictures and displays. On the other hand, United Nations posters

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appear frequently. Most significantly, the delay in teaching English to the children until the sixth grade, whether justified by pedagogical theory or the lack of English-speaking teachers, has lost precious years in developing a territory-wide medium of communication which is an important means of engendering common interests and institutions and the rapid spread of information.

There is no close count of the privately-owned radios in the Trust Territory. The government estimates that, in 1962, there were some 2,000 sets in indigenous homes. In any case, the number is constantly increasing, and radios represent the quickest and easiest means for the dissemination of ideas. The Saipanese listen to the Guam radio; the Marshallese receive a strong signal from Kwajalein, but unless they understand English they are closed out to news interpretation and must rely on their own, weaker station broadcasting in Marshallese. Ponape is planning a radio transmitter. Yap has no transmitter but can hear the Palauan radio which broadcasts almost exclusively in Palauan. In both Palau and Truk the overwhelming portions of the programs are music, with little or no English broadcasts. Palau radio broadcasts the news three times a week. Japanese, Chinese and Moscow broadcasts can be heard clearly in the Carolines and Marianas although the Mission was unable to identify any sentiments that might derive from those sources. The Voice of America is not heard clearly in most areas, but local stations do use the tapes and material of the United States Information Service.

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and to run the information, radio programming and adult education program in the district; (2) an information-adult education specialist should be added to the headquarters staff to develop programs to influence mass attitudes; and (3) the Peace Corps volunteers (proposed program in the Community Action program of Part II, Section B of this report) should be utilized to help implement the adult education and information programs at the community level as part of the proposed community action program. It is strongly suggested that Americans who have the needed skills and experience be recruited with the help of the United States Information Service (or possibly through the help of the Department of State) for these Public Affairs or Information officers in the Trust Territory. They should be responsible for the development of favorable political attitudes toward the United States through a systematic program of information through various communications media. They would assist in the selection of persons for educational tours in Guam, Hawaii and the mainland and act as reporters and evaluators of all activities and attitudes that might have an important bearing on the outcome of the plebiscite in Micronesia.

G. Present and Post-Plebiscite Territorial Government

The current government organization of the Trust Territory, as noted earlier, consists of the United States financed and directed government under the High Commissioner with its field structure extending down through the districts and three layers of Micronesian government -- the territorial advisory Council of Micronesia, the district legislature and the municipal

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magistrates and councils -- superimposed on the traditional clan organization. The High Commissioner's government is unusual -- even among the United States territories -- in the degree to which it dominates the field, accounting for well over ninety percent of the governmental expenditures in the area.

A considerable effort has been made by American officials to copy democratic institutions which have little political relevance in the situation. Those officials have been urged on in that direction by the United Nations which has also exaggerated the theme of self-government, pushing complex democratic forms upon a Micronesian community that had no experience therewith and a minimum economic capacity to support them. The product is an apparently greatly "over-governed" community of only 81,000 people of which easily 1,000 serve in one or more legislatures and municipal councils, aside from the traditional clan councils and the 2,200 Micronesians in the Trust Territory Government.

The present Council of Micronesia is still no more than the inter-district advisory committee from which it grew. The new name was chosen in 1962. It has no legislative power, no executive counterpart and merely passes declarations, resolutions and recommendations to the High Commissioner for such action as he deems appropriate. No laws prescribe its functions or the manner of the selection of members, instead, each year the High Commissioner has announced that there

will be a meeting of the advisory body at a certain time (usually the Spring) and place and invites the districts to send representatives. In response to, or in anticipation of the invitation, the districts each select two representatives, usually by popular election, although the district legislature selects the members from Ponape. Tradition apparently calls for certain subdistricting so that, for example, Saipan elects one of the Mariana members and the other is elected by Tinian and Rota, and Yap Island selects one of the members from that district while the district administrator selects the representative of the outer islands in that district.

We have already discussed the need for a more meaningful Micronesian central government, not only to dispel Micronesian doubts as to the shape of their government in affiliation with the United States but also to offer inducements to the Micronesians to vote for affiliation. The present feeble structure, in the Mission's opinion, does not satisfy those needs. As important is the need to satisfy the world community it is our friends to whom we must look for assistance in the matter of affiliation as well as the new nations and the neutrals -- that we would be providing Micronesia with a reasonable degree of self-government. Without that, we would be defenseless against charges that we are grabbing Micronesia to thrust it into a colonial status without consideration of the interests and rights of its people.

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The question then is: How can the existing weak institution be converted or developed into a meaningful central government for Micronesia in the short time before the plebiscite? It is the conclusion of the Mission that a central government for Micronesia can only become effective through the transfer to it of some of the executive, legislative and judicial powers of the High Commissioner and the United States government for the Trust Territory. Such transfer, however, must be accompanied by adequate protection of the United States interests in the area and its government and the United States funds involved.

The Legislature:

The first step in the right direction is already underway in that the High Commissioner announced to the United Nations that by 1965 the Council of Micronesia will become a legislative body. A draft order outlining the creation of a Congress of Micronesia has been prepared by the Department of the Interior and was discussed at the meeting of the Council in the Spring of 1963.

The path to the formation of a Congress, however, is strewn with many obstacles. No one who has visited the territory, stopped at the isolated atolls and district centers, can be blind to the separateness of the Marianas from the Marshalls, the Yap Islands, Ponape, Truk and Palau. There has been no common historical heritage in the area, no common language, religion or economy to raise transcending problems that require solution in a single territory-wide legislature.

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By some standards the establishment of a central legislature might seem premature, especially since it will have few resources to work with and little control over the bulk of the funds spent in the territory and the executive machinery which spends those funds and enforces the laws. If regarded solely as a law-making body, in its first years it might seem to have too little to do for all the effort and expense of creating it. But most institutions have an educational value beyond their functional operations. Legislatures are extraordinary educational bodies. The opportunity of bringing together regularly elected representatives of the people from all the islands, having them concentrate on emerging and gradually increasing common problems, indeed, creating issues, and training them in political leadership, responsibility and the practice of democracy cannot be missed. Moreover, as soon as legislative power is transferred the Micronesian Congress will be able to tax -- and the responsibility for taxation is the surest way of teaching statemanship. It is therefore the Mission's recommendation that, as the first step toward the creation of an effective Micronesian central government, the Council of Micronesia should be converted into a legislative body with the delegated authority to legislate on all territorial matters. That conversion should take place in the Fall of 1964. In the Mission's opinion, deliberations on the composition of the legislature and other outstanding problems should be completed during the session of the current Council of Micronesia in the Spring of 1964. Action should

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then be taken promptly to promulgate an order setting forth the powers, membership, election and procedures of the legislature.

That order should be issued in time to permit the election of the first legislature in August or September 1964 and the convening of the legislature in November 1964. This would give the legislature the maximum experience possible, and, on the basis of a three-year term, permit the election of a second legislature for a term beginning in the Fall of 1967. Depending on the situation at that time, the announcement of the plebiscite to be held in the Spring of 1968 could be made either before or after the 1967 election.

It is the further recommendation of the Mission that the legislature should be established by a Presidential order or an order of the Secretary of the Interior approved by the President in order to lend to it as great a prestige as possible and to provide for necessary interagency coordination.

Briefly, the draft order prepared by the Department of the Interior provided for the establishment of a single house of twenty-one members to be apportioned among the districts roughly on the basis of population (with the smaller Yap and Mariana districts receiving slightly excessive representation) with a reapportionment every ten years. Legislators would have to be at least twenty-five years old, citizens of the Trust Territory and residents for two years prior to their election. They would be elected for two-year terms by the residents of their districts who are Trust Territory citizens at least eighteen years old, and they

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would receive a salary of \$2,080 annually. They could have no other gainful employment. Provision would be made for two regular sessions each year and for special sessions.

Under the Interior draft, the legislature would be granted the power to legislate on all rightful matters of legislation not inconsistent with the treaties, international agreements and laws of the United States or the Trust Territory bill of rights. Their enactments would be subject to approval by the High Commissioner, but, in the event they overrode his veto by a two-thirds vote, the final decision on an enactment would be made by the Secretary of the Interior. The High Commissioner would also be given the authority to promulgate urgent laws unilaterally with the approval of the Secretary. On the key question of Federal funds, the legislature would be allowed to review and make recommendations on the High Commissioner's budget before it goes to the Secretary.

Although a working committee of the Council of Micronesia suggested only slight changes in the Interior draft, the Council itself, in March 1963, came up with recommendations as to organization which varied substantially from the draft. Primarily, the Council proposed a bicameral legislature consisting of a lower house, the Assembly, of sixteen members very roughly based on population, and an upper house, the House of Delegates, composed of two members from each district. The latter were to serve for four years and be at least thirty years old. The Council further proposed a review of the bicameral system after the

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first year by the Assembly. Only the holding of other government positions was to be barred and salaries were to be provided by law. Other minor changes were also proposed from the Interior proposal.

The key issue that requires resolution appears to be that of the membership of the legislature. The Council voted for a bicameral legislature by a narrow margin apparently with the idea in mind of either preserving the upper house for the traditional chiefs or of minimizing the proportional representation which the large districts particularly Truk, would enjoy in a legislature based strictly on population. However, the debate was rather indecisive and, as one member said, "I voted for the bicameral system, because nobody seemed to give any reasons why it should be unicameral."

In the judgement of the Mission, it would be a grave error to allow a bicameral system to take root in the territorial legislature. Micronesia has only 81,000 people who must already support a sizeable legislative superstructure. They should not be called upon to support an additional house in the legislature. In addition, the shortage of Micronesians with real leadership talent makes it necessary to concentrate the supply. To find even twenty, let alone a much larger number of capable Micronesians to elect to the legislature will be a challenge. The institution of two houses will also call for a higher degree of leadership and parliamentary skill than appears available -- it will be enough of a strain to get a single house functioning with a semblance

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of order -- and no doubt will call for longer sessions and more staffing, another commodity in short supply.

The larger goal, moreover, is not to perpetuate the rigid island sectionalism which in the particular setting of Micronesia will be fostered by the bicameral scheme, but to develop a sense of community interest in Micronesia. The Micronesians must realize that all the districts form part of the same entity. The United States must consider the Micronesian legislature as the first step toward an affiliation with the United States after the plebiscite. Since the leaders of the first legislature will inevitably have a voice in future arrangements, these also will proceed more smoothly if the Micronesian leaders are working together in one body.

In addition, it is the judgement of the Mission, that the members of the legislature should be elected from single-member subdistricts insofar as practical rather than at-large from the existing districts. This will provide for better representation of all the people of the territory. In Ponape, for example, it will be very important to have Kusaie as a separate subdistrict; in Yap, the outer islands should be a subdistrict. Without such subdistricting it is certain that all the members of the legislature would, in effect, be elected by the people living in the more populous district centers. We believe the advantage of giving certain outlying areas the right to elect members

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of their own outweighs the disadvantage which may result in some cases
from the fact that the subdistricts will contain differing numbers of
people.

Based on the above, it is the recommendation of the Mission
that the Micronesian legislature should consist of a single house
of about twenty members to be elected to the extent practical from
single-member subdistricts rather than at-large from the existing
districts. If, for some reason, it is impossible to convince the
Council of Micronesia along those lines at its next session it would be
our alternative suggestion, as a temporary measure, that the legis-
lature be set up initially in the same manner as the current Council,
with two representatives from each district and with appropriate sub-
districting to allow the outer islands to have representation.

The Mission found itself at variance with the proposals of the Depart-
ment of the Interior and the Council of Micronesia regarding the legis-
lature in several other respects. First, we believe the minimum age
qualification should be set as low as twenty-one years for membership in
the legislature. In our opinion this is necessary to encompass as many
educated Micronesians, especially those few who are now graduating from
colleges, as possible in the potential group from which the legislature
be chosen. Second, we believe a term of three years is more realistic
than a term of two years under Micronesian conditions. Third, we believe

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that a salary of \$3,000 annually is more in keeping with the amount required to attract the best people to service in the legislature. That amount would equate with the salary now received by Micronesians serving as department heads at the district level. Fourth, we believe it is unrealistic to require at this time that the members drop all other gainful employment in order to serve in the legislature for very limited periods during each year. We also believe it is unrealistic to require at this time that the legislators terminate their service in the Trust Territory government. We would certainly support such a requirement a few years from now unless a clear distinction is created between those legislators who would hold political appointments in the executive branch and the career civil servants, but as we have noted, most district legislatures are now dominated by government employees and we believe it will be necessary to rely on that group for much of the potential membership in the legislature of Micronesia. We do feel, however, that the members of the legislature should not receive dual compensation during periods in which they serve in the legislature -- those who are government employees should be put on leave without pay for such periods.

Finally, we believe that action should be taken by the High Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior to perfect the existing Trust Territory code before the Micronesian legislature receives the power to amend the Code with its own laws. What is particularly needed are laws spelling out the functions and duties of various government

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departments. This should not be left to absolute executive discretion
or under the proposed action to establish a Micronesia Chief
Executive. In Part III of the report are detailed recommendations for
implementing this proposal.

The above views of the Mission regarding the proposed legislature are
embodied in a draft order which we have prepared and attached (Appendix A).
The doubts and fears of the different districts over a new territory
legislature -- in particular with respect to their existing
rights -- must also be allayed. Political education will help, and
some persuasion that the High Commissioner retains a veto over any
legislation that might penalize the minority, that legislation will not
extend to matters covered by their bill of rights, including the traditional
land tenure system, and that the division into subdistricts for electoral
purposes will break up any domination by the populous district centers.
Anyone joining a larger community must yield something in order to
secure the benefits of that union. At least in the case of the eventual
territory of Micronesia, this larger community will contribute more
to the political, economic and social development of its component
parts than it will take away.

The Executive Power:

With the creation of a Micronesian legislature and its enactment of
territorial laws, the need for an executive counterpart will increase.
Initially, the High Commissioner will be able to execute the laws of

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the legislature and spend their funds through his organization, but as time goes on the anomaly of the situation will increase. This factor, combined with the one already stressed of the need to satisfy the world community and Micronesia that they will have a realistic measure of self-government, make consideration of a Micronesian Chief Executive imperative. The establishment of such an office should be the next step in the evolutionary development of Micronesian political institutions.

The formation of the office of a Micronesian Chief Executive apart from that of the High Commissioner, however, represents a departure from the historic ways in which the United States has governed its territories. Looking forward to the period after the plebiscite when Micronesia may become another United States territory, it would seem logical that it should follow the pattern of Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa and, until recently, Alaska and Hawaii. As such, the area would be governed by a Presidentially-appointed governor who would be the chief United States representative in the area as well as the executive head of the local government.

However, in the opinion of the Mission, we must be prepared to go farther in the case of Micronesia. Micronesia is not now United States territory; we wish it to become so. To accomplish that we must convince the United Nations and the Micronesians that a measure of self-government will be given. The continuation of all executive power

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in an American High Commissioner or governor is not compatible with that image. On the other hand, we believe that the creation of a Micronesian Chief Executive along with the continuation of the United States High Commissioner will satisfy that objective and provide the vehicle for the transfer of realistic responsibility to the Micronesians gradually and flexibly and under circumstances which will continue effectively to protect United States interests and funds. The establishment of a Micronesian Chief Executive, serving primarily at the pleasure of his legislature or people, will also create a responsibility of government in Micronesia which it has been difficult to develop in our existing territories. There the legislature and executive depend on two different sources of power and have no real need to work together constructively.

For the above reasons, it is the recommendation of the Mission that the office of a Micronesian Chief Executive should be created to function as the executive head of the government of Micronesia. It might be noted that such an office has been created under a United States High Commissioner in the Ryukyu Islands, and the arrangement appears to be working well.

The Mission considered various alternatives regarding the timing of the establishment of a Micronesian Chief Executive. It would, of course, be possible to do so concurrently with the establishment of the legislature. The difficulties implicit in having the High Commissioner execute the legislature's laws would then be overcome. However, such action would confuse and complicate the already difficult situation that would then

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prevail. It would be preferable to allow the legislature to organize, begin to function and gain several years experience before the next big hurdle is crossed. In addition, the Congress might react unfavorably to such abrupt action. Finally, an adverse reaction might result among the Micronesians in the event that a Chief Executive, for one reason or another, had to be removed from office prior to the plebiscite.

We also considered the establishment of the office around 1967 in order to demonstrate our good intentions regarding self-government even before the plebiscite is announced. This would have the additional advantage of giving the Micronesians some experience with the institution and a clear idea of the shape of their government in affiliation with the United States by the time of the plebiscite. Again, this alternative was rejected because of the possibility of having to remove a Chief Executive before the plebiscite.

While it would also be possible merely to promise, during the period before the plebiscite, that the office would be established after the plebiscite, it is the Mission recommendation that an order -- and this should be a Presidential executive order because of the importance of document in the eyes of the United Nations -- setting up the office of Chief Executive should be issued at the time the plebiscite is announced to be effective immediately before or after the plebiscite. This would constitute evidence of our good faith; it will come after the legislature has had over three years of experience; it will provide the Micronesians

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with a clear view of the shape of their government in affiliation; it will constitute an inducement for a favorable vote for affiliation; ^{and} it will not involve the risk of the removal of a Chief Executive before the plebiscite. ^{re}

Alternatives also exist with respect to the manner in which the Chief Executive shall be chosen. It might be possible to have him elected directly by the people of the Territory. However, as we have stressed, in the absence of information in the districts about people outside their areas and with the existing problems of distance transportation and communications and with the absence of any political party machinery for overcoming those problems, that choice does not appear feasible. Consideration was also given to have the Chief Executive elected by the legislature. This might provide a greater appearance of self-government but provides no guarantee that the election would not be simply a popularity contest or that the Chief Executive would have the support of the majority of the legislature. ^{cal} The Mission believes, instead, that it would be preferable to have the High Commissioner appoint the Chief Executive on the basis of a nomination by the legislature and with the assurance that the Chief Executive can command the confidence of the majority of the legislature. Essentially then a parliamentary form of government would be created. To complete the system, the Chief Executive ^{should be} selected from the legislature, but there would be no need to require ^{require} by statute. Practice would be the best father of the law.

To assure an appropriate degree of maturity and yet not to limit too severely the potential choice of Chief Executive, the Mission recommends that the qualifications of the Chief Executive should be the same as those of members of the legislature, except that he should be at least thirty years of age. On the matter of salary, in order to provide for comparability with the salaries paid to government personnel -- including United States personnel -- and to provide adequately for the expenses of the office, we recommend that the Chief Executive should receive an annual salary of about \$17,500.

A major question arises concerning the disposition of the operating departments and agencies under the High Commissioner. It would, on the one hand, be possible to continue them under the High Commissioner and not make them part of the Micronesian government. This would mean greater control over the development and management of their programs and the use of the Federal resources involved. However, it would also place us in the strange position of having two governments in Micronesia -- the High Commissioner's government with over ninety percent of the resources and a very minor Micronesian government. The potential for duplication and conflict in that situation would be great. Continuation of the bulk of executive activities under the High Commissioner while having transferred

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legislative power with respect thereto to the Micronesian legislature would be awkward and would severely limit the concept of self-government in Micronesia.

We, therefore, recommend that, at the time the Chief Executive is established, the executive departments and agencies now in the office of the High Commissioner should be transferred to the government of Micronesia and placed under the general supervision of the Chief Executive with adequate safeguards of the United States interests involved. As noted above, the powers and duties of those departments should be spelled out now in law to limit the discretion of the executive in administering them. In addition to supervising those activities and others that might be added by the laws of Micronesia, the Chief Executive would carry on the generally accepted executive functions of appointing the heads of departments and agencies and the district administrators, approving the enactments of the Micronesian legislature and executing the laws of Micronesia. The need to move Micronesian bureaucrats into more responsible positions and to train them in anticipation of such a change is obvious.

The end product of the shift of the operations and executive powers from the High Commissioner would be a government organization in which the High Commissioner continues as the United States representative with the power to exercise certain controls over the

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Micronesian government to protect the United States interests. He would retain a small personal staff to carry out his control functions and probably to provide technical advice to the Micronesian government. We would visualize the continued employment by the Trust Territory government of a cadre of American personnel until such time as trained Micronesians are available. None of these shifts would affect the operations of other Federal agencies in the area.

It is obvious that the transfer to the Micronesian government of responsibility for carrying out a program which is financed for the most part with Federal funds must be accompanied by controls which adequately protect Federal interests, not only in the funds, but also in the government of Micronesia generally. Any number and variety of controls could be visualized. We concluded that the control which would, on the one hand, be the most effective, and, on the other, be the most defensible, would be a control over the Federal funds to be used by the Micronesian government. Without those funds, a government of Micronesia would be impossible. We would envision a continuation of the system of securing the comments and recommendations of the Micronesian government on the budget that is submitted to the Secretary of the Interior -- indeed the Chief Executive and his departments and agencies should be quite directly

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involved in the preparation of that budget -- and an allocation of those funds once appropriated by the High Commissioner to the local government. However, we would recommend that the High Commissioner should have the authority to review the use of Federal funds by the government of Micronesia and to withhold or withdraw those funds when he believes they are being used improperly. That power standing by itself, we believe, would be enough to compel any Micronesian government to follow the wishes of the High Commissioner in most matters. Withdrawal of funds could certainly be used, for example, to force the resignation of a Chief Executive who might be acting contrary to United States interests. Such power alone, however, might still permit situations which would be highly embarrassing to the United States and inimical to its interests. For example, the legislature might refuse to elect a Chief Executive or to elect one which the High Commissioner would consider appropriate. The legislature might also enact laws which would be in conflict with United States interests or which would so reshape the executive machinery as to create severe problems on the expenditure of funds. To overcome those problems, we recommend that the High Commissioner should have the additional power of appointing an Acting Chief Executive in the event of a vacancy or in case the legislature does not elect a satisfactory Chief Executive within a reasonable period of time. Such an appointed Chief Executive should serve until the legislature

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does elect a satisfactory Chief Executive, with disputes as to the approval of a Chief Executive being referred to the Secretary of the Interior. Further, where United States security or interests are involved, he should have the power to approve the Chief Executive's major appointments and to veto or annul legislation and to remove public officials.

The above views of the Mission regarding the proposed organization of the government of Micronesia and the office of the Chief Executive are embodied in a draft executive order which we have prepared and attached (Appendix B). The extent to which that order spells out the structure of the Micronesian government would, of course, in itself constitute a control over the actions of the Micronesian government. It would also serve to allay certain other fears through the inclusion of a bill of rights preserving local customs and prescribing the manner in which -- if at all -- non-Micronesians can acquire property and business interests.

II. Additional Plebiscite Inducements

In addition to issuing the executive order which would establish the office of the Chief Executive after the plebiscite, as we have mentioned earlier, several other inducements for a favorable vote in the plebiscite should be made known in the appropriate form. The most important of those, we believe, would be the announcement

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that action will be initiated to secure the status of United States nationals for the Micronesians in the event they choose to affiliate with the United States. The benefits that go with that status as well as its symbolic meaning would go a long way toward assuring a favorable vote if carefully explained. As noted earlier, this is, of course, a matter on which the Congress must be thoroughly consulted beforehand. The Mission believes that citizenship, however, cannot now be considered because of the threat it poses to certain of the vested rights of the Micronesians, particularly their restrictive land tenure system and restrictions of entry of American business. Action must be taken on the latter restrictions before citizenship will be feasible.

Additional inducements that are also appropriate to offer at the time of the plebiscite would be (1) the extension of the social security system to wage and salary earners in Micronesia and (2) the completion of action to equalize American and Micronesian government pay schedules (discussed further in Part III).

The Mission believes it is too early to make a definite recommendation on steps to be taken after the plebiscite and the establishment of a Micronesian Chief Executive. As noted earlier, we do believe that subsequent to those actions consideration could appropriately be given to confirming the then existing organization

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through an organic act. It is not too early, however, to begin consideration of an eventual merger of Micronesia and the Territory of Guam. In the long run this would be logical because of cultural, racial and other ties between the territories and because it would result in administrative economics and probably stimulate the economic development of both areas.

I. Government at the District Level

Elected district legislatures have been established in all six districts of the Trust Territory. The achievement of creating those bodies in the space of half a dozen years, given that lack of Micronesian experience with such institutions and the problems of transportation and communications, deserves great praise. The Administration has been in a tutelary position, taking the initiative in suggesting the chartering of district legislatures, helping in parliamentary procedures, the drafting of bills and giving general counsel on subjects of legislation, appropriations and other legislative matters. The enactments of the district legislatures have been subject to approval by the High Commissioner on the recommendation of the district administrators.

The real problems of the district legislature lie in (1) their lack of any significant revenues with which to work to develop programs of district interest, (2) the lack of an executive

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counterpart -- their laws being enforced by the district administrator who is a representative of the central government, (3) memberships made up in large part by the employees of the district administration, (4) the non-elective representation of traditional chiefs in some districts, and (5) their general lack of political experience and leadership.

The history of modern legislatures revolves around appropriations by consent. Without power to tax and spend public funds, the role of a legislature is severely limited. The district legislatures of Micronesia have some control over the resources in their areas, but not much. The Marshall Islands district, for example, collected the most taxes in 1962, about \$93,000, while Yap collected only \$31,000. United States funds for just the operations, not the capital improvements in those districts in 1963 ran to about \$825,000 and \$385,000 respectively. All the districts -- and the municipalities in Micronesia -- collected only \$750,000 in taxes and other revenues in 1962 as contrasted with the \$6,304,000 in United States funds appropriated for the area in the same year. In 1963, the \$15,000,000 Federal appropriation will overshadow local revenues even further.

The current circumstances in which the vast majority of the funds spent for governmental purposes in the districts come from the

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United States and are spent through the machinery of the central government under the control of the High Commissioner can be expected to continue indefinitely, even after a partial shift of responsibility to a Micronesian Chief Executive. Further, because of the small amount of district revenues, it makes little sense to create a distinct district executive arm apart from that of the central government. The Mission recommends, however, that the district legislatures should be consulted and their recommendations should be sought in connection with the preparation of the budgets of the district administrators and on the allocation of funds. Those budgets should cover the use of United States as well as district funds. They should be able to determine how their own funds will be spent, but their appropriations should be included in a consolidated district budget. This would enable the district administrator to secure the legislature's knowledge of local needs and their evaluation of his program. The most important objective is to bring the district administrator and the district legislature closer together in thinking about the needs of the district. Too often the district administrator now seems to be running one government while the legislature is operating another—even to the point of having a district treasurer, selected and paid by the legislature, to collect taxes and, in some cases, to make separate disbursements. This practice, in effect creating a minor executive arm of the

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legislature, should be stopped. All district tax collections and all disbursements of district funds should be made by the district administrator or his agents. This principle is beginning to receive recognition in some of the districts as exemplified by Public Law 4-63 of the Palau legislature in which a grant of \$4,250 was made to the municipalities "to be administered and controlled by the District Administrator, who is further authorized under this resolution to make any change he sees necessary and justified to insure that public funds are properly handled and used wisely". This practice should be clarified and enforced in all districts.

The scarcest resource in Micronesia is skilled manpower. The lack of administrators and political leaders in the Trust Territory is serious. One consequence has been to extend the lean talents available over two or more responsibilities, asking the few kaen men, usually with good English-speaking ability, to serve two masters or to do more than they can realistically manage. The drive to establish legislatures has put a heavy burden on the administration to find competent legislators. The brighter young men, familiar with American ideas of government, are to be found working mainly for the district administration and headquarters. These have been the natural candidates to fill many legislative seats in all six districts, but the number of those seats (79 in the Marshalls, 40 in Pohnpei, and so forth) has drained all the Trust Territory

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talent. The problem of the oversized legislature is currently being solved through headquarters efforts to reduce the membership in those legislatures, but there is still a premium on talent.

In all district legislatures the number of administration employees runs upwards of 30 or 40 percent of the total membership and in some districts they constitute a majority. In Yap, for example, three members of the legislature work for one private enterprise, three are unemployed and fourteen are either teachers or otherwise work for the government. The domination of a legislature that has the power to tax and appropriate money and which must learn to criticize the use of executive power by men working for the executive is plainly unhealthy. In addition, the administration suffers from the interruption of its work during legislative sessions, from a confusion of roles among some of its key employees and a lack of healthy criticism.

No quick remedy is suggested. If all administration employees were denied seats in district legislatures this year chaos would ensue because the legislatures would be depopulated. The stipends of legislators are so small that no Micronesian government employee would opt for a legislative post. It is not too early, however, to lay down some fundamental principles and planning for the following years. The Mission recommends that (1) no district administrator or assistant district administrator should now be permitted

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hold a seat in the district legislature and (2) within two or three years no department heads at the district level should be permitted to hold a seat. Other employees who continue to hold seats should gradually be given a choice between their legislative and executive functions, but for the present should be placed on leave without pay during legislative sessions.

It must be recognized that the development of independent district legislatures in Micronesia, where sessions last one or two months a year, requires individuals who have sources of income from the private sector and who can earn enough from their salaries as legislators to make ends meet. A good legislative system in Micronesia is not conceivable until relatively independent skilled legislators can be found. To help foster that development, the district legislatures should provide for adequate compensation of their members on a per diem basis and, to help ease the burden on the districts, the administration should provide free transportation for members to legislative sessions.

With an increase of power over municipal functions (as is proposed below), greater access to and discussions of the district budget, a continuing reduction in membership, and greater tax resources if the economy thrives, the district legislatures can be raised to

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a more useful role. (In that connection, note should be taken of the Taxation Policy section, II-B-8, of the Mission report dealing with taxes in which it is recommended that, on the one hand, the districts be barred from taxing exports and imports while, on the other hand, the district's remaining educational functions would be transferred to the central government with the net effect of increasing the amounts of funds available for other district activities.) To help in that direction, it is recommended that each district legislature should appoint an executive committee of three to five members to perform legislative functions during the periods when the legislature is not in session -- to study legislation, scrutinize the budget, investigate executive actions, transmit petitions and prepare the agenda for the sessions of the legislature. The members of such committees should receive additional compensation at a rate equivalent to that of a district department head.

J. Government at the Municipal Level

In June 1963, the headquarters political affairs officer wrote to the High Commissioner:

"Our local governments need attention ... Some confusion and misunderstanding exists on the part of local officials regarding their duties and responsibilities. Financial problems are present also, due to limited

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local revenues, relatively high salaries, tax collection difficulties and management. Charter provisions are frequently violated. Elections are often improperly administered. Many municipalities have simply 'gone bad' ... local government is not receiving the support of the people which it must have. Criticism is mounting in the municipalities. Further deterioration will weaken the foundations of our active political development program ..."

Beginning in 1957 in Metalanin, the Trust Territory embarked upon an intensive program of chartering municipalities with an honest desire to bring self-government down to the smallest village. In the previous Japanese administration, of course, neither legislatures nor a democratic expression of policy had existed, with the commands of the Japanese passing to village chiefs for execution. The current chartered municipalities consist of an elected magistrate, an elected council, sometimes an elected treasurer and secretary, and they have the power to pass ordinances, tax and collect revenues subject to the approval of the district administrator. Their power to tax is fairly limitless with the result that they frequently duplicate district and even territory taxes.

With the zeal for pushing the responsibility for local government upon Micronesians, including the responsibility for roads, schools,

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police, and so forth, some of the plain political and administrative facts that promote government efficiency were overlooked. The largest municipality in the Marshalls, for example, has just over a thousand electors. They elect a magistrate and ten council members from four precincts. Another municipality has only 238 electors voting for a council of 16 with nominations and voting carried out by a primitive house-to-house canvass. Three other municipalities, with potential electorates of 460, 200 and 80 could not even have their elections supervised by the district because the transportation problems were so difficult.

In Ponape district, four municipalities with electorate of a little more than a thousand people in each had to elect 11, 17, 20 and 21 officials. Members of the town council of Kolonia, the district center on Ponape, were elected by precinct, the second precinct having only 57 inhabitants.

In Truk only five municipalities collected revenues of more than \$1,000 in 1962. The municipality of Parea used nine different taxes to collect \$220 of which \$32 was spent for transportation and office supplies, \$36 for police and the rest for the salaries and expenses of the magistrate, council and secretary. The largest municipality of Palau, with a total budget of \$15,502 in 1964, will spend an estimated \$8,062 for salaries of the magistrate, council,

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clerks, tax collector, high chief, chiefs, and district congress-
man. In Malekeiok municipality, \$640 in salaries were paid to
officials out of \$845 in revenues, and in Ngardman the only
expenditures made during the year were \$10 for rental of boat or
vehicle and \$1.09 for miscellaneous expenses, the rest of the \$394
in revenues going to the magistrate and his council.

Even with this evidence, generalization about municipalities is
misleading. Saipan, for example, which was chartered by the Navy
as a single municipality, has revenues of more than \$300,000 and
a population of about 8,000. Yap has no chartered municipalities
yet on the other hand. Nevertheless there is a pattern of too many
municipalities for too few people, too many elected officials with
too few responsibilities receiving too large a portion of hard-
earned tax revenues for salaries. A complicated governmental unit
has been imposed upon a paucity of resources. The result is formal
elections, meetings, paperwork and little to show as a product in
the way of community improvement. The administration is to be
congratulated for its sincere effort to include all men and women
in a democratic electoral process, but it is the recommendation of
the Mission that the chartering of municipalities ought to be halted
until the whole institution is reevaluated.

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The election of municipal magistrates (mayors) by the people is probably a wise introduction of democratic control at the lowest level of government, but they should be the only municipal officials receiving salaries. Councilmen and other part-time appointees, if continued at all, should serve on a honorary basis. Both for purposes of the rationalization of the tax structure (see II-12-8) and to create a link between the municipalities and their district governments rather than continue a completely separate and inappropriate layer of municipal government, the magistrates's salaries should be paid by the district governments. The magistrates would then be responsible for the implementation of district laws and policies at the local level.

Finally, action needs to be taken to terminate municipal taxing authority. Taxing authority below the central government level should be confined to the districts.

The long-range objective should be a reduction of the load of elections and administration on small communities, the better coordination and supervision of municipal programs and activities from the district administrators office and an improved budgeting procedures and taxing procedures stemming from the concentration of authority and responsibility at the district level.

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APPENDIX A

Department of the Interior Order No. _____

Subject: Amendment of the Code of the Trust Territory to provide for the establishment of a Trust Territory Legislature

1. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 28 of the Code of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, such Code is hereby amended by the insertion of the following new chapter:

CHAPTER 3A

LEGISLATURE

Sec. 51. Legislative Power. The legislative power of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, except as otherwise provided in this Chapter, shall be vested in the Legislature of the Trust Territory which shall consist of a single house of twenty-one members. The legislative power shall extend to all rightful subjects of territorial legislation, except that no such legislation may be inconsistent with

- (a) treaties or international agreements of the United States;
- (b) the laws of the United States applicable to the Trust Territory;
- (c) sections 1 through 12 of the Code of the Trust Territory.

Prior to his submission of the annual budget of the Trust Territory to the Secretary of the Interior, the High Commissioner shall submit such budget to the Legislature for its review and recommendation. The High Commissioner shall adopt such recommendations of the Legislature as he may deem appropriate, but he shall transmit to the Secretary of the Interior all recommendations he has not adopted. Legislation for the expenditure of

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under
as other than as budgeted by the High Commissioner and the Secretary of the Interior and as appropriated by the Congress shall either include revenue measures to provide the needed funds or shall be based upon the receipt by the Government of the Trust Territory of revenues in excess of those estimated in the annual budget as presented to the Congress.

Sec. 52. Membership. For purposes of representation in the Legislature, the Trust Territory shall be divided into the six districts described in Section 39 of this Code. Of the twenty-one members of the Legislature, three shall be elected by the qualified voters who reside in the Mariana Island District; three shall be elected by the qualified voters who reside in the Palau District; one shall be elected by the qualified voters who reside on the Yap Islands, Yap District, and one by the qualified voters who reside in the remainder of the Yap District; five shall be elected by the qualified voters who reside in the Truk District; one shall be elected by the qualified voters who reside on Kusaie Island, Ponape District, and three by the qualified voters who reside in the remainder of the Ponape District; and four shall be elected by the qualified voters who reside in the Marshall Islands District. Consistent with the foregoing apportionment, the laws of the Trust Territory shall provide for the further division of each district into a number of sub-districts as nearly as possible on the basis of population equal to the number of members to which the district is entitled, and the qualified voters within each subdistrict shall be entitled to vote for the member.

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from that subdistrict. The number of members to be elected from each district and the boundaries of the subdistricts shall be reapportioned as nearly as possible on the basis of population at intervals of ten years beginning in 1980, but no district shall be entitled to less than two members at any time, regardless of population.

Sec. 53. Qualifications of Legislators. No person shall be eligible to be a member of the Legislature who is not a citizen of the Trust Territory, who has not attained the age of twenty-one years, who is not a qualified voter in the Trust Territory, or who has not been a bona fide resident of the Trust Territory for at least two years next preceding the date of his election. No person who has been expelled from the Legislature for giving or receiving a bribe or for being an accessory thereto, and no person who has been convicted of a felony or of a crime involving moral turpitude, shall sit in the Legislature, unless the person so convicted has been pardoned and has had restored to him his civil rights.

Sec. 54. Franchise. The franchise shall be vested in residents of the Trust Territory who are citizens of the Trust Territory, eighteen years of age or over. Additional qualifications may be prescribed by the Legislature: Provided, That no property, language, or income qualification shall ever be imposed or required of any voter, nor shall any discrimination in qualification be made or based upon difference in race, color, ancestry, sex, or religious belief.

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Sec. 55. Elections. General elections shall be held every three years beginning in 1964 on the first Tuesday following the first Monday in November and ending not later than three weeks thereafter. Legislators shall be chosen by secret ballot of the qualified electors of their respective subdistricts.

Sec. 56. Term. Each legislator shall hold office for a term of three years, commencing at noon on the third day of January following his election, except as otherwise provided by law.

Sec. 57. Sessions. There shall be two regular sessions of the Legislature held in each year, one beginning on the third day of January and the second beginning on the first day of July, except as otherwise provided by law. Each such session shall be held at the seat of government of the Trust Territory and shall continue for not to exceed forty-five consecutive calendar days.

The Legislature may meet in special session at the call of the High Commissioner, for such period of time and at such place as the High Commissioner may specify in his call, but no legislation may be considered in a special session other than that specified by the High Commissioner in his call for the special session or in a special message to the Legislature while in session.

Sec. 58. Enactment of Laws; Vetoes. The enacting clause of all bills shall be: "Be it enacted by the Legislature of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands", and no law shall be enacted except by bill. The High

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Commissioner may submit proposed legislation to the Legislature for consideration by it.

Every bill passed by the Legislature shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the High Commissioner. If the High Commissioner approves the bill, he shall sign it. If the High Commissioner disapproves the bill, he shall, except as hereinafter provided, return it, with his objections, to the Legislature within ten days (Sunday excepted) after it shall have been presented to him. If the High Commissioner does not return the bill within such period, it shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Legislature by adjournment prevents its return, in which case it shall be a law if signed by the High Commissioner within thirty days after it shall have been presented to him; otherwise it shall not be a law.

When a bill is returned by the High Commissioner to the Legislature with his objections, the Legislature may proceed to reconsider the bill. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the members of the Legislature present agree to pass the bill, it shall be presented anew to the High Commissioner. If he then approves it, he shall sign it; if not, he shall within ten days after it has been presented to him transmit it to the Secretary of the Interior. If the Secretary approves the bill within ninety days of its receipt by him, it shall become a law; otherwise it shall not.

In the event that the High Commissioner has submitted to the Legislature proposed legislation which he has designated as urgent, and the Legislature

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has failed to pass the same in its original form or an amended form acceptable to the High Commissioner at the session at which it was submitted, the High Commissioner may himself, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, promulgate such proposed legislation as a law.

If any bill presented to the High Commissioner should contain several items of appropriation of money, he may object to one or more of such items, or any part or parts thereof, portion or portions thereof, while approving the other items, parts, or portions of the bill. In such case he shall append to the bill, at the time of signing it, a statement of the items, or parts or portions thereof, to which he objects, and the items, or parts or portions thereof, so objected to shall not take effect.

Sec. 59. Procedure. (a) Quorum. The quorum of the Legislature shall consist of eleven of its members. No bill shall become a law unless it shall have been passed at a meeting, at which a quorum was present, by the affirmative vote of a majority of the members present and voting, which vote shall be by yeas and nays.

(b) Title. Every legislative act shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title; but if any subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in the title, such an act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be embraced in the title.

(c) Amendment and revisions by reference. No law shall be amended or revised by reference to its title only; but in such case the

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act,
as revised, or section or subsection as amended, shall be corrected
and published at full length.

(d) Journal. The Legislature shall keep a journal of its proceedings in English and publish the same. Every bill passed by the Legislature and the yeas and nays on any question shall be entered on the journal.

(e) Public sessions. The business of the Legislature, and of the Committee of the Whole, shall be transacted openly and not in secret session.

(f) Procedural authority. The Legislature shall be the sole judge of the elections and qualifications of its members, shall have and exercise all the authority and attributes inherent in legislative assemblies, and shall have the power to institute and conduct investigations, issue subpoenas to witnesses and other parties concerned, and administer oaths, whether the Legislature be in session or otherwise.

Sec. 60. Immunity. No member of the Legislature shall be held to answer before any tribunal other than the Legislature for any speech or debate in the Legislature, and the members shall in all cases, except treason, felony, or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Legislature and in going to and returning from the same.

Sec. 61. Compensation; other employment. Each member of the Legislature shall receive for his services an annual salary of \$3,000, payable

at such times as may be provided by law. Each member shall also receive transportation and a per diem allowance at the expense of the Government while on official business within the Trust Territory or in Guam.

No member of the Legislature shall, while on official legislative business, receive any other compensation from the Government.

No member of the Legislature shall, during the year following the expiration of the term for which he was elected, be appointed to any office which was created, or the salary or emoluments of which have been increased, during such term.

Sec. 62. Vacancies. Whenever, prior to six months before the date of the next general election, a vacancy occurs in the Legislature, the High Commissioner shall call a special election to fill such vacancy. In case of vacancies occurring within six months of the next general election, no special election shall be held and the High Commissioner may fill such vacancy by appointment.

2. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 28 of the Code of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, such Code is further amended by the deletion of section 28.

3. The above and foregoing order is subject to and is to be construed in accordance with Presidential Executive Order No. 11021 of May 7, 1963.

4. Existing laws, regulations, orders, appointments, or other acts in effect immediately prior to the effective date of this order shall remain in effect until they are superseded pursuant to the provision of this order.

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with the United States as administering authority, by the trusteeship agreement between the United States and the Security Council of the United Nations, being the Mariana Islands (other than Guam) and the Marshall and Caroline Islands, shall be known as the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (hereinafter referred to as the "Trust Territory"). For administrative and other purposes set forth in this order, the Trust Territory shall be divided into the following six districts:

(1) The Mariana Islands District, consisting of those islands of the Trust Territory, and the territorial waters thereof, which lie within the area north of 14° north latitude, south of 21° north latitude, west of 150° east longitude, and east of 144° east longitude.

(2) The Palau District, consisting of those islands of the Trust Territory, and the territorial waters thereof, which lie within the area beginning at a point 2° north latitude 130° east longitude, thence north to a point 11° north latitude 130° east longitude, thence east to a point 11° north latitude 136° east longitude, thence south to a point 2° north latitude 136° east longitude, thence west to the point of beginning.

(3) The Yap District, consisting of those islands of the Trust Territory, and the territorial waters thereof, which lie within the area beginning at a point 2° north latitude 136° east longitude, thence north to a point 11° north latitude 136° east longitude, thence east to a point 11° north latitude 148° east longitude, thence south to a point 0° latitude 148° east longitude, thence northwesterly to the point of beginning.

(4) The Truk District, consisting of those islands of the Trust Territory, and the territorial waters thereof, which lie within the area beginning at a point 0° latitude 148° east longitude, thence north to a point 11° north latitude 148° east longitude, thence east to a point 11° north latitude 154° east longitude, thence south to a point 0° latitude 154° east longitude, thence west to the point of beginning.

(5) The Ponape District, consisting of those islands of the Trust Territory, and the territorial waters thereof, which lie within the area beginning at a point 0° latitude 154° east longitude, thence north to a point 11° north latitude 154° east longitude, thence east to a point 11° north latitude 158° east longitude, thence southeast to a point 5° north latitude 166° east longitude, thence south to a point 0° latitude 166° east longitude, thence west to the point of beginning.

(6) The Marshall Islands District, consisting of those islands of the Trust Territory, and the territorial waters thereof, which lie within the area beginning at a point 11° north latitude 158° east longitude, thence southeast to a point 5° north latitude 166° east longitude, thence south to a point 0° latitude 166° east longitude, thence northeast to a point 4° north latitude 170° east longitude, thence east to a point 4° north latitude 172° east longitude, thence north to a point 16° north latitude 172° east longitude, thence northwest to a point 19° north latitude 158° east longitude, thence south to the point of beginning.

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SEC. 2. Secretary of the Interior. The responsibility for the administration of all civil government in the Trust Territory is hereby vested in the Secretary of the Interior, and all executive, legislative, and judicial authority necessary for that administration shall be exercised under the general supervision of the Secretary of the Interior in accordance with the provisions of this order. Subject to applicable law, such policies as the President may from time to time prescribe, and, where advantageous, in collaboration with other departments and agencies of the Government of the United States, the Secretary of the Interior shall take such actions as may be necessary and appropriate to carry out the obligations assumed by the United States as the administering authority of the Trust Territory under the terms of the trusteeship agreement and under the Charter of the United Nations: Provided, That the authority to specify parts or all of the Trust Territory as closed for security reasons and to determine the extent to which Articles 87 and 88 of the Charter of the United Nations shall be applicable to such closed areas, in accordance with Article 13 of the trusteeship agreement, shall be exercised by the President: And provided further, that the Secretary of the Interior shall keep the Secretary of State currently informed of activities in the Trust Territory affecting the foreign policy of the United States, and that all relations between the departments and agencies of the United States Government and appropriate organs of the United Nations with respect to the Trust Territory shall be conducted through the Secretary of State.

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In carrying out his responsibility, the Secretary of the Interior shall be guided by the need to provide for, and encourage the development of an effective and responsible civil government in the Trust Territory, based on democratic principles and supported by a sound financial structure, shall make every effort to improve the welfare and well-being of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory, and shall promote the political, economic, social, and cultural advancement of those inhabitants.

SEC. 3. Bill of rights. (a) No law shall be enacted in the Trust Territory respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of conscience, or of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people to form associations and peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

(b) Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist in the Trust Territory.

(c) The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized.

(d) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public

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use without just compensation; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall any person be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.

In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. No crime under the laws of the Trust Territory shall be punishable by death.

(c) No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligations of contracts shall be enacted.

(f) Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

(g) All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties in the case of criminal offenses, except for first-degree murder and other offenses for which the punishment may be life imprisonment when the proof is evident or the presumption great. No person shall sit as judge or magistrate in any case in which he has been engaged as attorney or prosecutor.

(h) No law shall be enacted in the Trust Territory which discriminates against any person on account of race, sex, language, or religion; nor shall the equal protection of the laws be denied.

(i) Subject only to the requirements of public order and security, the inhabitants of the Trust Territory shall be accorded freedom of migration and movement within the Trust Territory.

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(j) Free public elementary and secondary education shall be provided throughout the Trust Territory.

(k) No person shall be imprisoned solely for failure to discharge a contractual obligation or for debt.

(l) The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, when in cases of rebellion or invasion or imminent danger thereof, the public safety shall require it.

(m) No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

(n) The laws of the Trust Territory may restrict or forbid the acquisition of interests in real property and in business enterprises by persons who are not citizens of the Trust Territory, and shall give due recognition to local customs.

SEC. 4. Office of the High Commissioner. (a) The Secretary of the Interior shall appoint a High Commissioner of the Trust Territory (hereinafter referred to as the "High Commissioner") who shall be the chief representative of the Secretary of the Interior in the Trust Territory, have the powers and perform the duties assigned to him by the terms of this order, and carry out any powers or duties delegated or assigned to him by the Secretary of the Interior. The High Commissioner shall report to the Secretary of the Interior on the operations of his office and the Government of the Trust Territory. The High Commissioner may, in case of rebellion or invasion or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety

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requires it, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Trust Territory or any part thereof under martial law, until the decision of the Secretary of the Interior is communicated to the High Commissioner. He shall coordinate and have general cognizance over all activities of a civil nature of the departments and agencies of the United States Government in the Trust Territory, except that the President may, by Executive order, provide that any such department or agency shall not be subject to the coordination or general cognizance of the High Commissioner.

[(b) The Secretary of the Interior shall appoint a Deputy High Commissioner of the Trust Territory who shall carry out any powers or duties delegated or assigned to him by the High Commissioner, and have all the powers of the High Commissioner in the case of a vacancy in the office of the High Commissioner, or the temporary removal, resignation, or disability of the High Commissioner, or in the case of his temporary absence.]

(c) The Secretary of the Interior may from time to time designate another officer or employee of the United States Government to act as High Commissioner and carry out his powers and duties in case of a vacancy in the offices, or the disability or temporary removal or absence, of [both] the High Commissioner [and the Deputy High Commissioner].

(d) The High Commissioner, [the Deputy High Commissioner] and such other personnel as may be deemed necessary to carry out the functions, powers, duties, and responsibilities of the Secretary of the Interior and

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the High Commissioner with respect to the supervision and administration of civil government in the Trust Territory shall constitute the Office of the High Commissioner. The personnel of that office, who shall be citizens or nationals of the United States or of the Trust Territory, shall be considered to be officers or employees of the United States Government. The expenses of that office shall be paid with United States funds.

SEC. 5. Trust Territory Government. The Government of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, which shall have the right to sue by that name, shall consist of three branches: executive, legislative, and judicial. The capital and seat of government thereof shall be located at Saipan in the Mariana Islands District. All officers and employees of the Government of the Trust Territory shall be citizens or nationals of the Trust Territory or of the United States: Provided, That citizens of another nation may be employed with the approval of the High Commissioner. The Government of the Trust Territory shall have jurisdiction, including jurisdiction over all persons, in all of the Trust Territory, except those parts which the President may from time to time designate as closed for security reasons in accordance with Article 13 of the trusteeship agreement and those parts which the Secretary of the Interior shall designate as reservations pursuant to section 14 of this order: Provided, That the Government of the Trust Territory shall always have the right to tax persons and corporations, their franchises and property, on the lands in such parts and to serve civil and criminal process within those

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parts in suits or prosecutions for or on account of rights acquired, obligations incurred, or crimes committed within the Trust Territory but outside the said parts, and that the Trust Territory shall not be prevented from exercising over or upon such parts, concurrently with the United States, any jurisdiction whatsoever which it would have in the absence of the reservation of such parts which is consistent with this order and the United States laws applicable to such parts, and that the persons residing in such parts shall not be denied the right to vote in all the elections in which such parts are otherwise authorized to participate.

SEC. 6. Executive branch. (a) The executive power and authority of the Government of the Trust Territory shall be vested in a Chief Executive, who shall have attained the age of thirty years and who shall have the other qualifications of a member of the Legislature of the Trust Territory. The Chief Executive shall have general supervision and control of all executive departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Government of the Trust Territory, and shall faithfully execute the laws of the Government of the Trust Territory. He may grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures against the laws of the Government of the Trust Territory. He shall appoint all officers and employees of the office of the Chief Executive and of the executive branch of the Government of the Trust Territory, except as otherwise provided by law, and shall commission all officers that he may be authorized to appoint. He shall have the power to issue executive regulations which

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do not conflict with law. He shall maintain his residence during his incumbency at Saipan in the Mariana Islands District in a government house free of rent. He shall receive an annual salary of \$17,500 which shall be paid from the funds of the Government of the Trust Territory.

(b)(1) The Chief Executive shall be appointed by the High Commissioner on the basis of a nomination which is made by the Legislature of the Trust Territory and is acceptable to the High Commissioner. If the High Commissioner does not appoint a person who shall have been so nominated the Legislature of the Trust Territory shall reconsider its nomination and if the majority of its members shall again nominate such person, the Secretary of the Interior shall approve or disapprove his appointment. The Chief Executive shall continue in office until removed by a vote of the majority of the members of the Legislature of the Trust Territory, unless he sooner resigns or dies.

(b)(2) In the event a vacancy occurs in the office of the Chief Executive and the Legislature of the Trust Territory does not nominate a Chief Executive within a reasonable time whom the High Commissioner or the Secretary of the Interior will appoint, the High Commissioner may appoint a Chief Executive without a nomination. Such appointed Chief Executive shall continue in office until replaced by a Chief Executive nominated and appointed pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection.

(b)(3) In the event a vacancy in the office of Chief Executive occurs at a time when the Legislature of the Trust Territory is not in session, the High Commissioner shall call a special session within thirty days for the purpose of nominating a Chief Executive.

(c) The executive branch of the Government of the Trust Territory shall consist of such executive departments or agencies as may be deemed necessary, but each such department or agency shall be established by law which shall enumerate the powers and functions thereof. The head of each such department or agency shall be appointed by the Chief Executive with the approval of the High Commissioner.

SEC. 7. Legislative branch. (a) The legislative power and authority of the Government of the Trust Territory shall be vested in the Legislature of the Trust Territory (hereinafter referred to as the "Legislature") consisting of a single house of twenty-one members. The legislative power shall extend to all rightful subjects of territorial legislation, except that no such legislation may be inconsistent with (1) the treaties or international agreements of the United States, (2) the laws of the United States applicable to the Trust Territory, or (3) the provisions of this order. The Legislature shall have the authority to select its own officers.

(b) For purposes of representation in the Legislature, the Trust Territory shall be divided into the six districts described in section 8 of this order. Of the twenty-one members of the Legislature, three shall be elected by the qualified voters who reside in the Mariana Island District; three shall be elected by the qualified voters who reside in the Palau District; one shall be elected by the qualified voters who reside on the Yap Islands, Yap District, and one by the qualified voters who reside in the remainder of the Yap District; five shall be elected

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by the qualified voters who reside in the Truk District; one shall be elected by the qualified voters who reside on Kusaie Island, Ponape District; and three by the qualified voters who reside in the remainder of the Ponape District; and four shall be elected by the qualified voters who reside in the Marshall Islands District. Consistent with the foregoing apportionment, the laws of the Trust Territory shall provide for the further division of each district into a number of subdistricts on the basis of population equal to the number of members to which the district is entitled, and the qualified voters within each subdistrict shall be entitled to vote for the member from that subdistrict. The number of members to be elected from each district and the boundaries of the subdistricts shall be reapportioned on the basis of population at intervals of ten years beginning in 1980, but no district shall be entitled to less than two members at any time, regardless of population. The Chief Executive shall make recommendations to the High Commissioner with respect to such reapportionment.

(c) No person shall be eligible to be a member of the Legislature who is not a citizen of the Trust Territory, who has not attained the age of twenty-one years, who is not a qualified voter in the Trust Territory, and who has not been a bona fide resident of the Trust Territory for at least two years preceding the date of his election. No person who has been convicted of a felony or of a crime involving moral turpitude shall be eligible to be a member of the Legislature unless such person has been pardoned and has had restored to him his civil rights. The Legislature

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shall be the judge of the selection and qualification of all members.

(d) All citizens of the Trust Territory, eighteen years of age or over, shall be entitled to vote for the member of the Legislature in the subdistrict in which they reside, except that persons who have been convicted of a felony shall not be so entitled unless they have been pardoned and have had restored to them their civil rights.

(e) General elections of members of the Legislature shall be held every three years beginning in 1964 on the first Tuesday following the first Monday in November and ending not later than three weeks thereafter. Each member shall hold office for a term of three years, commencing at noon on the third day of January following his election.

(f) There shall be two regular sessions of the Legislature held in each year, one beginning on the third day of January and the second beginning on the first day of July. Each of the regular sessions shall continue for not to exceed forty-five consecutive calendar days. The Legislature shall meet in special session at the call of the Chief Executive or the High Commissioner at such time and place as may be specified in the call, but no legislation shall be considered at such session other than that specified in the call or in a special message. All sessions of the Legislature shall be open to the public, and the Legislature shall keep a journal of its proceedings in English and publish the same. Every bill passed by the Legislature and the yeas and nays on any question shall be entered into the journal.

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(g) The Legislature shall have and exercise all the authority inherent in legislative assemblies, and shall have the power to institute and conduct investigations, issue subpoenas and administer oaths whether the Legislature is in session or otherwise.

(h) No member of the Legislature shall be held to answer before any tribunal other than the Legislature for any speech or debate in the Legislature, and the members shall, except in case of treason, felony, or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Legislature and in going to and returning from the same.

(i) Each member of the Legislature shall receive an annual salary of \$3,000, payable at such times as may be provided by law. Each member shall also receive transportation at the expense of the Government of the Trust Territory and a per diem allowance at the same rate as other officers of the Government of the Trust Territory while on official business. The salaries and other expenses of the Legislature shall be paid from the funds of the Government of the Trust Territory.

(j) No member of the Legislature may hold another position, except that of Chief Executive, in the Government of the Trust Territory, the Office of the High Commissioner, or the United States Government during his term as member. If a member serves as Chief Executive, he shall receive only the compensation of the Chief Executive during such service. No member shall, during the year following the expiration of the term for which he was elected, be appointed to any office in the Government

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of the Trust Territory which was created, or the salary of
of which were increased, during such term.

(k) Whenever, prior to six months before the date of the general election of members of the Legislature, a vacancy occurs in the Legislature, the Chief Executive shall, within sixty days, have a special election held to fill such vacancy in the subdistrict in which the vacancy occurs.

SEC. 8. Enactment of laws. (a) The enacting clause of all bills shall be: "Be it enacted by the Legislature of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands", and no law shall be enacted except by bill. The Chief Executive may submit proposed legislation and messages to the Legislature for its consideration. No bill shall be passed by the Legislature except at a meeting during a regular or special session, at which a quorum of at least eleven members is present, by the affirmative vote of the majority of members present and voting.

(b) Every bill passed by the Legislature shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the Chief Executive. If the Chief Executive approves the bill, he shall sign it. If the Chief Executive disapproves the bill, he shall return it, with his objections, to the Legislature within ten days after it shall have been presented to him. If the Chief Executive does not return the bill within such period, it shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Legislature by adjournment prevents its return, in which case it shall become a law if signed by the Chief Executive within thirty days after it shall have been

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presented to him; otherwise it shall not be a law. When a bill is returned by the Chief Executive to the Legislature with his objections, the Legislature may proceed to reconsider the bill. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the members of the Legislature present vote to pass the bill, it shall be sent to the High Commissioner. If the High Commissioner approves it, he shall sign it. If he does not approve it within forty-five days after it shall have been presented to him, it shall not be a law. If any bill presented to the Chief Executive should contain several items of appropriation of money, the Chief Executive may object to one or more of such items or any portion or portions of the bill. In such case, the Chief Executive shall append to the bill, at the time of signing it, a listing of the items or portion or portions thereof objected to, and those items or portion or portions shall not take effect. In computing any period of days under this section, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded. Copies of all laws enacted by the Legislature shall be transmitted within fifteen days of their enactment by the Chief Executive to the High Commissioner and the Secretary of the Interior.

SEC. 9. United States funds. The High Commissioner shall annually, in consultation with the Chief Executive, develop a budget for the United States funds to be appropriated for the use of the Government of the Trust Territory. That budget shall be submitted to the Legislature for its review and recommendations. The High Commissioner shall adopt such recommendations of the legislature as he may deem appropriate and transmit

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the other recommendations together with the budget to the Secretary of the Interior. Upon receipt of an allocation of appropriated funds, the High Commissioner shall allocate such funds for obligation and expenditure among the various activities of the Government of the Trust Territory in accordance with the budget and the actions taken thereon by the Secretary of the Interior, the President, and the Congress. He shall take such steps as may be necessary to insure that United States funds are properly used by the Government of the Trust Territory, and he may withhold any or all such funds for such periods of time as he may deem necessary if they are not properly utilized.

SEC. 10. United States interest. With proper regard for the basic liberties of the people of the Trust Territory and the rights of the government and the people of the Trust Territory and the need to encourage the development of an effective and responsible civil government in the Territory, based on democratic principles and supported by a sound financial structure, the High Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, may, if such action is deemed essential for the fulfillment of the United States responsibility for the security of the Trust Territory, or for the security of the United States: (1) veto any bill or any portion or portions thereof which may be presented to the Chief Executive under section 8 of this order; (2) annul any law or any portion or portions thereof enacted under section 8 of this order within forty-five days after its enactment; and (3) remove any public official from office in the Government of the Trust Territory. With the approval

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of the Secretary of the Interior, the High Commissioner may assume in whole or in part the exercise of executive and legislative power and authority in the Trust Territory, if such assumption appears mandatory for security reasons.

SEC. 11. The Judicial Branch. The judicial power and authority of the Government of the Trust Territory shall be vested in a High Court for the Trust Territory, a District Court for each of the six districts described in section 1 of this order, and such local courts as may be established by law from time to time. The High Court shall have jurisdiction over the entire Trust Territory, and shall consist of a Chief Justice and an Associate Justice, who shall be appointed by the Secretary of the Interior, and such temporary and special judges as the Secretary of the Interior may designate from time to time. The High Court shall consist of a Trial Division and an Appellate Division. The Trial Division shall consist of the Chief Justice and Associate Justice, except that sessions may be held by either judge alone, and shall have original jurisdiction to try all civil cases where the amount claimed or value of the property involved exceeds one thousand dollars (\$1,000), all admiralty and maritime matters, all civil cases involving the adjudication of title to land or any interest therein, and all criminal cases in which the maximum punishment which may be imposed exceeds a fine of two thousand dollars (\$2,000) or imprisonment for more than five years or both. The Trial Division shall have jurisdiction to review on appeal the decisions of the district courts and to review on the record the decisions of

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district and local courts in which no appeal is taken. When a murder case is assigned for trial, the judge of the High Court assigned to preside at the trial shall assign two of the special judges appointed for the district in which the trial is to take place to sit with him in the trial thereof. The special judges shall participate with the presiding judge in deciding, by majority vote, all questions of fact and the finding and sentence, but the presiding judge alone shall decide all questions of law involved in the trial and determination of the case. The Appellate Division shall consist of three judges assigned by the Chief Justice from among the temporary judges designated by the Secretary of the Interior, provided that either the Chief Justice or the Associate Justice may also sit as a member of the Appellate Division in a case which he has not heard as a judge in the Trial Division. The Appellate Division shall have jurisdiction to review on appeal the decisions of the Trial Division in all cases originally tried in the High Court, cases decided by the High Court on appeal from a district court involving the construction or validity of any law or regulation or written enactment intended to have the force of law, cases decided by the High Court on review of a district or local court decision in which that decision has been modified or reversed, and cases on appeal directly from a district or local court involving the construction or validity of any law or regulation or written enactment intended to have the force of law. The concurrence of two judges shall be necessary to a determination of any appeal by the Appellate Division of the High Court, but a single judge

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make all necessary orders concerning an appeal prior to the hearing thereon, and may dismiss an appeal for want of jurisdiction, or failure to take or prosecute it in accordance with applicable law or rules of procedure, or at the request of the appellant. Each district court shall consist of a presiding judge and may include one or more associate judges, all of whom shall be appointed by the Chief Executive for a definite fixed term to be prescribed in law. The jurisdiction and manner of operation of the district courts and local courts shall be prescribed in law.

SEC. 12. District government. (a) The chief executive and administrative official of the Government of the Trust Territory in each of the six districts described in section 1 of this order shall be a district administrator who shall be appointed by the Chief Executive with the approval of the High Commissioner. The district administrator shall, under the general supervision of the chief executive, assist in the faithful execution of the laws of the Trust Territory in his district, shall perform such duties as the Chief Executive may assign, and shall be responsible for the coordination of the activities of the departments and agencies of the Government of the Trust Territory in his district. He shall also faithfully execute the laws of the district legislature of his district and shall consult with such legislature.

(b) The legislative power and authority within each district shall be vested in a district legislature which shall be established by law of the Trust Territory. The membership of such a legislature shall be

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determined by law, but shall be elected in such manner as (will provide for) fair representation of all the people of the district on the basis of population. The power of the legislature shall be set forth in law, but shall not extend to matters which are within the jurisdiction of the Legislature of the Trust Territory nor shall it enact laws which are inconsistent with the laws of the Trust Territory, the treaties and international agreements of the United States, the laws of the United States applicable to the Trust Territory, or the provisions of this order. Every bill passed by the district legislature, before it becomes a law, shall be presented to the district administrator. If the district administrator approves the bill, he shall sign it. If the district administrator disapproves the bill, he shall return it, with his objections, to the district legislature within ten days after it shall have been presented to him. If the district administrator does not return the bill within such period, it shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the district legislature by adjournment prevents its return, in which case it shall become a law if signed by the district administrator within thirty days after it shall have been presented to him; otherwise it shall not be a law. When a bill is returned by the district administrator to the district legislature with his objections, the district legislature may proceed to reconsider the bill. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the members of the district legislature present vote to pass the bill, it shall be sent to the Chief Executive. If the Chief Executive approves it, he shall sign it. If he does not approve it within

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forty-five days after it shall have been presented to him, it shall not be a law. In computing any period of days under this section, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded. Copies of all laws enacted in the districts shall be transmitted within fifteen days of their enactment by the district administrators to the Chief Executive and the High Commissioner. The salaries and expenses of the district legislatures shall be paid from the funds of their respective districts.

SEC. 13. Municipal Government. The Government of the Trust Territory may, by law, charter such municipal governments as are deemed appropriate and desirable based on the wishes of the people concerned and the need to provide for an effective government. Such charter shall provide for the organization of the municipality to exercise governmental, economic, and social functions not inconsistent with this order or the law. The charter shall provide for legislative, executive and judicial instrumentalities as appropriate which shall exercise such powers as may be assigned to them by the charter. Each charter shall provide for the election of a magistrate by the residents of the municipality. The magistrate shall assist the Chief Executive and the district administrators in the execution of the laws of the Trust Territory and the districts, for which he shall receive such reimbursement as may be provided in the laws of the Trust Territory.

SEC. 14. Federal reservations. The Secretary of the Interior is authorized, from time to time to designate portions of the Trust Territory as Federal reservations for the use and purposes of Federal departments and agencies.

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SEC. 15. Savings provision.

Except as they may be inconsistent with, the laws, orders, proclamations, regulations, ordinances, and other directives heretofore issued by the Secretary of the Interior, the High Commissioner, the Government of the Trust Territory, or other public officials and bodies in the Trust Territory in effect immediately prior to the effective date of this order shall continue in force and effect until modified, revoked, or superseded under the authority of this order. No proceeding, either civil or criminal pending in any court in the Trust Territory on the date of this order shall abate by reason of this order, and any such proceeding shall be conducted and concluded in accordance with the laws, orders, proclamations, regulations, ordinances, and other directives in effect immediately before the date of this order. Nothing in this order shall be construed as modifying the rights or obligations of the United States under the provisions of the trusteeship agreement or as affecting or modifying the responsibility of the Secretary of State to interpret the rights and obligations of the United States arising out of that agreement.

SEC. 16. Superseded order. Executive Order No. 11021 of May 7, 1962, is hereby superseded.

SEC. 17. Effective date. This order shall become effective _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

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REPORT BY THE U. S. GOVERNMENT SURVEY MISSION
TO THE TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

Volume Two

- Part II. The Economic and Social Development
of Micronesia
- Part III. Administration of the Trust Territory

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A Report by the U. S. Government Survey Mission
to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

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II-A

PART II

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF MICRONESIA

Section A

Private Sector Economic Survey and Recommendations.

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN MICRONESIA

This part of the Survey Mission's Report describes briefly the economy of the Trust Territory and sets forth the Mission's recommendations for economic advancement in Micronesia. It is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 sets out in broad terms the economic problems which face the Trust Territory now and in the near future and suggests the general lines along which solutions should be drawn. Chapter 2 describes the Micronesian economy, to the extent it can be done, in quantitative detail. The major features of its population, output, income, and foreign trade are set forth. Chapter 3 provides a more detailed discussion of the labor force, attitudes toward work, labor mobility, and related topics. Chapter 4 considers the major actual and potential producing sectors of the economy: agriculture, fishing, mining, and manufacturing, and makes recommendations on their further development. A separate part of the Report discusses agriculture in greater detail. Chapter 5 considers commerce, finance, and savings habits in the Trust Territory.

The Mission's recommendations have been incorporated into the discussion of each issue as it comes up, in order to indicate directly their relevance. The major recommendations are also summarized in Chapter 6.

Chapter 1

THE BROAD ISSUES

The economy of Micronesia is based largely on food gathering and on subsistence agriculture and fishing. Of an adult population of about 45,000, fewer than 10 percent are regularly employed for wages and salaries, although at least an equal number work from time to time at preparing dried coconut meat, copra, for export. The labor force is at a low level of educational and technical skill, with less than 20 percent of the adult population having completed more than 6 years of schooling.

Despite the importance of subsistence production in Micronesia, there is a growing desire for money income to use for purchasing wanted imports. In many areas a taste has been cultivated for rice, sugar, tobacco, beer and other items typically consumed in market economies; and outboard motors, motor scooters, gasoline, and kerosene are rapidly becoming "necessities" in and around the district centers of Micronesia. Largely because it is viewed as a channel to desirable employment and higher money incomes, more and better education is everywhere extolled and is widely coveted by the young.

Subsistence production can support adequate living standards only so long as land resources are ample. Rapidly growing population -- nearly 4 percent a year (see Table 1) -- is beginning to press against land resources in some parts of Micronesia. Throughout the

Table 1
Population Growth in Micronesia

Age Group	1953	1958	1962	1967 <u>a/</u>	1972 <u>a/</u>
Under 15	19,796 <u>b/</u>	30,173	35,690	41,260	48,000
15-64	34,321	37,009	40,606	47,500	56,200
65 and over	3,725 <u>b/</u>	3,412	4,784	6,130	8,200
Total	57,842	70,594	80,980	94,890	112,400

a/ Projected from 1962 assuming no change in the numbers of live births per thousand of adult population aged 15-64 and no change in the death rates experienced in 1962.

b/ These reported population figures seem inconsistent with later census results.

Note: The population of the Trust Territory rose 40 percent in the nine years 1953-1962, or 3.8 percent a year.

Trust Territory the population density is only 121 per square mile; but several large volcanic islands, now virtually inaccessible in the interior, account for most of the unused land. On some coral atolls in the Truk District rural population densities exceed 500 per square mile. With one of the fastest growing populations in the world, living standards in Micronesia may well fall in the coming years. Indeed, using the Trust Territory government's data, imports per capita appear to have fallen by nearly 20 percent since 1957. Neither the political nor the humanitarian interests of the United States are served by permitting this malthusian squeeze of population against land to depress Micronesian living standards. A two-pronged program which will raise productivity and facilitate mobility is required to prevent the number of people from out-running the availability of productive resources.

Proper education plays a critical role in any program for economic development. Education is necessary to provide the minimum skills required to raise productivity and to provide sufficiently common background to make successful migration possible. But greater education will in turn stimulate further the demand for money incomes and imported goods. Secondary education at boarding schools attracts teen-agers from the rural into the urban and semi-urban centers of the Trust Territory and Guam and exposes them to a way of life substantially different from that to which they are accustomed. The same education which prepares

Micronesians for absorption into the modern world often generates dissatisfaction and impatience with traditional modes of existence. The students become too sophisticated in their tastes to go "back to the farm". An expanded and improved educational system will, unless care is taken to prevent it, increase not only the desire for more cash but will raise unrealizable expectations for salaried employment.

While secondary education -- particularly as it is improved -- prepares students for more modern life and more modern employment, it does not automatically provide them with jobs. The demand for better educated Micronesians will not rise spontaneously to absorb the increased supply of them. Unless jobs are available for graduating students -- or unless the educational program is designed to discourage unrealistic expectations for salaried employment -- many reasonably well-educated students will be disappointed when they reach the job market. Already in Palau there are substantial numbers of men and women willing to work but unable to find jobs, and in Ponape and Truk "urban" unemployment in the District Centers is reported as beginning to appear. Provision of employment opportunities becomes more urgent as the school system is expanded and as it is centralized in areas of urban populations; special efforts will be required to assure that employment opportunities are adequate.

School enrollment is expected to grow rapidly in the near future (Table 2). In 1962 there were only 84 Micronesians graduated from high school, and fewer than 600 graduated from junior high school. Total high school enrollment is expected to double between 1963-1967 and to quadruple in the next 10 years. The number of graduates will increase by tenfold over the same 10 years. While there now seems a shortage of qualified personnel in most districts, this situation will rapidly change to a surplus unless employment opportunities are increased in step with the numbers leaving school after six or more grades.

The Trust Territory government, now the major employer with over half of the total estimated wage and salary earners in Micronesia, will absorb some of these additional graduates -- partly through new programs and partly through the gradual replacement of less qualified personnel now working for the government. The construction program and associated rise in operating costs recommended by the Mission will provide ample job opportunities in most districts during the next few years. Thereafter, government employment will decline while the total demand for jobs continues to grow.

The provision of additional jobs is imperative from a political as well as a social and humanitarian viewpoint. The young people are keener than their elders to become a part of the modern world, and partly

Table 2

Projected School Enrollment

	Grades 1 - 8	Grades 9 - 12	High School Graduates	College Graduates
1952	8,261	585	12	*
1955	8,728	658	20	*
1960	14,556	1,042	100	*
1963	17,581	1,492	100	*
1964	17,985	1,717	150	18
1965	18,495	2,074	275	22
1966	19,012	2,515	375	27
1967	19,634	3,030	450	34
1968	20,259	3,567	535	42
1973	23,000	6,900	1,000	125

* In 1963 there were 21 Micronesians with bachelors degrees, all graduated since 1955. In September 1963, 125 Micronesians will be enrolled in institutions of higher education.

for this reason they tend to be more receptive to closer association with the United States. It is the younger generation which is less insistent and less fearful of changing the present status of the Trust Territory, for it has less psychological commitment to the status quo. Yet the absence of job opportunities following secondary education may disillusion the younger generation with modern existence, with education, and with the United States as administering authority. Dissatisfied with traditional ways of life, this important political group will feel caught between a traditional life to which they cannot return and frustrated hope for a more modern mode of living.

The basic characteristics of Micronesia, its vast distances and its paucity of resources (including, ironically, labor), limit sharply the rise in living standards which can take place even with extensive assistance, and this fact should be recognized frankly. The ultimate solution for those Micronesians who aspire to ever increasing living standards is emigration from the Trust Territory, and partial preparation for such emigration should be one objective of U.S. policy in Micronesia. But extensive emigration from Micronesia, even if it were financially and legally feasible, cannot be regarded as a near-term solution to the problem of inadequate incomes and prospective unemployment in the territory. It will be years before any but a few exceptional Micronesians would be able to compete openly and effectively in the

sophisticated labor market of the United States. More could find unskilled work on Guam, but the labor market there is limited too. In the meantime, some improvement in employment opportunities is possible within the Trust Territory, and this should be sufficient to serve both U.S. objectives and Micronesian interests in the near future. However, several impediments stand in the way of marked increase in private employment outside the traditional agriculture sectors: Lack of capital, lack of entrepreneurial initiative, lack of adequate technical knowledge, and, not least, the lack of obvious profit-making opportunities.

There is evidence everywhere of the lack of capital, both public and private capital, both fixed and working capital. Often expensive construction equipment sits for weeks for want of spare parts; much time is lost in areas where there are roads because vehicles have no spares; and even more time is lost in other areas because there are no roads or vehicles. Produce and fish cannot be marketed for lack of chilling facilities and ice. Copra is not produced because small stores have insufficient capital to stock the trade goods wanted. And small manufacturing ventures cannot be launched because of inadequate working capital.

Even when capital is available -- and there is some local capital, especially in Saipan and Koror -- few ventures are undertaken

due to lack of technical knowledge and the lack of managerial initiative in acquiring practical knowledge of markets and production techniques. As in most underdeveloped countries, "business" means "trade" and few Micronesians even think in terms of non-agricultural production for sale. In a few cases where initiative has been demonstrated, it has been stifled by conflict with regulations or administrative practice in the Trust Territory. Especially in western Micronesia, historical channels for trade and technical assistance have been with Japan, and because of the small scale of operation in Micronesia, technical advice can sometimes be found in Japan when it cannot be found in the United States. Yet until July 1, 1963, it was against regulations for Japanese to visit or reside temporarily in Micronesia even on a consultant basis.

Even if all the ingredients discussed above -- potential markets, capital, technical knowledge, and initiative -- are present, surface and air transportation as it exists today within the Trust Territory hampers the development of continuing relationships between Micronesian producers and foreign buyers or buyers in the other districts. The transportation system is inadequate and irregular. For economic development of Micronesia, first priority should be given to improvements in transportation. Recommendations of the Survey Mission are outlined in a separate part of this Report.

The United States must overcome the years of neglect of the Trust Territory which is evident everywhere -- in the roads, the public buildings, the schools, the water and sewer systems. To overcome some of the present deficiencies the Mission recommends a substantial public works construction program, outlined elsewhere in this Report. In addition to these public expenditures, however, the Mission feels that some mechanism must be found to overcome the formidable impediments to economic development in the Trust Territory, a catalyst to economic activity which will work effectively to provide jobs when they are needed. Moreover, the timing of any public construction program is critical when viewed as a provider of local employment rather than as a program to get things built.

To program public construction expenditures and to act as a catalyst to business in the Trust Territory, the Mission recommends establishment of a Programming and Development Unit within the Trust Territory government, to be staffed with highly qualified technicians provided on contract by a firm with extensive economic and engineering experience in underdeveloped areas. The full responsibilities of the Programming and Development Contractor are set out in Chapter 4 below. They would include planning the timing of public capital expenditures to achieve the most desirable impact on local employment and income consistent with accomplishing the job efficiently, assisting private

businessmen with capital and technical advice, and initiating certain promising commercial ventures which Micronesians are not yet ready to start on their own.

Public capital expenditures in Micronesia must serve two objectives: (a) to get the job done quickly and efficiently, so the services from the construction project will be available without undue delay; and (b) to generate local employment and income. Although usually these two objectives will converge, in some instances they may conflict (for example when the fastest and cheapest method of getting a job done is to bring in sophisticated equipment and highly skilled labor and management from outside the Territory). In such cases the timing of a project should give heavy weight, in the view of the Mission, to the impact on local employment except in those cases where the indirect effects on local employment were judged so favorable that the project should be undertaken as quickly as possible. Only a continuously functioning Programming and Development Unit can make the needed judgements.

What is necessary in Micronesia is a sense of progress toward better living standards and social services, not a large one-step improvement. It would be a mistake to attempt to make up in a short period of time for more than a decade of U.S. negligence in the area. Indeed a too rapid increase in U.S. activity in the area could have two consequences which are better avoided: (1) local employment, a by-product of any

program to enlarge social capital such as schools, roads and docks, would be created in abundance during construction and then would be largely eliminated upon project completion, leaving workers with no alternative employment. (2) A pattern of expectation for a pace of future improvement which cannot be sustained may be created. Both consequences would have an unfortunate political impact on Micronesian attitudes toward the U.S.

For these reasons a "crash" program of public construction is not appropriate for Micronesia. Rather, a program of public construction and assistance to private enterprise should be paced to generate as smooth and continuous a rise in employment and incomes as is consistent with efficient programming. Instead of a crash investment program in all the sectors, it is preferable from the viewpoints both of employment and of intelligent planning to move ahead with the educational program quickly, and while the actual construction of schools and teachers' housing is taking place, the rest of the public construction program could be planned. Construction on these projects would begin as school construction tapers off, releasing workers. By the time total employment generated by the public construction program began to decline, employment in commercial ventures undertaken with the help of the Programming and Development Contractor should be on the increase. This recommended sequence of planning and implementation corresponds, the Mission feels, to the practical timing possible for intelligent use of funds. And it should succeed in providing a steady increase in Micronesian employment and incomes.

Chapter 2

THE ECONOMY IN PROSPECTIVE

The largely self-sufficient character of Micronesia's subsistence economy has hindered the systematic collection of statistical information for the area. Even statistics collected as a by-product of normal government operations, such as tax and duty collections, are often of doubtful quality, as are those deliberately collected for information to be included in official reports. For this reason careful quantitative economic analysis is not usually feasible. Despite the varying quality of the basic data, the Mission has worked with quantitative information on the labor force, production and foreign trade survey of the economic problems of Micronesia. However, many of the figures set forth below should be regarded as rough estimates or indicating orders of magnitude rather than as precise measurements.

Because of a period of sustained and rapid growth in population since the war (annual average, 3.8%), there are a large number of children in Micronesia -- in the Marianas district persons under 15 years of age make up over 50 percent of the total population, and for Micronesia as a whole the percentage is nearly 45 (see Table 3). This large percentage of children, even more pronounced here than in most other underdeveloped areas, places a heavy economic burden on the relatively small working

Table 3
Age Structure of Population

Age Group	(Percent)	
	Micronesia, 1962	USA, 1960
Under 15	44.1*	31.1
15 - 64	50.8	60.0
65 and over	5.1	8.9
Total	100	100

* The percentage of population under 15 is probably understated due to an under-reporting of births.

adult population. Of the total adult population of nearly 45,000, only 4,100 worked for wages and salaries in mid-1962. To these should be added the 5,000 who in the 1958 census reported themselves as "copra producers" and perhaps another 1,000 who through part-time producing or selling of artcrafts and produce should be considered at least partially in the monetary economy of Micronesia -- a total of around 10,000 or only one-eighth of the total population.

Over half of those working for wages and salaries are directly employed by the Trust Territory government. Table 4 lists employment by type of employer.

Over 65 percent of all wage earners are reported as employed by government agencies, but even this figure is low and should be increased by a large number of teachers and domestic servants in households of U.S. Government employees. Employment in manufacturing establishments of any kind is notable by its absence.

Large-scale hiring by trading establishments or firms manufacturing for the local market is precluded by the miniscule size of local markets and the vast distances which separate them. Quite apart from the low purchasing power of the average Micronesian, there is no concentration of population (including children) large enough to be considered a city.

Table 4

Employment of Micronesians for Wages, by Type of Employer, Fiscal Year 1962

	Number of Employees	Annual Wages ('000)
Trust Territory Administration	2,325	2,297
U.S. Post Office	4	7
U.S. Coast Guard	8	6
U.S. Weather Bureau	40	30
Naval Station, Kwajalein	174*	231*
Other Government Agencies	135	118
Trading Companies	426	332
Other Wholesalers	146	82
Other Local Business	234	60
Private Households	309	171
Missions	212	76
All Others	92	102
Total	4,105	3,513

*As reported in the 1962 Report to the United Nations. By mid-1963 Kwajalein employment was about twice as high as reported here.

While "urban" areas are developing around the district centers, none is larger than a small American town (see Table 5). The wide dispersion of population and labor force hampers efficient division of labor and precludes a volume of sales in local markets large enough for efficient, low cost operation. Only by turning to export markets can Micronesia hope to achieve the scale of production necessary for modern efficiency --even though, as discussed further in Chapter 4 below, there are some instances in which it would be feasible to substitute local production for imports.

The major source of money income, apart from wages and salaries, comes from the production and export of copra, the dried meat of the coconut. In addition, limited amounts of fruits and vegetables, fish, trochus shells (for buttons), and handicraft are exported from Micronesia, while some produce and fish is sold locally. Any estimate of the total money income for the area, following national income accounting concepts, is necessarily hazardous, but a crude attempt for 1962 is made in Table 6. Since national income data are not collected on a systematic basis, some component data are available only for calendar years (or parts thereof) and some for fiscal years. Some data do not exist at all. The computation here must be regarded as a rough guess for a 12-month period around 1962. It shows total national income of about \$9.4 million for 1962. If U.S. employees of the Trust Territory government are excluded, money income was \$7.3 million, or around \$90 per capita, placing Micronesia, in

Table 5
Geographical Dispersion of Population, June 1962

	Population	Adult Male Population
Marshalls District	15,710	4,126
Majuro	3,933	1,026
Kwajalein	1,971*	468*
Ponape District	17,224	5,132
Kolonias	1,247	367
Kusaie	3,019	802
Truk District	22,564	6,677
Truk Lagoon	15,541	4,598
Moen	3,903	1,263
Yap District	5,931	1,825
Yap Islands	3,530	1,086
Palau District	9,965	2,540
Koror	4,111	1,080
Marianas District	9,586	2,298
Saipan	7,830	1,874

*As reported in the 1962 Report to the United Nations. By mid-1963 about 2,600 people were living on Ebeye alone. Recorded figures were consistently lower than those generally accepted in the District Centers. For the sake of consistency, we have used the recorded figures.

Table 6

Total Money Income, 1962

Wage and Salary Compensation		5,984,000
Trust Territory Government		4,397,000
U.S. Employees	2,100,000	
Micronesian Employees	2,297,000	
Other		1,587,000
U.S.	371,000	
Micronesian	1,216,000	
Income from Unincorporated Business		2,659,000
Copra Exports		1,662,000
Other Exports		247,000
Production and Sale of Local Goods and Services		750,000
Corporate Income (before dividends)*		500,000
Income from Property		115,000
Rent		50,000
Interest		65,000
TOTAL		9,358,000

*Includes estimated income from sale of imports by unincorporated businesses.

terms of money income, among the poorest areas of the world along with Afghanistan, Bolivia, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Tanganyika.

Comparisons of money income can be deceiving unless they are accompanied by comparisons of the non-monetary sector of the economy.

Except in a few over-crowded atolls land has not been scarce under the U.S. administration of Micronesia, and during most of the time subsistence foodstuffs -- notably taro, breadfruit, fish, and the all-purpose coconut -- have been in abundance. Well-informed observers state that production of these subsistence products has grown along with the population growth -- again with the exception of a few over-crowded areas such as the Mortlock Islands -- so consumption standards have not deteriorated. Those relying on subsistence production with little cash income are subject, however, to periods of acute food shortage after heavy storms in which wind and salt spray have temporarily ruined the staple food plants. Inadequate communication and infrequent visits to some of the more remote islands sometimes results in long periods of great deprivation.

There is some non-agricultural production and even exchange which takes place outside the money economy. Houses are frequently built communally on a cooperative basis, but sometimes they are "bought" through traditional modes of exchange. The same is true of other durable goods such as canoes. In addition, many community projects such as school and

road maintenance are undertaken through labor contributions not involving the use of money. All such economic activity makes the computation of money national income represent only a shadow of the whole economy. A crude estimate based on available labor and usable land and on consumption places the value of subsistence production at $1-1\frac{1}{2}$ times the value of money national income, so total national income including subsistence production (but excluding household services) would be \$15-18 million a year. But money is required for imported goods, which are in ever greater demand, so to an increasing degree tracking the evolution of the monetary sector is appropriate for following changes in living standards -- so long as developments in the subsistence sector are not neglected entirely.

The paucity of accurate statistics prevents careful study of recent economic growth in Micronesia, but Table 7 sets out data for earnings from employment and exports and expenditures on imports since 1954.

It was stated above that subsistence food production has probably kept pace with population growth in most of Micronesia, but it can be seen from Table 7 that after a sharp increase from 1953-1957, imports seem to have risen very little in the past six years despite an increase in the population by one-fourth during the same period. At the same time, however, money incomes from wages and salaries rose about one-third, and export proceeds also rose about one-third. Under these circumstances the stability in imports is puzzling. Assuming the figures reflect the

Table 7
Employment and Foreign Trade

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Total Employment for Wages</u>	<u>Micronesian Wages</u>		<u>Exports</u> (\$'000)	<u>Imports</u> (\$'000)
		<u>Total</u> (\$'000)	<u>T.T. Govt.</u>		
1954	2,407	1,291	953 *	3,343**	2,258
1955	2,799	1,581	1,165*	4,302**	2,488
1956	3,939	2,276	1,404*	1,733	3,175
1957	4,201	2,604	1,342	1,649	4,158
1958	4,999	2,915	1,815	1,653	4,338
1959	4,196	2,981	1,980	1,241	4,009
1960	4,273	2,990	1,966	1,891	3,747
1961	4,207	3,345	1,778	2,130	4,560
1962	4,105	3,513	2,297	2,125	4,139

*Assuming average annual compensation of \$630 per employee.

** Includes exports of phosphate totalling \$2,049,900 in 1954 and \$2,744,500 in 1955.

trends accurately, this behavior can be accounted for only if the Micronesians are spending more on local goods and services -- if so the domestic monetary sector must have grown very rapidly in the last few years -- or if they are saving more. We have been told that savings have indeed increased, but they are not likely to account for the full difference between the higher money incomes and stable imports.

A rough check on Trust Territory import data is provided by recorded exports to the Trust Territory from the United States and Japan, which together normally provide over 90 percent of imports into the Trust Territory. Official U.S. and Japanese export figures (Table 8) suggest quite a different trend for imports into the Trust Territory, and one that corresponds more closely to expectations based on the recorded rise in Micronesian wage earnings and exports: a rise of over 30 percent between 1957 and 1961, and a trebling between 1954 and 1961, compared with increases of less than 10 percent and 100 percent for the corresponding periods recorded by the official import statistics.

The two series are conceptually different both in coverage and definition -- U.S. and Japanese exports exclude ocean shipping costs for example -- but the sharp divergence in their trends points up the need, critical if the economic development of the area is to be properly programmed, for more accurate and more complete economic statistics.

Table 8

Exports to the Trust Territory from the United States
and Japan, 1954-1962

<u>Calendar Year</u>	<u>United States</u>	<u>Japan</u> <u>(\$'000)</u>	<u>Total</u>
1954	910	866	1,776
1955	1,217	900	2,117
1956	1,843	813	2,656
1957	3,051	877	3,928
1958	2,505	625	3,130
1959	1,974	772	2,746
1960	3,675	909	4,584
1961	4,106	1,086	5,192
1962	1,538	n.a.	n.a.

Sources: Statistical Abstract of the United States; and Japanese Ministry of Finance, Foreign Trade of Japan (annual).

Even though official import statistics show a relatively stable total for several years, they show some shift in the geographical origin of imports away from the United States toward Japan, although the United States remains the dominant supplier (Table 9). In 1958-59 Japan supplied 15 percent of imports into the Trust Territory; by 1962-63 this share had risen to 22 percent. Steady Japanese advancement into world export markets with low prices is probably the main reason for the rising importance of imports from Japan, but the price advantages have been fortified by more frequent trips by Trust Territory ships to Japan, both for servicing and for regular logistical runs, and by favorable freight rates between Japan and the Trust Territory. The political implications of this and other growing ties with Japan are discussed briefly elsewhere in the Mission's Report.

Along with most underdeveloped economies, Micronesia's exports are concentrated heavily on a few products while its imports are rather diversified (Tables 10 and 11). Copra alone accounts for about 80 percent of the exports from the Trust Territory, and the remaining exports are all primary products except for a small amount of handicraft. Imports include a much wider range of goods, including several important products such as canned fish and such starchy foods as rice and flour which compete with local products.

Table 9
Origin of Imports
(Percent)

	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963*
United States	75.5	76.4	74.1	70.9	64.8	70.8
Japan	15.3	14.7	17.7	19.5	22.4	21.6
Other	9.3	8.9	8.1	9.6	12.8	7.6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Estimated on the basis of incomplete returns.

Table 10

Composition of Exports

(\$'000)

	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
Copra	1,488	1,423	968	1,588	1,776	1,662
Scrap metal	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	133	217
Trochus	76	149	175	148	64	34
Handicraft and shells	27	17	13	21	23	32
Vegetables	54	57	61	105	69	95
Fish, crab meat, etc.)		5	19	27	66	85
Charcoal	5	2	5	2	--	--
Total	1,649	1,653	1,241	1,891	2,130	2,125

Table 11
Composition of Imports

	(\$'000)		
	1958	1961	1962
Food	2,189	2,329	1,883
Rice	566	613	481
Flour	159	166	141
Sugar	217	231	200
Canned Meat	262	257	194
Canned Fish	210	205	232
Other	774	857	636
Beverages	328	385	365
Tobacco and Products	262	307	293
Clothing and Textiles	518	603	585
Building Materials	283	239	217
Boat Parts and Gas	122	116	97
Machinery	75	81	79
Petroleum Products	201	151	155
All Other	358	347	465
Total	4,335	4,560	4,139

Financing the substantial excess of imports over exports (see Table 7) requires other external sources of funds. The main source, of course, is that part of the annual appropriation by the U.S. Congress which finances the local wage bill of the Trust Territory government. Other sources and uses of funds in transactions with the rest of the world are difficult to trace because of the paucity of statistical information. Since U.S. currency is used throughout the Trust Territory, foreign exchange transactions do not provide information as they do in countries with a separate currency. But Micronesian families do receive remittances from relatives living on Guam and elsewhere abroad, and sales to visitors also contribute to the total receipts of Micronesia from outside the territory. Against these receipts must be set various outpayments, such as direct mail order purchases by individuals, travel abroad, and new savings deposited in banks which hold their funds in the United States. Also, many government expenditures do not get into the Micronesian economy, for they go to purchase goods or services outside the Territory. Direct government purchases from abroad are not included in the recorded imports, nor are Micronesian purchases in the stores of Kwajalein.

In estimating the total economic impact of additional expenditures in Micronesia, such as would result from the Mission's recommendations, it is necessary to know roughly how much of the additional local

income will be spent on imports of goods and services, how much will be spent on domestic goods and services, and how much will be saved. Again inadequate statistics make a large amount of guesswork necessary, but it probably would not be far wrong to estimate that somewhat more than half of additional money income would be spent on imports, while perhaps 40 percent would go to purchase local goods and services (including the wholesale and retail markups, usually around 40 percent, on imported goods). Savings would probably be under 5 percent, while municipal and district tax collections might tap 5-10 percent of the additional money income. Because of the heavy leakage of additional incomes into imports, any secondary ("multiplier") effects of additional expenditures on Micronesian incomes and employment would be small. (For every three jobs resulting directly from an increase in government expenditures, perhaps $1-1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 additional jobs would be created locally.)

It would be a mistake to suppose that average figures for exports, imports, and wage and salary compensation for the Trust Territory as a whole could be applied with accuracy to all areas within the Trust Territory. Substantial differences in per capita trade and wage compensation exist among districts (see Table 12), and within districts the differences between the district centers and the outer islands is undoubtedly even greater. Per capita exports are highest in the Marshalls, the major copra-producing area of Micronesia and an area where the Trust Territory

government payroll adds much less per capita than in most other districts. Yap, by contrast, enjoys a relatively high government payroll per capita, and exports are much lower. The Mission also received the impression that subsistence living standards are probably higher in the Yap Islands than in any other district of the Trust Territory, and it is well known that the Yapese have resisted the intrusion of foreign customs and tastes more than other districts. Nonetheless, imports per capita do not differ greatly from the average for the entire Territory.

The Marianas District, including Saipan, clearly enjoys the greatest financial benefit from the presence of government, and per capita exports are also much higher than average. As a result, imports into the Marianas (where subsistence agriculture and fishing, while present, is far less prevalent than other areas of Micronesia) are more than twice per capita imports for the Territory as a whole.

In terms of money income, Truk is clearly the most depressed district, ranking lowest both in wage compensation per capita and in imports per capita. As mentioned earlier, parts of Truk District are already pressing the limits, with existing methods of production, of agricultural output, and some observers suggest that the living standard may have fallen in parts of the district in recent years.

No description of Micronesia's economy would be complete without discussion of the transportation system, which alone makes it possible even to speak in terms of a "Micronesian economy" rather than half a dozen to a dozen separate "economies" with broadly similar problems. Transportation facilities in the Trust Territory are discussed in detail in another part of the Mission's report. It should be mentioned here, however, that the infrequency of port calls by inter-district vessels prevents extensive trade between districts, much less economic integration. While the similarity of population and resources in many districts naturally points to closer trade links with the outside world than between districts, there are nonetheless a number of promising possibilities for inter-district trade, and developing these lines of activity awaits first of all more frequent, more regular shipping and air connections.

Programming and following through on a development program requires a continuing back-flow of reasonably accurate statistical information about the economy -- production and trade, financial flows, size and skills of labor force. While the Trust Territory now does a commendable job in collecting as many statistics as it does for its annual reports, neither the coverage nor the accuracy is adequate to the requirements for tracking the economic development of the area. The statistics which do exist are often not analyzed as fully as they could be. Several suggestions for improving the statistical coverage are:

a. Import data should be extended to include direct mail order purchases, purchases at Kwajalein which are not made through currently reporting import firms, and as a separate entry, imports into the Territory by the government which are not made through reporting firms. Special care should be taken to assure that the landed price, excluding all local mark-ups, is recorded.

b. Greater detail on imports should be reported where there is some possibility of substituting Micronesian production for imports, for example; soaps, cooking oil, hardwood lumber, fiber board, non-carbonated soft drinks, and so on.

c. Some attempt should be made to estimate other payments to outside the Territory and receipts from outside the Territory -- remittance from Guam and elsewhere, travel abroad, movements of capital to and from the Territory (especially through the U.S. bank branches which operate in the Territory) and so on.

d. Systematic collection of monetary statistics should be undertaken, including demand and time deposits in banks (and annual changes therein), bank loans in the Territory, bank clearances in the Territory, credit union deposits and loans outstanding, and, if possible, currency in circulation.

e. The major components of national income should be collected. The most important omissions at present are business income and rental income. Such statistics would be a useful by-product of a territory-wide income tax, consideration of which is recommended elsewhere in this report.

Chapter 3

LABOR

A critical element in the economic development of the Trust Territory is its labor force. Labor productivity, or output per man per day, is exceedingly low. Climatic conditions are often given as the main reason for low output in the tropics; but Micronesia lacks the stultifying heat of the tropical continents and climate alone does not begin to explain the low level of output. Perhaps a more debilitating factor than climate is the general health of the working population. Even though health conditions are much better than in many other underdeveloped areas, intestinal parasites, respiratory diseases, and unbalanced diets all take their toll in human energy. In some areas as much as 90 percent of the population has stomach worms, for example. Moreover, the shortage of capital in all its forms -- including shipping -- lowers the level of output. Unreliable and infrequent visits to outlying islands fail to provide the incentive for extensive and well-planned copra production. And men trained to do construction work with heavy machinery cannot work when aged machinery is continually breaking down and when it is kept unusable for prolonged periods for lack of spare parts.

Recommendations to correct these deficiencies are made elsewhere in the Mission's Report. This chapter will focus on three further factors which limit productivity, however, and will suggest measures to reduce these barriers to higher output. Inadequate labor skills, conventional

attitudes toward work (and the closely related question of adequate work supervision), and relative immobility of the working population all inhibit increases in production. Improved living standards in Micronesia require that these obstacles to higher output be overcome. Moreover, in view of the proposed increases in government pay scales, productivity needs to be increased to avoid getting wage costs in Micronesia far out of line with those of other countries. Finally, this chapter considers briefly the impact of the Mission's proposed public construction program on employment in the Trust Territory.

Labor Skills

Modern skills and technical knowledge are almost non-existent in the Micronesian labor force. The population census of 1958 showed only 10 percent of the population over 14 years as having technical, managerial or clerical skills. Educational attainment, shown in Table 13, was exceedingly low even when no allowance is made for the fact that in many schools the fact of physical attendance is a misleading measure of the education actually acquired. Less than a third of the adult population has a minimum command of English, and there is no technical literature in the indigenous languages which are taught in the schools. Among adults, knowledge of Japanese is probably about as common as English in the Trust Territory as a whole. The lack of technical skills and the poor educational

Table 13

Educational Attainment in Micronesia and the
United States, 1993
(Percent of Population over 25 Years)

Years Completed	Trust Territory (Percent)	United States (Percent)	Years Completed
None or not reported	39.0	8.3	Less than five
One - three	25.5		
Four - six	16.0	13.8	Five - seven
Seven - nine	12.8	17.5	Eight
Ten - eleven	3.5	19.2	Nine - eleven
Finished high school	0.6	24.6	Finished high school
College: one - three	0.4	8.8	College: one - three
four or more	0.1	7.7	four or more
Special school: one - three	1.1	n.a.	
four - six	<u>0.9</u>	<u>n.a.</u>	
Total	100.0	100.0	

background (making advanced on-the-job training difficult) hinder the introduction of production processes or techniques which deviate sharply from tradition. Improvements in the educational system budgeted in the past year and further improvements recommended by the Mission should provide the basis for a more highly skilled working force as graduates from the improved system leave school.

Improvements in the school system must be complemented, however, by a program for on-the-job training of those now working and by a program of adult education in the evenings and special vocational programs in fisheries and agriculture. Recommendations for general adult education are discussed in the Mission's report on education. On-the-job training provides a direct and visible way for raising labor productivity. Such training has been a natural by-product of Micronesian employment in the public works departments of all districts. It is also taking place at the Pacific Missile Range located on Kwajalein. But on-the-job training should become a more deliberate part of the over-all educational program in the Trust Territory. The Texas Transport Company, servicing contractor at Kwajalein, estimates that it can train (including instruction in English) 115 Micronesians for \$40-50,000 a year to cover lost production time. At \$340-430 per trainee per year, this is an inexpensive form of vocational training. Such training will open up additional jobs for Micronesians as they become competent to replace higher priced American

personnel now filling many positions not requiring very sophisticated skills. In addition, there is a substantial demand for skilled and semi-skilled labor on Guam. The Mission recommends that on-the-job training programs, both at Kwajalein and by arrangement with the Navy on Guam, be explored fully to assess their contribution to adult education and to employment. In such training, particular attention should be paid to the building trades and to general mechanics, skills which are needed in the Trust Territory itself.

Attitudes Toward Work

Micronesian attitudes toward work vary from district to district. It has been said on more than one occasion that Micronesians are erratic workers and work only enough to satisfy their immediate needs for cash. If true, this would imply that higher wages would actually reduce the number of hours worked, for given cash needs could be satisfied more quickly. This attitude toward cash income may still exist in some parts of Micronesia -- particularly where population density is low and subsistence living is relatively easy -- but it is certainly not a valid generalization for the entire territory. Where it is valid, it affects the timing of new programs rather than their direction, for in all but the remotest areas of Micronesia work attitudes are likely to change substantially over the next decade or two. In Palau, attitudes toward

regular work are decidedly modern. Yap is perhaps at the other extreme, where possibilities for cash income (e.g. copra production) seem to go unexploited for want of incentive. (It should be added that the Mission was told of instances where cash income was foregone for lack of labor time rather than economic incentive; community projects in Yap frequently create heavy demands for voluntary labor -- sometimes as much as two weeks a month.) Employment opportunities should be geared, among other things, to work attitudes. Big projects should be especially carefully scrutinized for their political and economic impact in those areas where an adequate labor force is not available. Resentment against or contempt for the United States as administering authority is perhaps as likely to be generated by employment-generating projects which fail or are obviously bungled -- for whatever reason, including poor labor cooperation -- as they are by failure to provide employment opportunities for those wishing to work.

Labor turnover rates, one indication of attitudes toward wage employment, are not exceptionally high in Micronesia by comparison with young, clerical and junior professional working groups in the United States (Table 14). The very high turnover rate for Marianas indicates not only reduction in force of 55 (without it terminations would have been 37 percent of total employees in the Marianas), but also the use of Trust Territory government employment as a stepping stone to higher paying

Table 14

Trust Territory Employment and Terminations, FY 1963

	<u>Trust Territory</u>	<u>Marianas</u>
Total employment	2,209	430
Terminations	465	213*

Termination as a percent of employment by district

Marianas	48*
Marshalls	24
Truk	22
Total Trust Territory	21
Yap	20
Palau	16
Ponape	6

* Includes a reduction in force of 55 after the Navy turned Saipan's administration over to Interior; excluding these, the termination rate was 37 percent.

Note: Total Trust Territory employment fell by 16 during the year.

jobs in Guam, where an estimated 1500 Saipanese are now living. Ninety terminations gave search for employment in Guam as the reason for leaving. The Mission was informed, however, that absenteeism is high throughout the Trust Territory, in some places as much as 20 percent of all working days. Moreover, "loafing on the job" has been reported in some districts.

Discipline through firing is at present difficult in some districts because of the limited availability of labor, so fired employees sometimes must be re-hired. Much of the "loafing" seems to result from inadequate supervisory personnel, for with proper supervision most Micronesians are capable of working hard and efficiently. For example, building productivity in the Metalanum Housing Cooperative, where close supervision is provided, seems to be several times as high as building productivity in some district public works departments, where supervision is inadequate. Most Micronesians are apparently not yet able to follow a general set of instructions; detailed supervision and guidance is needed. Moreover, custom often prevents aggressive supervision of Micronesians by another Micronesian from the same area. In the Marshalls, for instance, conventions of behavior prohibit one Marshallese from "ordering" another Marshallese to do something; similar inhibitions exist in some other districts. In those areas where such conventions impede efficient work (and foster poor working habits), the Mission recommends that Micronesians be brought from other districts as supervisory personnel where practicable; and where this would

not work effectively (because of traditional antagonisms between different groups of Micronesians, for example), the Mission recommends that additional U.S. supervisory personnel be brought into the Territory.

A potential problem in Micronesia, as in many underdeveloped areas, is the attitude of the "educated" toward manual work, including agricultural work. The view is widespread that education, and virtually education alone, is the route to good jobs and higher incomes. Usually this means government jobs. So long as the policy of replacing U.S. employees with Micronesians as rapidly as possible is in full swing, this favorable attitude toward government employment is not entirely undesirable; it assures that the best-trained Micronesians are attracted into government service, where they are badly needed. With a new emphasis on more and better schooling for more Micronesians, and with less emphasis on the rapid replacement policy, it will no longer be desirable that qualified graduates look only to the government for jobs, disdainig "blue-collar" forms of employment.

The educational system should itself help to generate a more useful attitude toward work. Secondary education can in part be oriented toward skills which can be usefully applied to traditional occupations, viz. agriculture and fishing, and toward the practical arts such as carpentry and mechanics. Such orientation need not be "vocational" in the narrow sense; but it can provide the subject-matter focus on which

other more academic training is based. For example, agricultural training would involve a heavy dose of biology, plant ecology, etc. as well as more practical training in modern agricultural techniques suitable for the local environment. The object of such a program would be threefold:

a. To train students in proper techniques of farming and fishing and the reasons for the difference between these and more traditional methods.

b. To instill the notion that proper agricultural techniques are continually changing with new knowledge and new products and that modern agriculture requires extensive post-school professional reading.

c. To teach the "scientific" approach and to carry enough academic content so that those students close to graduation are sufficiently equipped to face a real occupational choice of going on in scientific-technical pursuits or returning to agriculture, trained to approach it a modern way and without shame. Such an orientation can minimize the post-graduation disillusionment which is bound to occur if government jobs are not available in sufficient quantity and if newly acquired standards of job acceptability preclude alternative forms of employment.

Developing favorable work attitudes is desirable on many grounds, but the educational program must still have enough academic content so that the brighter students can reasonably be encouraged to go on to college; there is likely to be adequate demand in the Trust Territory for qualified college graduates for some years to come, and in addition those who choose to do so will be well prepared to emigrate to the United States or elsewhere.

Labor Mobility

Over-all productivity can be improved by encouraging movement from low productivity to higher productivity forms of employment. Migration out of over-populated atolls into areas of urban employment is one way of accomplishing this. If manufacturing, even on a small scale, is to operate efficiently, the dispersed labor force of Micronesia must somehow be concentrated. Within districts the availability of jobs will itself attract labor from the outlying islands, and within some districts mobility is already high, facilitated by the customary and prolonged hospitality to even distant relatives who move in. Yap, and to some extent Ponape, represent exceptions since the out-islanders are not related to those living in the district centers.

Mobility between districts is much lower; only 39 Micronesians are reported to have moved from one district to another in fiscal year 1962. Some inter-district migration has taken place: a number of Trukese reside on Ponape (and more were brought in under the homestead program), and a Palauan community exists in Yap. People from the over-crowded Mortlocks in the Truk District have expressed a desire to move to highly-populated Tinian near Saipan in the Marianas but the Chamorros living on Tinian are reluctant to accept the move. Several dozen government employees work outside the district of their origin, largely in headquarters on Saipan. But on the whole the geographical horizon of most Micronesians is limited to the district in which they were raised;

in many instances other districts are regarded as no less foreign than foreign countries.

Inter-district mobility should be increased, for several reasons. First, such mobility will help reduce the wide regional differences in population densities within Micronesia, thereby raising output and incomes. Second, it should provide labor where larger working forces are needed, as may be the case in the future in urban areas that develop processing industries, or in certain agricultural areas that develop large labor-using production. Third, it will help to break down traditional patterns of behavior which inhibit raising living standards -- patterns which many younger Micronesians now resent but are unable to avoid in their own districts. Finally, it will reduce the parochial attitudes now fostered within each district and will increase dependence on a common culture based around the English language and American ways.

One way of increasing mobility would be through a conscious policy of placing some qualified Micronesian government personnel as well as some secondary school boarding students outside their home districts. A valuable service performed by the Pacific Island Central School and by Xavier High School at Truk is to bring together intelligent Micronesians from all districts where the only common language is English and where students can learn about the rest of Micronesia through their informal contacts

with other students. With the expanding high school programs in each district, PICS will probably cease to be a Micronesian-wide school. Placing government employees in other districts will serve somewhat the same function, and will have the additional advantage of insulating those government employees from traditional obligations and responsibilities which might result in conflict of interest or, as discussed further in Chapter 5, inhibit personal savings.

International mobility, while greater than inter-district mobility, is also low except in the case of Saipanese in Guam. In fiscal year 1962, 100 Micronesians are reported as having emigrated from the Trust Territory; of these, 60 were Saipanese and 32 were Palauans. Half of the total went abroad in search of further education. It is in the long-run interests of the United States and of Micronesians seeking higher living standards that such emigration, particularly to Guam and the United States, be encouraged. It would increase personal contact between Micronesians and the United States and it would provide qualified Micronesians with much wider opportunities for education and employment. Guam alone, with large U.S. military installations there, provides many more employment opportunities than are presently available in the Trust Territory, and Micronesians are prized there as workers. In addition, Micronesians (especially Trukese men and women) have a reputation as providing excellent domestic help. At present the Trust Territory has an annual immigration quota into the United States (including Guam) of only 100, and this

limits emigration sharply. The mission feels that this quota should be greatly enlarged, and that a program should be set up to facilitate hiring Micronesians as domestic help in the U.S. If Congress is reluctant to permit increased emigration to the United States, at a minimum freer migration to Guam should be permitted and, indeed, aided. In addition an expanded scholarship program for higher education in the U.S. is recommended in the Mission's report on education.

Pay Scales

Raising productivity is not only necessary to raise living standards, but also to compensate for scheduled increases in government pay for Micronesians, designed to reduce or eliminate the remaining gap between government wage rates in Saipan and elsewhere in Micronesia and to reduce the difference between pay for Micronesians and U.S. citizens in identical jobs. Still further increases in Micronesian pay are likely in the next few years. The discrepancy between Micronesian and U.S. salary scales for seemingly comparable jobs is a source of considerable resentment, and some attempt to mitigate this source of friction should be made. The Council of Micronesia has recommended that professional (C-Scale) pay for Micronesians be increased by more than 50 percent. As the opportunity and interest in emigrating to the United States increases, government wages for Micronesians will have to be raised enough to keep the desired number of qualified and capable Micronesians at home. The required professional

wage scale is therefore linked to U.S. policy regarding emigration from the Trust Territory. In the Personnel section of Part III of this report, the Mission develops recommendations for both a new transitional "D-Scale" in the interim before the plebiscite and for the long-run objective in the post-plebiscite period.

Government pay increases, while raising some incomes directly and injecting more purchasing power into the economy, will also tend to raise the general wage level and make competition of Micronesian products in world trade more difficult, or it will perpetuate the favored position of government over other kinds of employment. While political and equity considerations require some upward adjustment in pay, corresponding efforts to raise productivity should be made. At present, financial incentives are often insufficient to encourage higher productivity. The government practice of paying time wages does not provide a financial incentive to greater effort. There is a striking contrast in the number of concrete blocks laid per day between those on time wages and those on piece wages, for example. The Mission recommends that, wherever practicable, the government contract out jobs on a payment-for-work-done basis, even when government supervisory personnel are involved. This could be done in many construction jobs, such as the building of schools, teachers' housing, and other public buildings.

Employment Effects of Proposed Program

As already emphasized in Chapter 1, the need for additional wage employment in Micronesia will grow as the large number of postwar babies enter the labor force, as education is improved, and as Micronesians are increasingly attracted to the goods and services money will buy. To provide adequate employment opportunities or to accomplish successful emigration will be a major task. In the near future, however, the large public works and educational construction program recommended by the Survey Mission will generate enough additional jobs -- and in a few instances more than enough -- to satisfy the near-term demand for them.

The precise impact of the program on Micronesian employment cannot be estimated in the absence of more precise estimates of total expenditures and of their timing. But Table 15 sets forth rough estimates of the local labor requirements, on the assumptions specified in the note to the table, for that part of the capital expenditure program which can be allocated by districts. As a practical matter the expenditures will not be spread evenly over the four years 1965-1968, but will probably rise toward the end of the period. Some disbursements will probably take place after 1968. Both prospects are consistent with future employment requirements.

Over-all labor requirements of the program can be satisfied, even when allowance is made for rising requirements over the period, except possibly in the Yap District. In Yap labor requirements may possibly exceed the need for jobs in the next five years, and in that event it would be desirable either to stretch out capital expenditures in these districts so that jobs will be provided over a longer period, or to import labor from Truk or Palau, where both population and the demand for jobs are greater. The employment requirements in the final column of Table 15 should be compared with the adult male population in each district shown in Table 5 (page 19).

The incomes generated by expenditures on the construction program will result in higher expenditures on imports and on local goods and services. Some of these expenditures will create additional local employment. For reasons discussed in Chapter 2, this "multiplier" effect will not be large -- every two additional persons working on public projects might create enough local demand for one additional job or a little more -- but it should also be borne in mind when programming public expenditures.

The four-year capital expenditure program will provide time during which employment opportunities in business-type operations can be developed, and with adequate programming four years should allow

Table 15

**Estimated Labor Requirements for Proposed Capital Expenditure
Program, by District, 1965-68**

	<u>Capital Expenditure*</u> (\$'000)	<u>Micronesian Payroll</u> (\$'000)	<u>Man-hours</u> ('000)	<u>Men Per Year**</u>
Marianas	2,050	717	1,792	224
Marshalls	6,250	2,187	5,467	683
Palau	3,700	1,295	3,237	405
Ponape	5,900	2,065	5,162	645
Truk	5,100	1,785	4,462	558
Yap	<u>3,700</u>	<u>1,295</u>	<u>3,237</u>	<u>405</u>
Total	26,700	9,344	23,357	2,920

* Excludes ships and other equipment.

** Assuming 2,000 working hours per year, and 4 full years.

Note: Total payroll is assumed to comprise half of capital costs, and Micronesian payroll is assumed to comprise 70 per cent of total payroll. The average hourly wage for Micronesians is assumed to be \$.40.

ample time. As the labor requirements for the capital expenditure program taper off after 1968, commercial operations (discussed in the next chapter) in agriculture, fishing, manufacturing, and services should be ready to absorb the released workers.

Chapter 4

PRODUCTION SECTORS:

AGRICULTURE, FISHING, MINING, AND MANUFACTURING

Agriculture

The economy of Micronesia is largely agricultural, and agricultural production takes place largely for local consumption. The crop composition varies somewhat from district to district, especially as between the high volcanic islands and the low coral islands, but virtually everywhere the coconut, taro, breadfruit, and pandanus are found, and the first three are the major food crops in Micronesia. Pandanus leaves are used for weaving, and the fruit is only a supplementary food. In general the most efficient agricultural techniques are not used. Land use -- plant selection, spacing of plants, and inter-cropping -- is poor, and virtually no fertilizer is used in the Trust Territory despite the great improvement in yields which would result. But outside of a few areas the land and the surrounding water produce enough to feed most island populations adequately most of the time, although there is frequently some malnutrition (due to lack of a balanced diet) and, especially in certain densely populated areas where the breadfruit is important, there is an annual cycle of feast and famine.

In many parts of the Trust Territory land is held communally -- an extended family, or clan, claims ownership -- but use rights are often

allocated to individual adult members of the family. Sometimes the use rights of an individual piece of land will remain with an individual throughout his life, reverting to the clan for reallocation on his death.

In other places the land is reallocated more frequently, so a person does not use a particular piece of land for an extended period. Land use rights often cover many small, widely scattered pieces of land, with the resulting loss of time in moving from one to another. These land practices are not conducive to individual investment in land, and they probably reduce agricultural productivity. Some individual homesteading of land has been done in Ponape, Palau, and the Marianas, but it is too early to test the success of the program. The homestead program provides little other than land and certain specifications regarding planting; however, there is insufficient technical guidance and none of the financial aid which is required to get homesteaders into efficient agricultural production. Moreover, no account is taken of land quality in the homestead program, so productive land varies widely among homesteads. Finally, some land is under lease from the government. Since in many cases the future status of these leases is uncertain, Micronesians holding the leases do not know whether they will be allowed to take title to the land, whether the leases will be affirmed and continued, or whether they will be moved off the land. This problem seems especially acute in Ponape.

The main market crops in Micronesia are the coconut (in the form of copra), fruits and vegetables (especially from the Marianas), and, increasingly, cacao. In addition, produce such as taro and sweet potatoes are sold locally in the district centers, and some beef cattle are slaughtered and sold in Saipan.

Economic progress in agriculture can be divided into the development of new commercial crops and the improvement in production and marketing of existing crops. There has been too much attention paid in the Trust Territory to new crops and not enough to the commercial development of existing crops. Cacao, pepper, and ramie have all been introduced and passed through a period of experimentation to the point at which some small amount of output is now being marketed. Other products, such as coffee, tobacco, and various fruits and nuts are still in the stage of experimentation. While it would be desirable to find products which will do well in Micronesia and for which there is a substantial world market, it is doubtful whether the administration of the Territory is equipped to do this kind of work efficiently and whether the Micronesian farmers have yet reached the stage of agricultural sophistication where they can take on new crops and make them a commercial success.

It is not sufficient that a product grow well in Micronesia to warrant the expenditure of substantial resources toward its development; it must also be profitable to grow it. More critical attention should be

paid to the economic prospects of new products in the area; most such products must compete for land and labor with the coconut and other products which are known to be marketable at a profit. Considering the substantial technical assistance and persuasion required to introduce a new crop among uneducated farmers, the pay-off to such a crop must be high relative to improvements in crops which they know in order to warrant devoting resources to the new crop. There is a tendency to hope that there is agricultural gold or oil around, and it is just a question of finding the right product. The Trust Territory is not staffed to do the kind of agricultural and market research required to develop new products successfully. Recommendations in the Mission's report on agriculture suggest transferring agricultural research to a university or research institution interested in tropical agriculture. The Programming and Development Contractor, discussed later in this section, would include qualified personnel in agricultural economics. When a new agricultural product does look profitable on a commercial basis it might be established as a direct government venture to be transferred to private enterprise (e.g. a farmers' cooperative) once it was well established.

Several undeveloped possibilities for marketing products which are known to do well in the Trust Territory seem to exist. For example, the market for produce and meat is very large compared with production in the Trust Territory. There are 11,000 U.S. Navy personnel and 8,200

Air Force personnel on Guam, in addition to 50,000 other residents. The Navy alone provides a large relatively unexploited market. Demand for meat and produce on Kwajalein is also substantial, and can be expected to grow rapidly in the next few years. Tables 16 and 17 indicate roughly the size of these markets. In addition, there is substantial unsatisfied demand for fish and produce in several of the district centers within the Trust Territory.

These markets far exceed the potential output of Micronesia for some time to come. The principal obstacles to development of these markets revolve around quality control and reliability of supply. Produce quality must meet whatever U.S. legal standards are required and must meet the standards of uniformity which are available in purchases in the United States, or else compensate adequately with lower prices. Achieving high, uniform quality in commercial crops is not an easy job, and it will require close guidance by U.S. personnel until Micronesian businessmen or cooperatives can take over the job of policing agricultural sales and inducing the farmers to improve quality and reliability of production supply. The main obstacles to reliable supply, however, are the transportation system and the absence of adequate chill storage capacity. Shipping schedules are neither frequent nor regular enough to permit the development of continuing commercial relations. The Mission's report on transportation spells out recommended improvements in the system of surface

Table 16

Produce Consumption by the U.S. Navy

<u>Fruit or Vegetable</u>	<u>Guam</u> <u>Unit Price</u>	<u>Monthly Demand in Pounds</u>	
		<u>Guam</u>	<u>Pacific Missile</u> <u>Range, Kwajalein</u>
Papaya	.15	300	n.a.
Avocados	.23	500	800
Pineapples	.04	4,000	n.a.
Cucumbers	.07	5,000	1,500
Bananas		n.a.	2,500
Broccoli	.16	200	n.a.
Cabbage	.04	35,756	4,800
Cabbage, Red	.06	1,650	n.a.
Garlic	.41	1,032	200
Lemons	.13	11,891	2,000
Lettuce (leaf)	.12	29,180	9,000
Limes	.59	350	250
Onions, dry	.04	25,937	10,000
Onions, Yellow	.11	9,786	n.a.
Onions, White	.11	1,000	n.a.
Onions, Green	.14	2,520	1,200
Parsley	.16	444	100
Peppers	.13	3,920	1,600
Potatoes	.04	147,425	40,000
Potatoes 10# bag	.05	4,960	n.a.
Radishes	.11	2,760	400
Romanine	.08	4,560	1,000
Rutabagas	.06	340	n.a.
Turnips	.07	1,020	n.a.
Yams	.08	1,400	n.a.
Grapefruit	.11	7,322	2,100
Grapefruit, Pink	.11	1,020	n.a.
Honeydew Melon	.09	6,000	2,000
Nectarines	.21	2,000	n.a.
Oranges	.14	33,806	7,500
Orange, Temple	.14	3,000	n.a.
Orange, Val	.21	9,000	n.a.
Tangelos	.21	4,000	2,000
Watermelons	.05	25,000	8,000

n.a. - not available

Table 17

Meat and Poultry Consumption by the U.S. Navy

	Guam		Pacific Missile Range Kwajalein
	<u>Pounds Per Month</u>	<u>Unit Price</u>	
Beef	80,000	.36 - .39	33,000
Pork	27,000	.40	9,000
Ham (canned)	24,000	.45 - .65	7,500
Bacon	18,000	.39 - .45	3,000
Poultry	115,000	.27 - .34	15,000
Eggs	39,000*	.49 - .78	15,000*

* In dozens

and air transportation. It is sufficient to mention here that such improvements are essential if the Trust Territory is to capitalize on the existence of substantial potential markets for Micronesian agricultural products within Micronesia.

A separate part of the Mission's report treats in greater detail the land ecology in Micronesia, the possibilities for agricultural improvements, and the functioning of the Trust Territory's department of agriculture. The major recommendations of the agricultural report are brought together here, however, because of the central role which agriculture must play in the steady development of the Micronesian economy. More extensive discussion of these recommendations can be found in the agricultural report, where the agricultural program is considered district by district. Here the recommendations are grouped into three categories: (A) those which will produce results in the relatively near future, say by 1968; (B) those whose payoff will require a longer period of time; and (C) administrative changes.

(A) 1. An undetermined but large amount of copra, coconut, and other usable products is lost through rodent and pest damage. A rat control program should be undertaken at once in those areas where the limits on output are land rather than labor, and should be extended gradually to other areas. Programs to control or eliminate the Marianas beetle and harmful fruit flies should also be instituted. Finally, a more extensive

quarantine program should be inaugurated, especially at Kwajalein where hundreds of tons of food products enter Micronesia annually without inspection. Like human diseases, plant diseases and harmful insects can enter Micronesia and do tremendous damage.

2. Production of cacao beans is expected to rise sharply in the next few years, and enlarged fermentaries at Ponape and Truk are essential to prepare the beans for market.

3. The program for introducing carabao as beast of burden into Palau should be enlarged. Moreover, beasts of burden such as burros should be introduced into rugged high islands such as the northern Marianas and Ponape to haul copra.

4. Micronesians should be encouraged to use organic fertilizers. The tropical soils are poor and agricultural output could be increased substantially with the use of fertilizer. This will require some increase in agricultural extension work and some experimentation with the use of local products, particular marine life, as fertilizer. Effective use of imported chemical fertilizers should also be encouraged where the crop is sufficiently marketable to pay for the imports.

5. Local livestock and poultry should be improved with the introduction of pure strains, and livestock feed crops should be encouraged. At present swine and poultry are left entirely to scavenge

for themselves, with resulting inefficiency in meat and egg production. This too will require more extension work.

(B) 1. The present program for replanting coconuts should be continued for another four years, during which time an estimated 800,000 trees can be planted, primarily in Ponape and the Marshalls.

2. A program of afforestation should be started on most of the high islands. These islands once supported substantial stands of commercially valuable hardwoods, but uncontrolled cutting and other factors have reduced the forests to scrub and scattered individual trees. Afforestation is desirable for soil protection as well as to generate a local source of building materials for houses, boats, furniture, and so on.

3. On many low islands windbreaks to reduce salt spray are necessary before badly needed vegetables can be grown. A program for planting salt-resistant trees as windbreaks should be inaugurated, especially in the Marshall Islands.

4. New, disease-resistant varieties of citrus trees should be introduced where they will grow, with the ultimate objective of replacing the numerous citrus trees now plagued by citrus canker.

5. Castor beans should be introduced on a pilot basis on the low coral islands to provide an alternative cash crop to copra. If successful, an extensive tree planting program could be undertaken.

6. The possibility of growing bananas in exportable quality and quantity should be explored in detail, and the feasibility of rice cultivation with a view toward reducing the more than \$500,000 annual imports of rice should be undertaken.

7. The Farm Institute (agricultural training program) should be expanded from its present capacity of 12 students to at least 50 students, with the understanding that it is an agricultural training school and not a school exclusively for training agricultural extension agents which will automatically lead to a government job for all graduates. In addition, a mechanism for disseminating information to agricultural extension agents and other interested parties should be established -- perhaps a monthly circular containing information useful to Micronesian agriculture.

(C) 1. The Department of Agriculture should be reorganized so the Director of Agriculture has direct authority over District Agriculturists and can coordinate the agricultural program in the entire Trust Territory. This is also in line with the Mission's recommendations in Part III regarding the administrative organization under the High Commissioner. Moreover, the District Agriculturists should be absolved of their present

responsibilities for cooperatives, credit unions, and other development efforts -- a Cooperatives Officer should take over those functions in each district -- and of their research responsibilities. Finally, new agricultural substations for propagation and agricultural extension work should be established in several of the districts.

2. Basic agricultural research should be placed in the hands of a qualified research organization. The College of Tropical Agriculture of the University of Hawaii has expressed through a letter from the President of the University a general interest in establishing a research facility in the Trust Territory under contract, and suggested a short-term contract to study the feasibility and recommend the location and scope of such a facility. This possibility should be pursued. In addition to a general arrangement bringing a research institution into the area, the Director of Agriculture should have a Specialist Fund for hiring agricultural specialists, including those at the research facility, on a short-term basis.

The total annual budget required to implement the recommended agricultural program is about \$800,000, of which \$515,000 is for personnel. This compares with a total agricultural budget of \$705,000 in fiscal 1964. The contingency fund of \$100,000 for hiring specialists is not included in this estimate. In addition, \$250,000 is recommended for a revolving loan fund to provide small loans to farmers, and \$60,000 is recommended

to establish a small pool of agricultural equipment for lease to farmers in the Marianas.

Several commercial-type agricultural operations seem to offer enough promise to warrant detailed exploration: a ramie plantation at Palau, a cattle ranch and slaughterhouse on Tinian, a large produce farm on Rota, etc. While agricultural, these operations would be commercial in intent and should be operated by the development contractor (see below) -- with the objective of transferring them to private hands as quickly as feasible -- rather than by the department of agriculture. These business operations are discussed further later in this chapter.

Fishing

While the marine resources in the Trust Territory have never been thoroughly surveyed, the presence of Japanese fishing ships in open water and the large inshore catches by Micronesians indicate an abundance of fish and other edible marine life. Despite this, there is a shortage of sea food in the area. The Trust Territory imports over \$200,000 in canned fish annually, and the demand for fresh lagoon fish in such "urban" areas as Ebeye, Majuro, and Moen (Truk) often goes unsatisfied.

Two types of fishing are possible in Micronesia, and each presents separate problems. The first is inshore fishing, generally within or just

outside the barrier reefs, by net, line, or spear gun. The second is off-shore fishing of pelagic species, notably tuna, from boats of 50 or more feet in length. Lagoon fish are desired fresh; but except in a few places fresh tuna is not liked.

There seems to be three bottlenecks to catching and marketing inshore fish in greater abundance: ice, chill storage capacity, and transportation to markets. These factors are not all lacking in all districts; in Majuro, for example, a reefer is being used to store canned goods because there is not enough fresh fish or produce to use it. But both in Ponape and Palau inshore fishing is periodically stopped because the modest limits of cold storage capacity are reached before the fish can be exported to other areas. Transportation from areas of excess supply -- Palau and sometimes Ponape -- to areas of excess demand -- Majuro, Kwajalein, Truk, and above all Guam -- is inadequate and irregular. Development of commercial inshore fishing could proceed much further if these obstacles were eliminated.

In Ponape and Palau fisherman's cooperatives have been organized as clearing houses for keeping production records, arranging for storage, marketing the fish, and paying the fishermen. These organizations still need further guidance, particularly with respect to record-keeping and general management, but on the whole they seem to be very promising.

When the cooperatives are capable of extending their operations they could be encouraged to provide other services to the fishermen, such as stocking fishing supplies and perhaps arranging for the care of small boats.

Similar cooperatives might also be started in Truk and Majuro, where the local demand for fish would justify better organized systems for catching and marketing than now exists.

In addition to improvements in inshore fishing, there is some possibility of developing the modern industry of deep-sea fishing. World demand for edible pelagic fish is expected to double to 800,000 tons annually in the next decade, and a substantial part of this increase will apparently have to be supplied with the smaller and less desirable skipjack tuna, a species abundant in Micronesian waters. Successful skipjack tuna fishing depends on plentiful sources of live bait within the vicinity of the fishing zones, so many more fishing bases are required than for larger tuna, which can be caught with frozen bait. Parts of Micronesia are well suited to skipjack fishing, and it is known that live bait sources were sufficient to support a substantial Japanese tuna fleet in the area just before World War II. Unfortunately Micronesians today have neither the equipment nor the technical skill to undertake deep-sea fishing, although 28 Micronesians are now training in Hawaii.

The Van Camp Company has been given a contract to establish a tuna fishing base and freezing plant at Palau, where it will land and

freeze fish for shipment to canneries in American Samoa or the United States. The letting of this contract seems to have raised unrealistic expectations, especially in Palau, about the amount of employment and income which will be brought into the Trust Territory in the near future from tuna fishing. The Shore-side employment requirements of a freezing plant, once it is built, are not high; servicing the fishing boats could also generate some employment -- if the facilities and skills were there -- but again the resulting employment is unlikely to be great. In the absence of a cannery, the most important impact on employment would result from staffing the fishing boats with Micronesians. At present very few Micronesians are trained in the kind of fishing required, and the Van Camp contract fails to specify the number of Micronesians to be trained, although the clear understanding apparently exists that as rapidly as possible the Okinawan fishermen brought in to supply the fish will be replaced by Micronesians. The Mission was told, however, that fishermen's wages on the Okinawan boats which Van Camp plans to use are so low that Micronesians will probably not be willing to work on them in significant numbers and consequently will never replace the Okinawan fishermen. By contrast, Hawaiian tuna fishing techniques, using more expensive Hawaiian-type tuna boats, permit incomes which would attract Micronesians into tuna fishing.

A second defect of the contract is that it fails to specify any rule for determining the price which will be paid for landed fish. As a monopolistic buyer in Palau, Van Camp will be able to set the lowest price consistent with the volume of fish required. A greater flow of income into the Micronesian economy could have been assured by linking the buying price to some widely recognized world market price (e.g., the Tokyo price).

Finally, the contract's stipulation that the live bait resources shall be reserved for the people of Micronesia is inconsistent with Van Camp's present plans for establishing skipjack tuna fishing with Okinawan boats and crews.

It is now too late to re-write the entire contract, but the High Commissioner (subject to Defense Department veto) does control the entry into Trust Territory ports of Okinawan fishermen and of foreign freighters, as well as Japanese fishing vessels (from whom Van Camp is interested in buying the larger size tuna). He should use this leverage to assure that the long-run interests of Micronesia are served by training Micronesians to fish and by conserving their sources of live bait. At a minimum, a "statement of objectives" should be agreed in writing between Van Camp and the Trust Territory government. Such a statement would stipulate that the tuna operation is to be for the mutual

benefit of Van Camp and the Micronesian people and to that end Van Camp will purchase equipment and use fishing techniques suitable for the speedy employment of Micronesians. Such an agreement would provide a rationale for punitive action if Van Camp seemed to be relying indefinitely on Japanese and Okinawan boats and fishermen for its skipjack. In addition to such a statement of objectives, it would be highly desirable to get a firm agreement from Van Camp on the rate at which Micronesians are to be trained as skipjack fishermen.

It should be recognized that a commercial fishing operation requires large volume if it is to be successful. No operation, particularly one which relies on training Micronesian crews, will generate substantial volume rapidly. It is commercially advantageous, and possibly essential, to use the excess freezing capacity while catches of skipjack are still small to freeze yellow-fin tuna caught in the area by Japanese fishermen. Van Camp's request to permit Japanese tuna boats to land their catches is not unreasonable. To permit Japanese boats to land without bringing into play Article 8 of the Trusteeship Agreement, requiring that equal treatment be given to all UN members beyond the administering power, a contractual arrangement between Van Camp and certain Japanese fishermen could be worked out and only specified boats would be permitted to land their fish.

Additional employment could be generated by establishing a factory in Palau to can tuna. The Mission has been told that the main obstacle to opening such a fish cannery is the 45 percent U.S. duty on fish prepared in oil. As a general recommendation, the Mission favors a change in U.S. tariff laws to permit products with 50 percent or more of the value added in the Trust Territory to enter the United States duty-free, and the extension to the Trust Territory of the same legislation covering the landing of fish in Guam and American Samoa. Such a change would facilitate greatly development of Micronesia's marine resources in a way which would provide maximum benefit for the Micronesians. The Mission is aware that there is domestic resistance from Pacific Coast fishermen on this point, but in addition to other considerations, the greater the economic development of the Trust Territory, the smaller the financial burden on the United States. Certainly it would be most discriminatory to maintain this situation if this area were to become a U.S. territory.

Large scale commercial offshore fishing should be encouraged in other areas of Micronesia. There are three ways this might be done:

- a. The Fisheries Project could buy or build fishing boats and hire Japanese or Okinawans to train the Micronesians in offshore fishing techniques.

- b. Along the lines of the Van Camp contract, a private firm would be invited to build facilities to service the catch of its own fleet manned by Okinawans, but with stipulated responsibilities for training Micronesians and phasing out the Okinawans.
- c. Main emphasis could be placed on dockside employment for processing fish landed by selected foreign fishermen over the indefinite future. This would result in some employment benefit (e.g., at Truk) from long-line and other types of fishing which the Micronesians are not likely to be able to do successfully in the near future.

These three possibilities are not mutually exclusive and could to some extent be combined, using different approaches in different districts or sharing dockside facilities in the same district. All should be considered in planning the commercial development of Micronesia's marine resources, a development which will require such "infra-structure" as wharves, fresh water lines and dredging and marking channels. Only the higher priority of these kinds of public works that also have important general use are included in the Mission's recommended capital investment program through Fiscal Year 1968. It is envisioned that the Programming and Development Unit would bear in mind additional infra-structure needs and, where appropriate, would provide loan capital for ice-making and cold storage capacity.

Given the potential importance of fishing in the Micronesian economy, the Mission feels that the Trust Territory's Fisheries Project should receive greater budgetary support than it is now getting. In fiscal year 1964 the final budget request for fisheries was \$52,000 (plus \$15,000 for boat-building), compared with over \$700,000 for agriculture. This budget covers the operation of a fisherman's school, support to local fishermen's and boat building cooperatives, and the main job of fisheries research and market development. The Fisheries Project has requested a budget of \$140,000 for fiscal year 1965, a budget which provides for additional U.S. personnel and equipment, and which also provides for opening a second Fisheries Station, at Truk. The Mission feels that a budget increase of this magnitude is justified, although it would place fisheries research outside the Fisheries Project, as discussed below. Fisheries Stations outside of Palau would lay the basis for larger scale and more efficient inshore fishing in other districts.

Detailed fisheries research is not a responsibility which should be placed on the Fisheries Project. It lacks qualified staff and its other responsibilities are too numerous and too important to be diluted by the requirements of a major research effort. Yet systematic research is required in Micronesia if sound conservation practices and optimum exploitation of the marine resources are to be achieved. The Mission recommends that some qualified research organization be invited into

the area to establish a station for the use of scholars and graduate students pursuing marine research. If the Trust Territory wished specific studies to be performed, it could then contract for them using the facilities of the research station. Tentative approaches to the Marine Laboratory of the University of Hawaii (which already has a small facility on Eniwetok) suggested that a mutually satisfactory arrangement could be worked out for the study of inshore marine resources. The Mission was told that the U.S. Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, based in Hawaii, was best equipped to study offshore pelagic fish, so the Trust Territory government should discuss with the Bureau the possibility of extending its research into Micronesian waters. In addition, the Scripps Oceanographic Institute has indicated it would be interested in working with the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries if it were to undertake the job.

Mining

The mineral resources of Micronesia are meager, but two mining operations existed before the Second World War in the Palau District: phosphate on Angaur and bauxite on Babelthuap. The phosphate is of good quality and is a fertilizing mineral badly needed in the Pacific area. Mining was continued after the war (resulting in large export receipts in the early fifties), but was halted in deference to the people of Angaur, since stripping the overburden off the phosphate eliminated the arable land. If in future the people of Angaur decide to move to the

relatively unpopulated island of Babelthuap, consideration should be given to resuming the phosphate mining operations.

The bauxite on Babelthuap is of low but apparently usable quality under certain conditions. Given its low quality, it is too far from U.S. mills to be of interest to them at present; but several Japanese firms familiar with the area have expressed interest in re-opening the bauxite mines. One of these, Yawata, proposed a combined operation with Kaiser Aluminum, but there seems to be little interest on their part now that their representative visited the area. The Mission has nothing to contribute in this matter, except to suggest that any serious proposal for resuming bauxite mining be examined, in the light of recent changes with respect to U.S. security requirements in the area, with an open mind for its impact on Micronesian employment and incomes, and that the Trust Territory government be aided in any contract negotiations by qualified persons.

Light manufacturing

The possibilities for developing competitive manufacturing industries in Micronesia are distinctly limited, and that fact should be recognized at the outset. There are just too many disadvantages for substantial industrial production: paucity of raw materials, great distance from large markets, small local markets, and a small, poorly

trained, and generally undisciplined labor force unwilling to work at wages as low as those in many other underdeveloped countries.

Despite these substantial disadvantages, there do seem to be several possibilities for developing small scale industry to produce some of the goods which are now imported, and even for developing exports to a limited degree. The Trust Territory needs some method for systematic evaluation, through feasibility studies, of those possible ventures which look as though they have commercial promise; and it further needs to be able to play an active role in organizing and financing the ventures which seem worthwhile. Very little manufacturing is likely to develop spontaneously in the Trust Territory. Initiative, technical guidance, capital, and management all may have to be supplied at least in part by the government. The Trust Territory government is not presently equipped to provide all these missing ingredients from an economic development program, and the Mission feels that resources and time would be largely wasted in attempting to so equip it. Of critical importance in the development effort which the Mission has in mind is a practical, business orientation toward possible commercial ventures.

The Mission recommends, therefore, that a firm from the U.S. private sector with suitable experience and expertise be contracted to perform two broad sets of functions on an advisory basis: (A) acting as an over-all programming office to assist the High Commissioner in

drawing up budget priorities; and (B) promoting the economic development of the Trust Territory. This Programming and Development Contractor would have the following responsibilities:

A. Programming function:

1. To program and coordinate budget priorities for all capital expenditures by the Trust Territory and for those current expenditures which bear on the economic development of the area, such as agricultural extension work, vocational training, and the like;
2. Assist the High Commissioner in the technical problem of coordinating the remaining budget components.

B. Development function:

1. To provide technical and managerial assistance to Micronesian businessmen who seek it and to interest businessmen in undertaking ventures within their competence;
2. To help finance private ventures through loans from a Development Fund (described below) or through guarantees on private loans;
3. To undertake direct ventures, both agricultural and industrial, which seem commercially promising but are unsuitable for Micronesian businessmen to manage at the time.

The Programming and Development Contractor would establish a compact organization within the Trust Territory government and its director would be responsible to the High Commissioner. Aside from its small permanent staff, the Contractor would bring in the requisite experts for such length of time as seemed necessary to launch a particular enterprise or to provide specific technical assistance. Its permanent organization would provide a highly qualified planning and programming staff to the High Commissioner, whose integrated expertise, experience, and businesslike organizational efficiency he could not easily achieve in Micronesia through the alternative of hiring individual programming personnel on a civil service basis. Certainly, at best, it could not be achieved rapidly enough to meet this top priority for the efficient execution of the capital investment program needed in the Trust Territory. It is envisioned that this contractual service would eventually give way to a comparably efficient governmental staff as the needed Micronesian expertise developed.

Hiring the Programming and Development Contractor would require negotiation with several of the qualified firms in the field of economic development and management. After preliminary discussions an interested firm would doubtlessly want to send a representative to Micronesia to ascertain the character and dimensions of the job and to establish the principles and coverage of the final contract. It is not possible to

specify in advance of such a survey precisely how much the contract would cost, but on the basis of its research the Mission believes that it should be in the neighborhood of around \$200,000 a year. Special technical assistance brought in for short periods of time would be financed separately, and management of direct ventures would be financed by each venture.

A Development Fund of \$5 million should be established to supply capital, under the technical direction of the Programming and Development Unit, but subject to control by a Board, to promising business enterprises in Micronesia when local capital is not available in sufficient quantity. Capital is only one of the missing ingredients for the economic development of Micronesia, and without the adequate technical and managerial guidance which the Programming and Development Unit can provide, capital is not likely to be used effectively. But without additional capital the economic progress of Micronesia will falter from the start. A fund of \$5 million should be adequate, when supplemented with local capital and private American capital, to launch those agricultural and industrial ventures which show commercial promise.

The Development Fund would supply loan capital to qualified local businessmen or farmers, would supply equity capital in joint ventures with Micronesians or with U.S. businessmen investing in Micronesia, and would finance direct ventures staffed by the Programming and Development Contractor and run on a commercial basis. Overhead expenses in administering

the Fund should be covered in the Contractor's fee, which would be part of the Trust Territory government's annual operating budget.

The Fund should plan to sell any equity interest (or convert it to fixed debt instruments) as rapidly as qualified Micronesians or joint U.S.-Micronesian groups are able to take over a business venture. Some ventures might best be reorganized as producers' cooperatives, while others would more appropriately require individual business management or a corporate structure.

Consideration should be given to permitting the Fund to borrow additional capital in its own name from the Angaur and Saipan Trust Funds, from the banks established in the Trust Territory, or even from the public in the Trust Territory, Guam, and the United States. This possible privilege would permit local banks and savers to purchase good securities without worrying about the outlook for any particular enterprise, and foreigners could invest in the area indirectly through the Fund.

Day-to-day management of the Fund would be the responsibility of the Programming and Development Contractor, which would be responsible to a board of directors on which the High Commissioner and the Council of Micronesia would also be represented. A liaison with the Guam Development Commission (possibly through the use of the same Contractor by Guam) should also be established for greater economic coordination between Guam and the Trust Territory.

The recommendation to bring in an outside contractor is no reflection on the present staff, which does not have, and cannot be expected to have, the degree and diversity of expertise required for systematic economic development of the area. Launching a development program requires complex teamwork among a number of qualified individuals, plus the ability to draw quickly on skills which are needed for a short period of time. A number of firms have built up knowledge and experience in dealing with the problems of underdeveloped countries, and this knowledge and experience should be brought to the Trust Territory.

The Mission does not wish to impose limits on the income- and employment-generating projects which the Programming and Development Contractor should explore. However, the following list of ventures represents its judgment of the more promising projects for promoting the economic development of Micronesia.

Coconut Oil and Soap. Copra, the raw material for coconut oil, is the most important produce of Micronesia. About 13,000 tons of copra are produced annually, half of which comes from the Marshall Islands. Improved copra storage and more regular collection in the outlying islands alone could apparently raise copra production in the different districts by amounts ranging up to 40 percent, while thinning out old trees and replanting could, in time, raise output even further. Today the dried copra is shipped to Japan for processing into coconut oil and cake

and thence into further fabrication. Some employment could be created in Micronesia by doing some oil extraction and further processing there. Coconut oil is an expensive vegetable oil and is used in fine soaps, shampoos and detergents; ordinary soaps and detergents are now imported into the Trust Territory in amounts exceeding \$50,000 per year. Odorless coconut oil can also be used as a cooking oil, which is also imported in some quantity. Coconut cake, the residue after the oil has been extracted, can be used as fertilizer and as a livestock feed, both badly needed in the Trust Territory. Of less importance is the fact that a high-protein baking flour can be made with still further processing.

Oil extraction can be done in large or small volume, although the larger scale operations are substantially more efficient. A simple oil extractor with a capacity of about one ton of copra a day, yielding roughly 1200 pounds of oil, can be purchased for about \$1500 in Japan. A more efficient oil mill with a daily capacity of about 70 tons of copra can be erected for around \$400,000 on one estimate. Working capital requirements would make this 70-ton mill somewhat more than a million dollar investment. It would require much water to operate, and the logical location of Majuro would be ruled out unless additional water could be collected. However, making the airfield into a water catchment, as recommended elsewhere in this report, would produce water far in excess of a

mill's requirements and would meet Majuro's general water needs. A relatively new oil extracting process, now being tested in the Philippines, requires virtually no water, and this should be studied as an alternative by the Programming and Development Unit.

One large mill could provide whatever oil and cake were required for the local market and the rest could be exported to the United States, where the imports of coconut oil run 75 - 100,000 tons annually, mostly from the Philippines. (Japan, which now imports copra from the Trust Territory, has a prohibitive duty on oil imports.) If necessary, shipping rates within the Trust Territory -- which now favor the shipment of copra -- could be adjusted to give greater preference to oil and cake.

The process of extracting oil would put \$5-10 a ton into the Micronesian economy for wages and other services. In addition, some oil and coconut cake could be processed further -- oil into soaps and cake into livestock feed. An average hog or steer can consume 1/2 - 3/4 tons of coconut cake annually, so a 10,000 head herd of cattle on Tinian (see the Mission's report on agricultural **programs**) alone could absorb up to 7,000 tons of cake a year, just about the production of a mill with a daily capacity of 70 tons of copra. Coconut cake alone can make up 40 percent of a hog's diet, so swine herds could be built up to the availability of the coconut cake if other feed (for example ground fish) were also available.

There is now one soap manufacturer in Palau. He manufactures soap for the local market, retailed through his own store, for about three days every two months, employing six men in the process. He also exports some soap to Ponape and has produced some for the Trust Territory government, although wrapping before thorough drying resulted in a 75 percent rejection rate on a large order. The soap lathers and washes well but retains a lingering odor of coconut which could be eliminated by the proper cooking of the extracted oil. The soap could also be perfumed, for example with ylang-ylang blossoms, found in abundance both in Palau and on Ponape. Crudely cut soap can be produced to compete with the greatly inferior brown laundry soap now widely used in the Trust Territory. The main obstacle to larger sales is consumer buying habits, but at Ponape a gradual substitution of the Micronesian soap for the brown laundry soap is reported to be taking place. To compete with the wrapped toilet soaps, considerable technical help on hardening, flavoring, and packaging is required. The costs of competing in this market do not look prohibitive, but consumer buying resistance might require a territorial tariff during the first few years to help get the soap accepted.

Other coconut products. In addition to oil and coconut cake, the coconut provides a shell which can be made into buttons or charcoal and a husk which yields coir fiber and fiber dust. The fiber can be made

into yarn, rope, upholstery material, or miscellaneous household items such as brushes. Coir fiber dust can be made into a variety of building materials, presently in short supply locally and expensive to import, such as fiber board for interior walls and insulation. Each of these offers some possibility for manufacturing, though largely for the Micronesian market. Some pilot project work with coir fiber is shortly to begin in Truk.

Lumber and woodworking. Lumber is another building material available in a few parts of Micronesia. Sawmills exist on Kusaie and Palau, where good timber is available but only in scattered stands. Sawing lumber is a haphazard affair on Kusaie, but in Palau mills operate quite regularly when construction is going on. Fine timber also is found on Ponape but it is so inaccessible that it is not now economical to fell. The new road system that the Mission is recommending in Ponape, primarily for other reasons, would open up some exploitable timber areas. There is an urgent need and, to some extent, a money-backed demand for reasonably priced building materials in Micronesia, for much of the housing is recognized to be in need of renovation. Even where cement is largely used, there will also be a demand for lumber from the continuing government construction program of schools, teachers' housing and other public building. Local mills could, with proper organization and capital, profit from this demand. Kusaie faces the

difficulty of transporting lumber to the areas of high potential demand such as Ebeye and Majuro, and irregularity in transportation is reflected in irregularity in lumber production. All sawmills face a severe shortage of working capital, as well as some essential equipment in certain mills, so they are unable to cut to stock standard sizes and allow the lumber to cure for the appropriate length of time.

Micronesia lacks extensive stands of good timber, but at present cutting rates the timber supply is adequate. Local sawmills should be assisted in modernizing, however, and should be encouraged to supply local private and government demand. Any sharp increase in demand will require a more extensive source of timber, and until the forest planting program recommended by the Mission can supply it either the Philippines or New Guinea timbers could be used. At present, Philippine lumber must be transhipped twice before landing in Palau, and is thus uneconomic, but the recommended improvements in surface transportation should permit occasional trips to the Philippines for stripped logs or crude cut lumber to be reduced and milled in Palau.

The Palauan Woodworkers and Handicraft Guild obtained a modest order for furniture to supply some of the new schools. While the final returns are not yet in, the venture looks very promising. More such orders (which can result in considerable savings for the government)

should be directed toward such indigenous factories, and they should be aided in developing a local market for their products. Relatively little technical assistance in design is needed for supplying these government contracts but working capital aid is essential.

Food processing. Micronesia imports large quantities of canned and packaged foods. Some of these foods compete closely with products which can be produced within the Trust Territory, such as fish and pineapple; and others, such as gelatins, ice cream, non-carbonated soft drinks, etc., are made from simple raw materials which could be imported and processed for the local market.

Much simple food processing, however, relies on canning; many fruitful lines might open if there were a cannery in the Trust Territory. Palau, with a relatively able labor force seeking employment and an agricultural hinterland in Babelthuap, would provide a good location for a cannery operation, which could be operated as a direct venture and could also be leased to small private enterprises arranging their own supplies of materials. Many products could be canned for the local market: fish and other marine life, kamaboko, fruits such as pineapple, and fruit juices, jellies or jams from the guava, acerola cherry, passion fruit, custard apple, and a host of others. The canning of soft drinks, now imported in large quantities, might also be possible (an alternative would be a bottling operation, using secondhand beer bottles). A few products, such as the caramel-like

coconut syrup used in ice cream, cake frosting, dehydrated banana flakes, exotic tropical jellies, etc., might even have a profitable export market. The cannery itself would provide urban employment, and growing the contents would provide additional agricultural employment yielding a cash income.

Bulk fertilizer, livestock feed, and feed bags.

In place of importing individually packaged and already mixed fertilizers and livestock feed, the bulk importation of the separate ingredients and their local mixing and bagging may be economic. Such an operation would have the further advantage of gradually replacing imported with local ingredients. Different variety fibers currently or previously cultivated in Micronesia, such as jute, kenaf, hemp, etc. would supply the raw material for a bag fabricating plant. The needs of the copra trade would supplement the fertilizer and livestock feed demand for these bags.

Boat-building is a manufacturing activity which has great appeal in an island economy extremely dependent on small and medium-sized boats. There are a few private boat-builders in various districts of the Trust Territory, but they do not begin to meet the demand for even small boats and rarely do locally-built boats exceed 30 feet in length. Most boats are imported from Japan. A boat-building cooperative has been established

in Palau, under the guidance of an experienced Hawaiian boat-builder, with the expectations of building boats up to 90 feet in length. Unfortunately, there are no orders for boats of that length and there are not likely to be any unless they come from the Trust Territory government. In order to begin operations -- to buy tools and stock building materials -- the cooperative would have to go very heavily into debt on the basis of a very uncertain expectation for orders. The cooperative form of organization seems peculiarly unsuited in Micronesia to an operation like boat-building, which requires careful coordination and management of many diverse activities. The Mission recognizes the useful role which successful boat-building and, even more, boat maintenance and repairs can play in Micronesia -- particularly once a tuna boat fleet is based in the area. But the operation should not begin with the very heavy ratio of debt to equity which the cooperative now has; the government should consider reclaiming the boat shed which has been built, cancelling the loan for it, and leasing it at nominal rates for boat-building and boat maintenance and repair. If a boat-building enterprise seems viable in the long run (and it will be difficult to tell until Van Camp's plans clarify), then perhaps the Palau boat-building association should be run as a government training program, and partially funded as such, until there is a regular order for larger boats and the Palauans can build them economically.

Small boat-building should be encouraged elsewhere in the Trust Territory. The Mission's proposal to equip each lagoon in the Marshalls with 21-foot boats provides a fine opportunity for encouraging local enterprise through selective contracts.

Other manufacturing ventures. There are numerous other possibilities for light manufacturing which deserve further exploration: brick-making in Palau and Yap where the U.S. Geological Report indicates that appropriate clays exist; slaughtering, tanning, making fertilizer and other meat-related industries in the Marianas; crocodile hunting and crocodile farms in Palau; tapioca starch and garment manufacturing in several of the districts; inexpensive perfume using local blossoms, and so on. Handicraft, now well established in some of the districts, does not seem, to the Mission, contrary to general thinking, to be an area to which further resources can be profitably devoted; the market has become world-wide, and Micronesian designs, workmanship, and costs are not likely to provide the basis for successful competition with handicraft from other parts of the world. The poor commercial prospects for a Micronesian handicraft industry were indicated by the failures under Navy administration of the Trust Territory. Rising sales to the Micronesian Products Center on Guam should be assessed in light of the Center's large unsold inventories and its continued purchases on a consignment basis.

Other ventures: Agricultural. A number of agricultural ventures might be commercially successful under good management and a carefully supervised labor force which would not be successful if left to individual Micronesian farmers. In such circumstances, organized plantations might be introduced -- particularly when a new product or novel production techniques (e.g., extensive use of fertilizer) are required. Such plantations would be under government management until the private sector was ready to operate them successfully, but they would be run as businesses and would hire labor on the basis of work actually done rather than on fixed salaries or hourly wages. The following ventures appear to be among the more promising for this type of operation in Micronesia: cattle raising, vegetable and other produce, and ramie fiber. These are dealt with in more detail in the section of this report dealing with governmental agricultural programs.

Other ventures: Tourism. A potential source of income for Micronesia not now fully utilized is tourism. Micronesia is too far from the United States and too much off the beaten track to attract many tourists directly from the United States in the foreseeable future. Foreign tourists from Asia would pose a number of problems which are best avoided in the pre-plebiscite period. Guam, however, has a population of 70,000 including over 20,000 military personnel and their

dependents. Another 3000-4000 Americans live on Kwajalein. Both groups have a rapid turnover, and for both groups there are potential tourist attractions in certain parts of Micronesia. From Guam the most obvious tourist centers would be Saipan, Yap, and Palau, of which Palau would probably be the most popular. For the people on Kwajalein Atoll, the high island of Ponape with its luxuriant vegetation could offer an interesting break to living on a low coral island. In the short run there would be political disadvantages as well as advantages from these increased American tourist contacts with Micronesians, but the Mission believes the net effect would definitely be favorable.

Some tourism already exists; there are irregular but frequent flights to Saipan from Anderson Air Force Base on Guam; people from Kwajalein visit Ponape and even Majuro in small numbers. But development of a sizeable tourist business is impeded by inadequate and unreliable transportation (except to Saipan) and limited hotel space and eating facilities. Once these bottlenecks are broken, tourists would come in considerable numbers if there were enough diversions to keep them happily busy. Completion of the land airstrip at Palau and construction of one at Ponape, along with commensurate improvements in air transportation, should provide adequate travel facilities. The military have voiced the possibility of running special flights if accommodations were available.

Constructing tourist hotels and restaurants requires a substantial amount of capital. In the initial stages it would be appropriate for the Trust Territory to attempt to achieve rather "rustic" accommodations, however, and this would require less capital. In Palau, additional accommodations could be made available simply by expanding the existing hotel at no great expense; and modest hotel facilities already exist on Saipan. New accommodations would have to be constructed before Ponape or Yap could absorb any more than a handful of tourists.

In addition to better accommodations, various service facilities would have to be made available -- car and boat transportation around the islands, diving equipment, water skiing, evening entertainment, etc. After a thriving tourist industry was established, these subsidiary businesses could perhaps be relied upon to develop entirely with local initiative and with local financing; but in the formative stages of the industry, considerable guidance and some capital for getting things established would be required. Yet once transportation is adequate this may be one of the most promising avenues for raising incomes in some districts. One estimate we have seen places the capital cost of adequate tourist facilities in Palau at only \$71,000 -- a very modest investment considering that every tourist generates one and a half jobs, according to the admittedly dissimilar Puerto Rican experience with tourism.

Other Ventures: Construction. In Palau and Saipan there are already a number of local contractors who build houses and stores locally. At Koror we were told that the four regular contractors build 40 to 50 new houses a year. A source of considerable discontent in Palau is the government's failure to invite local contractors to tender bids for building teachers' housing under the accelerated school program, and the Palauan contractors claim they could have done a satisfactory job of building housing in Palau at a substantially lower price than the housing will cost under the outside contract. The Mission feels that for political as well as economic reasons, greater attention should be paid to the possibility of using local contractors when simpler construction is required -- whether it be schools, teachers' housing, public housing or other public building. Invariably some mistakes will be made and more sophisticated tasks will require contracting with U.S. firms (who should be encouraged to subcontract to local contractors). But construction, with its relatively high labor content, is a useful area for encouraging local entrepreneurship. And if done by contractors rather than the public works department, the building can be done on a unit payment-for-work-done basis. There has been sufficient experience in private housing ventures in Metalanum (Ponape) and Palau to indicate that this method of payment can help raise productivity above levels achieved when workers are paid on an hourly basis.

Preferred Treatment for Micronesian Enterprise. Micronesian business, particularly manufactures, may fail without some temporary protection from outside competition from the United States, Japan, and elsewhere. Such protection could be provided through import tariffs, through favorable freight rates for internal trade and unfavorable rates for competing imports, and, in the case of government orders, through price differentials favoring local work. The purpose of protection should not be to shelter local business indefinitely, for that would foster inefficiency in production at the expense of the consuming public. Rather it should simply provide enough preference to local goods and services to overcome the inertia of human buying habits -- the public has gotten used to imported soaps, cooking oils, and canned fish, for example -- and to give local business a breathing space during which it learns the techniques of efficient production and quality control. The Mission recommends that territory-wide duties be placed on imports of goods which look as though they can be produced and marketed successfully in the Trust Territory. However, it is premature in Micronesia to rely solely on profit incentives -- such as would be created by a protective duty -- to generate local production. Protective duties should be imposed only after an evaluation of production and marketing prospects has been made and after the production and marketing facilities have been set up. Moreover, these duties should generally not exceed 50 percent (the need for greater

protection, except in unusual circumstances, would cast doubt on the long-run viability of the venture), and they should decline to the level of revenue duties over a period of five years.

In addition to making a special effort to use the services of local contractors when there is construction work to be done, the Trust Territory government should rely on local production where, as in the case of school furniture and soap, local production can be made available. Reliance should be placed on local sources of supply even when the price is slightly (say 10 percent) higher -- some of the earnings will be recouped in taxes -- or where some sacrifice in quality is required, at least during an initial learning period. Such forms of protection must be provided selectively; and instituting a protective arrangement must be followed up by technical consultations with the producers or contractors to be sure that they are taking the opportunity to learn better techniques and improve quality during the period of protection. It should be recognized that proper protection will generate useful technical and managerial skills among Micronesians, and to the extent that these skills facilitate general economic activity in the Trust Territory, the future grants by the U.S. congress can be reduced.

Other Forms of Assistance to Business. Economic development cannot proceed very far without government help in still other areas -- transportation, power and water. An adequate and reliable transportation system is critical for bringing the distant parts of Micronesia together

commercially. Without transportation, markets will remain too small for most efficient production. To develop markets on Guam and Kwajalein, and tourism on Ponape, Palau and Saipan, requires reliable personnel transportation. A separate part of the Mission's report recommends substantial improvements in both surface and air transportation.

In addition, extension of power and water facilities at moderate rates is one of the most useful forms of economic development assistance, quite apart from the additional social advantages of a proper utilities system. Electric power will be required in "urban" centers to run power tools, freezers, cold storage, and ice-making machines. Water is needed for ice and for some types of manufacturing. The fact that over-all programming and administration of the Development Fund are both to be done by the Programming and Development Contractor should ensure that programming for utility extension will take into account potential industrial needs as well as other needs.

The recently formulated more liberal policy toward temporary residence of foreigners in Micronesia must ultimately be well publicized in the Mission's judgement if it is to have any impact on the economic development of the Trust Territory. The Mission was apprised of a number of instances in which Micronesians were prepared to seek technical advice or assistance directly -- mostly from the private sector of Japan -- but were hindered from doing so by the security

requirements for the Trust Territory. However, as of July 1, 1963, the High Commissioner has the authority to permit any foreigner to reside in the Trust Territory or any foreign ship to land in a Trust Territory port, subject only to the absence of objection from the U.S. Navy within a reasonable period of time after application. The Mission feels that in the period before the plebiscite there are both political and economic advantages in using this authority but not to the point of admitting large numbers of foreigners. After a resolution of the political future of the Trust Territory, however, the new policy should be well publicized.

Similarly, United States capital should be encouraged into the area under general restrictions designed to protect Micronesia from exploitation and abuse, rather than under the detailed evaluation of proposals which now exist. It will be clear from the preceding discussion that profitable business opportunities are not so numerous in Micronesia that foreign capital would flood into the area if the present restrictions were relaxed. The government is not always better able to judge the economic viability of a business venture than the willing businessman-investor. At the same time, some limits should be placed on the ability of Americans to invest in the area, particularly in view of the ambivalent feeling throughout Micronesia about foreign investment -- a recognition that it is desirable for economic progress combined with a fear that the Micronesians will be displaced and shoved aside much as the Hawaiians were

in Hawaii. To protect Micronesian interests while also permitting capital to come in more easily, the Mission recommends the promulgation of an Investment Code governing all foreign investment in the area. The Code would stipulate that a minimum of 50 percent of Micronesian equity be retained in any venture established in the Trust Territory, except in special cases where the High Commissioner could waive the requirement. Where the amount of required capital is too large to be raised from Micronesians, the Development Fund might participate in Joint ventures on behalf of Micronesians. This would also permit the technical and managerial expertise of the Programming and Development Contractor to become involved in any large investment in the area. The Code would include any other general provisions deemed desirable by the High Commissioner, and any American enterprise which adhered to the conditions of the Code could enter the area freely.

Chapter 5

COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Commerce

The only substantial firms now in the Trust Territory are a dozen and a half trading companies which import, export, wholesale, and retail. Gross sales for the chartered companies, including the Ponape Cooperative and the Faichuk Cooperative, run around \$4.2 million a year including copra sales. Several large unchartered companies probably bring total gross sales in the Trust Territory to \$7-8 million. The large trading companies sell most of their goods through their own retail outlets. In addition to the major wholesale-importers, there are countless retail stores in the Trust Territory, many with inventories hardly greater than an enlarged kitchen larder. In some outlying islands they really operate on a barter basis, exchanging trade goods for copra and reselling the copra when the field ship visits.

Each district has at least one big importer-wholesaler, and most have two or more. The trading companies undertake a variety of activities outside trading -- boat rental or operation, movies, restaurant-bars, garages, and so on -- but with few exceptions they have not gone into manufacturing. A number of companies expressed relief at having gotten out of the intra-district shipping business, although several indicated that they would willingly go into the business on a contract basis with the government if financial arrangements were satisfactory.

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Several companies expressed a reluctance to expand either their existing operation or extend themselves into new lines because it might invite the charge of monopoly. Only in Ponape was the view expressed that the several trading companies may be "exploiting" their position, especially on field trips when people have little choice but to buy at the ship, whatever the price. This feeling, whatever its merits (and the Mission did not have the time to investigate the charge carefully), has given impetus to a local cooperative movement. Village cooperatives plan to buy copra for cash and to sell trade goods off their shelves, declaring a dividend at year-end if gross revenues exceed total costs.

Working capital requirements of the trading companies is very large by U.S. standards. Total trade-turnover is often as little as two, although three-to-four is more common. In addition to stocks on hand, goods in transit beyond the credit period of the foreign exporter also require working capital. And an unusual amount of business must be transacted by cablegram because mails from some of the districts cannot be relied upon to meet business deadlines. Improvement in transportation, both as to reliability and frequency, should reduce working capital requirements and transactions costs considerably. Thirty-day visits by logistic vessel would lower inventory requirements well below requirements with 45-day visits; but an even greater reduction in inventory requirements would be permitted by reducing

the uncertainties of ship arrivals. With greater regularity in shipping, trading companies could plan their inventory policies much more carefully, perhaps reducing total inventory requirements of around \$3 million by more than one-third. This would release for other uses over \$1 million in capital now tied up in inventories -- or would permit the stocking of badly-needed retail stores in the outlying islands.

A number of importers expressed dissatisfaction at having to order their goods through licensed dealers on Guam at what they considered excessive mark-ups and transshipment costs at Guam. The Mission found that transshipment costs excluding spoilage and pilferage (which is alleged to be high) range from one to four dollars a ton, resulting in total transshipment costs of \$40-50,000 a year, hardly enough to warrant building an extensive ocean port in the Trust Territory to avoid transshipment at Guam. Nonetheless, unsatisfactory commercial relations with Guam provide a point of friction between the Trust Territory and Guam which is undesirable from the viewpoint of U.S. political interests. Guam dealers should be encouraged to take more seriously their markets in the Trust Territory. In case of egregiously bad service official correspondence with the parent company might be undertaken with a view to changing the dealership. A joint Chamber of Commerce between Guam and Trust Territory businessmen, or some other form of social relationship, might serve to lessen any antagonism.

Marketing of the main export, copra, is done through chartered dealers -- one in each district except Truk, where there are two -- under the regulations and supervision of the Copra Stabilization Board. The Stabilization Board sets the grading standards, allowable shrinkage, and the prices which will be paid to the producers. These prices are the same in all district centers, and \$10 a ton less in the outlying islands -- the \$10 difference just covering transportation and handling costs to the District Center and allowing no profit on that phase of the operation. Profit is made by the licensed dealers by selling copra to the Stabilization Board at \$10 a ton more than the buying price at the district centers. It is on this price that the 15 percent Territorial processing tax on copra is levied, so the effective tax on the producer in the outlying islands is closer to 18 percent. The copra is shipped from the district centers to Japan on the logistic vessels of the Trust Territory and marketed there by a commercial agent, Atkins, Kroll and Company, at a fee which works out to about \$6 a ton at the present Japanese price of \$160 a ton.

The Copra Stabilization Board attempts to absorb week-to-week fluctuations in world market prices, so the price to the producer is

changed only infrequently. The CSB seems to be accepted as a desirable organization, although the copra producers fail to understand the secular fall in copra prices (until July 1963) since 1957. Still less understood, even among sophisticated Micronesians, is why a U.S. agent must be paid to market copra. There is no doubt that for a relatively small seller such as Micronesia, the contacts and experience of a professional commodity trader can be very helpful. The Mission recommends, however, that the arrangement with Atkins Kroll be reviewed to see whether the arrangement is beneficial to the extent of \$6 a ton, or a total of \$70-80,000 annually. It may be possible for the Copra Stabilization Board or residents of the Trust Territory to undertake this function, if necessary with the aid of expert advice in Japan hired on a consultant basis.

A principal deterrent to the development of a market economy in the outlying islands is the absence of ready buyers of copra and sellers of trade goods. Some retail stores have enough capital to support a small inventory, but generally the would-be copra producer has no place to buy trade goods except during visits of the field trip vessel. Some areas go without staple imports such as sugar for weeks or even months. One device for moving closer to a market economy would be the establishment of small producer-consumer cooperatives in the outlying copra-producing areas such as now exist in the British administered

Gilbert and Ellice Islands. The British cooperatives pay cash for copra and stock the staple trade goods. Until they are running well, such co-ops are under the supervision of a qualified Cooperatives Officer, who makes sure good weighing, grading and record-keeping practices are established. A producer can sell copra at any time of the working day, in amounts as small as one pound. Working capital requirements are met by loans from the reserves of the Copra Stabilization Board.

The Mission feels that a similar system should be introduced to the Trust Territory, where much copra is said to be lost for want of accessible collection depots where the natives can always sell copra for cash or trade goods. Cooperatives have been started in several of the districts, but they lack working capital and they lack adequate supervision. Moreover, discussion with Micronesians outside district centers revealed hardly a glimmering of what cooperatives are all about, except that they are alleged to result in more money to the producer. With such ignorance, mismanagement will soon overtake the cooperatives which are being established. The job of supervising cooperatives, and credit unions as well, now falls on the agriculturist in most districts -- a man who is generally overworked by his agricultural responsibilities alone. If cooperatives are to succeed -- and they seem well-suited for the type of economy which now exists in Micronesia -- they will need both supervision and capital. The Mission

therefore recommends that a Cooperatives Officer should be assigned to each district for the purpose of setting up and supervising cooperatives and credit unions. In this connection, the Cooperative League of the USA should be contacted; it has done useful work in underdeveloped areas for the Agency for International Development. AID is also associated with the International Cooperative Training Center, which offers a 16 week course at the University of Wisconsin for Cooperative Officers. Working capital for the coops could be provided from the assets of the Copra Stabilization Board and supplemented, if necessary, from the proceeds of the copra processing tax.

Finance

Throughout Micronesia claims of ownership are not well defined, and what "belongs" to one person generally also "belongs" to all of his relatives. Relatives -- including relatives very distant by U.S. standards -- feel free to use anything another relative has, including cash. This practice of communal ownership discourages savings and makes it very difficult for Micronesians to buy durable goods, for the little cash income they have is often distributed far beyond the wage-earners' immediate family for consumption of essentials such as food and clothing. It is not unusual for families in urban areas to have as many as three or four relatives (other than spouse and children) living with them at any point in time -- although sometimes small children are left with grandparents.

The practice of communal ownership also inhibits purchase of staple goods in economic quantities, for they will probably be "borrowed" before the purchaser is able to use them.

If the maximum use of local resources for development is to be encouraged, some method must be found both to encourage individual savings and to protect them from the claims of relatives. Two methods of doing this are:

- a. Individual savings accounts in banks or credit unions -- and in school savings accounts -- with direct deposit deducted from receipts of government employees and copra producers.
- b. Commercial credit with payments on time which convert current purchases into contractual payments.

In the first case individual savings precedes the "investment" in a durable product, while in the second case savings follows the "investment."

Contractual saving through credit unions has been strongly encouraged in the Trust Territory and there is now at least one credit union in every district and there are 15 in the Palau district alone. Typically the member of a credit union agrees to regular periodic deposits, say \$1 every month or every pay period. He is entitled then to borrow from the credit union for "provident or productive" purposes. Borrowing in some credit unions is limited by the

individual's deposits and shares, e.g., the loan cannot exceed 1-1/2 times his claim on the credit union. In other cases all loans are decided by a loan committee, and there is no fixed limit. Members typically borrow to purchase capital items -- motor scooters, outboard motors, home repairs; but occasionally borrowing takes place to discharge outstanding debts to storekeepers. Interest charges on loans are high -- 1 percent a month or, in a few cases, 2 percent a month.

Many of the credit union treasurers are not adequately trained in credit union principles or in bookkeeping, and the financial records are often in very poor condition. From this viewpoint the large scale movement into credit unions, as at Palau, was premature. Yet the contractual savings achieved through credit union membership is so valuable from the viewpoint of financial self-improvement that the credit union movement should be encouraged. The Cooperatives Officer in each district, recommended above, should also supervise credit unions and give close guidance on record-keeping. Where possible, credit unions should be consolidated under good management, and the indiscriminate formation of credit unions should be discouraged. Possibly the formation of district-wide credit union leagues would not only promote better management practices but would also provide the organizational structure for credit union merges.

There are now bank branches of the Bank of America or the Bank of Hawaii in every district except Yap. In the Marshalls, however, there is no bank in the district center at Majuro, and in Ponape the branch bank was just opened in July 1963. On the whole these branches are simply banking facilities which accept deposits and clear checks; only rarely do they make bank loans. Moreover, the bank officials are not doing an adequate job of explaining to the public the advantages of savings and checking accounts. Despite this, the value of deposits have grown nearly 20 percent over the past year (Table 18).

The Mission agrees with the Trust Territory government's use of its own deposits to encourage the extension of banking services (which should be extended to Majuro and Yap), but it feels that the loan policies of these banks should be clarified and stimulated. To encourage the use of banking among Micronesians, government salaries should be paid by check rather than in pay packets. Where it is agreeable to the employees, salary checks could be deposited directly into individual bank accounts. Such an innovation, favored by the banks and a number of officials, would encourage (and permit) greater savings, would increase financial sophistication and foster family budgeting, and would reduce the risk of theft from government finance offices when much cash is on hand.

Table 18

Total Reported Bank and Credit Union Deposits, by District

	<u>June 1962</u>	<u>June 1963</u>
Marianas	\$334,544	\$433,407
Marshalls	n.a.	n.a.
Palau	267,050	252,595
Ponape	0	5,450
Truk	31,885	38,001
Yap	<u>0</u>	<u>9,929</u>
Total	\$633,479	\$739,382

The branch banks of Bank of America and of Hawaii now make a negligible number of loans to individual Micronesian employees and businessmen. The little loan business they do is installment lending at high interest rates, generally to employees of the Trust Territory government. The failure of the banks to lend in Micronesia means that deposits are sent out of the area for investment in Guam or the United States. One reason the banks have been reluctant to lend is the lack of satisfactory collateral in Micronesia. The prohibition against alienation of land (so banks cannot take clear title to it) and the absence of an active market for land reduce its attractiveness as collateral, but the banks are apparently unaware that under Trust Territory laws they can obtain a court judgment and foreclosure order on land used as collateral so long as the land is sold to Micronesians. More acute is the problem of undefined and ambiguous land titles, both as to boundaries and ownership. This lack of clarity in land ownership has other undesirable effects, both political and economic, and the Mission has recommended a Land Surveying and Registration Program.

One function of the Programming and Development Unit, using assets of the Development Fund as backing, would be to guarantee bank loans in Micronesia, thereby providing adequate security to the banks. This

would keep Micronesian bank savings productively at work in the capital-short Territory. Ultimately, it might be advisable that banks should be able to buy -- and might even be required to buy -- securities issued by the Development Fund under its own name. This would be another way of putting Micronesian savings, deposited in U.S. bank branches, to work in the Trust Territory.

Consumer credit is used extensively in some districts, while in others the trading companies operate on a strictly cash-and-carry basis. Curiously, where consumer credit is extended it is largely for staple products -- food and cloth -- and not for consumer durables, which are more often imported on specific order rather than from stock and must be paid for in cash. It is an anomaly not to have time payments for durables, where collateral is available, when credit is given for day-to-day purchases. Where purchases of durables can raise productivity, as in the case of boats or outboard motors or building materials, consideration should be given to setting up a system of time payments. In the case of government employees, payroll deductions -- such as are being used to pay off credit union loans -- could be made. And in those cases where the trading companies are short of working capital, loans from the Development Fund could be arranged. Credit Union lending has facilitated the purchase of durable goods.

Three substantial funds already exist in the Trust Territory:

- a. The Angaur Trust Fund, amounting to \$1.2 million, which was set aside from the proceeds of postwar phosphate mining on Angaur to be used for the benefit of the people of Angaur. Interest earnings of about \$37,000 annually are distributed as current income. Investment of the Fund is determined by the High Commissioner.
- b. The Saipan Trust Fund, now about \$375,000, was set aside by the Navy for the benefit of the Saipanese as rent for the property it used on Saipan. This Fund once amounted to over \$1 million, but it has been used for such community projects as the new hospital and high school in Saipan. Use of the Fund is determined by the High Commissioner.
- c. The assets of the Island Trading Company, liquidated in 1954, have been held as a loan fund for all chartered trading companies and cooperatives. The fund amounts to about \$330,000, of which \$155,000 was outstanding as loans in mid-1962. Loans are determined by a committee comprising the Executive Officer, the Program Officer, the Attorney General, the Economic Officer, and the Finance Officer of the Trust Territory. It has been the practice to lend from this fund only for fixed capital investment; and only on one occasion, the Mission was told, has a loan been made for working capital.

- d. In addition, \$100,000 was appropriated in fiscal year 1964 to be used for financing economic development. About \$40,000 of this has already been transferred into general funds by the High Commissioner, however, to replace funds used previously for economic development.

These funds should be used in close conjunction with the proposed Development Fund to the extent it is consistent with limitations on their use. Indeed, the loan fund for chartered companies and what is left of the recently appropriated funds for economic development should be fully absorbed into the Development Fund. Geographical limitations on the use of the Angaur Trust Fund and the Saipan Trust Fund require maintaining them as separate funds, although their use should also be influenced by the over-all development program.

At the same time, greater Micronesian participation in determining the use of these funds should be permitted and encouraged. The leaders of Angaur showed considerable misunderstanding about the use of their fund, which is entirely controlled by Trust Territory headquarters, and one result is substantial sentiment in Angaur for distribution of the entire fund to the people. The Mission feels that such distribution would be a mistake, but that a locally-chosen representative from Angaur should sit on a three-man Management board (which the High Commissioner is empowered to create) made up of the High Commissioner and a second person appointed by the High

Commissioner to administer the Fund. Apart from several scholarships and the purchase of a boat, the Fund has not been used for the improvement of Micronesia. Interest earnings of the fund are distributed as income. Greater thought should be given to using a part of the fund for productive investment on Angaur, or if the 450 people of Angaur decide to move to Babelthuap, as has sometimes been suggested, a part of the Fund could be used to establish a community there.

If no productive use of the Fund can be found on Angaur, then some thought should be given to using the Fund for investment elsewhere in the Trust Territory, with interest and/or dividend earnings paid to the people of Angaur. At present the Fund is earning only about 3 percent a year in U.S. Government securities. The Trust Territory government should be willing, if attractive investment opportunities in Micronesia present themselves, to use the Angaur Trust Fund as a source of capital. It would be advisable to guarantee a return to the people of Angaur slightly higher than that which would have resulted from retaining the Fund in government securities. This would be an inexpensive way of raising capital for productive use, provided the investments were carefully selected and supervised.

The Municipal Council of Saipan has proposed that the Saipan Trust Fund be used for public housing (\$100,000), economic development (\$100,000), agricultural development (\$75,000), scholarships (\$25,000),

and capitalization for a Bank of Micronesia (\$75,000). Reconstruction of the town of Garapan with modern housing to replace the patch-work housing which now exists in Chalan Kanoa is an excellent objective. The Mission feels, however, that a Bank of Micronesia would be premature at this time, and it would be unnecessary if the lending policies of the bank branches in the area can be adapted to Micronesian needs, as discussed above.

Chapter 6

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

For convenience, the major recommendations by the Survey Mission made in its Report on Economic Development are brought together here in summary form, with page references to the discussion in the text. The recommendations have been grouped into three categories on the basis of how they can be implemented, although it should be recognized that the borderlines between them are not clearcut:

1. Those recommendations which can be implemented by the High Commissioner, subject only in some cases to approval by Interior, with only minor changes in institutional arrangements and with no major increases in expenditures.
2. Recommendations which require more extensive institutional changes or entail substantial increases in expenditures.
3. Recommendations which require changes in U.S. statutes.

1. Recommendations which can be implemented by the High Commissioner
In programming capital expenditures in the Trust Territory, particular attention should be given to their impact on Micronesian employment and income. This applies especially to large programs such as The Accelerated Elementary School Construction Program and the public works program recommended in this Report. Where it is possible without great cost, capital expenditure should be geared to local employment requirements -- accelerated or stretched out according to the local desire for jobs and cash income (pages 13-41).

Education plays a critical role in economic advancement, and the school curriculum should be designed accordingly to serve the two-fold objective of training Micronesians in the application of intelligence and accumulated knowledge to local problems and of giving them sufficient breadth to emigrate successfully. (page 45-46 and the Education Section of the Mission's Report).

To encourage the development of supervisory capability, to foster the accumulation of savings, and to integrate further the Trust Territory, there should be a deliberate policy of placing capable Micronesians in districts outside their home districts (pages 44, 48, 49).

Where possible, Micronesian employees should be paid on the basis of work performed rather than for hours spent on the job, with a view to raising labor productivity. (page 51).

Where the cost is not prohibitive, the Trust Territory government should make a greater effort to direct its procurement of goods and services to Micronesian businessmen. (page 99).

The Trust Territory government should use its regulatory powers to ensure that Micronesian interests are served by foreign investment in the areas and in particular it should reach a clear understanding

with The Van Camp Company on the rate at which Micronesians are to be taken on as fishermen. (page 72-73).

The High Commissioner should invite the University of Hawaii, or other qualified research organizations, to establish agricultural and fisheries research stations in Micronesia. (pages 67, 76).

The practice of prohibiting foreign citizens from entering the area should be relaxed considerably in cases where visits or temporary residence by selected foreigners would further economic development in the area. (page 100).

The High Commissioner should promulgate an Investment Code, under the general provisions of which American investment could be undertaken in the Trust Territory without specific government approval. The Code would be designed to protect Micronesian interests while encouraging U.S. investment in the area. (page 101-102).

Where banking facilities exist, payment of salaries to government employees should be made by check, with a view to encouraging savings and raising the level of financial sophistication. (page 112).

Banks now in the Trust Territory should be encouraged to make more business loans than they now do in the Trust Territory. (page 114-115).

The various trust and loan funds administered by the High Commissioner should be used more actively to further economic development. (page 116-117).

Measures should be taken to improve the quality and the coverage of the economic statistics collected for the Trust Territory. (page 34).

2. Recommendations requiring additional appropriations, or requiring substantial institutional changes.

A Programming and Development Unit, contracted from a qualified consulting firm should be established within the High Commissioner's staff on an advisory basis to program and coordinate government budget priorities, to give technical and managerial assistance to Micronesian businesses, to administer a newly established Development Fund, and through that Fund to undertake where advisable direct business ventures important for development of the area. (page 79-83).

A Development Fund of \$5 million should be established to finance commercial undertakings in the Trust Territory. (page 82).

The agricultural program in the Trust Territory should be extended in a variety of ways. The major recommendations of the Mission's Report on Agriculture are summarized on pages 63-67.

The fisheries program should also be expanded, both in training and in commercial development. (page 75).

Greater use should be made of the technical skills available on Guam and Kwajalein for on-the-job training of Micronesians. (page 38).

Cooperative officers should be appointed in each district center to supervise the founding and management of producer-consumer cooperatives and of credit unions, institutions which are needed in the Trust Territory if properly managed. These responsibilities should be removed from the district Agriculturists. (pages 107, 108, 112).

3. Recommendations requiring a change in U.S. statutes

The U.S. immigration quota for Trust Territory residents should be enlarged or abolished, to permit freer emigration from the area and closer ties with the United States. (page 50).

U.S. tariffs on Trust Territory products should be abolished, and the Trust Territory should be given a tariff-status like that of Guam and the Virgin Islands. (page 74).

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B. PUBLIC SECTOR SURVEY

AND PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS

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Chapter 1

PUBLIC WORKS - HEADQUARTERS

The High Commissioner has on his staff a Director of Public Works whose office is in Saipan. The Director is charged with the responsibility of advising the High Commissioner on matters pertaining to construction, maintenance and operation of the Trust Territory government facilities. When a construction project has been developed and approved by the High Commissioner, the plans and a material list are prepared in the headquarters' Department of Public Works. When all necessary paper work has been completed and signed off, the Comptroller assigns a project number to the work order and all necessary information to do the job is sent to the district in which the project is located. From this point on, the job is the responsibility of the District Administrator who instructs his Public Works Officer to proceed. Changes which affect finance and design must be approved by headquarters before the district can incorporate them in the construction job.

On the staff of the Director of Public Works there is one general engineer, a young graduate who is of Saipanese birth. The one other engineering slot on the staff is vacant. There are no registered professional engineers on the Public Works staff. There is one technician, one draftsman and one draftsman-trainee to handle all the drawings and designs that headquarters wants to produce.

The central supply and repair depot also comes under the Director of Public Works. There is one technician on the headquarters staff in charge of the workshop and central supply. He has at his disposal a limited revolving fund for the purchase and repair of surplus equipment, which he purchases from any available source. He then sells the repaired equipment to the districts for what it costs the depot to obtain and repair it. From observation, it appears that the procurement, stocking and shipping of spare parts is the larger part of the operation; approximately \$40,000 per month worth of spares are handled by the central depot. The handling of this operation plus the repair shops is a big job for one technician and does not allow close supervision to be given to the repair work. A few months ago a tractor was overhauled at a cost of about \$5,000 and sent to the Palau airport job. Three days after it went into operation, it broke down, and another \$3,500 worth of spares was ordered from the field. The Mission was informed that because of the lack of supervision the grease seals were put in backwards while in the central work shop, and several important parts were burned out.

District Public Works, General Survey

Public works offices in each of the six districts are charged with a multitude of responsibilities: the maintenance and operation of all public utilities; construction of new buildings and facilities; repair and overhaul of operational equipment for all other departments; and the ground support for air and ship transportation. These functions are carried out with a combined staff of Americans and Micronesians. Each

district employs from 100 to 150 Micronesians in its Public Works Department.

The major responsibility of the district public works staff is providing operational continuity for public utilities. In every district, except Saipan, the road system, the water supply and the power system are all in a marginal state of repair and require many hours of time and extra effort to keep them in some semblance of dependable operation.

Power and water are provided to the district center offices, schools, hospitals, hotels and homes of American employees. Where the utilities are available they are also provided to certain commercial establishments in the district centers. In very few instances have water and power been provided to the local Micronesian residences. The present systems require extensive repair, modification and expansion before it will be possible to provide service to the people in the villages near the district centers.

In addition to water and power, each public works office is responsible for the maintenance of the roads and streets in the district centers. Also from time to time they assist the municipalities in a specific maintenance job on roads outside the district center.

Upon the arrival of the logistic vessel or field trip ship, the public works office must assist the vessels to dock with the use of its "M" boat. Stevedores are employed and supervised by the public works office to offload and load the ships as required, and to transfer fuel oil from

ship to shore storage. The public works office must make a report on each ship which arrives or departs from the district. Aircraft ground handling and fire control is also the responsibility of the public works office, as well as the upkeep of the landing strip.

Motor vehicle and heavy equipment repair and overhaul is done in public works shops when spare parts are available. Often it is necessary to manufacture the part at several times the original cost because no spare is available. Power and outboard motor boats are operated and maintained by the motor shop. Carpentry, electric, and paint shops also provide services to the district centers.

In addition to the operating and maintenance responsibilities the public works office is charged with the task of conducting a full scale construction program. New construction is provided for U.S. employee housing, school buildings, hospitals, warehousing, power plants, water storage tanks and all other construction necessary to support a district center operation.

About 65% of public works time is spent on operation and maintenance and about 35% for construction. The same supervisory personnel required for 'O and M' are also used to supervise construction. Frequently, these competing demands force the inefficient shifting of workers as well as supervisors between maintenance and construction functions. District construction is further complicated by delays in purchasing and shipping of critical construction supplies - all material and supplies for

construction in the districts are ordered by headquarters supply and shipped directly to the district by the supplier. Material required for the finishing of a project is often received before material for the foundation and structural walls arrive, thereby causing a serious warehousing problem. These are the major problems confronting Public Works in drawing up, and adhering to, construction schedules.

Public Works In The Marshalls

The Public Works Office in the Marshalls consists of an American District Public Works Officer and his staff of five technicians. During the time of the Mission's visit to the Marshalls District, the American staff was short two people. One man was on home leave, and the other position was unfilled. In addition to the American staff, the Public Works Office employs about 100 Micronesian workers. Some of these workers are capable of doing skilled work such as equipment operation and general mechanical work, but it was noticed that very few of them were used as foremen or in any position where responsibility for supervision was theirs.

The Majuro district center water system consists of a catchment area near the center of the government employees' housing area and a sump storage of about 500,000 gallons. The catchment area alone does not provide sufficient water. An additional supply is provided through shallow well pumping. The water taken from the shallow wells is high in salt content but when mixed with the catchment water the salinity is reduced sufficiently so that the clear water which is distributed is only slightly brackish. Two large ships buoys are installed with pressure

pumps to provide for pressure distribution throughout the district center. Another 500,000 gallon storage capacity is planned at the new high school site. The present water usage is about 600,000 gallons monthly. With the added storage capacity at the high school this usage should about double. So far no plans for distribution to the village of Rota which adjoins the district center have been developed. If safe drinking water is provided to those villagers, another 1 million gallons should be added to the monthly usage bringing the total usage to about 2.1 million gallons per month.

Power for the district center is provided by two 300 KW generators and one 60 KW generator. The third 300 KW generator is being installed and should be on the line by about November 1st. The peak load demand for the district center, the hospital and the new schools will just be met with the installation of the third 300 KW unit this year. This does not provide any power for lights or utility service to the village of Rota. An additional 500 KW unit would be required for this and other commercial uses which might be developed later.

In addition to operating the water and power system, the public works office is responsible for the upkeep of the roads in the district center which consists of approximately 5 miles of coral and dirt packed construction. No major work has been done on the roads during the last 5 years so that they are in a bad state of repair. Outside of the district center there is 2 1/2 miles of road in the village of Rota and 6 1/4 miles of road on "long island" beyond the airstrip toward Laura on

the southeastern end of Majuro island. From the western end of this road to the village of Laura, a distance of 18 1/4 miles, a community-built road has recently been completed which now links Laura with the district center by road during all tides. This roadway was hastily thrown up by using coral and dirt when available and shaped by hand and a bulldozer. The road is actually constructed over three isolated islets connected by hand-made coral causeways. The public works office assisted the people of Laura to construct this road by furnishing heavy equipment, technical advice and supervision. This first effort at a roadway between Laura and the district center is only a start on a passable permanent road. Much more time and money must be spent before this road can be used as an all weather means of communication. As soon as is possible additional crushed coral must be placed on the present base and reasonably good compaction achieved. The causeways will have to be strengthened and sea walls provided to keep them from breaking down and washing away at high tides. However, the public works office has assumed no responsibility for the upkeep and repair of the roads outside of the district center. Even within the district center the road is not really "maintained"; only large holes and breakups are repaired because of a serious lack of personnel, equipment and funds to do the work.

The operation and maintenance budget for the public works does not adequately provide funds for operational costs as well as preventive maintenance and repair. In the low atolls of the Marshall Islands, maintenance is a special problem, not only for housing and utilities but

for equipment and machines. The salt air spray which is continually present makes upkeep of equipment especially difficult. Little funds are available for preventative maintenance and barely enough to keep operations going. The one bulldozer in Majuro broke down in June while working on the road on Arno. It is still waiting for parts. The front-end loader in use is at least 10 years old, and the Public Works Office said that "it is in the shop three days a week to get two days operation out of it." The small crane in use at the crusher site broke while the survey Mission was there and parts are expected to take from three to six months to arrive. In the meantime, the shop must make do by trying to file down the broken gear and use it in limited service. But limited service will not supply the sand and aggregate required for the accelerated school construction program. Dump trucks are also needed to move the required material to the housing and school building location. The Majuro district sent to headquarters for the FY 1964 budget inclusion, a request for \$120,000 to replace worn out equipment and to stock operating spares. They had not received any acknowledgment of their submission as of the 9th of July 1963. They further submitted another \$200,000 for the same purpose for the FY 1965 budget. This amount includes \$80,000 additional for equipment that will be needed to support the new construction program. The survey Mission was shown a copy of a proposed master plan for construction and repair to the district center facilities, which was submitted in 1960 to headquarters. The Public Works Office said that they had not received any acknowledgment of the plan from headquarters. Given

these various problems, the major part of the public works activity is on an improvised basis, with little time or funds to do preventative maintenance or planned replacement.

The only public works activity on islands outside the district center is the community road project on Arno which is a 15 1/2 mile road and causeway similar to the Laura road. Again lack of funds and availability of equipment and materials has limited this kind of activity to one or two small efforts.

Priorities for the construction work in the Marshalls can be divided into two classifications, (1) project priorities and (2) program support priorities. (1) Project priority would be determined by the review and recommendation of the Program Division in headquarters. It would be hoped, upon the acceptance of the survey Mission's report that a clear distinction between project construction and program support construction will be established.

Project Construction

1. New Outer Island sub-centers. (\$1,854,000)

The Mission recommends the development of two outer island sub-centers located at Jaluit and Wotje to serve as nuclei for the stimulation of economic activity and overall development of the Marshalls District. This would involve a substantial construction (high schools, hospitals, roads, power, etc.) with total cost estimated at \$1,854,000. It is suggested that a team of 27 men, 2 U.S. supervisors and 25 Micronesians,

equipped with the necessary tools and machines, stay on one selected island doing the construction work necessary to develop the above listed buildings. After, or even during the building construction, roads could be constructed with the help of the local community. Land could also be cleared where it was possible to reach by bulldozer. Utilities would be provided for the center and a Micronesian technician could be left in charge. Total equipment cost would be about \$240,000 including 15% operation spares for the first year. If the equipment is amortized over a five year period, the total yearly project cost should be about \$155,000 including salaries and wages as well as providing a 5% contingency fund. The project could pay the central equipment fund the amortization costs on the equipment and the equipment would revert back to the headquarters depot upon completion of the project.

2. Airport Reconstruction & Water Catchment and Storage. (\$1,450,000)
This project would rebuild the 80 acre airfield with a more permanent sub-base and base course than the existing ones of coconut tree trunks which are starting to rot and protrude in places. It is further suggested that during the design development for the airport, plans be made to use the landing strip for water catchment with drains and sumps on either side which will provide a source of over 114,000,000 gallons of water yearly. Pumps could be installed which would transfer the sump water into storage tanks for purification and distribution, and would provide water purification for almost unlimited expansion.

This project because of its size and nature, would require programming in three phases. Phase I would be a feasibility and engineering study which would provide the program division with necessary professional advice on the alternatives and possible costs. Phase II would be the design and specifications required to prepare exact costs and a construction schedule. Phase II would only be entered into after selection of the best alternative determined by phase I feasibility study. Phase III would be the final construction stage which would be completed from the design and specifications produced under phase II.

Because it is necessary for advance programming to project a cost figure prior to developing sound engineering data it must be understood that the following budget is for projection purposes only and may change drastically upon the development of more complete engineering data.

Phase I. Feasibility study, approximately ninety days and should produce exact information as to what the former construction consisted of.

Development of at least three alternatives which would include the water requirement as well as the landing strip. Soils studies and preliminary designs and costs for the alternates. Costs: (\$25,000)

Phase II. Design and specifications for landing strip and water catchment system as selected by Program Division. About 180 days -- costs \$65,000 -- includes complete design and specifications. Material take off list and construction method. Preparation of all documents to allow for construction contract bidding.

Phase III. Construction -- should include complete job with equipment left at job site in "new-used", condition by contractor, to be U.S. Government property. About 18 months.

Material	(\$650,000)
Labor	(710,000)
	<u>(\$1,360,000)</u>

3. Sewage and Water Systems on Majuro and Ebeye (\$745,000)

Discussions have been under way for some time concerning the desperate need for an improved sewage and water system on the Island of Ebeye in the Kwajalein atoll. With approximately 4000 people crowded onto this small island, sanitary sewage disposal and potable drinking water is a serious problem.

In considering the sewage disposal problem strong consideration should be given to the use of a dilution plant and pumping system. As Ebeye is a low island and its highest elevation is only a few feet above sea level, the use of a gravity flow sewage system would appear very difficult. However, it is possible that a more careful engineering study of the need and possible alternatives would produce a less expensive method than the dilution plant. Without the benefit of such a study, however, preliminary planning should be on the basis of the most obvious method.

Engineering survey and preliminary plans -	(\$ 8,000)
Final plans and specifications -	(32,000)
Construction & equipment -	<u>(110,000)</u>
Total	(\$150,000)

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An enlarged, more reliable central water catchment system for Ebeye to provide about 500,000 gallons of potable water will cost about \$245,000.

A sewage system for the village of Rota on Majuro would be practical in the event the additional water catchment at the airport was constructed. It is estimated that prior to a complete engineering survey, a figure in the magnitude of \$350,000 could be used as a planning estimate. This amount should provide for a complete survey as well as plans, specifications, labor and materials for a sanitary system in the village of Rota.

Program Support Construction

1. Power expansion to provide power to Rota and Laura.
(Move 60 KW generator to Laura when additional 500 KW generator installed for Rota.) (\$ 60,000)
2. Road improvement in district center as well as Laura road. (70,000)
3. Road maintenance. (20,000)
4. Replacement of worn out and unuseable equipment in public works. (300,000)
5. Addition of water filtration unit and automatic chlorination system. (35,000)
6. Modification of freezer unit to provide more freeze space. (10,000)
7. Employee housing construction to replace existing sub-standard housing. (170,000)

The total capital requirements of these recommended program support priorities is estimated, following the usual guidelines, at \$665,000.

Public Works in Ponape

The Public Works Office in Ponape consists of the officer in charge and a staff ceiling of five U.S. hire technicians with one position unfilled.

The water system on Ponape is provided solely by catchment. The system was originally built by the Japanese and had very little modification or improvement since. An abandoned fighter plane airstrip serves as the catchment area with an elaborate system of run off canals which brings the water from both ends and one side of the air-strip about 250 feet down the hill to a settling and storage area. There are four settling tanks and one clear water storage tank of 28,000 gallons. With such a small storage tank the water usage is much greater than the settling tanks can handle. Distributed water is cloudy with a very high silt content. Chlorination is by hand. The demand for safe drinking water is increasing. The people in the villages near the district center want water piped to their areas. There are six community stand pipes in Kolonia and a 2" line into Kapingi village. The new school construction program and additional U.S. personnel will require much more water than is being produced as clear potable water. Over 100 million gallons of water per year is collected by the catchment system but most of it is spilled away because of inadequate storage.

The power plant in Ponape is operated with two diesel driven generators of 200 KW each and one 267 KW generator. One of the 200 KW units was broken down waiting for spare parts. The plant is old and very near exhaustion. No expansion of power facilities within the district center can be planned until additional generators of larger capacity are installed.

The transmission is 2400 volts and in poor condition.

The road system in use throughout the district center was originally constructed by the Spanish, improved and expanded by the Germans and greatly extended by the Japanese. Much of the road system formerly in operation under other administrations has been allowed to deteriorate and in some cases have all but disappeared. There is approximately 60 miles of such road beds on Ponape of which less than 15 miles are in usable condition. About 9 miles of the 15 are located within the district center. Public works attempts some road maintenance but lack of equipment prevents any more than a token attempt.

The high island of Ponape does not have the same maintenance problem that is found in the low atolls of the Marshalls. The heavy rainfall (220-300 inches per year) keeps the salt from doing as much damage as it does in the lower islands, but humidity and continual rain cause other problems. Equipment in the public works district of Ponape is in a very marginal condition. Lack of funds for equipment replacement and adequate spare parts has required the public works district to operate

equipment that is unsafe and undependable. A D-7 Caterpillar which was dismantled 9 months before for repair is still waiting for the parts from headquarters. The road grader had just been put back into operation after several months of down time waiting for parts delivery. The Public Works Officer stated that the average time required for repairs to be completed on heavy equipment that breaks down is from 5 to 6 months because of the minimal district spare parts budget and the lengthy process required to purchase parts from the central repair depot on Saipan. Sand and gravel for the contractor constructed housing on Ponape is a critical item. The only rock crusher able to produce aggregate is broken down and if several months will be required to repair it, crushed stone for aggregate will not be delivered to the construction site in time to meet the construction schedule. Even if the crusher is repaired in time now its dependability is questionable. It is several years old, and has been assembled from several different manufactures and many critical parts are no longer manufactured as a standard item. When these parts break a great deal of time and expense is required to have them manufactured by hand and shipped to Ponape.

There is no public works activity on the outer islands. On the island of Kusaie, the Education department had an education and training specialist who assisted the people of the community of Malem to construct a school. However, he was removed by the DISTAD before the school was completed.

While the members of the survey Mission were in Kusaie the community leaders made a strong plea for public works assistance to help them

reclaim some of their roads, build a dock, build more schools and to develop a water system and a small power station. The survey Mission stayed overnight at the Fafunsak public elementary school where it was obvious that with just a little technical assistance and leadership great improvement could be made in utilities and roads. But lack of funds and program planning has prevented the district public works from extending the appropriate assistance to the outer islands.

PROJECT PRIORITIES FOR CONSTRUCTION

1. Landing Strip (estimated cost \$1,585,000)

Phase I - Feasibility study (\$30,000)

- a. Location
- b. Type of construction
- c. Alternatives
- d. Soils available
- e. Preliminary cost estimates

Phase II - Engineering design and specifications (\$55,000)

- a. Construction method
- b. Specification for construction method
- c. Materials for take off
- d. Firm cost estimate

Phase III - Construction (\$1,500,000)

- a. Equipment - \$375,000
- b. Material - \$225,000
- c. Contract - \$900,000

2. Road Improvement (estimated cost \$1,000,000)

Phase I - Location and alignment study (\$20,000)

- a. Miles to be done
- b. Method of construction
- c. Drainage
- d. Elevation
- e. Material source
- f. Structures required and preliminary design
- g. Preliminary cross section design
- h. Cost estimate

Phase II - Construction (\$30,000 per mile including structures)
The Mission estimates that slightly more than 30 miles of the road system in Ponape should be considered high priority to be included in the recommended program for FY '65 through FY '68.

3. Power plant replacement (\$600,000)

Phase I - Preliminary Survey - \$6,000

a. Plans and equipment list.

Phase II - Installation - \$594,000

- a. Power plant
- b. Transformers
- c. Primary-secondary distribution
- d. House drops and meters to nearby villages

4. Boat Channel Dredging and marking (\$120,000)

- a. Use of dredge and barge to clear 100' wide channel for boats with 5' draft at low tide around the entire island would require about 15 miles of dredging.
- b. Day markers required to locate channel between reef.
- c. Coral dredged up could be used for road rehabilitation.

5. Water system rehabilitation (\$285,000)

- a. 1,000,000 gallon storage tank (or 2 500,000 gallon tanks)
- b. Water mains to be replaced
- c. Distribution to be extended to all surrounding villages
- d. Automatic chlorination system
- e. System to be looped and automatic air bleeders installed
- f. Pressure pumps installed where required.

PROGRAM SUPPORT CONSTRUCTION

1. Technical assistance to Kusaie (\$35,000)
 - a. Assist in road rehabilitation
 - b. Install 50 KW generator and freezer for fish
 - c. Install small telephone with switchboard at radio shack to connect the four villages of Lelu, Tafunsak, Malum and Utwe
 - d. Assist in the repair of existing causeway and build a new one between Lelu and Malum island.

2. Sewage system - \$110,000

Extend present system to serve villages next to district center

3. Equipment Replacement (\$280,000)

PUBLIC WORKS IN TRUK

The Acting Head of Public Works in Truk has a staff of seven United States hire technicians and over 150 Micronesians. The large dock project recently completed on the island of Moen where the district center is located has served to strengthen the public works in this district since equipment and personnel which would not normally have been in Truk remained after the construction was completed. However, many of the same problems are present in Truk that are apparent in other districts.

The water system on Truk depends on run off for the main supply. During the rainy season run off is enough to supply all the water required and the two deep wells are not used. During the dry season which is about 4 months long, run off is not enough. The two deep wells provide only about 30 gallons per minute, and water rationing is necessary. The water distribution system is old and in poor

condition and is inadequate to meet new demands.

The road system on Moen is good. Public works has just completed a road rehabilitation program which has been very successful. There is still some work to be done on the South end of the island and the Xavier school road. No road work has been done or is contemplated on any of the outer islands.

Power for the district center is provided by 3 diesel generators of 300 KW each. They are very old and are a type no longer manufactured. Spare parts when available are very expensive and are difficult to find. The distribution system has a 240 volt primary and appears to be badly balanced between phases.

Construction in Truk is slow and difficult to keep on a schedule. The Acting Public Works Officer believes that construction time could be reduced by 50% if materials and supplies for the job arrived on time or even in the proper sequence.

Public Works equipment in Truk is in the same condition as was found in other districts; it is generally old, worn out and difficult to maintain, although there is more of it.

The airfield on Moen is being lengthened by about 700 feet, 400 feet on one end and 300 on the other. This is space which has been reclaimed from the lagoon by a gradual filling process of rubble from the work going on the island. This will be surfaced with coral,

compacted and will make the field that much more useful.

Priorities for construction work in the Truk district:

PROJECT CONSTRUCTION

1. Additional source of water and increase of storage (\$350,000)
 - a. Drill four deep wells about 100 to 120 feet/casing of Pump: (\$120,000)
 - b. Construct additional water storage of 1 million gallon (\$150,000)
 - c. Install new distribution system (\$80,000)

There is a possibility that after the wells are drilled additional water storage will not be necessary. Test will have to be made to determine the firm water supply each well will delivery during the dry season. If it proves to be enough to meet the demand the storage tank will not be required.

2. Rebuild Power system (\$184,500)
 - a. Survey to determine extent of work required (4,500)
 - b. Installation of adequate power plants (100,000)
 - c. Rework Primary and secondary system and extend to village areas near district center (80,000)
3. Enlarge sewage system and extend to include adjacent villages (65,000)
 - a. Survey to determine needs (5,000)
 - b. Construction (60,000)

PROGRAM SUPPORT - CONSTRUCTION

1. Replace 3,000 feet of fuel oil pumping line Boat Pool to public work area. Present line runs above ground and constitutes a safety hazard as well as blocks entry to private property.

Total Cost (\$35,000)

2. Complete the Xavier Catholic School road 13 miles, and extend the South field road past the new school. Improve the rest of the district center roads and streets - Total mileage of 32 miles (\$10,000 per mile - \$320,000)

3. Equipment Replacement (\$420,000)

PUBLIC WORKS IN YAP

The Yap District Public Works Officer and a staff of three United States technicians supervise and direct the work of over 100 Micronesian employees. Although Yap is a small district the public works operation is an extensive one.

The water system depends on run off which is contained in an earth filled open reservoir from where it is pumped for settling and storage to tanks located on telegraph hill. From here the clear water is gravity fed to the end users. The quantity of water available on the island is adequate, but storage is minimal and there is no filtration system or automatic chlorination. A few years ago a 500,000 gallon storage tank was constructed near the dock, but due to some error the present pumping system will only pump down to the last six feet of water. According to the Public Works Officer there is

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also a serious leak in the bottom of the tank caused by the concrete cracking.

The tank is not usable as it is, and has been standing dry for a long time. There is no water provided to adjoining villages.

The power plant and distribution system on Yap is small but in reasonable good shape. The diesel driven generators have a total capacity of 480 KW. There is a good supply of spare parts on hand for both the engines and the generators. There is not, however, surplus power to extend the distribution to the surrounding villages.

For such a small district the road system is fairly large. Approximately 24 miles of fair-to-good roads are now in use by the administration. Most of the roads other than those used to support the administration operation and the road to Giliman are in very bad shape.

The public works equipment in Yap is in very poor condition. The airport construction which has recently been terminated used one D-8 and one standby generator belonging to the district public works. The Public Works Officer said that both units are now worn out and there are no funds to repair or replace them. The rest of the equipment in the district is in very poor condition. The small rock crusher which is located on a quarry face near the Public Works Office is an outdated single pass crusher, still operating, but it is slow

and costly. The Public Works Officer stated that he has to keep his only road roller at the airport all the time to keep up on the heavy maintenance required. The high school construction also ties up several pieces of equipment as it is generally impossible to move the equipment in or out of the hillside location after a rain. During the past month a great deal of time was lost at the high school job site due to the inability to work the equipment on the side of the hill during wet weather. More seriously, time was also lost because the equipment could not be moved elsewhere because of the poor access road to the job site. There is on file in the District Administrator's Office a report on the down time of the equipment and the days lost for the month of June 15th - July 15th. The equipment time cost is considerable. The barge which was at Yap was sent to Koror for the airport job and the Koror barge was to have been returned to Yap. But as the Koror barge was being towed between Koror and Yap it sank; Yap is now without a barge and the only available sand must be barged in from one of the coral sand bars some distance out in the lagoon. Meeting the construction schedule is going to be difficult if not impossible without a barge. The rock crusher cannot produce sand.

PROJECT CONSTRUCTION

1. Completely redesign and reconstruct water system (\$450,000)
 - Phase I - Feasibility Study (15,000)
 1. 60 days. 2 men field work plus home office support
 2. System recommendations

	(3) Proposed alternatives	
	(4) Estimated cost	
	(5) Preliminary drawings	
	Phase II - Engineering Design	(\$ 40,000)
	(1) Final design and specifications	
	(2) Construction method	
	(3) Construction schedule	
	(4) Equipment list	
	(5) Material take off	
	Phase III - Construction	(\$395,000)
	(1) Equipment (Government owned upon completion of Contract)	(\$150,000)
	(2) Material	(\$90,000)
	(3) Labor	(\$145,000)
2.	Electric Power Extension to Village	(\$150,000)
	A. Survey	(\$5,000)
	B. Design and specification	(\$15,000)
	C. Construction	(\$130,000)
3.	Harbor for Deep Draft Ships	(\$1,300,000)
	Phase I - Feasibility Study	(\$20,000)
	(1) Alternatives	
	(2) Suggested location	
	(3) Types of design	
	(4) Preliminary drawings	

Phase II - Engineering Design (\$65,000)

- (1) Complete design and Specification
- (2) Material take off
- (3) Type of Construction
- (4) Construction schedule

Phase III - Construction (\$1,215,000)

- (1) Equipment (to remain in custody of Government) (except rental) (\$515,000)
- (2) Material (\$200,000)
- (3) Labor (\$500,000)

4. Road Construction including \$540,000 drainage, bridges and culverts. About 18 miles of new road required to connect all of the new schools to the district center. (\$30,000 per mile).

PROGRAM SUPPORT - CONSTRUCTION

1. Road improvement (\$75,000). The existing 24 miles of road on the island of Yap should be re-shaped and drainage repaired. Surfacing of selected material should be applied - this could be carried out over a two year period by public works staff.
2. Telephone system installation (\$30,000). There is a switch board in the warehouse at Yap to be installed. One technician is required plus additional material.

3. Enlargement and extension of sewage system (\$35,000).
4. Equipment Replacement (\$250,000).

PUBLIC WORKS IN PALAU

The public works staff in Koror is composed of a public works officer and a United States hire staff of seven. Also working in the area but not part of the field staff are six other United States hire employees who are assigned to headquarters and are working on the airport construction on Babelthuap Island. There are nearly 200 Micronesians employed in almost every skill capacity in the public works operation except supervision.

The water supply and distribution system for the district center and some of the adjoining Micronesian communities, is a very complex network of interlocking pumps and tanks. The main source of water comes from the Glimel River on Babelthuap Island and is brought from a small check dam in the river across the Toagel Channel with rubber pipe laid 120 feet deep on the bottom of the channel, to Koror. Additional water is taken from a "water cave" and pumped to the main water station near the district center. The water then passes through a system of surge tanks, settling tanks, sand filters and finally into clear water tanks from where it is distributed to the users. The system was installed by the Japanese and has been working for many years without any major change with the exception of installing new pumps on Babelthuap and at the water cave. The end result of all this is inadequate water supply to meet the present demand.

The power system on Koror is marginal. The three diesel generators are in fair condition and are well maintained but the distribution system both primary and secondary is in very poor condition. Headquarters is to be commended for the contract just entered into with an electrical engineering firm from Hawaii for a survey of the power needs in Koror. If the recommendations of the survey are implemented the power system should be greatly improved and the additional demands for power in both homes and commercial establishments will be partially met. Eventually there will need to be larger generators installed. The present survey is dealing only with the outside plant.

All the roads on Koror need major repair and maintenance. There are about ten miles of roads and streets in the district center used by the administration which are in immediate need of rebuilding. Drainage, realignment and grading will be required to save the sub-grade and sub-base from further damage. A proper surfacing with some impervious material is also indicated to reduce future maintenance. The private car population is larger in Koror than in any other district.

With the construction of the airport on Babelthuap about $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles of road will be opened up from the old ferry dock to the airport site. Part of the road has been constructed but the major portion of it must wait for proper materials to arrive to construct the necessary bridges and drainage culverts. This will be the first road opened on Babelthuap. It is estimated that there is about 120 miles of old Japanese roads on

Babelthup all of which has gone over to the jungle. To restore them now or even a part of them will be a costly job.

Construction conditions in the Palau District are somewhat different than in the previous districts by the presence of several local contractors who have shown some competence in simple building construction. The present school building program is being assisted by some of these contractors who have already started construction on some of the schools. This leaves the public works free to carry on its operation responsibility.

Under the direction of the headquarters public works division an airstrip is being constructed on Babelthup Island. Separate funds and personnel are also assigned with only nominal support being given by the district public works. The supervisor of the construction was also supervisor of the Yap airfield.

Engineering plans and construction specifications which were shown the Survey Mission were very inadequate to construct such a major structure. No design or drawings for drainage was found at the job site. Compaction test records of the progressive lifts were also not in evidence. Neither were CHR (California Bearing Ratio) test standards for the soils being used, found. The Mission was told that the soils test equipment had been shipped back to Yap sometime ago and no further tests were being made at the job site.

Three of the four-eight tractors and bulldozers used on the job were down for major repair. The large #80 shovel which feeds the rock crusher was also disabled and had been for sometime. There were only four pieces of equipment working during the day long inspection made at the airfield. One caterpillar D-8, one pan and two road graders. The supervisor of the airport job stated that the dirt moving alone on the airstrip would cost \$600,000 and that completion of the work had been scheduled for July of 1964 but that it was likely to take a little longer, perhaps to December 1964.

Most of the heavy equipment assigned to Koror is in the same condition as equipment found throughout the Trust Territory. It is old, worn out and undependable. Inadequate repair budgets and replacement programs has forced the district to repair the equipment at a very high cost to the operation budget.

PROJECT - CONSTRUCTION

1. Water supply and storage	(\$ 500,000)
(1) Study of existing surveys	(\$ 5,000)
(2) Updating of existing surveys	
(3) Recommendations based on existing updated survey	
(4) Complete plans and specifications	(\$20,000)
(5) Construction	(\$475,000)

2. Road Development on Babelthuap (\$525,000)
- Phase I - Location and Alignment Survey (\$45,000)
- (1) Location of road building material source
 - (2) Alignment of selected roads
 - (3) Drainage and bridges
 - (4) Types and quality of construction
 - (5) Alternatives
 - (6) Preliminary plans and center line plot
- Phase II - Preparation of Plans and Specifications
of selected roads and Type of Construction (\$10,000)
- (1) Material required
 - (2) Grade of material
 - (3) Test required
 - (4) Method of construction
 - (5) Suggested control
 - (6) Surfacing material
- Phase III- Construction (\$470,000)
- (1) Special equipment
 - (2) Use as much local labor as possible
3. Landing strip - Babelthuap (\$1,200,000)
- Phase I - Engineering Survey (\$10,000)
- (1) Material being used
 - (2) Location of material supply if present
material unusable

- (3) Drainage requirement
- (4) Compaction tests of present fill
- (5) Alternatives
- (6) Preliminary drawings to support alternatives

Phase II - Complete drawings and specifications (\$25,000)

- (1) Type material required
- (2) Tests required for construction
- (3) Drainage plans
- (4) Inspection procedure
- (5) Proposed construction schedule
- (6) Equipment list
- (7) Material list

Phase III - Construction (Contract) (\$1,165,000)

- (1) Resident Engineer (Contract)

PROGRAM SUPPORT - CONSTRUCTION

- 1. Sewage extension to adjacent villages (\$35,000)
- 2. Road repair on Koror (\$50,000)
- 3. Move petroleum, oil and lubrication storage yard (\$10,000)
- 4. Public works facilities improvement (\$25,000)
- 5. Equipment replacement program (\$300,000)

PUBLIC WORKS - MARIANAS

The public works office on Saipan has a chief and three United States hire employees to supervise approximately 150 Micronesians none of whom are in supervision. The office on Saipan serves the other two islands of Rota and Tinian. There are six Micronesian public works employees permanently stationed on Tinian.

The entire facility on Saipan which comes under operation and maintenance of the public works office was constructed by the Navy and turned over intact to the Trust Territory Government. Therefore most of the roads, utilities and shops are in good condition. However, there is evidence already of the lack of an adequate maintenance budget. Some of the roads are beginning to unravel and jungle growth creeping in on the sides. One of the 700 KUA diesel generators is broken down and waiting for spare parts. This puts more of a load on the remaining machines.

The water system depends on six deep wells and two small springs. Storage capacity is about three million gallons which is about three days supply, estimated consumption being one million gallons per day.

Maintenance tools and equipment on Saipan are in the same condition as in the rest of the districts, that is, badly in need of replacement.

The Mission does not recommend any project type construction priorities for Saipan.

PROGRAM SUPPORT - CONSTRUCTION

- | | |
|-------------------------------------------------|------------|
| 1. Overhaul #1 Engine at power plant | (\$63,000) |
| 2. Overhaul water cooling system at power plant | (\$35,000) |
| 3. Road maintenance and repair | (\$35,000) |
| 4. Equipment replacement | (\$85,000) |

PROBLEMS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM

Professional program planning is a tool which if effectively used can be the single most effective device for such an organization as the Trust Territory Government, especially in the Department of Public Works. Long range program plans are necessary to base reasonably accurate budget estimates as well as regulation and recruitment of labor forces and more effective use of special equipment.

It was noticed by the Survey Mission that the districts were often unable to complete plans for their yearly programs until after headquarters informed them of the amount of their appropriation. In many cases, this prevents the districts from exercising the most effective use of their time, manpower and funds, since there is then a tendency to use the money on requirements of the moment, letting the long range programs go.

The Public Works function in the Trust Territory breaks down into two main responsibilities: (1) The construction of, and the operation and maintenance of the Trust Territory Government facilities and employee housing. Providing all necessary utilities and their continuing upkeep.

With a few exceptions these offices appear to be staffed with personnel qualified to perform this operational and maintenance responsibility. These are men who have had a great deal of experience in similar occupations elsewhere in the world. Most of them originally came into their present jobs via work with the Navy in Guam or Saipan. It was further noticed that it was the rule rather than the exception to find that most of the public works personnel had more than five years of service with the Trust Territory. There is some danger in over long employment abroad but it is usually more critical in positions outside the district public works departments. The Mission was, however, impressed by one remarkably uniform characteristic of Public Works officials -- their high capacity for alcoholic beverages. (2) The second main responsibility is not so clearly a traditional function of public works. This responsibility is found in the Headquarters Office and includes planning, estimating, professional engineering services to the districts. In this function the Public Works Division is not as well provided with qualified personnel nor does it think of itself as a service agency to the district. Rather it emphasizes its supervisory function.

The Headquarters office has only one graduate engineer on the staff, and no professional engineers at all. The concept of a sound engineering approach to a major construction job does not appear as consistently as is desirable. The burden of this attitude is transferred to the district where they must supply the lack of proper support by trial and error and doing the best they can. But the most serious lack is in the area of

planning. A well staffed properly motivated engineering office can supply the program planning office with well prepared estimates and long range construction plans so as to make the planning operation realistic and meaningful. Budgets prepared from well supported planning documents have less trouble meeting questions and requirements in Washington. Also, and probably more important, well prepared planning documents takes a great burden off the field staff which is charged with the ultimate responsibility of completing any given project.

Good planning supported by professional engineering judgement must be supplied to the field by headquarters. This would place the responsibility on professionally qualified people for spending large sums of public funds which are required on major construction projects and would not force such responsibility upon a construction supervisor. No construction job of the magnitude of the Palau airport should be undertaken without plans and specifications signed and sealed by a professional engineer. This type of a construction project involves not only large sums of public funds (at least \$600,000) but involves the safety of human beings who will use the landing strip when completed. The plans for this field, that were shown to the Survey Mission, was a one sheet original drawing prepared by the Land Title Officer in Palau (who is an engineer) and consists of a topographical survey of the proposed site and a suggested alignment. It also had some cross sectional views which were added by the Land Title Officer in his spare time. This sheet was sent to Headquarters where it was changed slightly, signed by the Chief Land Title

Officer (who is not a professional engineer) and then returned to the field where the construction superintendent is building the landing strip. It does not require a professional civil engineer to judge that this method of constructing an airport in the U.S. or any other place using U.S. public funds is less than desirable.

This type of operation is very likely to duplicate itself several times in the next few years if the system is not changed to prevent it. Prior to 1963 the maximum yearly construction budget for the Trust Territory was less than \$1 million dollars. In the two years FY 1963-64 the combined construction budget has increased over 1000% or in excess of 10 million dollars. A 10 million dollar construction program should not be left to casual engineering.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that the office of the Director of Public Works be abolished and an Office of Engineering and Construction be established. The District Public Works office would remain under the District Administrator but with absolutely no supervisory control from headquarters except as inspectors, and examiners are sent out from headquarters.

The district public works office would remain a local administrative responsibility of the District Administration.

All support and backstop for the districts would come from the Engineering and Construction Division. This division would be handled by a qualified

registered engineer and would have professional engineers on his staff in the field of Civil (highways, airports - water) electrical, and mechanical. An office engineer would be in charge of the several draftsmen required and a construction supervisor would head up a staff of inspectors and contract supervisors.

It is further recommended that all major construction work be done under contract. Also that all major construction work be preceded by an engineering feasibility study done by others, from which detailed plans may be completed by the Engineering and Construction Division or done by others.

No major construction work is to be performed by the district public works office. They will occupy themselves with maintenance and operation and with an occasional small construction job if equipment and men are available to do the job quickly and without jeopardizing the regular operation.

As a guide, any job \$35,000 or under could be done by the district if agreed upon by the program office and the district administration. No job over \$35,000 except in unusual circumstances would be done by the district public works. Any job between \$35,000 and \$75,000 can be done by a negotiated contract if the Program Office concurs and the Engineering and Construction Division has a qualified contract supervisor on its staff available to monitor the contract. This provision is not intended

to restrict the use of a bid if so desired. All contracts over \$75,00 must be entered into on the basis of bidding unless a special waiver is granted by the Secretary of the Interior. Each contract of this nature must have a contract supervisor assigned by the contract officer who will familiarize himself with all aspects of the contract and interpret the views of the Trust Territory Government to the contractor during the life of the contract. This person can be a staff member or may be contracted for from an accepted engineering firm. The contract officer and the contract supervisor could, in some cases, be the same person but it is not desirable that this be done too often.

Chapter 2

SEA AND AIR TRANSPORTATION

SURFACE TRANSPORTATION IN THE TRUST TERRITORY

Surface transportation in the Trust Territory is provided in two ways:

(1) Two logistics vessels make a circuit from Japan to all district headquarters and Guam. On the circuit, cargo from Japan and Guam is discharged and copra to be offloaded in Japan is picked up. The logistics vessels are also used for interdistrict transportation of passengers and cargo. Logistics vessels operate on a 70 day turnaround basis which ideally provides 35 day service to each district headquarters. (2) Surface transportation within each district is provided by field trip vessels which make the rounds of the outlying islands providing administrative governmental services, copra pickup service and trade goods delivery service. Field trip vessels operate on schedules set up by each District Administration (DISTAD) and they provide service to the outer islands which varies from 30 days to 180 days depending on the situation existing in each district.

Both the logistics vessels and the field trip vessels are well run ships and provide the best service they can considering the financial limitations under which they operate. All of the ships except two field trip vessels are old, having been built during World War II. They are relatively expensive to operate. Because of these high operating and maintenance costs and the limited budget of the Trust Territory, new

construction replacement ships except for the two field trip vessels have not been possible.

Operational Management

The operational management of the logistics vessels and the field trip vessels is done by the Pacific Micronesian Line (PML), a subsidiary of the Pacific Far East Line on a cost plus fixed fee basis. PML provides officers and crews for the vessels, handles all of the logistics services required by the vessels and in coordination with the High Commissioner, issues the schedules for the vessels. PML assigns the field trip vessels to the DISTADS for field trip operations.

Logistics Vessel Problem Areas

The logistic vessel operations present relatively few problems. The seventy day turn around with two ships schedule provides adequate service to the districts. During the first phase long range program through fiscal '68 when scheduling problems are solved, the two ships will call at each port every 35 days. Delays in loading caused by rain, and delays enroute caused by storms, are facts which must be accepted in any shipping operation. One problem area in scheduling, however, should be mentioned. In Koror the frozen fish industry is getting started. The reefer storage capacity in Koror is 25,000 lbs. now and will shortly increase to 75,000 lbs. At present, the frozen fish is loaded into both logistics vessels in the space vacated by the frozen imports into Koror on the outbound voyage. On the return

voyage, the GUNNERS KNOT usually returns to Guam from Truk, bypassing Koror. The PACIFIC ISLANDER, however, does call at Koror on its return voyage and picks up frozen cargo. As the frozen cargo capacity of Koror increases, it may be necessary to divert GUNNERS KNOT to Koror to provide additional frozen cargo space.

General Field Trip Problem Areas

Although each district has problems peculiar to itself, all districts have certain problems in common such as:

a. Lack of communication to the outer islands. Since copra is the main cash crop in the outer islands, the producers must know well in advance when the field trip vessel will call to pick up the copra. Copra does not store too well in the field and the producers will make it only when they feel sure it will be picked up. They must have a way of being notified of the field trip vessels schedule. This problem is solved in those districts having a broadcast station in District Headquarters. Broadcast stations should be installed in those District Headquarters which do not now have them. The stations should be of sufficient power to reach the outlying islands.

b. Lack of navigational aids in the outlying atolls. Navigational aids in the harbors of the District Centers, installed and maintained by the Coast Guard, are adequate for daytime use and navigation in these harbors presents no problem to the masters of the Trust Territory vessels. However, in the outlying atolls the Coast Guard does not install or

maintain nav aids. The vessels must pass through the reef and navigate within the atoll strictly by seaman's eye, depending on the sun to help the master identify the shoal areas. Much time is lost waiting for the sun to be in the right position to make navigation possible. The low number of groundings to date while operating under these extremely difficult conditions certainly speaks well of the professional qualifications of the masters employed by PML. Nav aids have been installed by the people of some of the atolls under the direction of the ship masters but this has been done in very few of the atolls because of the lack of time available to the masters due to tight scheduling.

c. The necessity to employ field trip vessels in tasks which detract from their field trip operations. These tasks include among others; student-teacher lifts during the summer months, judicial lifts which require moving the district judge to an island to hold court and congressional lifts which require picking up and returning congressmen from the district congress meetings.

d. Combining field trip operations and commercial trading operations on the same field trip vessel. A conflict often occurs between the desire of the field trip personnel (medical, dental, sanitary and administrative) to spend more time in the outlying islands and the desire of the copra buyer and trade goods sellers to get the trip over with as quickly as possible. To the field trip personnel time means the ability to do more for the local people but to the commercial

personnel time is money and they desire to consummate their business as quickly as possible and get to the next island full of customers. The obvious solution to this problem would be to have a field trip vessel for commercial operations and a field trip vessel for field trip operations. However, the cost of such a solution would be prohibitive. The Mission feels that if the additional field trip vessels, as mentioned later in this report, are provided, then the interval between field trip visits to the outlying islands would be reduced and therefore it would be practical to leave some of the field trip personnel ashore on the islands to be picked up on the next trip.

e. The necessity to provide more frequent field trip service. One of the most frequent complaints heard by the Mission was that the field trip vessel didn't visit often enough. It was found that the average community in the outlying islands produces enough copra to buy enough trade goods to last for approximately six weeks. Although more copra could be produced, it was not done because of the spoilage caused by too few pickups and inadequate shoreside storage space.

Specific Field Trip and Boating Problem Areas

a. Marshall Islands District. The Marshalls produce the greatest amount of copra in the Trust Territory. The problem is to pick it up at six week intervals on a dependable, scheduled basis. The presently assigned field trip vessels (ROQUE, RAN ANNIM and privately owned MIECO QUEEN) are not sufficient even though they are being operated to their limits, to provide this service.

b. Ponape District. Field trip service provided by KASELEHLIA to the outer islands is excellent. On the island of Ponape, however, road transportation is practically non existent to those areas which are adjacent to the perimeter lagoon. Four cooperative copra warehouses and trading goods stores are either proposed or in operation adjacent to the lagoon. The problem is to provide water transportation to these co-ops to the extent that the Mission's over-all priorities do not call in near future for road construction to these areas. This is possible now only at high tide since at low tide, many areas are impassable for the type of boats required for this operation.

c. Truk District. The Truk District has the largest population of all the districts, and the problem here is moving people rather than cargo. The field trip vessel, MILITOB, serves the islands outside the Truk lagoon, MILITOB has a large cargo carrying capacity which is only partially utilized and a limited amount of passenger space which is not capable of meeting the passenger lift demand. Within the Truk Lagoon there are private boats providing passenger and cargo transportation but this is not adequate to meet the needs of the area. Also within the Truk Lagoon there is no means of providing rapid, dependable, emergency, all weather boat transportation for medical and police emergencies.

d. Yap District. Field trip service in the Yap District is provided by the ERROL. ERROL is also used for shuttle service between Saipan and Guam, for certain Saipan District field trips and for the

Palau District field trips. As a result the field trip service to the outer islands in the Yap District is not frequent enough.

e. Palau District. As noted above, field trip service to the four outer islands of the Palau District is provided by ERROL. Although the DISTAD tries to schedule service to these islands every three months, service in the past year has averaged every six months. Ferry service to connect Koror and Babelthuap is needed. Ferry service from Anguar to Koror is provided by a 50 foot passenger ferry owned and operated by the Anguar municipality. The boat is two years old and is in good shape. Ferry service between Pelelieu and Koror is provided by two decrepit, converted, Navy 50 foot motor launches. Although they are still operating, their life expectancy is rather short. The harbor channel at Anguar needs to be cleaned out.

f. Saipan. As noted above, Saipan District is served by ERROL (when needed and available) and by the FOUR WINDS, a wooden hull, 543 ton vessel, privately owned by the Saipan Shipping Company. Preference is always given to the FOUR WINDS in order to encourage private enterprise in this district. Field trip service to the northern islands is provided once every three months. The break-water in the port of Tinian is deteriorating and will not last much longer. The harbor at Rota needs cleaning out.

Port Facility Problem Areas

In general the pier facilities at each district headquarters are adequate to meet the needs of the district except for Yap, Truk and Ponape. In Yap, the existing pier will handle only the field trip vessel. The logistics vessel must anchor in the harbor and cargo must be lightered to and from the pier. The geographical layout of the existing pier area precludes its expansion. To build a pier large enough to handle the logistics vessel will require relocation of the pier to an adjacent area. In Truk the newly constructed pier is too high for the field trip vessel to use its booms to handle cargo. Cargo handling is accomplished by using shoreside cranes. In Ponape the pier facilities are adequate but the pier is located on an island which has no road connection with the main island. The cargo must therefore be lightered to and from the main islands.

Cargo warehousing presents more problems. In Truk the trans-shipment warehouse is an old quonset hut which has outlived its usefulness and is too small to handle the amount of cargo received. In Yap, the copra warehouse is also a quonset hut which will handle only the copra collected on the "short" field trip. When the field trip vessel returns from the "long" field trip, the copra in the copra warehouse is back-loaded into the vessel and shipped to Palau where a larger amount of storage space is available. In Koror, although the warehouses are in excellent shape, they are too small to handle the ever increasing tonnages being shipped into Koror. Lighterage is adequate in Ponape but in Yap

the cargo lighter has been sent to Palau to assist in the airfield project. The lighter which Palau sent to Yap to replace it sank at sea. Because of this unexpected calamity, Yap must lighter cargo to and from the logistic vessel on a diesel oil barge which has pipes, valves, and raised scuttles on its deck which makes cargo handling difficult. Throughout the territory the LCM's which are assigned to public works and which act as tugs for the logistics vessels were apparently in satisfactory condition and they are maintained by the District Public Works Department boatmen.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Marshall Islands District. (1) Transfer MILITTOBI to Marshalls to provide increased shipping capacity. (2) Establish copra storage warehouses and trade goods stores in the heavy copra producing atolls to act as a collecting point for the copra and to reduce the number of stops within the atoll. (See Economic Division Section of Mission's report on suggested measures of implementation.) (3) Provide small boats (21 ft.) powered by a diesel outboard for intra-atoll copra shipping. (4) Install daymarkers in the atoll lagoons to improve navigation and speed up operations within the lagoon. The daymarkers can be manufactured by the district public works machinshop out of reinforcing rods and sheet steel as a rainy day project. The daymarkers can be installed by the local municipality under the supervision of the Peace Corps Volunteer in the location picked by the master of the field trip vessel. This manufacture and installation procedure applies to the other districts also.

b. Ponape District. (1) Leave KASELEHLIA assigned to Ponape. (2) Dredge channels in the Ponape perimeter lagoon to provide low tide boat transportation to the copra co-ops. (3) Provide a boat which would be capable of carrying passengers and cargo to provide boat service in the perimeter lagoon. Boat should be 40-50 ft. long with a draft not to exceed 4 feet. Boat could be operated by DISTAD and turned over to private ownership after an initial period. (4) Install nav aids in the atolls which do not now have them (Captain Blanc in Ponape has made progress in this respect so far). (5) Install a radio broadcast station whose over-all priority is justified by other considerations (see section II-B-3 of this report), which among other things could broadcast field trip information to outer islands.

c. Truk District. (1) Replace MILITTOBI with the field trip vessel to be constructed in FY '64. Modify this vessel to provide a twin screw engineering plant to increase its maneuverability in the restricted waters of the atoll lagoons. Install booms capable of working cargo at the Moen pier. Increase the passenger carrying capacity of the new ship as much as practicable by redesigning the TATAMI passenger cabins and using Coast Guard approved inflatable life boats in place of wooden boats. (2) Set up a ferry boat service within Truk lagoon to provide daily service to the islands south of Moen and west of Moen. This could be done by using two 50 ft. motor launches and utilizing existing Japanese pier facilities in the islands. A minimal amount of dredging would be required. The ferry service could be set up and

operated by DISTAD during an initial period and turned over to private ownership after the operation was established. (3) Provide a 15-20 knot radar equipped boat to be operated by DISTAD for day and night medical and police services within the Truk lagoon. This would also make unnecessary, in the Mission's judgement, the proposed construction of the field hospital at Toll, one hour away from the District Center hospital at Moen. This would require the installation of additional nav aids some of which should be equipped with radar reflectors. (4) Replace the trans-shipment warehouse in Moen.

d. Yap District. (1) Move ERROL to Saipan. (2) Construct a new vessel similar to the one in the 1964 shipbuilding program and assign it to Yap. Operate it on a 30 day field trip service to the outer islands in the Yap District. Every three months send it to Palau for field trip service to the southwest islands. (3) Increase the size of the copra storage warehouse. (4) Provide an adequate lighter to handle the cargo from the logistics vessel. (5) Install nav aids in Elato atoll lagoon. (6) Install a broadcast radio station, justified by other priorities, which could broadcast field trip information to the outlying islands. (7) Build a new pier and port facility which could be located on the east side of Donitch Island at the edge of the reef. Donitch Island could be cleared and used for warehouse area. A causeway would connect Donitch to main island.

e. Palau District. (1) As the frozen fish industry in Palau increases, schedule both logistics vessels into Koror on their return trip to increase the amount of frozen exports from Koror. (2) Provide a car and passenger ferry between Koror and Babelthuap. The Trust Territory has plans for a ferry which would be adequate. Additional terminal facilities would be required on the end of the existing causeways. The design of these terminal facilities should be closely coordinated with the design of the ferry to insure compatibility due to the six foot rise and fall of the tide in the channel between Koror and Babelthuap. (3) Increase the size of the trans-shipment warehouse in Koror.

f. Saipan District. (1) Move ERROL to Saipan. Continue to use FOUR WINDS to provide field trip services to northern Marianas Islands. Use ERROL for this field trip service and shuttle runs between Saipan, Tinian, Rota, and Guam when FOUR WINDS is not available due to other commitments. Also use ERROL as a replacement vessel for other field trip vessels during their annual overhaul. This replacement service would use up about 40 weeks per year. Use ERROL to assist other districts in their special lift requirements such as student-teacher lifts during the summer months.

Note on Recommendations:

a. A new Ponape dock is not high priority enough in the Mission's judgement to include in the program of fiscal '68. Also, the replacement of the World War II built field trip vessels, the ROQUE, RAN ANNIM, and

ERROL can be deferred until after 1968. They should be replaced by MILITTOBI class vessels because of their large cargo carrying capacity. The horsepower of these ships should be increased to provide a cruising speed of 12 knots (as compared to $9\frac{1}{2}$ knots now possible in MILITTOBI) in order to permit night time transits between atolls 140 - 160 miles apart.

b. Certain harbors, passes, and channels in various islands and atolls not mentioned specifically above require dredging and/or blasting to improve field trip and small boat operation. An extensive territory wide survey should be made to determine the extent of what is required and the recommendations of this survey should be implemented as funds become available.

Capital Requirements of Recommendations

Note: All cost figures are, of course, rough estimates and are subject to modification as more accurate information becomes available.

a. Marshall Island District

Copra Warehouses in atolls	
20 concrete block bldgs. @ \$11,000	\$220,000
21 foot atoll boats (24@ \$1500)	36,000
Nav aids	10,000
	<u>\$266,000</u>

b. Ponape District

Perimeter Channel Dredging	\$ 120,000
Co-op Servicing Boat	20,000
Nav aids	5,000
	<u>\$ 145,000</u>

c. Truk District

Field Trip Vessel	\$ 150,000
Ferry service for Truk Lagoon (2 boats @ \$20,000 each)	40,000
Minimal ferry pier dredging	10,000
Radar equipped emergency boat	30,000
Nav aids	5,000
Trans-shipment Warehouse	60,000
	<u>\$ 295,000</u>

d. Yap District

Field Trip Vessel	\$ 150,000
Cargo lighter	50,000
Copra storage warehouse	30,000
Nav aids	1,000
	<u>\$ 231,000</u>

e. Palau District

Vehicle, passenger and cargo ferry	\$ 60,000
Terminal facilities	200,000
Trans-shipment warehouse	60,000
	<u>\$320,000</u>
TOTAL	\$1,257,000

Private Operation of Field Trip Vessels

All of the recommendations made in this paper concerning the field trip operations were based on the assumption that the Trust Territory (and PML) would continue to operate the field trip vessels. However, it is understood that the shipping company controlled by Carols Etscheit in Ponape is negotiating with Trust Territory to take over the field trip operations in the Ponape District and later on in the Truk District. In the Ponape District this would involve using the TUNGARU, owned by Etscheit, and the KASELEHLIA. KASELEHLIA would be operated by Etscheit using Micronesian personnel. This would lower the operating costs of the ship considerably since the salaries of the Micronesian master and chief engineer would be about one-third that paid the Americans now doing the job. It is understood that the agreement has not been finalized as yet and therefore the details are not known. However, it is felt that if proper field trip operations can be provided under private operation, the private operators should be given a chance. It is understood that the KASELEHLIA would be subsidized and therefore would operate as a common carrier with equal rights given to all traders (including the

Etscheit's trading competitors). However, the Trust Territory will have to insure that proper field trip service at a proper interval is given to all outlying islands, not just those which have the highest commercial potential. The field trip service in the Ponape District has been excellent (albeit expensive) in the past. The Trust Territory will have to monitor and control the field trip operations very closely in the future if it goes to private operation to insure that the same high standards are maintained.

Future Surface Transportation Improvements

The Trust Territory has prepared a long range construction program which, among other things, provides for the construction of ships to be used in the Trust Territory. The total cost of this program is \$600,000 and it covers the period FY '63-68. In FY 1963, \$74,000 was provided for the construction of a small ship to service the islands of the Truk lagoon. The ship has not been ordered as yet and the funds could be used for the two boats recommended for the Truk lagoon ferry service in paragraph 7c of this report costing approximately \$40,000. The remainder could be used for the radar equipped emergency boat also recommended for Truk lagoon service in paragraph 7c. In FY 1964, the Trust Territory budget includes an item for \$150,000 for the construction of a field trip vessel. This could be used to build a vessel to service the Truk District. On its delivery, MILITOB I could then be moved to the Marshall Islands District as recommended in paragraph 7a. There is also an item for \$50,000 in the FY 1964 budget for

small boats. Since the cost of the field trip vessel is expected to be about \$130,000, the funds remaining could be added to the \$50,000 to provide the ferry boat to be operated between Palau and Babelthuap as recommended in paragraph 7e. In FY 1965, \$150,000 is planned to cover the cost of another field trip vessel. Upon delivery, this vessel could be assigned to Yap releasing ERROL for assignment to Saipan District as recommended in paragraphs 7d and 7f. In the period FY 1966-1968, \$226,000 is programmed for unspecified purposes. This estimate should be replaced by approximately \$1,400,000 to finance the capital investment priorities of surface transportation outlined in this section up through FY 1968.

Estimated Operating Costs

The estimated gross operating cost of the surface transportation services for FY 1964 is \$1,380,000. Assuming that the field trip vessel to be built in FY 1964 is in operation in FY 1965, the estimated operating cost for FY 1965 should be about \$1,500,000. Assuming that the field trip vessel to be built in FY 1965 is in operation in FY 1966, the estimated operating cost for FY 1966 should be about \$1,650,000. For FY 1967 and 1968 when the new vessels to replace the ROGUE, RAN ANNIM, and ERROL should be operating, the gross operating costs would run about the same or slightly less than FY 1966. Anticipated cash revenues for FY 1964 is \$600,000. For FY 1965 cash revenues are estimated to be \$800,000 and for FY 1966, \$1,000,000. For FY 1967 and 1968 the revenues will probably increase at a slower rate since the

number of vessels will remain constant and the increase in copra production arising from more transportation facilities would have been realized by then. Therefore the cash operating deficits to be financed from the Trust Territory Government operations budget services over the next five years are estimated roughly as follows:

FY 1964	\$ 780,000
FY 1965	700,000
FY 1966	630,000
FY 1967	630,000
FY 1968	630,000

However, in accordance with correct accounting practices and the general recommendations of Part III of this report, the shipping business of the Trust Territory Government should be handled separately from its general accounts. Government passengers and government cargo should pay appropriate rates rather than be transported free so that the amount of profit or loss is clear to everyone concerned.

AIR TRANSPORTATION IN THE TRUST TERRITORY

The Trust Territory has one DC-4 and two SA-16 aircraft which provide airline service to all of the district centers plus Guam, Rota and Kwajalein. The airline is operated by Pan American on a contract basis. The contract calls for Pan American to fly 360,000 miles per year. The rate is \$2.3057 per mile for the DC-4 and \$1.861 per mile for the SA-16 for up to 29,700 miles per month. If the mileage exceeds this figure,

the rate per mile decreases to \$1.9348 for the DC-4 and \$1.4901 for the SA-16. However, a premium of \$2,830 is charged for each increment of up to 5,600 miles flown over 29,700 miles per calendar month. This increment covers the cost of additional crews which must be brought in to fly the additional miles. Service is provided from Guam to Yap, Palau, Truk, Ponape, Kwajalein, and Majuro on a weekly basis using SA-16 aircraft. Service from Guam to Rota and Saipan is provided thrice weekly using the DC-4. All places served by the airline have airfields except Ponape and Palau which require water landings. An airfield is being constructed in Babelthuap which will service Palau District. The completion date of this airfield is indefinite. An airfield is being considered for Ponape but as yet the site has not been approved. When the airfields are completed the SA-16 aircraft will be phased out since they are expensive to operate and the spare parts problem is getting worse. The DC-4 seems to be the logical replacement for the SA-16.

Problem Areas

The DC-4 service between Guam, Rota and Saipan presents no problems. The flights are short and the passengers and cargo are transported expeditiously. When additional flights are required because of additional demand, more flights are scheduled with a minimum of fuss. Since the DC-4 carries 39 passengers and 2000 lbs. of cargo, sufficient space is available to meet the needs of the area served. However, the SA-16 flights to the areas southwest and southeast of Guam do not run so

smoothly. The SA-16 aircraft is small. It can carry only nine to twelve passengers and has a much smaller cargo capacity than the DC-4. As a result the demand for space usually exceeds the supply. Passengers and cargo must wait in the districts while higher priority passengers and cargo get the space. Although the priority system is fair and is being properly administered generally, there have been isolated instances where it has been abused. However, no priority system can overcome the handicaps of insufficient aircraft space and therefore passengers are subjected to expensive delays in the districts while waiting to proceed onward.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

The Mission recommends that airline service in the Trust Territory be increased as follows:

1. Five DC-4 flights per week from Guam to Rota and Saipan instead of three now being made.
2. Two SA-16 flights per week from Guam to Koror and Yap instead of one now being made.
3. One DC-4 flight per week from Guam to Truk, Kwajalein, and Majuro instead of none now scheduled.
4. Since Ponape will be bypassed by the DC-4 because of lack of airfield facilities, the Mission recommends that an SA-16 be based at Ponape to run a shuttle service between Ponape and Truk and Ponape and

Kwajalein. If a need for air service between Kusaie and Kwajalein should develop, the SA-16 could stop at Kusaie on its way to Kwajalein since the trip is only 80 miles further. However, if stops at Kusaie are made, a seaplane ramp and fueling facility would be required.

5. The present contract with Pan American should be renegotiated as is the intention of the Trust Territory Government, but that the Civil Aeronautics Board be brought in to assist the Trust Territory in the renegotiations. The present contract with Pan American is for 360,000 miles. The recommended schedule requires 480,000 miles per year to be flown. Since the utilization rate for the aircraft would be better under the recommended schedule the costs per mile should be lower than they are in the present contract.

Private Commercial Operation of the Trust Territory Airline

Pan American has been surveying the airline situation in the Trust Territory to determine whether it is feasible for them or a subsidiary to take over the operation on a commercial basis. Their survey is not complete and many problems concerning, among others, subsidy, tariffs, communications, nav aids, and flight crew personnel would have to be resolved. The recommended schedule listed above was a tentative one prepared by the Pan American representative with which the Mission was in agreement. In addition to the possibility of a satisfactory arrangement with Pan American, the Mission understands that the Federal Aviation Agency might be interested in operating the Trust Territory airline. Both of these possibilities should be explored further by the Office of Territories

and by the Trust Territory Government.

Present System of Operation Versus Commercial Operation

As to the merits of the present system of operation versus commercial operation, it boils down to the service furnished and the cost to both the customer and the Trust Territory. Pan American is undoubtedly making money on its contract or it would not be so anxious to renew, but the Trust Territory Government has no way of knowing if it is excessive under the present arrangement. It is clear that although the present cargo and passenger rates are high (except on the Guam - Saipan run) some subsidy by the government will be necessary under any system of operations. The Mission recommends that if the Trust Territory airline is operated commercially by a private organization, that the services of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) be utilized both in writing the original contract and for regulatory purposes. The CAB would determine the size of the subsidy and the form it should take. If after a certain period of operation, it was determined that the airline profits were excessive, the CAB would have the power to establish lower rates, reduce the subsidy or both. These recommendations naturally assume that only one airline would be permitted to operate in the Trust Territory. A possible alternative to a Pan American contract negotiated with the aid of CAB is the operation of the Trust Territory airline on a cost basis by the Federal Aviation Agency. The FAA does operate certain air routes now and there seems to be the possibility of an arrangement. The Mission recommends exploratory consultation talks in Washington with CAB and FAA.

Cost of the Recommended Schedule

The present schedule provides three DC-4 flights per week from Guam to Saipan, whereas the recommended schedule provides five. The present schedule provides one SA-16 flight per week from Guam to Koror, whereas the recommended schedule provides two. The present schedule provides one SA-16 flight per week from Guam to Majuro, whereas the recommended schedule provides one DC-4 flight from Guam to Majuro plus one SA-16 flight per week from Ponape to Truk and Ponape to Kwajalein. For FY 1964 the budgeted gross cost of airline operation is \$695,000. Figured over a twelve month period, the estimated cost of the recommended schedule is approximately \$1,080,000. This figure was calculated using the cost and penalty figures in the existing contract with Pan American. As mentioned before, the contract with Pan American should be renegotiated to provide a lower annual cost. Although the cost of operation of the recommended schedule is about 50% greater than the FY 1964 budgeted gross cost, the carrying capacity of the airline would be greatly increased because of the more extensive use of the DC-4 in place of the SA-16. The operation can be carried out using the existing three aircraft but they would fly more hours. The increased service should result in tangible economic benefits and intangible political benefits to the Trust Territory.

Long Term Recommendations

a. When the airfield at Babelthuap is completed, it is recommended that one SA-16 be phased out and that a DC-4 be acquired to replace it.

This would provide DC-4 transportation for the Guam to Palau run.

b. When the airfield at Ponape is completed, the DC-4 on the Guam to Majuro run would stop at Ponape thus deleting the need for the remaining SA-16 to make shuttle runs between Ponape and Truk and Ponape and Kwajalein. However, if the need for air transportation to Kusaie becomes a reality, the SA-16 would have to be retained because of the need for a water landing at Kusaie since there are no airfields on the island. For the purpose of this report however, the Mission recommends that the SA-16 to be based on Ponape be phased out when the airfield is completed.

Costs of the Long-Term Recommendations

a. Capital Cost

(1) Purchase one DC-4 \$200,000 (HICOM est.)

b. Gross operating cost per year assuming continued Trust Territory operation of airline under the excessively high estimates of present contract prices.

(1) When Eabelthuap airfield is completed and SA-16 service to Palau is replaced by DC-4 service. \$1,150,000

(2) When Ponape airfield is completed and all SA-16's are phased out. \$ 928,212

Revenues

No attempt has been made to estimate the revenues which would be received if the short term and long term recommendations were implemented. It is pointed out, however, that the FY 1963 revenues were about \$180,000 and that the anticipated revenues for FY 1964 are calculated by the Trust Territory Government in the neighborhood of \$200,000 under the present operating schedule. The revenues under the recommended schedules would certainly increase due to the greater carrying capacity of the airline and substantial savings can be made through the new contract arrangement but the air service subsidy that will be needed may still exceed that of the surface transportation subsidy.

Mercy Flights

Aero-medical evacuations and mercy flights are done by the Navy SAR units based in Kwajalein and Guam and by Coast Guard logistics aircraft which service the loran stations in the Yap and Palau Districts. The service has been excellent and is much appreciated by the people of the Trust Territory. The Mission recommends that these services be continued, both for humanitarian reasons and for the very favorable political impact among the Micronesians of this image of the U.S. military.

Chapter 3

COMMUNICATIONS

District Stations

Small radio stations were established in each Trust Territory District Center by the Navy in 1946. These centers were: Majuro, Marshall Islands; Saipan, Mariana Islands; Ponape, Truk, Yap and Palau, Caroline Islands. Equipment used was wartime, manual operated, Bureau of Ships type. All equipment - transmitting, receiving and including radio beacons - was housed under one roof. These stations were intended to handle a light internal traffic load and to provide an intermittent beacon service.

The radio stations were transferred to Interior in 1951. The facilities were entirely adequate at the time. Slowly additional equipment has been acquired to meet changing and increasing requirements. Much of this equipment has been procured from excess sources and is now well worn and difficult to maintain. Some replacement is required.

The addition of equipment has resulted in overcrowded radio stations. Most transmitters should be removed for relocation to separate buildings. This relocation would improve operating efficiency by removing the interference caused by operating of transmitters in close proximity to receivers, and would permit erection of improved receiving antennas through removal of the transmitting antennas.

District radio station improvements, including erection of small cement block transmitter buildings and equipment replacement can be met with modest expenditures.

Relay and Control Station

By 1959, message traffic from District Stations had increased to the point where the single manual radiotelegraph circuit into the Navy Communications Station, Guam, was over-loaded. This increase largely resulted from an expanded Weather Bureau observational program. In an effort to relieve this congestion of traffic, a Central Relay and Control Station was established at Truk. This was accomplished by removing all transmitting equipment from the radio station for relocation to a separate building near the airport. Additional and higher powered transmitting equipment was secured from excess sources and installed. The radio station was converted to a "receive only" station and additional receiving and teletype equipment was received from excess sources and installed. The removing of transmitters and some additional equipment enabled a Truk-Guam radioteletype circuit to be established. Other Trust Territory stations then forwarded traffic to Truk over separate manual radiotelegraph circuits for onward relay to Guam via radioteletype. This greatly expedited movement of traffic.

Plans are underway to move the Control and Relay Station from Truk to Saipan. This will serve to bring the Headquarters function under more direct supervision; greatly expedite the flow of District message traffic

to the High Commissioner's Office; and eliminate, by virtue of the short distance, delays in Guam traffic due to poor signal conditions.

Expenditures

The communication allotment for Fiscal Year 1963 was \$251,000; the proposed communication allotment for Fiscal Year 1964 is \$375,000. This compares with an average allocation of \$127,000 for the previous eight years. In order to improve and maintain the District radio stations in a satisfactory manner a \$1.2 million dollar capital budget is proposed for the next four years as follows:

District Stations New Equipment & Supplies \$200,000/yr - \$800,000.00

Broadcast Stations (Including Buildings) \$160,000.00

Marshalls	\$ 14,900
Truk	32,800
Palau	21,800
Yap	25,500
Ponape	18,500
Marianas	46,000
	<hr/>
	\$160,000

Out Islands Stations 57, plus Spares \$140,000.00

Marshalls	20 Units @ \$1,800.00	\$ 36,000
Ponape	6 Units	10,800
Yap	6 Units	10,800
Marianas	3 Units	5,400
Truk	10 Units	18,000
Palau	5 Units	9,000
Spares		20,000
		<hr/>
		\$ 110,000

57 Generators @ \$400	\$ 22,800
Spares	7,200
	<hr/>
	\$ 30,000

Moving the Control and Relay Station from Truk to Saipan \$100,000.00

TOTAL \$1,200,000.00

FOR UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT USE ONLY

If, however, we are to meet U.S. Weather Bureau demands for "within minutes" relay of weather traffic, greatly increased equipment expenditures will be required. The Weather Bureau persists in comparing Trust Territory traffic handling times against Federal Aviation Agency multi-million dollar semi-automatic systems. The present system adequately meets Trust Territory Government requirements and cannot be compared with a system established to handle great volumes of time-critical traffic.

Weather Bureau traffic presently accounts for 40% of all the Trust Territory message traffic. The Trust Territory Government is reimbursed to the extent of \$25,000 per year for this service. This sum does not meet increased expenses and is to be reconsidered in the near future. However, short of a very substantial initial sum, equipment to meet Weather Bureau requests cannot be provided under the above budget.

Maximum Program

To provide this "within minutes" relay of weather traffic, additional equipment and buildings would be required in the magnitude of \$1.5 million. This would bring the Communication budget to a total of \$2.7 million through 1968.

Chapter 4

AGRICULTURE

Field and Functions of the Agricultural Program in the Trust TerritoryProgram

The present agricultural program of the Trust Territory Government is based on two broad lines of development:

1. Subsistence Agriculture, involving certain basic crops, livestock, poultry and soil improvement and conservation. Present basic crops in the area are coconuts, breadfruit, pandanus, taro, yams, sweet potatoes, bananas, citrus, and tapioca.

2. Cash crops, involving the improvement of the local economy by developing cash crops for export to other districts and outside the Trust Territory. This includes work on coconuts, cacao, black pepper, ramie, coffee, forest products, and fisheries. Only cacao is in an advanced state of commercial development, with ramie and pepper still in the initial stages.

There are also special projects of particular interest and importance:

1. Entomology Program:

This involves territory-wide insect and disease control -- control of plant pests prevalent in the area and a Quarantine Service whose function is to control and regulate the movement of plants and animals.

2. Academic and Practical Training Program:

a. Farm Institute:

This is a large government plantation operated to give the agricultural agents and students academic training and practical field experience, with the strong emphasis on the practical side.

b. Agricultural Scholarships:

These are designed to select people for advanced agricultural training in the Philippines and Hawaii either for a degree or for specialized training, such as forestry, animal husbandry, crops, etc.

Staffing Structure:

Under the present administrative structure of the Trust Territory, the Director of Agriculture serves in a staff position on the High Commissioner level. He has no direct authority over the district agriculturists nor their programs. Instead, the district agriculturists are responsible to the district administrators. Each agriculturist determines his own program for agricultural development.

All the American staff are graduate agriculturists holding B. S. degrees. In Yap, Truk, Ponape, and the Marianas, the district agriculturist is called the "Island Development Officer". This work consumes 75% or more of the agriculturist's day, keeping him out of the actual agricultural field, for as development officer, he is expected to organize and manage cooperatives, credit unions, develop small businesses, etc.

The 164 Micronesians at the district level serve a variety of functions, i.e., agricultural extension agents, assistant agricultural extension agents, junior agricultural extension agents, foresters, horticulturists, animal husbandmen, agricultural trainees, maintenance men, farm foremen, and farm laborers. The educational level and technical competence of these agriculturists leave much to be desired. Two have B. S. degrees; one has two years' special study in the Philippines and Hawaii; two have one year's study in the forestry school in Fiji. Presently, there are ten applicants studying for a degree at the University of the Philippines in community development, general agriculture, poultry husbandry, animal husbandry, entomology, and forestry. From performance records to date, approximately five will complete their degrees.

The Education Department of the Trust Territory has three students studying for degrees in food technology. These people, upon their return, will apparently be used in the vocational agriculture programs in the local high schools.

MARSHALLS DISTRICT:Staff:

A new American District Agricultural Officer arrived for the Marshalls District during the Mission's survey; the Micronesian Assistant District Agricultural Officer was acting chief during the visit. Two Americans and 23 Micronesians are presently available to operate the District Agricultural Department. Fifteen of the Micronesians are Agricultural Extension Agents and eight are Agricultural Station employees. Eight of the Agricultural Extension Agents are stationed in the outer islands; the remainder work in the district center at Majuro.

Budget:

The budget for FY '63 was \$39,000. Of this, 2/3 went for salaries; the remaining 1/3 went for construction materials, POL, travel, seeds, feeds, and fertilizer.

A request of \$52,000 has been submitted for FY '64 and \$96,000 for FY '65; the breakdown of the budget remains basically the same.

Facilities:

The present facilities consist of an Agricultural Station containing approximately two acres of land on which are located one office-warehouse combination, one tool room, one lath house for plant propagation, one set of hog pens, one poultry house, one small coconut seed bed.

The District is in the process of moving the District Agricultural Station to Ejit Island and rehabilitating the existing station. The present facility and location is entirely unsatisfactory. Being located in the center of town, it presents a poor picture of the Agricultural Department and its activities.

Subsistence Crops:

The Agricultural Staff concentrates the major part of their efforts in advising the local people on coconut rehabilitation of debilitated and typhoon-damaged islands. A small percentage of time is spent on development of subsistence crops such as breadfruit, pandanus, taro, bananas, vegetables, fishing, poultry and swine production.

Cash Crops:

Work in this field of development is almost non-existent in the Marshalls District except for the coconut rehabilitation of several atolls. The rehabilitation of the coconut groves on Jaluit and Namorik demonstrates the work that can be accomplished when properly supported with budget and personnel. From 1960 to the present 2,484 acres on these atolls have been replanted with selected seed-nuts. Pre-typhoon copra production on Jaluit, for example, was 1,293,076 lbs. After the concerted effort of the Trust Territory Government and District Agriculturist, copra production for FY '63 on Jaluit was reported at 221,593.5 lbs. As the new trees come into bearing over the next four years the tonnage of copra will rise and is expected to increase by 50% over pre-typhoon production.

The Marshalls District is presently producing approximately 40% of the Trust Territory copra. The FY '63 level of 9,951,938.5 lbs. of copra represented a decrease from the FY '62 level of 10,591,051.5 lbs.

It is estimated by the District Agriculturist that with the existing number of trees in the Marshalls and with improved transportation that copra production could be increased by 40% to 50%. It is proposed that with more frequent and pre-announced arrivals of field trip ships, work would increase by 30% and spoilage would be cut by 20%.

To further support this estimate of the need for more frequent field trips to increase copra production, the District Administrator reports that in 1961 there were only 43 field trips. These ships purchased 2,710,248 lbs. of copra. In 1962 they had 77 field trips purchasing 4,850,310 lbs. These were purchases by the field trip ships only and do not account for the total copra production which was brought in by other means.

Further, on Majuro atoll a road was recently completed linking the atoll by means of trucks. Since the completion of this road copra production on Majuro atoll has increased by $\frac{1}{2}$ million lbs. or 30%. (For further details on the Mission's recommendations on meeting this problem and the cost involved, see the Transportation section of this report.)

Another of the major problems affecting copra production is the fact that present Marshallese coconut groves are composed of trees of varying age, generally unplanted (volunteer growth), uncultivated, irregularly spaced and crowded to such an extent that the yields per acre are seriously reduced. It has been demonstrated that copra production could increase by $\frac{1}{2}$ ton per acre if these faults were corrected. To convince the people that 55 trees per acre will produce more than 150 trees per acre, and additionally to prove the positive action that would result from clearing competing brush, using fertilizers, etc., is a job for the Agricultural Agent, and an important one.

Additionally, rats are causing considerable damage, not only in the Marshalls but in other Districts as well. Since the actual population of the rats is unknown, it is difficult to estimate the dollar loss from their activity. Animal control biologists have estimated that each rat will cause \$10 damage per year; observations of the destruction caused by rats tends to verify this figure.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The coconut is the principal economic plant of the area and almost the sole source of income for the people. The coconut, besides being the main commercial crop of the area, also provides for the people food and ingredients for cooking. It provides a source of feed for swine and poultry. The sap drained from the flowers is used as a

milk substitute for babies. Green nuts supply the best drinking liquids of the atolls. The leaves make baskets, hats, mats, sides for houses, and sometimes thatch for roofs. The husks and shells are used as fuel. Rope and twine are also made from the husks, and the trunks are used in construction. Because of the geography, soil, and climate, the Marshallese economy is and will be based in the future on plants, and the coconut tree will continue to be the principal one.

Because of the importance of the coconut palm to the District, the recommendation is made to establish a coconut grant or subsidy of \$100,000 spread over a period of four years, allotting \$25,000 per year. This will enable the Agricultural Extension Service, through a cash payment of \$.25 per tree to plant a maximum of 100,000 seed nuts. For the farmers to qualify, they must plant a minimum of 50 trees under the supervision of the Agricultural Extension Service using the principles laid down by Mr. Pieris, the Ceylonese coconut specialist previously contracted by the Trust Territory Government to formulate a plan for coconut rehabilitation. Mr. Pieris spent three years in the Territory formulating said plan.

To further increase the supply of copra, the subsidy should also extend to the planting of dwarf varieties of coconuts for home consumption. This plan would save annually more than 30 million coconuts, which is equivalent to approximately 7,500 tons of copra.

With an input of \$100,000 from the subsidy over the next four years the farmers at this point should understand and appreciate the fact that 55 to 60 trees per acre can produce more coconuts per acre than 150 trees per acre, and that better husbandry pays off. If the program is successful, this would mean 400,000 new trees planted scientifically that would increase the dollar income of the farmers in the District by over one million dollars when the trees come into bearing.

2. To further increase the dollar yield per acre it is recommended that the District Agricultural Office extend through the Agricultural Agents castor bean seeds for interplanting among the coconuts. This practice will promote more efficient use of the land and can work well with the coconut plantings. To start this program it is recommended that the Agricultural Agent give the seeds to the farmer and teach him how to handle and harvest the crop. The Department of Agriculture should guarantee a market for the seeds. According to present market prices of \$.05 a lb. and expected yields of 800 lbs. per acre, this could add \$40 per acre per year to the farmer's income.

3. Vegetables are presently grown with considerable difficulty in the District due to high winds and salt sprays that sweep the islands. The need for vegetables, particularly in view of the high starch diet, cannot be argued. In order to promote the growing of vegetables for family use it is recommended that the Agricultural Department establish a program for the planting of trees that will afford protection from

the winds and spray. The following trees are selected with the consideration of the needs of the area for fire wood and construction material, besides affording the needed protection for the cultivation of vegetables: Cupressus Macrocapa, Pinus thunberjii, Eucalyptus gomphoelho, Leptospermum laevigatum and Casuarina eguissetifolia. These breaks will aid not only vegetables but other crops such as fruits that have a low salt tolerance. Funds would come from the proposed Forestry program of the agricultural budget.

4. Citrus, particularly limes, grow extensively on the Marshall Islands. Observation of these trees reveals that they are quite heavily infected with Xanthomonas citri. With this disease the fruit will never be allowed into the export market. Species and varieties of citrus should be introduced and treated to cleanse them of the viable citrus canker. A small grove for demonstration purposes and bud wood should be established at the Ejit station.

5. Success of any agricultural program is dependent upon the competence of the District Agricultural Extension Service and the proper placement of these agents throughout the District to carry the program and to give the leadership necessary to affect agricultural improvement in the District.

It is recommended that a minimum of five agents be sent annually to the Farm Institute in Ponape for a year's study with strong emphasis on practical training.

It is further recommended that exceptional agents or students be offered scholarships for study abroad.

To insure the continuity of the District Agricultural Service objectives, it is recommended that an annual conference of the agents be held at the main agricultural station.

The need for incentives must be firmly established in the Service. Exact staff positions should be clarified. Grade or pay raises for scholastic training or "job-well-done" must be an integral part of this program.

The use of young people will present a problem because of the Micronesian deference accorded age and experience. Therefore, the young agent will be effective only if given the technical competence and professional stature needed in the community.

6. Agricultural facilities will be an integral part of the program for providing training of the Agricultural Agents in specific crops, training and demonstration to the farmers, and providing sufficient quantities of planting stocks and animals for effective work in the District.

To help compensate for the distance between atolls and to insure an effective program of agricultural development, it is recommended that the District establish two sub-stations, one in Woji and one in Jaluit,

with the main agricultural station at Majuro. This would also be in accordance with the Mission's over-all recommendations for building up these two islands as sub-centers in the District.

It is recommended that the agricultural station on Ejit in the Majuro atoll be completed and put to use with dispatch. The present facility is entirely inadequate, considering the seed beds necessary for 100,000 seed nuts per year.

These stations should be so designed that the farmers can imitate the procedures and methods used. In addition to propagating planting materials for distribution they should be heavily used for the training of the Agricultural Agents. The agents should be expected to perform the major portion of the labor involved. Additionally, short courses should be set up for the local farmers, and at least one field day a year held at the stations to discuss with the people the objectives of the work and the resulting benefits. Care should be taken to refrain from pure research; the stations' use is for propagation, teaching, and demonstration of known techniques for the area, such as soil conservation, composting, planting methods and caring of commodities.

The sub-stations should be small units and serve merely as a base of operations and for propagation of seed stocks. The main effort of these stations should be for the rejuvenation and rehabilitation of the coconut groves.

For maximum effectiveness it would be desirable to have three American agriculturists on the staff. This would give one American for each station and sub-station to give guidance to the program.

The Micronesian staff should be increased by eight for the Agricultural Extension Service. No increase is indicated for the farm hands.

MARIANAS DISTRICTStaff:

The existing agricultural staff consists of two Americans (one Island Development Officer and one Agriculturist) and a fairly complete staff of 37 Micronesians.

Budget:

The budget for operations for FY '63 amounted to \$124,130; the budget request for FY '64 operations amounts to \$113,500. The dollar decrease results from the transfer of personnel from the agricultural staff.

Cash Crops:

The main emphasis on agricultural development in the Marianas District for the past decade has been on truck crop farming and beef cattle production. This work was begun by the Navy. One year ago the Trust Territory assumed the administration of these islands and has attempted to continue the work.

Vegetable exports to Guam, a major market, amounted to \$11,000 in FY '62. The meat produced was sold locally. In FY '62 beef production amounted to 182,248 lbs., and fresh pork production, 24,900 lbs.

The vegetable program is quite disorganized -- the growing, harvesting, handling, grading, packing, shipping, and marketing, inclusive. Farmers are presently unaware of market demands and the need for variety. For example, if one farmer realizes an admirable profit from watermelons one

year, everyone the following year follows suit; consequently, the market is glutted with watermelons and the price naturally does down. To correct this situation an effective system for production and marketing is urgently needed.

Plans call for the building of an animal industry station to cover poultry, hogs and cattle which would serve as a central supply of stock to all the Trust Territory districts.

Copra was formerly the largest source of agricultural income for the District until the Brontispa beetle invaded the area; because of this infestation copra was then displaced by cattle and truck crops as the foremost money-maker. The 1962 copra production level was down considerably; only 141,915.5 lbs. were marketed. FY '63 saw an increase to 272,234 lbs. due to the scolia wasp being introduced to parasitize the beetle grubs. Mariana District is presently producing only 2.16% of the Trust Territory copra. Most of the copra is produced in the northern islands, an area which has little agricultural potential for anything else.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The establishment of a cattle ranch under auspices of the Development Fund on Tinian. (See Agricultural Business Ventures for details.)

2. The establishment of a truck crop farm under auspices of the Development Fund on Rota. (See Agricultural Business Ventures for details.)
3. The Agriculture Department should develop a poultry and live-stock feed program.
4. The Agriculture Department should establish a forestry and conservation program.
5. The Agricultural Extension Service should direct efforts to coffee production in the District and to increased copra production in the small northern islands.
6. If the Development Fund's feasibility study of papain production should be favorable, papaya cultivation should be stimulated.
7. The development of a dairy herd program on Saipan is recommended.
8. It is recommended that the experimentation with so many breeds of stock cease. From the climatic conditions of the area, cattle should have a preponderance of Brahman blood. Berkshire and Yorkshire hogs are well established and producing excellent results in the Philippines and other neighboring islands. Plymouth Rock and Rhode Island Red hens would be quite adequate for the area, producing sufficient quantities of eggs and meat.

9. Efforts should be directed toward producing needed foods and decreasing large imports of such commodities as rice, coffee, and sugar. With proper staffing and budgeting the Marianas have the best potential for progress with the least amount of investigative work.

10. No increase in the Micronesian staff is indicated. A program for improving technical competence should be followed as described in previous districts.

11. For maximum efficiency of the District Agricultural Department, a total of four American agriculturists is recommended, and as previously described for other districts, the District Agricultural Officer should be relieved of the duties of Island Development Officer.

PONAPE DISTRICTStaff:

There is one American on the agricultural staff, the Island Development Officer, who also serves as the District Agricultural Officer; and twenty-one Micronesians -- one Assistant Agricultural Officer, nine Extension Agents, and eleven station hands.

Budget:

The operational budget for FY '63 for the Ponape Agricultural Department was \$42,000. An additional \$28,000 was allocated from the Headquarters' special budget for the cacao development project.

The FY '64 budget requests for operational expenses amounted to \$54,000. Special allocations from Headquarters for FY '64 amount to \$52,000 for developmental work in the District: \$26,000 for cacao development; \$10,000 for pepper development; and \$16,000 for a pilot rice development project.

Facilities:

In this District are found two agricultural stations. The main station is on the island of Ponape in Kolonia, and the sub-station is in Kusaie. The main station consists of approximately 23 acres of land. This is a former Japanese Tropical Research Station and most of the buildings here were constructed by the Japanese. The main building has been declared unsafe by the Public Works Officer; funds have been requested, but to date no action has been taken and the building is still being occupied by the Agricultural Department and several other offices of

the District government. Tool sheds, a garage for mechanical equipment, swine and poultry houses, resident housing for the Agricultural Officer, and a lath house for propagation are the main structures on the station. In the port area the Agricultural Department was given a building for the construction of a cacao fermentary. This is in operation, but will be inadequate for the increasing production of cacao.

The Kusaie station is a small facility; its use is for the propagation of planting materials for distribution to local farmers. It includes resident housing for the agent, a small fermentary, and seed beds for citrus, cacao, coconuts, and vegetable crops. This station is well located and quite adequate for the area.

Copra:

Copra production is the principal export and commercial activity of the area. Ponape District presently produces 25.6% of the Trust Territory's copra. Production figures for FY '63 totalled 6,582,496.5 lbs. This was down 17,698.5 lbs. from FY '62's production. The age of the trees appears to be the principal cause for the decline, the 4,377,000 trees in the District averaging 35 years of age. There are 23,512 acres planted to coconuts in the District. It is reported that of the total land available, only 1/3, or 37,000 acres, is suitable for coconut production.

The major work of the Extension Service is the rejuvenation and rehabilitation of the existing groves. To encourage the farmers toward this goal the government has established a subsidy for planting and caring for trees in a prescribed manner, as laid down by Mr. Pieris, the coconut specialist from Ceylon. Increased yields of $\frac{1}{2}$ ton per acre, or nearly 100%, have been experienced when the procedures are followed.

In FY '62 a subsidy of \$14,000 was allocated from the Trust Territory's Government to support the program. 90,000 trees were planted as a result of that subsidy in 1962. All told, under the subsidy a total of 190,000 trees have been planted. With a continued subsidy and the diligent working of the Extension Service it is reasonable to expect a noticeable increase in copra production for the District.

Cacao:

In 1958 cacao was introduced on the island of Ponape. There are presently 294,635 trees. Approximately 575 farmers have cacao with an average acre planting of 512 trees. To encourage farmers to plant cacao, a subsidy was established by the Trust Territory and has continued each year. During the harvest season the Agricultural Department provides a boat for the collection of beans and pods. They purchase wet beans from the farmers for \$.06 per pound and/or six pods at \$.05. Farmers who sell at the fermentary receive \$.07 per pound for wet beans and \$.01 for pods. Present yields are averaging 600 lbs. per acre or

1.2 lbs. per tree annually. (This is rather low; after a few years' experience, it should approach 5 lbs. per tree.) In FY '63 the Agricultural Department initiated a grading system for the purchasing of beans, paying \$.07 for #1; \$.06 for #2; and \$.05 for #3. Marked improvement in the quality of beans sold to the fermentary was reported.

The following presents a resume of the typical cost of production for one acre of cacao. Labor is the only investment the farmer need make given the subsidy:

<u>Labor</u>		<u>Capital Investment</u>
Breaking, clearing and planting; 4 men, 12 days @ \$1.50/da/man	\$ 72.	Tools \$10.
Nursery, potting, etc. 2 men, 6 days @ \$1.50/da/man	18.	Seeds 1.
Maintenance to bearing: brushing every 2 mo; 30 man da/yr @ \$1.50/da for 4 yrs, or 120 man days	140.	
TOTAL	\$ 230.	TOTAL \$11.

With an average of 300 trees per acre yielding 30 pods per tree, in the first yield, 15 pods equaling one pound dried, the yield will be 600 lbs. of dried beans per acre.

It is necessary in the growing of cacao to provide shade to afford protection from the drying winds. For this purpose cacao plantings in the Trust Territory are recommended as interplantings with coconuts.

Actually, the major portion of the labor costs is work that normally should be performed on the coconuts alone. With the combination of two crops the farmer is working more efficiently and in the first years will be realizing nearly \$150/acre profit vs. \$90/acre from coconuts alone. As the cacao matures, and proper husbandry is practiced the yields per acre will rise. The price of cacao will probably stay high enough to justify the use of imported fertilizer. With care the trees should produce without any appreciable decline for 40 years.

Forestry:

Test plantings of mahogany and aurucaria have been initiated at the Agricultural Station. Every effort should be made to step-up the forestry work throughout the District using not only introduced species, but many of the indigenous species. Strict rules should be established to control cuttings and provide for replanting.

Pepper:

Over the past several years an effort has been made to establish pepper as an economic crop for the Trust Territory. Initially lack of funds and first-hand knowledge of the crop produced poor results. With an increased knowledge, diligent work, and a considerable outlay of cash and labor, it now is possible to grow peppers successfully in Ponape. From a 1/3 acre test plot at the Agricultural Station, the first harvest yielded 1,158 lbs. of processed pepper valued at \$604.80. Expenses, according to records, were \$110 for fertilizer

and labor, and \$138 for picking and processing, leaving a balance of \$366. Figures were based at \$.50 per pound. This first crop was sold to a gourmet market, accounting for the high price. Pepper on the New York market sells for \$.28 to \$.30 per pound for black and \$.30 to \$.35 per pound for white.

With a revolving government subsidy to get the project started, the Agricultural Department is encouraging the farmers to plant 100 stands of pepper. An assistance loan of \$200 (to provide fertilizer, posts, bags, and plants) is given, this to be repaid over a four-year period.

The present intention is to capture a gourmet market with the yield produced. The United States' demand is currently running 25 million pounds per annum. The Director of Agriculture estimates there are 500 acres of land suitable for pepper culture in Ponape. This would be 250,000 plants, total, and expected yields would be in the 1000-ton size.

This is to be a supplemental crop, and one of small scale. The latter should be an advantage because of the ease in controlling the quality. With a small yield, quality will be all-important for sales. Ability to get a premium price for extra-quality pepper seems indispensable to the successful development of pepper cultivation in the Trust Territory.

Although additional work is being done with citrus, bananas, vegetables, cattle, swine, and poultry, the aforementioned crops are the outstanding

possibilities for the area. Papaya, sweet potatoes, taro (upland), and rice development also present a future potential, as does hibiscus fibers. World Wide Trading Company of Japan has already expressed interest in this last product, and a test shipment to Japan will be made in August.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The coconut tree planting subsidy should be continued until the estimated limit of 37,000 acres that are appropriate for coconut trees is reached.
2. The planting subsidy for cacao should be discontinued at the end of FY '64. More intensive work by the District Agricultural Extension Service needs to be instituted to insure proper management of the trees and training for the farmers. Laxity in this matter will probably result in disaster for the project considering the present unskilled level of the farmers.
3. A livestock and poultry feed program should be developed with the introduction of grasses and legumes, making the fullest use of those already present. Legumes will be an excellent addition to the coconut-cacao plantings, adding considerable green manure to the soil.
4. The program for black pepper should be expanded modestly; from the results to date it is deemed advisable to try the crop with local farmers. This project should proceed slowly with selected farmers;

these farmers initially should not plant more than 100 standards. Loans should be provided to initiate the crop and carry it to harvest; repayments should begin with the harvesting of the crop, the rates being set by the District Agricultural Officer.

5. A forestry and conservation program should be established with dispatch under an American forester to be shared with the Truk District.

6. The feasibility of establishing a banana market and increasing banana production should be further investigated by a U.S. firm as previously recommended for the Palau District.

7. The Trust Territory Government should be asked to do a feasibility study of rice cultivation in the Ponape district, but bearing in mind the special problems of using Micronesian labor. This should specify what machinery would be used.

8. As in the other districts, the shortage of both technically qualified American and Micronesian agricultural staff employees is hampering the movement of the work. Recommendations made for the personnel in preceding districts also apply to the Ponape District.

The minimum American staff calls for a District Agriculturist aside from the forester previously mentioned.

9. Because of the condition of the building at the main station, it will be necessary to construct a new facility. The plans should bear in mind the need for teaching and demonstration facilities for agents and

farmers alike. Considering the fertilizer needs of the area, it would be advisable to have a small soils testing laboratory included.

YAP DISTRICTStaff:

The agricultural staff for the Yap District consists of one American who is titled "Island Development Officer" and who has duties additional to those involved with agriculture; and 19 Micronesians, six of whom are Agricultural Extension Agents and the rest laborers. The entire staff is located on Yap proper. Staffing requests for FY '64 call for two Micronesian extension agents to attend the Farm Institute and one Micronesian to take a specialized course in fishing.

Budget:

The agricultural budget for FY '63 was \$28,000 for operating costs and allocated as follows: American salaries, \$8,300; Micronesian salaries, \$16,500; and supplies, \$3,500. Additionally, \$2,500 was allocated from Trust Territory Headquarters for the Ulithi typhoon rehabilitation, and \$30,000 capital costs was assigned for Agricultural Station construction, of which only \$16,000 was used; the remainder reverted to Headquarters.

Requests for budget in FY '64 amount to \$38,000, all for operations.

Facilities:

The facilities at Gaanelay (outside of Colonia) consist of $6\frac{1}{2}$ acres of which approximately $2\frac{1}{2}$ acres are in use. The remaining 4 acres are expected to be completed by the end of FY '64, this being dependent upon funds and ordered equipment. Construction of this station has

been going on since 1959. The major energy of the Agricultural Department has been going into this facility leaving little time for more productive work. Two buildings have been constructed on the site, consisting of an office and warehouse respectively.

Cash Crops:

The principal cash crop of the Yap District is copra. In FY '63 the District sold 947,587 lbs. to the United States and 155,386 lbs. to Japan, for a total of 1,102,973 lbs. with a value of \$49,690.73. This is double FY '62's copra production for the area. Rehabilitated groves on the outer islands accounted for the increase. The Yap nuts are exceptionally good, and annually many are sold for seeds to the other Districts. For FY '63, these sales amounted to \$3,000 revenue for the Yap District.

Cacao is being extended in the Yap District as a cash crop. To date, 20,000 trees have been planted. It will be two years before production starts, however. The Agricultural Department, to keep abreast, has purchased cacao processing equipment amounting to \$7,500.

The Yap Trading Company is presently buying Trochus shell for \$.05/lb., on a 20,000 lb. order to Japan. If quality proves good enough, the Trochus gatherers may receive an additional bonus payment from the Japanese purchasers and the Yap Trading Company. The Trochus was formerly a valuable commodity. With the advent of the plastics industry, there is very little demand for Trochus now.

The Agricultural Department has fostered a "Farmers' Market" in Yaptown for the sale of locally produced vegetables, fruits, handicraft, etc. The Yap Congress pays the wages for 16 agents who, among other duties, operate the market. This is not a large operation, but it is a beginning to meet the needs of the residents of Colonia, the Yap District Center.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. From conversations with some of the older inhabitants in the area, it seems that the forests of Yap proper were formerly quite extensive and productive. Due to indiscriminate cutting and the lack of any plan for replanting, the forest lands have reverted to a rather scrubby condition. A reforestation program is definitely recommended for the area. Because of the extent of this program, a forester to be shared with the Palau District is recommended to guide the development of this program and the training of the Yapese in the care and use of the forest lands.

2. Due to problems of land ownership, many outsiders living in Yap cannot own land and are therefore dependent upon the local market for fruits, vegetables, fish and meats. Presently the supply of these commodities to the markets is rather sporadic. To alleviate this situation, it is recommended that the Agricultural Department establish and operate a truck farm. It is anticipated that this farm, within a period of five years, could convert to a vegetable producers' cooperative. In setting up the farm the work procedures should be of a nature that could be easily imitated by the local farmers and that would create little operating difficulty for the Yapese after the conversion.

This farm should also be used extensively for training Agricultural Agents and providing short courses for the local farmers. The agents would extend this information and practice to the outer islands.

These outer islands would also need the wind breaks as recommended for the Marshalls District.

3. The Japanese intensively farmed many acres on Yap proper. Through their methods the soil was depleted of what little fertility it possessed and now lies in waste. It is recommended that the Agricultural Department commence a program for rebuilding these soils.

Presently this land is composed of rough grasses and scrub pandanus. By seeding these soils with soil building plants it is felt that they can be brought back into productive use over a period of years, with a potential for cattle production. This soil building program should be part of a District program for the development of livestock feeds.

4. To increase the meat supply of the District it is recommended that the Agricultural Department import pure-bred swine for the upgrading of local stock. This program could be operated similarly to 4-H Club "pig-chains" in this country whereby a pure-bred hog is given to the farmer by the Agricultural Department; upon farrowing, one of the pigs is then selected by the Agricultural Department for further distribution or sale, as the merit of the pig dictates.

5. The main Agricultural Station at Gaanelay on Yap proper should be completed as quickly as possible and brought into use as a teaching, propagation, and demonstration farm for the Agricultural Agents and farmers alike. This station should operate as that described for the Marshalls District.

6. The establishment of a sub-station on Ulithi atoll is additionally recommended in order that the Agricultural Department might commence a more effective program of agricultural extension in the area. Agricultural development in the Yap District, as was described for the Marshalls, is dependent on a strong, competent Agricultural Extension Service, and the same general recommendations with reference to the station's operations, objectives, and program apply to the Yap District.

7. It is recommended that the Yap Extension staff be increased by five. These five agents should be sent to the Farm Institute in Ponape for one year's study and practical training, while the present agents should be shown how to improve their effectiveness with the Yapese farmers by the District Agriculturist.

8. Presently the District Agricultural Officer has the title and responsibilities of "Island Development Officer". It is recommended that he be relieved of these additional duties, i.e., formation of cooperatives, credit unions, creation of small businesses in the islands, etc. The position of Agriculturist is sufficiently demanding that the individual needs to devote his full time and attention to this task. Most

of these non-agricultural duties could be handled by a Cooperative Specialist in each District, as recommended in the Mission's report.

9. For maximum impact the American staff of the Agricultural Department should be increased by two, one extension horticulturist and one forester. It is proposed and recommended that the forester have dual responsibility for two districts, Yap and Palau.

PALAU DISTRICTStaff:

One American Agricultural Officer and 35 Palauans comprise the existing agricultural staff. Of the Micronesians, six work on the Agricultural Extension staff, three are agricultural technicians, two are agricultural trainees, and 24 are Agricultural Station hands.

Budget:

In FY '63, \$35,000 was appropriated for operations. An additional capital investment appropriation of \$14,000 from Headquarters was used for ramie development. Budget requests for FY '64 total \$49,000 for operations plus an additional capital investment of \$23,00 for ramie.

The entire budget of \$23,000 for the ramie development project will be spent to purchase production items for ramie growers only. Twenty decorticators will be purchased and sold to farmers on a two to three year repayment basis. Each decorticator costs \$620. CIF Guam. Other materials (fertilizers and insecticides) will be distributed to growers as a subsidy for the initial year only.

Facilities:

The facilities afforded for operations, testing, introduction, teaching, and demonstration consist of two stations. The main station in Koror, at present an estimated seven acres, is being used for cash crop development, improvement of existing subsistence crops and fruits with new

variety introductions, and the testing of new species of plants and trees. Poultry, carabao, and hogs (all of improved breeding) are also raised and the progeny sold to local farmers for the upgrading of local stocks.

The second station is located on Babelthaup at Nekken. The total acreage of this unit, a former Japanese plantation, is 1500 acres. Presently, approximately 15 acres are under development. The station is working on cacao, mahogany, coconuts, fruits, ramie, and pastures. Further plans call for the building of a second Farm Institute for the Trust Territory on this site.

For Palau these stations are essential. Every effort is being put forth to develop new crops for the area due to the devastation caused to the coconuts by the coconut Rhinoceros Beetle. Despite the lack of sufficiently trained personnel, the work is progressing smoothly, and one new crop (ramie) is ready for large scale plantings.

Cash Crops:

Prior to World War II, the *Oryctes Rhinoceros* L. (Coconut Rhinoceros Beetle) was accidentally introduced from New Guinea. The coconut trees of the District were devastated (see Entomology Report). Today in the District, the reported coconut tree count is 180,000 trees. Over 100,000 trees were planted during the last three years. 70,000 Yap seed nuts were imported, and 30,000 seeds from selected Palauan palms.

In 1962, 1,358,080 lbs. of copra were produced and in 1963, 1,460,518.5 lbs. This amounts to 102,438.5 lbs. increase. The movement of this rehabilitation is sound and very impressive to the local populace. A good deal of extension work needs to be done yet to keep the areas clean and clear of possible breeding sites for the beetle along with improving the curing methods of copra.

One of the most promising cash crops being developed to date is ramie (*Boehemeria nivea*, L.). This is a fiber plant for which world demand is growing. The fiber is used for dress fabrics, millinery and trimmings, thread for fine embroidery and laces, upholstery fabrics, webbing, canvas, rope for mountain climbing, belting, milk filters, and shoe thread. It has a tensile strength eight times that of cotton and seven times that of silk, and the tensile strength increases by 60% - 70% when wet. Buyers in Japan are very interested in developing the crop in the Trust Territory and have even suggested giving a 500 ton quota to the Trust Territory. Japan is presently importing 5,000 to 6,000 tons of ramie annually. The agricultural officer heading the project has an eventual goal of 220 acres in ramie. Test cuttings sent by the station to Japan were favorably received by the market. If this quality is maintained, \$.24 to \$.25/lb. should be received.

Estimated out-of-pocket costs for a farmer to plant one acre of ramie,
of which all but \$130 is capital investment:

Labor	Family	Plow	\$15 - \$20
Fertilizer	\$100/ton (need 1300# of 10-5-2)	Carabao	80
Insecticides	30 (BCH-Mal.)	Decordicator .	700 (will handle 3-5 acres)
<hr/>		<hr/>	
TOTAL, Operations - \$130.		TOTAL, Cap. Invest. - \$800.	

Five cuttings in the first year, with an average yield of 800 lbs. per cutting and sold at \$.25/lb., would yield the farmer \$1,000 gross per year per acre. The initial planting is good for three years before a decline in the yield. It is therefore recommended that he replant every fourth year.

From 1952 to 1956, 10,000 cacao trees were planted on Babelthaup at Nekken. Today, approximately 1,000 trees of this planting are surviving. The site was poorly selected, and this error was compounded by poor management. From the existing trees which now are suffering from Black Pod disease and a lack of adequate care, a total yield of only 1200 lbs. of dried beans per year is being made. Present plans call for introducing the Jeterango variety. This is a hybrid variety and is disease resistant. The Agricultural Station expects to put out approximately 1500 of these hybrid trees. After observing the soil conditions and the existing trees, however, it is felt that a cacao project for the Palau District should be eliminated.

Forestry work at the moment is just beginning. Some work, particularly with mahogany, has been done. Two separate plantings on Babelthuap were observed and appeared very favorable. The District Agriculturist made the plantings on a three foot spacing. The trees in a period of 18 months have grown to approximately 20' in height and measure 3" in diameter. Due to the closeness lateral branching has been retarded. Plans call for cutting every other tree in five years and utilizing this lumber for boat planks, furniture, etc. Being free of knots, it will be of exceptional quality. A second cutting is made five years after the first, and cuttings continue at five-year intervals until the 20th year when the trees are then at the desired spacing of 30' intervals. Rather than waiting for the normal growth on a 30' basis, this scheme, therefore, will provide a valuable commodity every five years.

Forestry can play a very important part in the long range development of Palau. At present one Micronesian with one year's training in Fiji at the Forestry School is on the staff. There are eleven private saw mills in the district, and no control is exercised over cuttings despite the fact that there is a district ordinance on size; there is presently no one to enforce the order. After cutting by the private mills, no replanting is attempted. Reports state that 20,000 board feet per year are cut in Koror for housing; 7,000 board feet for canoes and boats, etc. If the existing stands are to be preserved and new plantings made, a forester and staff are definitely needed.

Test plantings of pepper, rice, castor beans, sugar cane, coffee, taro, rozelle, citrus, rambutan, macadamia, papaya, bananas, pandanus, truck crops, and several fruit trees are being carried on at the station and receive good care. They look healthy and show vigorous growth, and some can be distributed for production. Because of a limited staff, however, this work is moving slowly.

Carabao have been introduced and are being bred for draft purposes on a small scale. Results are good and the demand is greater than the supply.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

This district, in over-all, has perhaps the best potential for agricultural development. There is sufficient suitable public domain so that the Trust Territory Government could assume the initiative and the initial financial burden of establishing various plantations to be turned over to the local farmers at a later time when the projects are operating successfully.

1. It is recommended that the Trust Territory Government establish and operate a 200 acre ramie plantation. (See Agricultural Business Ventures for details.)

2. A long-range forestry and soil conservation program should be initiated immediately. Further expansion of *Swietenia microphylla* (mahogany) plantings should continue on the 3x3 basis. Introductions of *Pterocarpus indicus*, *Eucalyptus deglupta*, *Auracaria excelsa*, and the

expansion of local hardwoods should be accomplished. A forester is essential for preparing and managing the program in addition to duties involving the establishment of conservation regulations.

3. A livestock feed program should be developed. This is essential for any expansion of the livestock and poultry industry for the district.

4. Further extension of cacao for the area should cease.

5. Plantings of coconuts should be increased, for this is again showing promise as a cash crop for the area. This expansion should be closely coordinated with the staff entomologist.

6. Castor beans, nut and fruit tree production should be pushed to the fullest extent, particularly on the outlying coralline islands.

7. Development work on subsistence crops should be intensified at the Agricultural Station.

8. From the results shown of carabao introduction, this program should be expanded. This is an excellent program for the Palauan farmers; maximum use of the buffalo in cultivation work will be far superior to mechanical equipment in conserving the thin soils.

9. It is recommended that a U.S. firm be invited to make a study of the export possibilities of Palauan bananas for the Far Eastern market, although the development of the banana industry involved certain logistic problems that make this a lower priority.

10. Some of the best soils on the islands are in the mangrove swamps; these should be brought into crop production.

11. The Japanese spent 30 years in the area and conducted an expansive tropical research program. Some of the records of this work were found and saved, but nothing substantial exists. The former director of Tropical Agricultural Research now resides in Tokyo and he has in his possession extensive volumes detailing the research conducted during the years of Japanese occupation. These documents could be of tremendous value and could save considerable time and expenditure. He should be contacted and these documents procured:

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12. For maximum effectiveness a total of $3\frac{1}{2}$ American technicians is recommended: 1 District Agricultural Officer, 1 animal husbandman, 1 horticulturist, and 1 forester to be shared with the Yap District.

One of the major problems confronting the Agricultural Department is the lack of sufficiently qualified technical people to carry out the programs, both American and Micronesian. Crop failures such as that with the cacao plantings on Babelthuap cause the people to be wary of the sound work that is being done. This can be overcome with a strong, technically qualified Extension staff. Palau District presently has four Micronesians studying for degrees at the University of the Philippines. These

opportunities for advanced study should definitely be encouraged and continued; but, correspondingly, it is essential to have a slot for the man to return to after he has developed and augmented his technical competence. Similarly, pay must be in accordance with his professional achievement. Neither should the practical side of the training for Agricultural Extension Agents be overlooked; they should be required to handle the major portion of the daily station chores.

13. The facilities at Koror should be maintained and necessary equipment added to handle the fiber program and cattle expansion. A soils testing laboratory should be installed. This will be essential for the ramie growing program in order to insure the efficient and economical use of soil amendments used in the program.

TRUK DISTRICTStaff:

There is one American on the Agricultural staff, the Island Development Officer, who also serves as the District Agricultural Officer; and 28 Micronesians, serving in the following capacities: Assistant District Agricultural Officer, Agricultural Agents, Cottage Industry Specialists, Fisheries agents and farm hands. Duties and responsibilities include advising farmers on proper and more productive methods of planting and tending coconuts, cacao, pepper; fisheries; development of cottage industries; small businesses; industrial development; formation of cooperatives; management; credit unions; farm-to-market transportation; and quarantine inspection service.

Budget:

For FY '63 the Truk agricultural budget was \$54,000, all operational. Budget requests for FY '64 total \$64,000 for operational costs.

Facilities:

The Agricultural Department currently operates two stations. The Truk Agricultural Station includes five acres. The land area is being used for agricultural buildings, nurseries, taro introduction beds, poultry and livestock facilities, fish reefer, boat and engine repairs, permanent tree crop and plant introductions, and for a general headquarters for the promotion of the Agricultural Extension Program. The main Agricultural Station serves as a test center for the low island agricultural development.

The agricultural sub-station on Moen caters to the high islands agricultural development. It encompasses $7\frac{1}{2}$ acres which are used for the development of tree crops and provides an area where plant introductions can be made and tested for disease and insect resistance. In general, the sub-station serves three purposes: (1) to develop crops found in the area, (2) to introduce new species, (3) to train agricultural extension agents in the work of propagation and cultivation of these various crops.

The sub-station is in very poor condition; it is poorly located, and is unattended; and the plantings are scattered in such a manner so as to be extremely difficult to ascertain what one is observing. The Agricultural Officer newly arrived on post is attempting to rectify the existing situation, and it may be stated that this is no small chore. The "farm" contains plantings of cacao, coffee, pepper, acerola cherry, citrus, nutmeg, mango, rambutan, taro, and macadamia nuts.

Cash Crops

Truk District produces approximately 13% of the Trust Territory's copra. In FY '62, 5,430,748.5 lbs. were sold; in FY '63, 5,426,298.0. Truk District appears to be unique in respect to the number of field trip ships. Here, apparently, increasing the trips does not increase copra yield, whereas elsewhere the copra production is increased repeatedly in anticipation of a ship arrival. This seems tied to the population density of the area. Local consumption per day of nuts is quite heavy.

For an average family of five, ten nuts per day are consumed -- or 3,650 nuts per family per year. This is equivalent to about 1200 lbs. of copra per year per family.

It appears that an increase will come only with more intensive and effective work by the Agricultural Extension Service in persuading the people to adopt the recommended procedures of coconut production. To aid and encourage this work, the local Congress pays \$.05 for each nut planted.

Truk has the second largest cacao plantings in the Trust Territory. There are presently planted 200,000 trees in the District, with 75% of these plantings on Toll. About 46,000 trees should begin to bear next season. To date 4,600 lbs. of beans have been cured. Ten thousand dollars has been requested for the cacao plant for FY '64; this includes building a 20' x 40', 1700 lb. dryer and sun racks to be erected at the Agricultural Station.

Truk District, particularly in the lagoon area, has a real potential for forests. This needs developing, not only for cash, but as a means of conservation, both water and soil. The Agricultural Station has $1\frac{1}{2}$ acres planted with *Swietenia microphyla*, *Auracaria excelsa*, and *Pteracarpus indica*. As in other districts, there is indiscriminant cutting of timber by the people without regard to size or replanting. On Toll a group of farmers have formed a cooperative to harvest the abundant breadfruit trees.

The Agricultural Department is renting the group a portable saw mill to harvest this supply of timber. With selective and controlled cutting this supply will last for some time, but the Agricultural Department has neither program nor personnel to enforce this policy.

The Agricultural Station maintains a purebred Berkshire herd and a flock of White Leghorns and Hampshire hens for reproduction, the progeny of which are sold to farmers.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. A forestry and conservation program should be established under the direction of an American forester to be shared with the Ponape District.
2. An immediate feed production program should be initiated to strengthen the poultry and swine program.
3. The Agricultural Service should direct considerable attention to the rejuvenation and rehabilitation of the district coconut groves through the aid of the planting subsidy program.
4. The Agricultural Department should establish a new sub-station on the Island of Dublon, and the existing sub-station on Moen should be eliminated. The work and purpose of this station should be as that described for the Marshalls District.
5. One large scale cacao fermentary should be set up now, but as part of a planned program for additional cacao fermentaries over the future.

6. Aid the Vegetable Producers' Cooperative to increase the scale of its operations.

7. As in the other districts, the weakness of an agricultural program is a poorly qualified staff. Efforts for strengthening the Agricultural Department should follow the same pattern previously mentioned. Additionally, the recommendations for the Island Development Officers' positions should follow the recommendations made for the Yap District.

HEADQUARTERS

The Office of the Director of Agriculture is located on Saipan in the Office of the High Commissioner of the Trust Territory. The Director acts in an advisory capacity on agricultural matters to the High Commissioner and has charge of the entomology and Farm Institute operations and special agricultural development projects such as the cacao subsidy, ramie development, etc.

The Director of Agriculture does not have direct authority over the District Agriculturist; the District Agriculturist answers to the District Administrator, and the District Administrator to the High Commissioner. The High Commissioner then consults with the Director of Agriculture, or the Director with the High Commissioner. This is a very awkward and cumbersome system causing considerable frustration to a department that in many instances cannot afford the delay created while waiting for the proper channels to function.

Except in matters of policy it is recommended that this system be eliminated and that the Director of Agriculture have the authority to act on matters of an agricultural nature and that the District Agriculturist be able to confer with the Director of Agriculture without first having to go through the District Administrator. This recommendation is in keeping with the general administrative recommendations of Part III of the Mission's report.

The position of Agriculture Extension Specialist was recently approved for addition to the Agricultural Headquarters staff. To this new staff position will also be delegated the duties of Deputy of the Agricultural Department.

The staff budget for FY '63 amounted to \$129,000. This was disbursed for operations and special projects generated from Headquarters, i.e., livestock replacement, coconut subsidy, and boat-building projects. In addition, \$122,500 was allocated for territory-wide projects, i.e., fisheries school, beetle control, subsistence fisheries, ramie development, coir fiber development, cacao development, and the Farm Institute.

The request for budget funds in FY '64 amounts to \$305,000:

U.S. Personnel	\$ 90,000
Micronesian Personnel	8,000
Travel, per diem	5,000
Special equipment and supplies	57,000
Agricultural development projects	145,000
TOTAL	<u>\$305,000</u>

The need often arises for specialists to handle specific problems.

Rather than taking on specialists as permanent staff, it might be advisable to establish a fund to recruit specialists on a short term basis as the need arises.

FARM INSTITUTE AT PONAPE

The Farm Institute, a former Japanese plantation and research station, is located on Ponape in the Metalanim municipality. In August 1962, an institute for the training of Micronesians in the skills of agriculture

was established. Presently, all districts are authorized to enroll two trainees each, for a total of 12 students at the institute. The graduates of this school will become agricultural extension agents, vocational agriculture teachers, and private farmers.

Trainees are taught all aspects of tropical agriculture, i.e., botany, soils, horticulture, entomology, animal and poultry husbandry, farm management, arithmetic, truck crops, subsistence crops and cash crops. Emphasis in training is on the practical side; the students raise the crops and process them. Approximately two-thirds of the students' time is spent in the field and the remainder in the classroom.

The physical plant consists of approximately 500 acres, most of which is planted with coconuts. A section within the coconut area is fenced off for cattle grazing purposes, and there are forty head of cattle therein. There is a ten acre cacao planting for experiment, demonstration, and teaching purposes. Other plantings consist of macadamia nut, dwarf pepper, forest and citrus. There are plant propagating nurseries, a cacao fermentary, a copra drier, dormitories and staff housing, classrooms, a mess hall, and miscellaneous sheds for tool and machinery storage.

The staff for the Farm Institute consists of one American superintendent and eight Micronesians to supervise and manage the many operations of the farm.

\$28,000 was allotted in FY '63 for the operation of the Institute. A request for \$32,000 has been submitted for FY '64. The American superintendent's salary is not included in the Trust Territory budget, but is accounted for in the Agricultural Headquarters budget.

It is recommended that the facilities of the farm be expanded to handle fifty students per year and an increase of one American on the staff be made to handle the additional student load.

As has been indicated, agricultural training in all the districts is sadly lacking. The Institute can handle practical training, but exceptional students should be selected and sent abroad for more advanced academic training. The Trust Territory Government presently has \$15,000 allotted for this purpose in the annual budget. Each district is allotted two scholarships annually, but they should, of course, be transferrable if a district cannot fill its quota.

ENTOMOLOGY AND QUARANTINE SERVICE

Headquarters for this project is located in Koror, Palau District. This site was selected because of the great variety of flora and fauna and because of the infestation of the coconut Rhinoceros beetle which had devastated the coconut trees in this district.

The staff for this operation consists of one American, three entomology assistants, one laboratory employee, and a ten man beetle crew.

Statistics regarding actual dollar losses from destructive insects have not been compiled, but judging from the known presence of harmful insects and observing the damage they cause, the loss is extensive. The U.S. Department of Agriculture which recently conducted a research project to eliminate the Melon fly on the Island of Rota, estimated the damage to the crops on Rota from that one insect was \$50,000 per annum. There are over a hundred known pernicious insects in the Territory -- such as scale insects, banana root borers, and fruit flies. Additionally, the islands suffer great loss from the activities of rats and snails.

To expect one entomologist to effectively establish a control program for the entire Trust Territory is unrealistic. In order to strengthen the program, it is recommended that two American technicians be added to the staff, one to be stationed in the Marianas District and one in the Marshalls. In addition to establishing an effective program and enforcing controls, the three technicians will be expected to conduct intensive training programs for agents and farmers alike.

Special training is urgently needed for the Micronesian District Agricultural Agents charged with enforcing the quarantine regulations of the Territory. These men must understand the need for quarantine regulations; they must be able to identify the harmful insects of the Territory, Hawaii, and Guam for both plants and animals alike. It is recommended that the Director of Agriculture establish funds for this initial training course and successive refresher courses.

In reference to quarantine enforcement, serious leaks in the present system now exist in Kwajalein and Guam. Tons of fresh vegetables and fruits enter these ports monthly and leave the entire area vulnerable to infestations from many pests. Already a cottony cushion scale was introduced through the Kwajalein port. This scale was stopped in Majuro several hundreds of miles from Kwajalein. This particular pest could have devastated the breadfruit crop, an essential in the diet of the people.

To close the quarantine leaks in Kwajalein and Guam it is recommended that the United States Quarantine Service be contacted to establish a permanent United States officer at these ports of entry to operate a quarantine service. Considering the particular nature of the Guamanian and Kwajalein facilities it is not felt that a Mirconesian quarantine officer would be able to command the respect necessary to perform the job satisfactorily at either of these posts, especially Kwajalein.

AGRICULTURAL BUSINESS VENTURES1. Small Loan Fund (Estimated Capital Requirements) \$ 250,000

Throughout the islands many farmers have accepted many of the principles being taught by the Agricultural Department. Instigation of most of these plans calls for an outlay of cash, i.e., to purchase a carabao for draft and plowing, plows, seeds, fertilizers, fencing, purebred swine and poultry, etc. To encourage farmers to take the initiative, it is recommended that the Director of Agriculture establish a Small Loan Fund for the use of Micronesian farmers. To initiate this on a pilot basis \$250,000 is recommended. After observation of the use and effectiveness of the fund, the amount needed could be adjusted accordingly.

The District Agriculturist will take the requests for loans in his district and assess the advisability and feasibility of the request. The maximum loan on a pilot basis should not exceed \$1,000. Care must be exercised not to encourage the farmer to burden himself with a debt he cannot repay. Repayment of the loan will depend on the crop or situation for which the loan was made. It is also recommended that a low interest rate be charged and repayment time not to exceed three years.

2. Equipment Pool \$ 60,000

It is recommended that the District Agriculturist establish an equipment pool of farm machinery. The rental cost to the farmer borrowing the

equipment shall be just for the operator and fuel in the initial years of the equipment pool.

3. Beef Cattle Program

\$1,900,000

There is presently on Guam and in the districts a large market for fresh beef. (See Table in Section A of Part II,) It is recommended that a commercial beef raising operation be established on 2,000 acres in Tinian in the Marianas group. As one of the promising economic development projects in the area, its organization and financing would be handled by the proposed Programming and Development Unit and the Development Fund.

On Tinian there are approximately 15,000 acres of unused land suitable for cattle production and grain growing. There is presently on the island a leguminous plant (*Leucanena glauca*) that runs rampant. This plant in nutritive value is equal to alfalfa, and if brought under control for grazing with grass, an acre of land should support one cow.

The operation should commence with 1,000 head of cross-bred cows and 40 head of bulls. To produce the grade of meat the Guam market calls for and to insure that cattle can thrive in the area, the cows should be of Brahma stock crossed with English blood. Such cattle are available in the southeastern portion of the United States where the climatic conditions resemble those existing in Tinian. Bulls should be pure and held to two breeds, Brahma and English type. It would be desirable to have the manager make the selection of the English breed to be used.

Considerable investment and employment will be generated before the introduction of the cattle can take place -- purchasing equipment, land clearing, pasture establishment, fence building, pen and corral construction, housing for staff and ranch hands, road improvement, water systems, barns, feed storage, machinery, sheds, etc.

It is recommended that the Department of Agriculture contract for the managerial services of the ranch. This would include an American manager, herdsman and two assistant herdsman. Each should have a five year contract, salary and a percentage of the sales. It is felt that with a salary, percentage of the sales or production, plus travel from and return to the States and housing, top quality people who have the ability, not only to raise cattle but additionally to teach Micronesians this art, can be secured.

It is further recommended that in the fifth year of operation the surplus heifers and cows be sold to Micronesians in the area who will homestead a minimum of 100 acres. This will mean changing the present homesteading limit of five hectares which is suitable only for subsistence farming.

It is recommended that about the tenth year the ranch be spun off to a private corporation or cooperative, depending on conditions at that time.

The gross return after seven years should in theory be at \$300,000 annually from the sale of 927,500 lbs. of beef at \$.30/lb. in Guam and the net profit would be in the neighborhood of a 15% return on the investment.

In order to capture the Navy market for beef on Guam, it will be necessary to build a slaughterhouse conforming to U.S.D.A. requirements. This commercial project whose capital requirement is estimated at \$90,000 would also be sponsored by the Development Fund.

4. Ramie Plantation

\$ 180,000

The District Agriculturist of Palau has proven that ramie can be successfully grown in that district, and intends to develop the crop with small scale farmers. In addition, the Mission recommends that the Programming and Development Unit investigate the feasibility of a 200 acre ramie plantation on a commercial basis in Palau. The chief problem could be using Micronesian labor on a disciplined basis.

The site for the operation should be chosen by the District Agriculturist. Management should be handled by a contract. The manager should receive a salary and a percentage of the sales and workers paid on the basis of work actually done. Housing will be needed for staff and workers, machinery to handle the land and for decorticating the fibers, balers, miscellaneous hand tools, etc.

Rough estimates of costs of production and return from the 200 acres would be a capital investment of \$120,000, with an annual operations budget of \$60,000.

With an estimated initial production of fiber at one ton per acre per year, or 200 tons per year selling at an average price CIF Japan of \$.20/lb., this in theory would equal an \$80,000 gross return and a \$20,000 net return or over 16% on the investment.

It is recommended that by the end of seven years arrangements should be made to phase out the government management to a private corporation or producers' cooperative, depending upon conditions at that time.

5. Truck Crop Farm \$ 200,000

There are few places in the Trust Territory where truck crops thrive as successfully as on Rota. The soil, the climate, and the rainfall are almost optimum. The geographic proximity of Rota to Guam also gives it special significance for an expanded commercial truck crop operation, for tons of vegetables are shipped monthly from the U.S. for Guam. Despite these optimum conditions and the closeness of a ready market, the vegetable production situation on Rota is presently in dire need of assistance. The assistance needed ranges from production through marketing. The farmers on Rota, although willing, are insufficiently aware of the specific market needs for Guam or of their own potential for production, that the demands on Guam are

constant, that a variety is essential, that quality must be foremost in order to capture this market.

A commercial truck farm sponsored by the Development Fund would implant methods of production, harvesting, packing, and marketing among the farmers on Rota so that after a few years the project could be "spun off" as a cooperative or a private corporation.

With the farm it will also be necessary to establish packing house facilities for the grading and proper handling of the produce.

It is recommended that local producers be encouraged to make use of the farm's packing house, and that all vegetables passing through the house be graded and paid accordingly. This would be an excellent method with which to start a producers' cooperative. After the third year, each producer using the services would be paid only 90% of the net price received in Guam for his produce sold. The 10% would be retained in a fund, and when he had accumulated \$50 credit, he would then be a full-fledged member of the vegetable producers' cooperative. If this begins in the third year of operation, and 100 farmers were to become members, the government could easily phase out to a complete Micronesian operation, and the cooperative would have \$5,000 working capital, plus the farm set-up to carry on.

Sufficient figures are not available for exact computations, but it is estimated that a 10% return on the investment will be received.

This estimation was made by the Director of Agriculture.

6. Carabao Program

\$ 60,000

Babelthup Island in the Palau District comprises the largest land mass in the Trust Territory. The Japanese used this land extensively, but efficient use of the land since World War II has been practically non-existent, for the Palauans, preferring to migrate to Koror, eschewed the Herculean task of clearing and maintaining the land by hand, particularly so when returns to the farmer were so slight. With the cash crops that are being developed, such as ramie, and the returns now being much more inviting, the Palauan farmer is still, however, confronted with the back-breaking job of putting the land to production.

In addition to other built-in subsidies to entice the farmer back to the soil, thus relieving conditions in Koror and helping to make sounder use of the real economic potential of the area and the more efficient utilization of labor, it is further recommended that the Trust Territory Government, through the Department of Agriculture, establish a fund for the purchasing and importation of carabao into the area. It is recommended that 200 head be purchased; one hundred of these, being of superior stock and including four outstanding bulls, should be maintained in Palau for reproduction and sale to the farmers in Palau and in other districts. The other 100 head are to be sold immediately to the farmers. The farmer, if in need of funds for the purchase of these animals, can make use of the Development Loan Fund.

RESEARCH:1. Tropical Agricultural Research Station

It is recommended that the Trust Territory Government arrange a contract with the University of Hawaii to establish a Tropical Research Station in the Trust Territory to engage in applied research. It is recommended that a three man survey team from the University of Hawaii be selected to inspect the area and determine the scope and nature of the research to be carried on. The anticipated capital investment of such a research station along with housing for American personnel would be under \$175,000. This must be a long range program to be of any significance; the University contract should not be expected to solve the day to day agricultural problems of the territory.

2. Specialists:

In order to handle the many emergency agricultural problems that arise in the Trust Territory, it is advisable to have an emergency appropriation for quickly securing specialists. For example, no funds were available to secure a plant pathologist when disease struck the cacao trees in Ponape which caused the loss of many trees in the area. The Entomology Service has many needs for specialists. Presently, someone is needed to travel to Indonesia to collect a species of Scolia wasps that prey on the Oryctes rhinoceros and Brontispa mariana beetles. This requires a specialist who can identify the insect, collect and transport

it back to the Trust Territory in a live condition. Several recent imports of predacious insects arrived dead because of poor handling. Work is urgently needed to effect control of the giant African snail that infests most of the Territory. It is recommended that the calling in of specialists be coordinated with the research program conducted under the University contract.

Chapter 5

EDUCATION

Education in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is beset with a multiplicity of complicated problems and pitfalls. Some of the problems of the schools are shared with other territorial services and activities, such as those imposed by the geography of Micronesia, poor communications and transportation facilities, the long absence of positive policies and directives from the United States Government with respect to the Trust Territory, and the inadequacy of its budgets over a period of years. Other problems of the schools are organizational and administrative in nature; still others are inherent in the unavoidable use of an alien educational system and language.

It is a truism that education does not function in a vacuum. Those who administer the affairs of the territory do so in the light of the policies accepted for the Trust Territory. Over the years, the public schools have reflected the policies of the national government then in vogue. Now the schools must be looked at in the light of new major policy decisions from Washington. The first of these was the decision "to bring the inhabitants of the island complex into the orbit of 20th century living as rapidly as possible while at the same time exercising the necessary precautions to avoid the social dangers inherent in rapid advancement."* The second was the decision to accelerate an overall plan of social, economic and

* See Task Force Report on Education, 1961.

political development. Additionally, it was decided that "political knowledge and the development of political skills are desirable in terms of the future relationships (of Micronesians) to the United States."* These goals, of course, constitute a major reversal of the old policy, prevalent in the early years of the United Nations, of "protecting" trusteeship people. It is a policy which calls for careful treading because it proposes to disturb, if not destroy, patterns of life that have "served" Micronesians for centuries. Insofar as education is concerned, the revised policy places the schools, more than any other public institution and agency, in the vanguard of a deliberate program of cultural change.

Already, in the light of the new policies toward Micronesia, the Trust Territory government has taken some major steps. The budget for education has been increased substantially. The elementary schools, which in years past were financed and maintained almost exclusively by the districts and municipalities in which they were located, are now being financed jointly by the districts and the Trust Territory government, with the latter taking on a major share of the burden. The minimum compulsory age for education has been theoretically lowered from eight to seven; and in Saipan, the Legislature had made it theoretically possible for youngsters to enroll between six and seven years of age. An expanding secondary education program throughout the six districts of Micronesia promises to bring high school education within the reach of many times the number of elementary school graduates now in high school. In an important step forward,

* See Task Force Report on Education, 1961.

English will replace the local vernacular as the language of instruction in the primary grades, and some commendable first steps have been taken to assure a measure of success. Plans are being formulated for a post-secondary vocational school in Palau. In a major drive to improve school facilities and instruction, the Trust Territory has embarked on an accelerated 3-year program of building 488 new elementary classrooms by 1965 and employing 271 American teachers by September 1966 to partially staff elementary schools throughout the Territory and to give the teaching of English an essential boost. The survey Mission took note of these and other strides since public education was established under American auspices almost two decades ago. It took note, too, of the dedication of many educators and the efforts they exerted to keep schools going under some of the most trying conditions.

During the visit by the Mission, criticisms were levelled at the schools by both educators and lay observers because they do not move fast enough nor educate well enough, and because they have not taken all the steps necessary to achieve better educational results. Some of the criticisms were healthy; some express a sense of urgency; others reflect a desire for a great deal more action after all these past years of neglect. Major steps have been taken, but some of those who hold the latter view want overnight success. Of course, there is not going to be any overnight success because the process of revamping education doesn't work that way. There are, however, vital steps which must be taken immediately to assure that the new interest and the increased budget for education are not

wasted on the same old system which over the years has, admittedly, not done much of an educational job.

There is no doubt that the new policy of change and the proposed plans for accelerated economic, social and political development in the Trust Territory will impose greatly increased responsibilities on education. In the final analysis, the basic educational level of the people of Micronesia will determine largely at how high a plane they can operate and, hence, how productive the proposed total economic, social and political enterprise can be. Because of these considerations, it is essential that the quality of education be substantially improved in the years ahead. In developing, and subsequently maintaining, a higher economic, social and political life for Micronesians, there is no substitute for good schools which must train the needed manpower for increased economic activities and, most important of all, provide the educated citizenry which is the essential ingredient of self-government.

The Trust Territory is faced with a tremendous task of revamping and redirecting its educational enterprise. The present system is ill-equipped in many respects to provide the kind of education essential for Micronesia at its present stage of development. The series of recommendations to follow offer some solutions to the problems.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. To assure good schools throughout Micronesia, the Trust Territory government should assume full and complete responsibility for the

financial support, maintenance and operation of education from elementary through high school and beyond under a unified school system.

It has been evident for a long time that because of its limited resources, Micronesia can not support good schools. Although local support of education is a worthy goal, its pursuit has been detrimental to education. The responsibility for intermediate (junior high) and secondary education is now in the hands of the Trust Territory government. This recommendation extends centralized finance and control to the elementary schools now financed jointly by local, territorial and United States funds. The small revenues from the districts heretofore devoted to elementary education could well be diverted to other public service activities or public works projects which would benefit the schools indirectly. (The data are given in II-B-8 of the report on Taxation policy). The assumption of financial responsibility for the maintenance and operation of elementary schools by the Trust Territory government will assure every child of an equal opportunity for an adequate education program. In accepting this, the Trust Territory government and the United States Government should be prepared to face the financial implications of the policy. Preliminary estimates indicate that an annual operations budget of about ten million dollars will be needed to operate all schools from elementary through high school by 1968.

2. To effect a single unified school system, the Territorial Department of Education should assume operational responsibility for education

throughout Micronesia, as well as such functions as educational guidance and leadership, supervision, service, research, planning and development, and the administration of rules, regulations and laws pertaining to education.

Through its department of education, it is the Territory's obligation to guide the destiny of the local school systems at all times. The educational interests of the children as well as those of the Territory must be protected against localism, petty or otherwise. This requires that the territorial department of education must be strengthened not only to guide the local district schools through leadership, service and research, but also so that the department, through wise administration, can act to avert local controversies, minimize jealousies, and prevent parochial interests from jeopardizing the educational interests of the children, the district community, and the Territory. The machinery of administration must expedite and not impede instruction.

This recommendation concurs with the 1961 Task Force recommendation for a single school system and the more specific administrative recommendations of Part III of this Report regarding the need for the professional content of territorial programs to be administered by the territorial departments at headquarters. A unified school system for Micronesia, administered and directed by a central department of education has two great advantages over the present organization of quasi-independent school districts administered by the district administrator through a district education officer. Among them: (1) A unified system will

place authority and responsibility for education in one department rather than in six district administrators; (2) it places the responsibility and authority for education in the hands of professional educators under the leadership of an educator who heads the department of education as director of education. Under a unified system, district school administrators will be responsible to the director of education for the conduct of the schools in their districts.

Probably the greatest movement toward the attainment of quality in the education of Micronesia will come through leadership, service, research, planning and development at the territorial level. Educational leadership at the top level of government based on sound scholarship and principles will provide Micronesia with something it lacks now -- a sense of direction. The quality of leadership emanating from the territorial department of education, however, must be such that the High Commissioner, the people of Micronesia in general, the school administrators and teachers in the district will have confidence not only in the advice, suggestions and direction that come from the territorial level but also in the scholarship and ability of the individual members of the department. It is most essential for effective leadership that the contribution of the territorial department be accepted on the basis of its own worth. With this in mind, the qualifications and competencies of the educators at the territorial department take on a major significance.

In order to operate on the professional level and serve Micronesia best, the central education authority should be vested with a high degree of administrative independence. In this respect, the Code of the Trust Territory should contain provisions which will insulate the education function in the Trust Territory from administrative interference and harrassment, from partisan politics, and from the radical changes that may follow on the heels of elections.

This proposal is a radical departure from the present set-up. Education, like all phases of the Trust Territory government, is the final responsibility of the High Commissioner. No change in this is being proposed. The schools are today operated for the High Commissioner by six district administrators through their district educational officers. District education officials are responsible only to the district administrators. Under this proposal, the district education administrators will be responsible for all professional matters to the territorial director of education who in turn will be responsible only to the High Commissioner for the conduct of the educational program. The maintenance of school buildings, housing of teachers and other employees, and other non-professional administrative, logistic and service functions remain with the district administrators. The planning of school plant construction would follow the procedures recommended in the Public Works section of this Report (II-B-1) but in consultation with the Department of Education. Educators, however, will be fully responsible for professional education matters. Under this arrangement, creating and sustaining operational

procedures that call forth and use the full creative capacities of all personnel in and out of education in the attainment of educational goals is a prime responsibility of the High Commissioner and of the director of education. By its very nature, this calls for common understanding, mutual respect, and a full measure of confidence among all who work in the schools and all who serve in the districts and at headquarters.

3. Lay-Micronesian Advisory Boards of Education Should Be Established at Both the Territorial and District Levels.

The combination of a lay board of control and professional administration of the school system is an American process that has stood the test of time. Micronesia should eventually have a lay board of education with real powers and control over educational policies. For the immediate future, and until such time as the level of sophistication of the people is considered adequate for this purpose, it is recommended that an advisory board be established at the territorial level to advise the High Commissioner and the director of education on such matters as educational policies, programs, rules and regulations, and at the district level to advise the district educational administrator on local educational matters.

For the present, there is no territorial board of education. Some districts have school boards with a varying degree of effectiveness. District education officers and district administrators have veto power over them.

An advisory board of education will serve some useful purposes: Members of the board will have a chance to work with educators on school matters thus giving them an opportunity to raise their levels of sophistication concerning this important service. It affords an opportunity for the High Commissioner and educators as well to sound out opinions of members on educational matters before deciding on major policies and embarking on major activities. Micronesian board members can serve as liaison officers between the school and the community. Finally, they can serve as lay "evaluators" of the success of the educational processes.

Lay advisory boards of Micronesian membership can be the forerunners of future boards of education which will have real powers and control over the educational enterprise.

4. The Territorial Director of Education Should Be Designated by The High Commissioner as the Chief Executive Officer for Education And All Executive Powers And Authority Pertaining to Education Should Be Delegated to Him as Head of The Territorial Department Of Education.

This is a corollary of recommendation number two. If the territorial department of education is to assume the responsibility for education across Micronesia, it is essential and necessary to strengthen the hands of the director of education, who now serves primarily as educational advisor to the High Commissioner and other officials, including district educational officers. The High Commissioner will continue to retain ultimate power of control over education, but he should delegate his powers to the director of education for operational

and administrative purposes. Aside from the directorship being a professional educator's job, the High Commissioner just does not have the time, amongst his many other duties, to operate and administer the affairs of the school system. Under his delegated authority, the director should serve as the chief representative of the High Commissioner on all matters of education and he should work immediately and directly under and be responsible only to the High Commissioner. The importance of the educational enterprise to the success of the Trust Territory administration makes it imperative that the director have direct access to the High Commissioner -- certainly not through a program officer or any other official in the Office of the High Commissioner. The director of education should be the administrative head of the territorial department of education and the chief administrative officer of the Trust Territory for executing the laws, rules, and regulations relating to education which arise under the United Nations Charter, the laws of the United States pertaining to the Trust Territory, the Code of the Trust Territory, or policies of the High Commissioner. This line authority rather than exercising a staff function is a general recommendation of the Mission for certain other department heads at Headquarters. (See Part III, Section C).

The director of education should be a professional educator and a professional school administrator capable of providing bold, imaginative and dynamic leadership. Anything which weakens his effectiveness in any of these roles will ultimately weaken the schools.

5. To Carry Out the Functions Proposed For It, The Department of Education Should Be Reorganized to Fit Its New Role.

The ultimate test of sound reorganization is the extent to which it will result in the improvement of education. It is essential, therefore, that the department of education provide for an organizational pattern best suited to efficient, economical, and effective operation. The size of the department and the size and number of its activities are decisive factors in organization.

For the educational task and other services it is called upon to perform, the department should have among its headquarters personnel the following key positions:

Director of Education - GS 15 level position.

Assistant Director.

Staff specialists in Elementary Education, in Secondary, Adult and Higher Education, in Curriculum Development and Research, in Library Service and in Nonpublic School Coordination.

These are top-level bureaus because they are expected to carry on top level activities under top-level professional administrators. All bureau activities are self-explanatory except perhaps for activities of the Bureau of Nonpublic Schools and Cooperating Agencies. The first part of the title refers to the neglected task of providing leadership and assistance to nonpublic schools. The second part refers to agencies which provide instructional services, such as health departments and health education, political affairs departments and political education and others. In the best interest of all educational programs, close

collaboration between other agencies and the department of education is essential.

At the district level, it will not be necessary to duplicate the territorial organization, but provisions should be made for the continuation of the Office of the District Educational Administrator at the GS 12 level, an elementary education section under a Superintendent of Elementary Schools at GS 9 or 10 level, a section which combines the other services under a superintendent, plus perhaps a section for business management, personnel, buildings and auxiliary services under a supervisor at GS 9 or 10 level. The organization at the district level should be big enough to do the job.

6. It Is Essential That The Departments Of Education At Both The Territorial And The District Levels Be Provided With Adequate Personnel.

The provision of adequate personnel is essential to any enterprise. The territorial department of education is grossly understaffed even for its present limited role. In line with earlier proposals to strengthen the department of education and to give it full authority and responsibility for education across Micronesia, additional professional and non-professional personnel will be required at both the territorial and the district levels.

At the territorial level, the department at Saipan has provisions now for only five professional positions: director of education, assistant director (vacant), coordinator of Accelerated Elementary School Program,

construction Supervisor of English, Supervisor of Libraries. The following personnel positions are recommended to conform to the organizational pattern proposed in recommendation no. 5:

Director of Education -- GS 14 or 15 level.

Special Assistant to the director -- GS 9 or 11 level position.

Assistant Director of Education -- GS 13 or 14 level.

Director of Curriculum and Research -- GS 12 or 13 level.

Director of Elementary Education -- GS 12 level.

Director of Secondary, Adult and Higher Education -- GS 12 level.

Director of Adult Education and Information -- GS 12 level.

Director of Nonpublic Schools -- GS 11 or 12 level (see rec. no. 13).

Director of Library and Information Services and Curriculum
Materials Center -- GS 10 and 11 level.

Director of Auxiliary Services -- GS 11 level.

Director of Business Management and Personnel -- GS 11 level.

Director of Pupil Personnel Service -- GS 10 level.

In addition to these professional positions, an adequate number of clerical, secretarial and administrative personnel is essential to permit these high-level-professional personnel to devote as much time to their professional tasks as possible. The department of education is presently so short of clerical, secretarial and administrative help that educational services are actually impeded. Specialists in English and other professional areas will also be needed to staff the bureaus.

At the district level, the departments of education are unevenly staffed.

Each district department should have a staff of positions as follows:

District Educational Administration (GS 12 level)

Assistant to the district administrator (GS 7 to 9 level)

Superintendent of Elementary Education (GS 9 or 11 level)

Supervisor of Secondary Adult Education and Information (GS 9 level)

Specialist in the teaching of English as a second language (GS 9 level)

Supervisor of Business Management, Personnel, Buildings and
Auxiliary Services (GS 9 or 11 level)

Supervisors of instruction (GS 7 to 9 level) - approximately one to
each 25 to 30 teachers or portions thereof

In addition to the professional positions, adequate number of clerical, secretarial and administrative personnel should be provided. All district school personnel should be responsible to the district educational administrator.

The need for an adequate number of instructional supervisors is greater in Micronesia than in any other place under United States jurisdiction. The low level of training of Micronesian teachers makes it essential that they be given constant supervision from qualified supervisors. American teachers, too, will require supervision, especially because they will be teaching in an entirely different type of environment. It might be pointed out that even in the best of school systems, classroom supervision is an essential part of school operation. The goal to shoot at as the ratio of teacher and supervisor should be about 25 or 30 to 1, but the

speed with which the required number of positions is filled must depend upon the development of adequate transportation facilities throughout Micronesia. Supervisors should be expected to live close to the schools to which they are assigned but they must be provided with adequate means to get around.

7. The Trust Territory Should Develop A Program And A Structure Of Education Unique To Micronesia At Its Present Stage of Development.

Micronesia requires the development of an educational structure and instructional program unique to the special conditions in these islands. This is a real challenge for those who shape education. For some time now, it has been demonstrated that the American-type school with its graded level of structure and its subject-centered, academically oriented curriculum has had very limited success and with only a small percentage of students at that. The chief reason for this is that the present level of cultural sophistication of the children of Micronesia, in the American cultural sense of the term, is just not yet at the point where they can profit from the kind of educational programs which American schools offer. Both stateside and Micronesian school officials in the districts estimated that not more than twenty-five percent of the total instructional materials suggested in the elementary curriculum guides have any real meaning to Micronesian children even when well taught. And with poorly trained Micronesian teachers, whose knowledge about America and the things they teach in schools is practically nil, the level of accomplishment is closer to zero. The best that can come out of the present schools - even after six years of attendance - are

children who can not communicate well in English and often parrot a few English words and phrases without really understanding the meaning behind them. The ability to absorb other subject-matter materials offered by the school is, of course, impaired. Micronesian children of each grade level are worlds apart from American children in the same grades. To expect that their level of ability and IQ will be comparable, taking cultural factors into consideration, is one thing; to expect that both groups would have the same level of achievement grade by grade using the same textbooks and teaching techniques is to expect something quite unrealistic. This is an educational fact of life that Micronesian educators and Washington policy formulators must face.

As a first order of business, Micronesia should begin to conduct research and experimentation on the best way to structure its educational program. At the elementary level, the grade structure and graded subject-matter curriculum developed for Americans have their shortcomings. Ungraded structure and locally oriented curriculum offer some possibilities. Under an ungraded structure children can be grouped without any reference to "grade level" and made to proceed through a sequential program of their own individual rate of speed. This, of course, calls for a school curriculum, courses of study and instructional materials designed for limited and very specific purposes. It will be well for the Trust Territory to contract for a year or so with a mainland university which could provide a team of experts in curriculum design to draw up a sequential course of study for Micronesia's children. This curriculum

should be close to Micronesia, but it should also have provisions for those who need to go beyond Micronesia for technical and professional training beyond the secondary level.

A. Suggested Program for Elementary School.

For the present generation of students and perhaps for a few generations to follow, the majority of students will not go beyond six years, or, at best, eight years of schooling. This means that the elementary schools must educate Micronesians to take their place in their own backyards, at the same time giving them some skills necessary in the modern world and in their future relationship with the United States. The program of the schools should be something as follows:

There should be a strong emphasis on teaching of English - all through elementary school. During the first "ungraded years" of approximately one to two years duration, depending on the ability of the child, emphasis will be placed on CRAL English needed for communication at their own age level. Once students master a minimum level of "communication English", then reading and writing may be started. Again, reading and writing should be related for the most part to the life of the children in Micronesia. For the great majority of students who do not go beyond elementary school the emphasis should be on reading and writing for communication and information rather than the finer points of writing and reading poetry and the higher levels of literature. These finer things should be left to the few who can profit from them

as they proceed further in their studies. For the elementary schools, it would only be necessary that they produce a mass of people who could communicate in English -- speak, read and write in a manner and at a level sufficient for all normal needs of human intercourse. If the elementary schools can succeed in this task with the majority of students who would end their schooling with them, they would be doing an essential public service. Providing more than this for the academically able students is an important but a much easier task.

There are established procedures based on research and experimentation on how best to teach English to non-English speaking people. Already some measures have been taken by the territorial department of education under a specialist in the teaching of English as a second language to acquaint teacher-trainers and teachers with the techniques of teaching English, in English, to Micronesians. More needs to be done and the single specialist can not perform the task all by himself. Since English is the most important single subject in the schools, an adequate supervisory staff is of prime importance. Given the language and culture differences among the districts, each district should have at least one specialist in English to assist the territorial specialist in the experimental and flexible formulation of English-teaching policies and in assisting teachers and supervisors to do a better job in this area. American teachers need supervision and special instruction in the teaching of English in English to Micronesians since they are usually untrained in this field. Since English has been adopted as the language

of instruction, the children's competence in English will determine how successful they can be in school and how far they can go in the academic world.

The elementary schools should also prescribe a deliberate program of teaching about the United States throughout the elementary school years. As the administering authority, it is only proper that Micronesian children know about the United States, its history, government, people and its way of life. In addition to an expanded program of formal class instruction, United States ideals and principles should be deliberately fostered through such activities as flag-raising ceremonies, singing of American patriotic songs, and celebrating or commemorating important American holidays. This is a radical departure from the present policy of studying the United States only as a subject in the fifth grade and practically ignoring its existence the rest of the time.

There are other vital subject areas such as arithmetic, science, especially life science, and health which properly belong in elementary schools after the students acquired a certain level of competencies in English. These subjects, again, should emphasize the preparation of students for the lives they must live when they drop out of school. Among these, the schools should teach health and hygiene not from the academic side but from the practical point of view. To perform this task, the schools themselves must be made clear, neat and healthy places. Most schools in Micronesia are unsightly, dirty and unhealthy. The power of good example

is a great one. The schools, both teachers and students, must take the lead in making Micronesia a clean and healthy place to live. It has been done effectively in many communities. It can be done in Micronesia if it is made a part of school life and activity as a deliberate policy.

The schools, too, must develop in their students a healthy attitude toward labor. Education has been "oversold" to Micronesians. Many see the school as the way to escape from doing hard physical labor. During the later years of elementary schools, community development projects and such vital activities as industrial arts and agriculture should be fostered as a deliberate method of keeping students close to the work they would be performing when they end school. The elementary schools should bring the students closer to the heart of the community by preparing them to make positive contributions to their own lives as well as those of their neighbors. These things are more than just book learning. If the elementary schools of Micronesia produce students who can communicate well in English, read and write adequately, appreciate in general terms the 20th century world in which they live, know their own history and culture, and that of the United States as well as the United Nations, and can return to the soil and the life of their community with a positive attitude towards helping its growth and development, then they will have done a good job of teaching.

B. Program for Secondary Schools.

Micronesia has embarked on a program to expand secondary schools throughout the Territory. Unfortunately, the expansion program started without a

meeting of the minds on the scope, structure and goals of secondary schools. The result is that the high schools now are moving in an unplanned and unsystematic fashion.

Secondary schools in Micronesia should have a double function: (1) it must expand the knowledges and skills acquired by the students in the elementary schools and (2) at the same time, explore the potentialities of the students to the end of channeling them toward the vocation which best suits their abilities. The secondary schools of Micronesia should offer a stiff academic program for those who must go to college to prepare for a profession, but at the same time they must not ignore the academic and vocational needs of those who can not or will not go beyond high school. Every high school should offer a good program to train the hundreds of clerks, secretaries, bookkeepers and workers in these categories needed by the government and by business firms. Every high school should offer basic courses in agriculture - the heart of the Micronesian economy. They should be able to offer courses to train enough mechanics for both land vehicles and boats to satisfy the needs of the islands. All these as well as programs in the teaching of masonry, carpentry and simple electricity can be offered without any large capital outlay. To be more effective, however, the vocational program of the schools must be tied in with practical work experience outside the schools. The emphasis here is the practical rather than the theoretical. The aim of the secondary school vocational program should be to enable qualified students to obtain useful employment

after high school and to give those who wish and are qualified to go on to further technical or professional training enough of a foundation to proceed with some promise of success. The Trust Territory for the present - if ever at all - can not afford to offer only an academic high school which does not prepare students for useful work in their home communities.

As in the elementary schools, Micronesia, again, offers the imaginative educator an excellent opportunity to devise an educational program which gives each student a solid program of English instruction adequate for his purpose, be it preparation for college or for a clerical position. It must provide knowledge about 20th century living and the place of Micronesia in it, a genuine understanding and appreciation of the United States as well as the United Nations and the rest of the world, a wealth of knowledge about his own community and Micronesia as a whole, and a positive attitude towards community improvement and development. Micronesia can offer an excellent high school program for Micronesians that can be the equal of any American high school without making an exact duplicate of it. The real test of Micronesian schools is not how close they are to copying American schools in their structure, curriculum, subject-matter and form, but rather how effective they are in producing good and useful citizens.

C. Vocational School in Palau

Plans are currently underway to develop a post-secondary vocational school in Palau to service all six districts in the Trust Territory. In

addition to this a second school might be developed in the Marshall districts. The employment opportunities for vocationally trained Micronesians at Kwajalein should make such a vocational school desirable in the eastern part of Micronesia. With activities likely to be generated through an expanded economic program Micronesia will need more trained manpower that only good vocational schools can produce. It is often said that the vocational school is the dumping ground for educational misfits. This should not be so. The vocational-industrial programs beyond secondary school should be available only for qualified students. The learning of technical and skilled trades requires the application of the ability to read and, in many trades areas, the application of a knowledge of mathematics and science. Strict screening procedures and adherence to high standards for admission to post-secondary trade programs should produce savings through providing training for those students who will be able to profit by the training.

D. Adult Education

Adult education should be an integral part of the total educational program. For the most part, this has been a neglected area of education. Too often, the adult educators are totally unqualified for the job needed to be done. Like other phases of education, Adult education requires competent leadership if it is to mean anything to the community.

The need for an effective adult education program in Micronesia is readily apparent. Bringing Micronesia into the orbit of 20th century living

requires adult participation if it is to be realized within the lifetime of the present generation. The attitude of the adults of the territory will determine the future relationship of Micronesia with the United States. Even if the elementary and secondary schools were effective in the tasks assigned to them, changes in Micronesian thought and patterns of life must come from adults.

The adult education program should provide the following:

1. A foundation education which would combat adult illiteracy in simple English.
2. A program of family life and parent education, such as care of home and children, health and sanitation, etc.
3. Citizenship education through such media as discussion programs, forums, films and lectures.
4. Informational programs on the United States, the United Nations, and problems of our times.
5. Programs designed to help orient and integrate Micronesians into a form of relationship with the United States.
6. Leadership training and development for service in adult and community programs.
7. Vocational training and re-training programs for those preparing for employment or already employed.

Educators have the tendency to think of adult education always in terms of classroom activities. Adult education as conceived herein is more than classroom work. It is community development in the best sense of

the term. It means having the teacher play a significant role in the community. It involves radio programs, group discussions, printed and spoken words, movies and slides, and all the techniques of the mass media of communication. It involves health education, political education, economic and social education. In short it is a practical program of community improvement and development.

The execution of the adult education program should not be confined to the Department of Education but should involve, as well, the district Information or Public Affairs Officers proposed in Part I and the Peace Corps Volunteers implementing the Community Action Program proposed for the outlying islands in Part II, Section B, Chapter 7.

8. Every Classroom Throughout The Trust Territory Should Be Provided With Well-Trained And Competent Teachers As Rapidly As Possible

The key to good education is the good teacher. It is imperative, therefore, that every classroom in Micronesia have a professionally qualified and competent teacher. If the schools are to provide the caliber of education essential for both individual and territorial well-being, the Trust Territory government must first provide, as rapidly as possible, a corps of qualified teachers. The quality, more so than the number of teachers, reflects the caliber of the school system. With a ratio of twenty students to one teacher, the Trust Territory has one of the lowest pupil-teacher ratios under the American flag and certainly the best among the territories. The favorable pupil-teacher ratio, however, is offset by the excessive number of

undertrained teachers. The problem is especially acute in the public elementary schools where slightly over 65% of the teachers barely satisfied the minimum Trust Territory certification requirement of a ninth grade education. Close to 10% had less than ninth grade training. Both stateside and Micronesian school administrators estimated that anywhere from 40% to 65% of their elementary teachers are, in varying degrees, ineffective in their teaching. The presence of so many unqualified teachers means that thousands of children receive an education that is inadequate. This continued employment of a great number of poorly trained teachers means, too, that a large part of a generation of Micronesian children may be irreparably handicapped.

Some steps have been taken by the Trust Territory to solve the problem. A new certification regulation was adopted, raising the minimum to completion of junior high school. American teachers are being employed as rapidly as time, money and facilities for housing can be obtained to replace those who are considered low in teaching competence and low in potential for higher certification. In increasing numbers each year Micronesian teachers with high competence in teaching and high potential for higher certification and teachers with low teaching competence and high potential for training are being provided scholarships and leave with pay for either high school training, special teachers institutes as well as for college education.

The schools of Micronesia face a serious problem of attracting competent Micronesians into the teaching profession and keeping those already in

teaching. One of the chief reasons for this is that the increasing demands for college trained personnel in virtually every facet of life in the Trust Territory makes it more difficult for the schools to attract and hold every college trained teacher. With the proposed accelerated economic and political activities, the public school system can be expected to lose some of its better teachers, especially those who have college training.

Teaching does not have the same high prestige that other government positions enjoy, especially for those with college education. This is particularly true for teaching in the elementary schools where it has not been necessary to have much of an education to be able to get a job as a teacher. It will take a deliberate program of upgrading the teaching staff to change the present status of the teacher. A major contribution can be made to this end by providing teachers not only with good classrooms and adequate working tools, but by raising the requirements for teaching and providing them with high enough salaries to attract the most competent and to provide incentives to the good career teacher to stay in teaching. Unlike other government positions, teaching offers very little in the way of promotion. Public employees enter one position and most often retire with another. Most teachers remain as teachers until retirement. There is a great need in Micronesia to embark on a deliberate program to professionalize teaching. One of the first requirements is adequate professional training.

The present minimum, ninth grade graduation, is too low. As rapidly as possible, the minimum entry requirement for teaching in the Trust Territory should be raised to graduation from high school and then to two-years of college. The requirement of at least a high school graduation should be established as early as 1966 when some 240 youngsters are expected to graduate from the twelfth grade. A teacher-training program should be devised in all senior high schools to prepare graduating seniors to teach. With some 360 students expected to graduate in 1967 and about 450 to graduate in 1968, the minimum entry requirement for teaching in elementary schools could be raised to two-years of college as early as 1969 or 1970 and most certainly by 1973. In the meantime every effort must be exerted to get new qualified teachers, be they Americans or Micronesians, and to improve the teaching competence of those already in the system, both by expanding the present MTEC training program at Ponape (Micronesia Teacher Education Center), and by sending the younger and more promising teachers to the College of Guam for the two-year Certified Teacher program. The Trust Territory should release from teaching all those who are incompetent and can not be substantially improved. Micronesia has passed the time when they can afford this dubious luxury.

The second requirement for professionalizing teachers is compensation equal to service and training. The present Micronesian Pay Plan for teachers is low. For example, teachers with Bachelor's degrees are

now paid between \$1,851 and \$2,911, Schedule C-1 in the Micronesian Pay Plan. After four years of college, a teacher should be able to receive no less than \$300 a month or \$3000 for about ten months of the school year. Properly qualified teachers should be compensated on the basis of the Mission's proposed Micronesian D Schedule which will be confined to fully qualified professionals in various fields. See Part III, Section G for description of this plan.

With regard to American teachers, the Trust Territory will be faced with a number of unhappy teachers unless it provides a sound program of orientation to its new recruits. For 1963, the districts were responsible for this. At the time of the Team's visit, there was no definite program being designed to orient teachers anywhere, except in Truk. The Trust Territory approached the University of Hawaii to conduct its orientation program, but this was made contingent on the availability of funds from foundations and sources outside the Trust Territory. There should have been no question about funds. Orientation of new teachers is of such importance that the Trust Territory should be able to provide the necessary funds. The cost for orienting teachers as a group in Hawaii or elsewhere this year could have been easily absorbed from savings in personnel salaries since only about 50% of the 140 allotted teaching positions for 1963-1964 can be filled.

Orientation of new teachers, or any other American employe for that matter, should be a regular part of the employment process. For

those who will be hired for the school year 1964-1965, provisions should now be made for a good orientation program to take place partly in Hawaii or the mainland and partly in the various districts. Many mainland institutions have had experience with Peace Corps orientation programs. Their experience could be most beneficial to the Trust Territory. The orientation should include, among other topics, the mission of the United States in Micronesia and its responsibilities under the United Nations Charter; the Trust Territory government - its relationship to the United States and to Micronesia; the geography, people, history, and culture of Micronesia; education -- its role and functions, its students, structure and curriculum, its problems and all other aspects of the school. The orientation should be conducted not only by people who know Micronesia well and who know the problems of educating its children and youth, but also by experts in the problems of Americans overseas and the problems inherent in culture contact. Orientation, if held in the Mainland initially, could serve a dual function: (a) to prepare teachers psychologically for teaching in Micronesia and (b) to weed out those who obviously could not be successful in the Micronesian environment. It seems that paying teachers' travel back to their point of recruitment from any point in the Mainland will be much less expensive than the problems and the miseries maladjusted teachers can create.

Aside from the proper orientation of American teachers, there is the even more critical problem of recruiting the right kinds of teachers

in the necessary numbers. The Mission developed an agreement in principle between the Trust Territory government and the State of Hawaii, whereby the latter would accept the contractual responsibility of providing the right kinds and numbers of teachers from its own State educational system. They would be detailed, with their individual agreement and subject to the individual confirmation by the Trust Territory government, on two-year tours of duty. Since they would retain their positions in the Hawaiian State Teaching Service, the advantages of such an arrangement are numerous. The Mission understands that this proposal is being pursued by the High Commissioner. However, if for any reason that is not now foreseeable, such a contract should not be realizable, and it remains necessary for the Trust Territory government to recruit American teachers directly, the Mission would recommend that the Peace Corps be asked to cooperate with Interior in handling the screening and the orientation of the teachers.

Present thinking calls for the elimination of all American teachers by 1973. The date seems unrealistic and the idea unsound. Even if the number of qualified Micronesians should be adequate to staff the schools of the Trust Territory, it would be a wise policy to have at least five to ten percent of the teaching positions in each district and at both the elementary and secondary levels open for competent American teachers on a limited-term appointment in order to bring to Micronesia new blood with new ideas and practices in education.

9. Wherever Possible Small Schools Should Be Consolidated.

Micronesia has something like 180 public and 40 non-public school units for a little over 19,000 students from grades one through twelve. This represents an average of 86 students per unit. Small one-and-two-teacher schools have been found to be very costly to operate -- costly in terms of the effects of poor education as well as in terms of money.

The geography of Micronesia makes small schools unavoidable in certain localities. Consolidation, however, is possible in many areas now served by small units. Some already are scheduled for consolidation within the next two to three years as new schools are constructed. Many more units can be consolidated in such localities as Ponape, Yap Island proper, Majuro, Koror and Babelthuap.

The point of this recommendation is that as a matter of deliberate policy, the Trust Territory should provide for and move toward more consolidation of schools in the interest of better education. To be sure, this may entail additional cost for housing and feeding students in some localities, bus transportation, and other services; but these are readily off-set by improved instruction, efficiency in operation, economy in staffing and to some extent savings in total construction costs.

10. A Master Plan For The Development of School
Facilities Should Be Prepared As Early As Possible

The Trust Territory is faced with a gigantic task of building adequate classroom and other school facilities throughout Micronesia. With financing from the United States Government, the Trust Territory embarked this year on a three-year accelerated elementary school construction program, involving approximately \$10,000,000 in Federal funds plus contributions from the people of Micronesia in terms of donated land, free labor and local aggregates like sand and gravel for concrete-block production. The ten-million dollar project is intended to build 488 elementary classrooms by 1966 and 246 houses for elementary school teachers by the end of fiscal 1965. With the expansion of secondary education throughout the territory, construction of new facilities was also in progress in all district centers. Half a million dollars was requested for fiscal 1964 and an estimated \$3,316,000 scheduled to be requested for 1965 to expand and improve high school facilities.

The school construction program is running way behind schedule. There were several reasons for this, one being that appropriations were not available until late in Fiscal Year 1963, and second, the Trust Territory government, at both the district and headquarters levels, did not have a clear and detailed plan on how to proceed with the project. The construction picture at the time of the visit was one of poor planning, poor coordination and improper control.

What is needed in the school construction project, of course, is a master plan for development. Schools are now being built at random and without too much attention to future growth and to the possibilities of improved roads and transportation facilities. Sites are more often accepted on the basis of availability rather than desirability. The junior high school in Kusai is a case in point. This was built away from the population center so most of the students have to be housed and fed. A careful study of population movement, proposed roads and transportation facilities, and other vital factors affecting school sites and facilities should provide the Trust Territory with the basis of a master plan for school development.

As much as possible, the accelerated construction of elementary school facilities should be looked at in terms of the proposal made to consolidate small units. The recommendation to keep seventh and eighth grade students in elementary units should be evaluated in terms of its effects on classroom needs. From the educational point of view, keeping seventh and eighth graders in small elementary units may prove to be a handicap for students, especially for those who need to go beyond the elementary level.

School buildings are educational tools as much as they are shelters from the elements. Educators should be consulted and their approval sought for every school building design and every site selected.

In so far as it is possible, the Trust Territory should provide permanent construction of concrete block rather than the temporary Enewitok building, particularly in typhoon-prone areas.

Since information was not available to make projections of school facility needs on a school by school basis, overall estimates were made to determine the need for additional classrooms to serve the 1968 elementary school population.

The following projections of elementary (1-6 grades) school enrollment were made by the Trust Territory education personnel for the years 1963 through 1968:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Projected enrollment</u>
1963	13,723
1964	14,410
1965	15,404
1966	18,441
1967	19,471
1968	20,425

The projections exclude non-public school enrollment which was 3,525 in 1962 and which is expected to remain about constant during the period. They also anticipate that the entrance age for children will be reduced to 6 years old. The projections include the phasing in of these additional pupils over a three year period starting in 1966.

The accelerated elementary school construction program will provide 488 new classrooms and 104 of the present classrooms are considered useable, giving a total of 592 classrooms. Using an average of 25 students per classroom (a conservative figure is used because of the small size of the schools in many islands) these classrooms will take care of 14,800 students. To provide for a 1968 enrollment of 20,425 students approximately 220 additional classrooms will be needed, costing an estimated \$2.3 million.

Teachers' housing needed to accompany these schools would cost \$1.4 million, bringing the total additional elementary school capital costs to \$3.7 million through 1968.

As indicated earlier in the report a sharp drop is expected in enrollment beyond the sixth grade. The need for 7th and 8th grade facilities is based on the assumption that 50 percent of the sixth grade class will go on to these grades. It is further assumed that approximately 60 percent of the eighth grade class would continue on to higher grades. While the majority of seventh and eighth grade students are expected to attend day schools, our projections assume that 70 percent of the 9th through 12th grade enrollment will be boarding students. The combined cost of classrooms, dormitories, dining facilities and teachers' housing for the secondary schools through 1968 is estimated to total \$6.3 million. The cost of meeting the needs for both elementary and secondary school construction through 1968 will be \$10 million.

11. For Purposes of Future Planning, A Relatively And Reliable Pupil Population Projection Should Be Obtained

A distinct characteristic of the schools in Micronesia is the upward growth pattern of enrollment. Between the period 1952 and 1962, the school population more than doubled in size, from 8,856 to 18,294. Enrollment is expected to increase from 18,973 in 1963 to approximately 23,826 by 1968 and 30,000 by 1973.* With greatly improved school facilities, better qualified teachers and good school lunch program, more students will enter and remain in school for a longer period of time than has been the case up to now.

There are conflicting predictions on enrollment. For future planning, reliable projections of school enrollment are a prime requisite. School population figures are significant indicators of the dimensions of the problem of programming, staffing, housing, financing, and generally operating the total educational enterprise. Unless someone is capable of doing this in the Territory, it is recommended that the services of an off-island expert on school population projection, available in many mainland universities, be obtained for a three months period to provide educational planners with a reliable indicator of student growth.

* Figures provided by Director of Education, Department of Education, Trust Territory Headquarters, Saipan. The figures are conservative - include non-public schools.

12. Adequate Provisions Should Be Made For An Expanded Man-Power Training Program Beyond Secondary Schools

A recent projection of needs in the professional field indicated that something like 1,043 positions of all categories in 1963-1964, including 635 teaching positions, require training beyond secondary schools. This is expected to increase to 1,305 by 1967-1968. Some of the positions will require less than four years of college but some, like dentistry and medicine, will require more. According to figures provided by the director of education, the Trust Territory expects to have about 164 college graduates by 1968, including 21 who graduated prior to September 1963, and 565 by 1973. This number is a far cry from what the territory needs in the way of technically and professionally trained Micronesians. Excluding approximately 800 teachers, the need for trained manpower in other fields will be in excess of 500.

In the absence of any institution beyond secondary schools, the Trust Territory resorts to scholarships and other means of financial assistance for those who need higher training. In 1961-1962 the Trust Territory government awarded \$101,500 worth of scholarships to 55 students. For the same year, non-government scholarships amounted to \$103,600 for 78 students.

Elsewhere in the report a number of references have been made to the need for college and professionally trained personnel. To meet this

Elsewhere in the report a number of references have been made to the need for college and professionally trained personnel. To meet this need the Mission recommends an expansion of the scholarship program through 1968. The number of scholarships and the estimated costs (which are included in the Mission's recommendations on annual operations budgets in Part II, Section C) are summarized below:

<u>Number of New Scholarships</u>	<u>Annual cost (in thousands)</u>			
	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>
100	\$ 250	\$ 250	\$ 225	\$ 200
125	-	312	312	275
150	-	-	375	375
200	-	-	-	500
	\$250	\$ 562	\$ 912	\$1,350

These projections assume that most of the scholarships would be for a four year period. By 1968 approximately 500 students are expected to be on scholarships. The projections are based on the general premise of providing scholarships for 25 percent of the students graduating from high school. Thus about 7.5 percent of a given year's entering first grade class could be expected to go on to college through the scholarship program.

To meet the need for training young men and women beyond secondary schools for technical and professional positions, the Trust Territory should begin a program of guidance in the secondary schools to identify students with potential for technical and/or professional training. The

proposed scholarship program should be evaluated both from the point of view of adequacy of funds and selection of areas of training. At the same time that off-island programs are expanding, all efforts should be exerted to strengthen the agriculture institute in Ponape, the nursing program in Saipan and the teacher training center also in Ponape. Other priority training programs are suggested in various sections of this report.

Because of its proximity to Micronesia and its low-cost features, the College of Guam offers the Trust Territory a college within its own locale. Close to a hundred Micronesian students were registered at the College of Guam during the academic year 1963. It is expected that the number of Micronesians will increase. The Trust Territory should make a study of the best way to utilize the College of Guam in meeting its needs for more college trained personnel. The Guam College could be very useful in preparing teachers for the elementary schools, for example. The College of Guam, however, can not continue for too long to support an expanded Micronesian program without some assistance. There are at least three ways of providing assistance:

- (1) The 1961 Task Force suggested a joint Trust Territory-Guam support program. This has merits and the Trust Territory government should begin to explore its feasibility.
- (2) Money grants for expenses in an amount to be based on the number of Micronesian students.
- (3) As a long range possibility, the establishment of a Pacific college, based on Guam, financed jointly by the Pacific territories

and the United States Government should also be explored. This would be somewhat like Howard University in Washington, D.C.

13. As Part Of The Total Educational Responsibility, The Trust Territory government Should Take A Vital Interest In Nonpublic Schools And Should Facilitate Their Educational Activities

Some 40 nonpublic schools are engaged in discharging in a favorable manner a part of the educational responsibility of the Trust Territory government. Over a third of the elementary students and over forty percent of secondary students are enrolled in nonpublic schools. Most observers in the area consider the nonpublic schools superior to the public schools. Public school officials treat nonpublic schools with "pleasant aloofness" and show very little, if any, live interests in their educational activities. Some officials frankly are resentful to the idea of assistance to nonpublic schools in any form. They see these schools as competitors rather than as partners in education. Not many seem to see the connection between the educational activities of nonpublic schools and the educational mission of the Trust Territory government. This is unfortunate.

Because nonpublic schools are discharging well a part of the educational responsibility of the Trust Territory government, the Administration should give due recognition to this important fact through a positive policy of assistance and cooperation. This can be done in many ways:

- (1) The statement of educational philosophy and objectives for Micronesia should include the role of nonpublic schools in the total educational effort.
- (2) The Department of Education should establish a top-level bureau and appoint a top-level educator who will coordinate the work of nonpublic schools and who will be responsible for meeting their needs in every possible way.
- (3) The High Commissioner should appoint a Trust Territory Committee of non-public school educators and/or supporters to advise him and the director of education on all matters affecting nonpublic schools. Such a committee should be given due recognition by the Trust Territory government and should have the right of direct access to the director of education and other top levels of government in pursuit of educational matters.
- (4) The Trust Territory should recognize and wherever possible give weight to the needs of nonpublic schools in making priority decisions on such matters as the building or maintenance of public roads, extension and repair of electrical, telephone and water lines and facilities. This is not intended to mean extending these facilities way in the wilderness just to serve a nonpublic school and no one else. It means, however, that the same weight and priority should be applied to the needs of nonpublic schools as they would be

applied to public schools, on how far and when to extend roads, public utilities and other non-school facilities.

- (5) The Trust Territory should eliminate present charges for freight from Guam to the district centers on United States Department of Agriculture surplus food for nonpublic school lunch programs.
- (6) The Trust Territory should assist nonpublic schools through joint purchase and procurement of materials for school construction, instructional supplies, materials and equipment, textbooks and other commodities whenever such assistance could mean savings for both government and nonpublic schools through bulk purchases and shipment. This could be done simply by asking nonpublic schools to submit their needs at the time the government prepares its orders for its schools, and billing them at cost when goods are delivered.
- (7) The Trust Territory government should make available either for purchase or preferably on a non-fee basis surplus government land for school sites. This will be highly desirable especially for well-established nonpublic schools. This policy is in line with United States mainland practice where the Federal Government makes available free of charge to both public and nonpublic schools and colleges any land it owns and does not need for its own use.

- (8) Trust Territory equipment and skilled personnel should be made available free of charge to nonpublic schools for temporary assistance where the educational benefits clearly indicate the value of such assistance.
- (9) The Trust Territory should conduct regular meetings between nonpublic school teachers, administrators and other personnel and those of the public schools, for the purpose of sharing ideas and working out mutual problems of education.
- (10) The Trust Territory should consider nonpublic schools as "public" for purpose of assistance and not as "private" in the same sense as merchants are private, and should therefore deal with nonpublic schools on a different basis, often providing services and assistance free of charge where such assistance will provide for better education.

This recommendation for assistance concurs with the sentiments expressed by members of the United States Congress and the Trust Territory government should facilitate the educational work of nonpublic schools. It was the sense of such leaders of Congress as Congressman Wayne Aspinall, Chairman of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Congressman Leo O'Brien, Chairman, House sub-committee on Insular Affairs, Congressman Michael Kirwan, Chairman of the House Appropriation Subcommittee handling Trust Territory appropriations, as well as others in Congress, "that it would not be considered out of place for the Trust Territory

government to furnish assistance to nonpublic schools, solely in their secular aspects, to the same degree to which Federal assistance is now or may hereafter become available to similar schools in the United States and to the extent to which the furnishing of such assistance is consistent with the use of funds, after they are actually appropriated, to accomplish in full the purposes for which they are appropriated." Financial and other forms of assistance to nonpublic schools always raises the question of its constitutionality. Until such question is settled by the Supreme Court or by amendments to the Constitution clarifying the matter, assistance to nonpublic schools in the Trust Territory, in the views of Congressman O'Brien, should not be the vehicle to try to solve that problem.

14. To Assure Success, The Trust Territory Should Demand Of Its Educational Leaders Nothing Short of Superior Quality Leadership And Service

For many years now, education in Micronesia was essentially a "holding operation." This is rapidly changing. The responsibilities of education departments at both the district and territorial levels will increase tremendously during the years ahead. The success or failure of the school system and the quality of service and leadership it renders rest in the final analysis upon the character, the ability and the capacity of the people who occupy the key positions in education. The rate of educational change in Micronesia -- and changes are needed badly in many respects -- and the extent to which the schools can be improved

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successful in providing quality education unique to the needs of Micronesia in the 20th century will be determined in large measure by the presence of enlightened, aggressive and competent, and creatively intelligent leadership and service in the territorial and district levels of education. Micronesia is not without dedicated leaders in education. But there is a terrible shortage of qualified leadership and service. Many things about the schools point to the absence of quality leadership, the most obvious and recent one having to do with the accelerated school construction program. Most Trust Territory educators see the accelerated program simply in terms of more classrooms and more teachers. Competent, bold and imaginative leadership would have capitalized on this first major breakthrough in education to begin a more vitalized and forward-looking educational program for Micronesia.

The time has come for the Trust Territory to face squarely the problem of poor leadership. There is a high proportion of mediocre and incompetent and stale personnel holding key positions in education throughout Micronesia. In the interest of students and the community and the future of Micronesia, the High Commissioner, as the Chief Executive Officer, must single out the incompetent people, be humane but firm in taking the steps necessary to remove them from their positions. Somehow, even with local and United States Civil Service tenure laws in effect, the Trust Territory government must find ways to eliminate the unfit from the school system and to remove them from their

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positions in administration where they do great damage to children and youth as well as to teachers and others who work under their care. The same should also be done with those who hold positions as teacher-trainers and/or supervisors. This should also apply to Micronesians as well as to stateside employees. Those who occupy the positions of superintendent of elementary schools should also be removed, reclassified, or shifted from their positions unless they are qualified.

Of course, it is not enough simply to remove the incompetents from their positions. It is imperative that those with potentials for leadership be provided with every opportunity to improve themselves. It is imperative, too, that potential leaders be identified early and be provided with every opportunity to develop into top-notch leaders. For the long pull ahead, it is essential that native leadership be developed. Promotion of Micronesians to key administrative positions should not be used simply as a "showcase"; nor should it be used to award the faithfuls who served good and long. Promotion of both Micronesians and Statesiders should be based only on competence and leadership ability. If educational leadership is to realize its potential and properly serve the schools and the territory, education must be strengthened not only by more adequate number of professional staff properly compensated, but also by the appointment of and retention of professionally competent educational administrators.

In conclusion, it should be stressed that providing a sound program of education unique to Micronesian needs is possibly the biggest

single challenge facing the United States in its objectives of bringing about the most rapid political, economic and social development. In addition, it is probably the most politically sensitive single issue among the Micronesians, and a failure in this sector of the over-all program would have very widespread effects among the masses of population.

Chapter 6

PUBLIC HEALTH

As a Public Health Team from Region IX of the U.S. Public Health Service had only recently (March 14 - May 11, 1963) made a survey on health conditions and diseases in the territory, the Mission did not include in its membership any public health or medical expert. The recommendations of the health team focused primarily on the building up of a core of professional public health and medical staff and the upgrading of those Micronesian personnel, both medical and paramedical, who are already in the service. Development of basic health plans and programs would be developed by the new health and medical staff.

Though rather critical of the general tenor of the Public Health Team report, the High Commissioner indicated his agreement in general with the "final summary comments and major recommendations" of the Health Team. Since these recommendations are largely concurred with American personnel staffing needs and the upgrading and training of Micronesian personnel, the Mission directed its major efforts in the Public Health sector to two problems it judges critical and which were not dealt with in the Public Health Team's report:

1. Capital funding necessary to provide adequate health and medical facilities;
2. Implementation of the recommendations on securing American professional staff.

Medical Plant Survey and Capital Requirements of Program

Present hospital facilities consist of a main hospital in each of the six district centers and a sub-hospital each in the island of Kusai, in Ebeye (Kwajalein Atoll) - and in the island of Rota. A leprosarium is located in the island of Pingelap. There are also about 106 field dispensaries which serve the routine medical needs in outlying communities.

The ninety bed hospital in Saipan was only recently completed. The tuberculosis ward for male patients is still on the planning stage and presently therefore both male and female patients are housed in the same wing of the present facility. An additional \$40,000 may be required to construct and equip these facilities.

The new hospital in Palau is still incomplete. The unobligated balance of \$40,000 will be used to remodel a portion of the existing warehouse for dental offices and the old nursing school for a kitchen and a dining room.

The new facility in Majuro, Marshall islands, contains about 45 bed spaces. The T.B. Ward which was a part of the old hospital has 20 beds. A new laundry and a classroom for health aid trainees are yet to be provided. In addition, a 60-bed ward is on the drawing board to house severe paralytic cases left by a recent polio epidemic. Of the funds for the hospital project, there is still a balance of about \$90,000 which is earmarked to complete these facilities - the polio ward, a new

laundry and a nurses' dormitory-and-classroom unit. However it is possible that this balance may fall short of needs by as much as \$80,000.

The present hospitals in Ponape and Truk consist of old frame and quonset type structures and should be replaced. A funding program has been started for both hospitals. Appropriations to date total \$320,000.^{1/} The proposed facility for Ponape should contain at least 125 beds and that for Truk about 150 beds. At about \$5270 per bed for construction (350 square feet @ \$15) and \$1000 per bed for equipment, an additional funding of a little over \$1,400,000 (275 beds @ \$6270 less \$320,000) would be required to complete the two projects.

The hospital in Yap is of concrete structure built on a mound which appears to be an old fort or shelter of some type. Though the hospital is not ideally situated, its appearance can be improved immensely by more efficient housekeeping practices. Fresh paint and lots of soap and water would give the facility almost a new look. Unless the building will be weakened structurally by further settling, its replacement should probably not be included in the capital program through Fiscal 1968.

One sub-hospital is needed in Babelthuap (Palau), in Ulithi and in Woleai (Yap outer islands), in Lukunor and in Puluwat (Truk district), in Jaluit and in Wotje (Marshall Islands) and possibly in Rota (Mariana district). At a minimum 20-bed space for each and at \$5000 per bed there is needed approximately \$800,000, i.e., eight (8) units at about

^{1/} Not included is the sum of \$15,000 for remodeling the kitchen of the present hospital.

\$100,000 each. The existing unit in Kusai will need a little refurnishing and not immediate replacement. The sub-hospital in Ebeye is being planned for transfer to the concrete shrapnel community shelter.

No general survey was made on the number of field dispensaries which should be replaced. Observation of the few visited, however, indicated as a very rough rule of thumb that approximately 50 percent of the total number requires new buildings.

At about \$4,000 per unit, total funding should total around \$200,000 computed as follows:

\$ 2,000	for a 200 square foot bldg. @ \$10 per sq. ft.
1,000	for fixtures per unit
<u>1,000</u>	for equipment
\$ 4,000	Total cost per unit
<u>50</u>	units to be replaced
\$200,000	total funding required.

Therefore, the recommended size of the public health capital program through Fiscal 1968 adds up approximately \$2,500,000.

Securing American Professional Staff

The major problem here is the tremendous difficulty for the Trust Territory government in individually recruiting and periodically replacing American physicians who have the necessary personal and professional qualifications. (This will continue to be a problem for at least ten to fifteen years, by

which time it is hoped that fully qualified Micronesian physicians will become available). Given this major and almost insuperable problem (arising from the necessarily insufficient compensation, poor living conditions, interrupted career, etc.), the Mission recommends that the responsibility for providing qualified U.S. physicians on a rotation basis be contracted out. The logical organization with which to contract this responsibility is the U.S. Public Health Service, but that organization informs the Mission that it is reluctant to enter into a contractual arrangement for providing physicians without having full jurisdiction over the entire Public Health program in the Trust Territory. Since this would involve the creation of a separate administration and bureaucracy, the Mission envisions many problems from such an arrangement in this vast island-scattered area where logistic and administrative difficulties are so great. As an alternative, the Mission was able to secure a tentative agreement in principle from "Medico", the non-profit volunteer organization, on a contractual arrangement for the provision and two-year rotation of the necessary American physicians. It is recommended that the Department of Interior, in consultation with the Trust Territory government, work out such a contract as quickly as possible.

An additional comment on the use of those American physicians is advisable. The Mission suggests that they not necessarily always be used as the district Public Health Department Heads. Rather, the American physicians should be used quite flexibly, given the fact

that, (1) there are in some districts, such as Palau, Micronesian medical practitioners who are competent medical administrators, and their automatic replacement by Americans would cause resentment among the Micronesians; (2) the greater need for internists and surgeons; and (3) the critical humanitarian need, as well as greater political impact, of American physicians frequently traveling throughout the islands on the district field trip vessels.

Similarly, both in terms of the greater political impact and the most effective execution of the Public Health Programs for proper sanitation, water supply, etc. in the islands outside the district centers, the Mission recommends primary reliance on the proposed Community Action Program of Peace Corps Volunteers (II-B-7), and only secondarily on a corps of Micronesian sanitarians.

Finally, as a minor but needed service, the willingness of the Public Health Department of the Government of Guam to handle at very minimal charges the supervision of the proper collection of Vital statistics in the Trust Territory and their processing through their new IBM equipment should be utilized. The same applies to the offer by the Public Health Department of the Government of Guam to supply laboratory backstopping services to the hospitals of the Trust Territory.

Chapter 7

COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM

Such a program to be implemented by the Peace Corps was found to be particularly essential in the Trust Territory due to:

1. widespread requests of villagers for leadership and assistance of this kind;
2. questions by Micronesians as to why couldn't the Peace Corps help them if it was helping the rest of the world;
3. the limited development potentials of this scattered island food-gathering economy makes community action one of the very few feasible aids that can be offered;
4. the difficulties of conducting a vigorous large scale community action program within the framework of the T. T. Government Bureaucracy;
5. given U.S. political objectives, the tremendous need in the Mission's judgement for direct and continuing American contacts at local levels.

The Mission recommends that the program consist of projects such as farm to market type roads, simple public building construction, catchment water systems and sanitation facilities, land clearing, adult education, handicraft assistance and youth corps development. The Peace Corps Volunteers would not function as teachers in the schools of the Trust Territory government.

It is suggested that the training program of the Peace Corps Volunteers would begin June 30, 1964, and that the work could then begin in October.

1. Council of Micronesia to pass resolution asking the T. T. Government to make available \$200,000 to District Congresses for logistic support for the initial two year contract which could be administered by District Administrators under terms of a single Peace Corps Project agreement to be signed by the District Congresses.
2. All non-logistic support (recruitment, training, allotments, subsistence, international-travel, medical support, etc.) to be advanced by Peace Corps and reimbursed by Department of Interior on quarterly advice of charges, if so desired by the Peace Corps. (\$600,000 over the two-year period).
3. One Peace Corps Representative to the Trust Territory, with headquarters in Saipan; 2 Associate Representatives, one in the Marshalls and one in Palau; and 6 Peace Corps leaders (1 each stationed at each District Center). This rather large complement of administrative personnel seems advisable in view of the great distances involved between PCV locations and administrative centers.
4. The initial program for 60 Peace Corps Volunteers can be expanded in successive phases.
5. Peace Corps volunteers will be assigned outside of District Centers among the 100 or so municipalities to assist them

with self-help programs of community improvement as described above.

6. Outside costs of this program would be in the magnitude of \$800,000 over the initial two-year period.
7. Members of this Mission, particularly Mr. Cleo Shook, are available to work with Peace Corps Headquarters if needed, to develop the specific community action program referred to above and to negotiate the Peace Corps Project Agreement with the District Congresses.

COST BREAKDOWN

A. Logistic:

- | | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| (1) Multiple use front end loaders @ \$7,500 each,
or \$15,000 in each of six Districts - | \$ 90,000 |
| (2) \$500 per year per Volunteer for special
purchases over the two years - | 60,000 |
| \$50,000 for 25 small boats including motors
and spare parts - | \$200,000 |

B. Non-logistic:

Estimated \$10,000 per volunteer for 2-year period - \$600,000

Chapter 8

POLICIES ON TAXATION, LAND AND HOUSING

Taxation

The principal source of revenue for the Trust Territory Government is an annual appropriation from Congress, amounting to \$15 million in fiscal year 1963. The Trust Territory Government collected an estimated \$1.9 million additional from local sources. Of this, only \$250,000 were true tax receipts, the much larger remainder representing gross revenue accruing to the government from business-type operations (sea and air freight and passenger fares, utility charges, building rentals, medical and dental fees, etc.). Tax revenues for fiscal year 1963, separated from the gross revenue data supplied to the Mission by the Finance Office of the Trust Territory Government, are as follows:

Copra processing tax	\$ 187,854.45
Cigarette and tobacco tax	56,258.75
Excise tax	3,373.08
Trochus Royalty	3,057.00
Licenses, fines and court fees	5,030.36
	<u>\$ 255,573.64</u>

In addition to these taxes collected by the Trust Territory Government, all the districts and many municipalities levy taxes on Micronesian residents. The resulting tax system is chaotic, with the Trust Territory Government, the District Congresses, and many municipalities frequently taxing the same products and assuming overlapping financial burdens for the same activities. One consequence is a distortion of trade and productive activity away from the most efficient channel.

Therefore, the Mission recommends that the High Commissioner issue an order before the Micronesian Legislature is opened in 1964 along the following lines:

1. All export taxes should be reserved to Trust Territory Government.
2. All general and specific import duties reserved to Trust Territory Government with exception of items listed in 5.
3. All import and export duties on trade within the Trust Territory should be eliminated.
4. All personal and corporate taxes on gross and net income as well as general sales taxes should be reserved to Trust Territory Government.
5. District Congress taxes should be confined to excise taxes on soft drinks, beer and liquor, cigarettes and tobacco, amusement taxes, business licenses and fees, vehicle registration and driver licenses and all other licenses and fees.
6. Municipalities should be permitted to tax and levy license fees only as permitted by their District Congresses.

The Mission calculated that such a rationalization of the tax structure at the rates now in effect would increase Trust Territory Government annual revenues by about \$90,000. Revenues would increase further if a moderate but general import tax were to be later imposed by the Trust Territory Government.

The proposed rationalization of the tax structure would, of course, reduce district and municipal tax collections substantially. This is another reason for the recommendation made in the Educational Section of this report, that the District Congresses and Municipalities should be relieved for administrative and educational reasons of the remaining and confused financial obligations they now have for teachers' salaries. The Trust Territory Government is now paying more than 90 per cent of overall educational costs and it should defray the remainder too.

Table 19 summarizes the estimated loss in revenues and the relief from educational expenses by district, showing a net gain in every district.

TABLE 15

Estimated Revenue and Expenditure Impact
of Proposed Tax Rationalization by District. *

	<u>Changes in Total Tax Revenues due to their shift from District Congresses to TT Govt.</u>	<u>Changes in burden of education costs.</u>	<u>Net changes in revenue available for non-educational activities.</u>
T. T. Govt.	+90,000 **	+215,000	-125,000
<u>DISTRICTS</u>			
Marshalls	-46,000	- 52,000	+ 6,000
Palau	-10,000	- 25,000	+ 15,000
Ponape	-15,000	- 32,000	+ 17,000
Marianas	-14,000	- 53,000	+ 39,000
Truk	-10,000	- 43,000	+ 33,000
Yap	- 5,500	- 10,000	+ 4,500

* Based on FY 1963 revenues

** Excluding district copra taxes, which would be cancelled.

Thus, for a net increase in annual cost of \$125,000, the Trust Territory Government could integrate and simplify (with resulting savings in administrative costs) its educational program as well as lay the groundwork for increased revenues in the future which hopefully would some day reduce the subsidy demands on the United States.

The Trust Territory Government now carries in its tax system a 15 per cent "processing tax" on all processed goods. In fact, it is levied only on copra (there is a separate "royalty" on trochus), and it has been specifically waived on handicraft. This tax provides an undesirable disincentive to manufacturing production of all kinds (the Mission was told this several times on its trip around the Trust Territory), and the Mission recommends that the term "processing tax" be dropped and that the 15 per cent tax on copra be retained simply as a "copra tax".

Copra is heavily taxed at all three levels of government, and this too inhibits further production of the principal cash product by lowering the cash return to the producer. District and Municipal taxes on copra will automatically be eliminated by the proposed general reform of the tax structure, and as alternative services of local tax revenue are developed, the Territorial copra tax might also be eventually eliminated. In the meantime, however, this copra tax should be retained as the only substantial source of funds for allocation by the Council of Micronesia.

The Mission feels that the consideration of a moderate tax on salaries and wages and a moderate income tax on chartered companies and unincorporated businesses might be advisable in the fairly near future. Later, if the U. S. Congress were to agree to a "return" of the proceeds of the Federal Income Tax collected from U. S. citizens in the Trust Territory similar to the arrangements with American Samoa, then the Trust Territory could levy a comparable income tax rate structure. The chief advantage would be developing greater experience and responsibility in the Territorial Legislature through the exercise of having to appropriate the expenditure of larger revenues. (However, there might be opposition in the U. S. Congress to such an arrangement as long as the U. S. Congress is directly appropriating large amounts for the Trust Territory Government.)

With the exception of Saipan "Municipality", the chartered municipalities of the Trust Territory each have tiny revenues composed of miscellaneous taxes and fees on all levels, most of which are used to pay the salaries of the elected magistrates (Mayors), secretaries, treasurers, and numerous councilmen. There is a justified dissatisfaction on the part of the more articulate villagers that they, who are on the margin of subsistence, are being taxed by this "American-imposed" municipality unit which serves little or no function but to pay salaries to village leaders investing little time in making decisions that they previously made free as a public service. (In fact many of the municipality officers outside the district center municipalities go out and collect taxes when their salaries have to be met).

Given this situation as well as many other factors, the Mission recommends that the District Congresses, which will control all municipal taxation under the recommendations made here, assume the financial responsibility of paying only one salary in each municipality to the full-time Magistrate, elected by the voters of that municipality as usual. (An alternative would be for this same salary to be paid by the Trust Territory Government through its District Administration so that the municipal magistrate would be the representative of the Trust Territory Government. Either alternative would be preferable to the existing situation.)

The Marianas District represents a special case due to the fact that Saipan, with 82 per cent of its population, was uniquely organized under the Navy administration as one municipality and it collects large tax revenues (about \$80,000 annually excluding business type operations). Last year, a new Marianas District Congress was superimposed on this municipality at the suggestion of the Trust Territory Government in order to bring about a structure of government comparable to the other district. Sources of revenue available to the new Marianas District Congress are extremely limited and a tax tug-of-war is developing between the Municipality and the District Congress. In the opinion of the Mission, with which the High Commissioner informally expressed full agreement, the same proposed rationalization of the tax structure and educational administrative burden should apply in the Marianas. Possibly it should be accompanied by a division of the large Saipan Municipality into several smaller

village municipalities comparable to the municipal organization in the rest of the Trust Territory, but if politically difficult, this division is not essential.

Non-chartered "municipalities" cannot levy money taxes - which is one reason many villages have refused to be chartered - but local taxes of labor services are common in Micronesia. In the extreme case of Yap, men sometimes must work more than half the time on community projects. The Trust Territory Government has itself encouraged the use of this "free" labor on government construction projects and community development projects. Yet in fact reliance on labor taxes often represents considerable sacrifice for the Micronesians who must neglect their food cultivation and copra processing. Moreover, the productivity of the "free" labor is very low due to high absenteeism and low "esprit de corps", which may raise related project costs and eliminate the "savings" from use of such labor. Therefore, the Mission recommends that the T. T. Government study this problem and formulate policies as to where they should continue to use free labor and where they should pay some compensation to the villagers, preferably on a unit piece work basis similar to the system of construction piece work rates developed in Palau with private contractors.

The grand total of all municipality tax revenues (excluding commercial operations and labor taxes) now collected in the Trust Territory is roughly, based on preliminary FY 1963 data, about \$65,000 excluding the special case of Saipan and about \$145,000 including Saipan. Under the

Mission's recommendation, these would be integrated (after eliminating intra-territorial import and export taxes) into the tax revenues of the six Districts which would then be able to increase their grants-in-aid to municipalities for approved municipal projects in addition to paying Magistrate salaries.

In conclusion the Mission believes based on its survey, that the entire set of recommendations outlined in this section would not only move toward a rationalized tax structure more conducive to the Trust Territory's over-all economic development and permit the needed integration of educational funding and administration, but would also have a favorable net political impact in the Districts and an even stronger favorable political impact on the forthcoming Micronesian Territorial Legislature.

LAND

The archaic and complicated communal land tenure systems of Micronesia, which as previously explained, seriously encumber its political and economic development, make essential the development of a Land Policy by the Trust Territory Government. The need for such a policy is intensified by the widespread confusion and legal disputes over individual and communal land titles and over what land is in the public domain (which affects the homesteading program). Land ownership in Micronesia is an acutely sensitive issue, it representing in a subsistence economy the only form of social security. The formulation of a land policy that will meet the needs of the immediate situation and ease the longer run

transition to the modern world is a difficult task, but the Mission believes that the broad guidelines should be as follows:

1. First and completely basic is the need for an accurate land survey and registration throughout the Trust Territory.

Although a network of primary controls was previously established by the U. S. Army, it would be advisable if the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey in the Department of Commerce were to establish an accurate triangulation network of secondary controls using electronic surveying equipment. This would not be inexpensive, the job probably requiring one to two years work by three or four teams using considerable equipment. This step is not absolutely essential but it would avoid the future problems and disputes that have plagued land matters in Guam where this step was also omitted.

Next all land parcels, whether owned by individuals, clans or the government, should be surveyed and registered on maps. It is estimated that this job would require the full-time equivalent of one trained Micronesian team working in each of the six districts from two to four years.

2. Clan homesteading of "public domain" in order to correct without more delay previous injustices of the German and Japanese administrations, could be permitted but with a special clause reserving for the government the right to subdivide the land at a later date among the individual family heads of that clan.

3. After completing the general survey and registration, the Trust Territory Government should commence a gradual and long-term program to demonstrate to the members of the clans the advantages to them from individual rather than communal land tenure. The long-term objective would be legislation by the District Congresses providing for division of the clan lands when a majority of the clan members so opted. In the interim the policy of leasing clan lands to individuals could be encouraged since it is a policy that would be acceptable without too much difficulty in most of Micronesia.

4. Other appropriate methods of working toward the individual land tenure objective can also be developed -- e.g., the conditioning of mortgage credit to individually owned land parcels, and the levying of a general land tax in money.

5. The District Congresses should also be asked (and guided) to develop legislation simplifying land inheritance and local land tenure systems.

6. Both for the immediate and the longer run situation, the Mission recommends that the homesteading regulations of the Trust Territory Government be made more flexible. The low existing acreage limits on homesteading tend to perpetuate subsistence utilization of the land, and the economic development of Micronesia would be fostered by having fewer people receive larger parcels of land that would permit them to engage in commercial farming.

HOUSING

Possibly the most shocking sight in the beautiful islands of the Trust Territory is that of the widespread corrugated iron slum shacks that go under the name of housing. The problem is acute in the semi-urban district centers and on the congested island of Ebeye where live the Micronesian laborers for the Kwajalein base. The Mission does not recommend any give-away housing program for the Trust Territory but it feels that the following elements of a housing policy are appropriate, and their cost has been included in the Mission's estimate of capital requirements.

1. In the very special case of Ebeye (where the crowding and unsanitary conditions helped spread a disastrous polio epidemic last year), there should be a housing program to replace virtually all the houses on the island which should be in conjunction with the installation of the water supply and sewage systems provided for in our Public Works program. However, the cost of the housing (concrete block) could be repaid by the Ebeye residents over a 20 year period, even allowing for a modest interest charge. The cost of such a general housing replacement program on Ebeye should be approximately \$400,000, and should be administered along with other programs outlined below by a Housing and Town Planning Unit at Headquarters.

2. This Unit should establish the urban plans, zoning ordinances and minimum building codes that are urgently needed in the more populous district centers such as Moen in the Truk District.

3. The Housing Unit should also organize the commercial purchase,

stocking and selling of critical construction materials, primarily lumber and cement, to enable private individuals to replace and improve their own housing. The building supplies fund should be \$450,000 for maximum impact on housing throughout the territory. The private trading companies are reluctant for many reasons to undertake this business, but it is critically needed. Once started by the Trust Territory Government, it should be possible at a later date to persuade the trading companies to take over this operation.

4. The Housing Unit should be prepared to lend funds on a long-term, low-interest basis for a housing development in Garapan on Saipan (\$300,000 including utilities and access roads), and in Moen on Truk (\$50,000 to start).

C. Capital Requirements for the Development Programs

The capital requirements for the development programs recommended in the various sections of this report are summarized below according to the territory wide activity and by each district. In the classification by districts, those activities which did not lend themselves to an areal distribution are classified under the heading "territory wide". School construction costs were distributed on the basis of projected school enrollment because detailed information was not available to plan for schools on an individual location basis. The relationship of these capital investments to the objectives of each of the programs are discussed under the relevant program sections.

Each of the tables identifies what is termed as an "optimum" and "minimum" program. The former is the maximum level of capital investment that can be realistically sustained in the 4 year period from FY '65 through FY '68 to achieve as rapidly as possible the desired goals for political, economic and social development. The latter is considered to be the minimum level of capital investment necessary to assure achievement of the political objectives but involving a less rapid rate of economic and social development.

The minimum level rather than the optimum levels of capital funding would result in the following program changes:

Table I

FY '65-'68 Capital Requirements for Development Programs

(by function) (In thousands of dollars)

	<u>Optimum</u>	<u>Minimum</u>
Education	\$ 9,944	\$ 8,088
Public Health	2,384	2,184
Agriculture and Fisheries	550	450
Economic Development Fund	5,000	3,000
Public Buildings	400	400
Public Safety and Judiciary	910	460
Sea Transportation	1,257	1,337
Air Transportation	200	200
Communication and Radio	2,700	1,200
Public Works and Utilities		
Airports	4,235	2,535
Harbors	1,300	1,300
Water Supply	1,545	1,545
Roads	2,655	1,480
Sewage Systems	745	545
Electric Power Systems	1,093	893
Employee Housing	1,190	1,190
Other	1,379	1,128
General Administration	500	500
Equipment Replacement	2,500	1,935
Housing Assistance	1,200	800
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	\$ 41,687	\$ 31,170

Table II

FY '65-'68 Capital Requirements for Development Programs
By Districts (In thousands of dollars)

	<u>Optimum</u>	<u>Minimum</u>
<u>Marianas District</u>		
Schools	\$ 1,074	\$ 873
Sub-hospital	100	100
Micronesian Legislative Offices	100	100
Court House	40	40
District Congress Building	50	50
Roads Repair	35	35
Power Plant Overhaul	98	98
Employee Housing	160	160
Ammunition Cleanup	200	0
Equipment Replacement	85	85
Garapan Housing Development (utilities and roads)	300	300
	<u>\$ 2,242</u>	<u>\$ 1,841</u>
<u>Marshalls District</u>		
Schools	\$ 2,585	\$ 2,103
Court House	40	40
District Congress Building	50	50
Ships and Warehouses	266	266
Airport and Water Supply System	1,450	450
Ebeye Water	245	245
Ebeye Sewage	150	150
Sewage System	350	150
Water Treatment	35	35
Road Improvements	90	90
Power Expansion	60	60
Employee Housing	360	360
Reefer	10	10
Ammunition Cleanup	50	0
Island Sub-centers at Jaluit and Wotje includes sub-hospital, dock and warehouse	954	954
Equipment Replacement	300	200
Housing Loan Fund	400	250
	<u>\$ 7,395</u>	<u>\$ 5,413</u>

II-C

	<u>Optimum</u>	<u>Minimum</u>
<u>Palau District</u>		
Schools	\$ 1,084	\$ 882
Sub-hospital	100	100
Entomology Laboratory	50	50
District Congress Building	50	50
Ships and Terminal Facilities	320	320
Airport	1,200	500
Water Supply	180	180
Roads	575	575
Sewage Extension	35	35
Employee Housing	170	170
Move POL Yard	40	40
Rehabilitation or Public Works Area	25	25
Equipment Replacement	300	300
	<hr/> \$ 4,129	<hr/> \$3,227
 <u>Ponape District</u>		
Schools	\$ 1,631	\$1,326
Hospital	684	684
District Congress Building	50	50
Court House	40	40
Airfield	1,585	1,585
Boat Channel Dredging and Ships	145	225
Water System Rehabilitation	285	285
Road Improvements	1,020	320
Sewage System	110	110
Power Plant	600	400
Employee Housing	170	170
Kusaie Public Works	35	35
Equipment Replacement	280	280
	<hr/> \$ 6,635	<hr/> \$5,510

II-C

	<u>Optimum</u>	<u>Minimum</u>
<u>Truk District</u>		
Schools	\$ 2,854	\$ 2,321
Hospital	820	820
Sub-hospitals	200	100
District Congress Building	50	50
Court House	40	40
Ships and Warehouse Facilities	295	295
Water Supply and Storage	350	350
Roads	320	120
Enlarge Sewage System	65	65
Rebuild Power System	185	185
Employee Housing	170	170
Replace Public Works Fuel Line	35	35
Equipment Replacement	420	320
Housing Loan Fund for Moen	50	50
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	\$ 5,854	\$ 4,921

Yap District

Schools	\$ 716	\$ 582
Sub-hospitals	200	100
District Congress Building	50	50
Ships and Warehouse Facilities	231	231
Harbor	1,300	1,300
Water System	450	450
Roads	615	340
Sewage System	35	35
Electric Power	150	150
Employee Housing	160	160
Telephone System	30	30
Equipment Replacement	250	250
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	\$ 4,187	\$ 3,678

II-C

	<u>Optimum</u>	<u>Minimum</u>
<u>Territory Wide</u>		
Dispensaries 50 Units	\$ 280	\$ 280
Agricultural Stations	500	400
Economic Development Fund	5,000	3,000
Jails and Police Stations	750	300
Purchase of DC-4	200	200
Communications	2,700	1,200
Central Construction Equipment Pool	865	500
Capital for Central Supply Fund	500	500
Capital for Building Supplies Fund (private housing)	450	200
	<u>\$11,245</u>	<u>\$6,580</u>

Marianas District

The \$200,000 cost for clearing the northern end of Saipan of undetonated ammunition is eliminated in the awareness that this expenditure can be postponed but not indefinitely.

Marshalls District

The airport would be rehabilitated at a cost of \$100,000 rather than replaced. Although eventual replacement will be necessary, the rehabilitation work will permit continued use of the facility for a few years. The optimum plan contemplated using the new airfield for water catchment, but the present airport is not suitable for this purpose.

A separate water system will need to be constructed at a cost of \$350,000, which is therefore included in the minimum size program. With a smaller supply of water from the separate system, the scale of the sewer system is reduced by \$200,000.

The capital for the housing loan fund is also reduced by \$150,000.

Construction equipment acquisition is reduced by \$100,000.

Palau District

By building the airport to lower standards, the construction cost can be reduced by \$700,000. However, this lower quality will require a larger maintenance program to keep the airport in operating condition.

Ponape District

The road program is reduced by \$700,000. This will require placing more reliance on water transportation and the channel dredging activity is increased by \$80,000 to provide better water access to all parts of the island. The optimum program provided for replacing two electric power generators. One generator can be overhauled for \$200,000 less than it can be replaced.

Truk District

Part of the road construction program is deferred and the acquisition of construction equipment is reduced by \$100,000.

Yap District

The road interconnection to Mop island has been eliminated to reduce total road construction costs by \$200,000.

Territory-wide

1. The minimum program provides \$100,000 less for agricultural station requiring a cut-back in the construction of certain facilities on existing agricultural stations.
2. The economic development fund would be limited to \$3 million under the minimum program. Unless additional private capital can be obtained, the reduction will result in deferring some development projects.
3. The \$450,000 reduction in the minimum program for jails and police

stations would require continued use of certain sub-standard facilities through 1968.

Annual Funding Requirements

Three criteria were used to make a tentative distribution of the optimum capital investment program over the four years from 1965 to 1968. These were: (1) the relative urgency of providing the public services, (2) the attainment of a sustained economic impact from the investments over the four years, and (3) the capability of the government to effectively administer the program - that is, the relative lead-times of the different classes of capital investment. Based on these criteria, the annual investment requirements are summarized in the following table, along with the related operations expenditures.

	<u>(In Millions)</u>			
	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>
Capital investments	10.0	14.0	12.0	5.5
Operations	<u>14.6</u>	<u>16.6</u>	<u>19.1</u>	<u>20.8</u>
Total	24.6	30.6	31.1	26.3
Less Local Revenues and Other Receipts	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1
Net Federal Financing Required	23.6	29.6	30.0	25.2

On the basis of these projections it is recommended that the authorization for the Trust Territory be raised to \$23.5 million in 1965 to \$29.5 million in 1966, \$30 million in 1967 and \$25 million in 1968.

PART III

ADMINISTRATION OF THE TRUST TERRITORY

The current United States administration of the Trust Territory was described briefly in Part I. This part will deal in more detail with the present organization, its problems and the steps necessary to improve its operations to pave the way for implementing the recommendations in Parts I and II.

A. Authority of the Trust Territory government

As noted in Part I, the current government has been created under the authority of the trusteeship agreement approved by the Security Council and a Joint Resolution of the Congress in 1947. The agreement does not specify the machinery to be used by the United States as the administering authority to govern the territory. Article 3 of the agreement simply gives the United States plenary powers of "administration, legislation, and jurisdiction" subject only to the provisions of the agreement which generally deal with the development of the territory, the rights of its citizens and the United Nations and the maintenance of peace and security.

On July 18, 1947, the day he approved the Joint Resolution, the President issued Executive Order No. 9875 which provided for an interim administration of the Trust Territory under the Secretary of the Navy, pending the enactment of an appropriate organic act by the Congress of the United States. This order simultaneously terminated the military government which was established for the territory when the islands were wrested from Japan.

On the same day in a public statement, the President expressed his intention to transfer the civil administration of the Trust Territory to a civilian agency at the earliest practicable date. This transfer was made eventually to the Secretary of the Interior on June 29, 1951, by Executive Order No. 10265. Subsequently, the administration of Saipan and Tinian in the Marianas was transferred back to the Secretary of the Navy by Executive Order No. 10408 of November 10, 1952, and the administration of the rest of the Mariana Islands, except Rota, was similarly transferred by Executive Order No. 10470 of July 17, 1953. On May 7, 1962, by Executive Order No. 11021, the responsibility for the administration of civil government in all of the Trust Territory was again placed in the Secretary of the Interior.

Though several organic acts for the territory were introduced in the Congress in the late 1940's and early 1950's, the Congress has taken no action on the matter. It has, however, confirmed the authority of the Trust Territory government with two enactments. A joint resolution of the Congress, approved August 8, 1953, continued the then civil administration of the Trust Territory to June 30, 1954, on the assumption that a pending organic legislation would be enacted before the latter date. As no such organic legislation had been enacted, another measure, Public Law 451 of the 83rd Congress, to provide for the continuance of the Trust Territory civil administration was approved on June 30, 1954. The 1954 law merely provides for the continuance of an interim civil administration which was established by Executive order of the President. Section 1

of this measure states:

"That until Congress shall further provide for the government of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, all executive, legislative, and judicial authority necessary for the civil administration of the Trust Territory shall continue to be vested in such person or persons and shall be exercised in such manner and through such agency or agencies as the President of the United States may direct or authorize."

The foregoing constitutes essentially all that Congress has provided for the civil government of the Trust Territory. The kind of civil government -- its form, power and authority, design of the administrative and legal machinery, etc. -- which may be established is left to administrative discretion. Beyond its broad delegation to the President, Congress has acted to place an annual ceiling -- currently \$17,500,000 -- on the appropriations for the Trust Territory and annually to review and enact those appropriations.

As is noted in the foregoing paragraphs, the President has been given broad authority over the civil government of the Trust Territory. This broad authority has been delegated alternatively to the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Interior. In his delegation to the latter, first in 1951 and currently under Executive Order No. 11021, the President made the Secretary of the Interior fully responsible for the administration of civil government in all of the Trust Territory. All executive, legislative, and judicial authority necessary for such administration are granted to the Secretary who may redelegate the same to appropriate officials under his jurisdiction.

Two provisos were contained in the 1951 and 1962 delegations, and both pertain to activities in the Trust Territory affecting the foreign policy of the United States rather than to the authority over the civil administration. One relates to the authority, which the President reserves to himself, to close for security reasons parts or all of the Trust Territory. The other provides that the Secretary of the Interior shall keep the Secretary of State currently informed of activities in the Trust Territory affecting foreign policy of the United States and shall consult with the Secretary of State on questions of policy concerning the Trust Territory which relate to foreign policy, and that relations between Federal agencies and organs of the United Nations regarding the Trust Territory shall be conducted through the Secretary of State. Thus, just as Congress has not imposed restrictions on the President for the administration of the Trust Territory, the President did not impose any restrictions in his basic delegation to the Secretary.

However, the 1951 order referred to a memorandum of understanding between the Navy and Interior which the President approved on September 23, 1949, and directed the two departments to effect the transfer to civilian control in accordance with the memorandum. The memorandum provided for the appointment of a civilian High Commissioner by the President to serve, first under the Secretary of the Navy in 1950 and then under the Secretary of the Interior when control was transferred. The remainder of this memorandum dealt with the replacement of military with civilian personnel, exchange of information and transfers of property. Amendments to the memorandum

provide for military control of the entry of persons and vessels into the Trust Territory.

Until August 1962, even United States citizens and flag vessels and aircraft were not permitted to enter the Trust Territory without the permission of the Navy. At that time, the President directed that only applications for entry of aliens and foreign flag ships and aircraft may be vetoed by the Navy. As the latest agreement between the Department of the Interior and the Department of the Navy in accord with the President's directive only went into effect on July 1, 1963, it is too early yet to draw any conclusion as to the implications the new arrangements may have on the administration of the area.

A month after the issuance of the President's order in 1951, the Secretary of the Interior issued his own Order No. 2658 to "delimit the extent and nature of the authority of the Government of the Trust Territory" and to prescribe the manner in which the relationships of the Trust Territory government with the Congress, Department of the Interior, other Federal agencies, foreign governments, and international agencies shall be conducted. Essentially, however, the Secretary's order again broadly delegates to the High Commissioner all executive authority for the government of the Trust Territory to be exercised under the "supervision and direction" of the Secretary. It also provides that "judicial authority shall be independent of the executive and legislative powers."

Subsequently, Department of the Interior Order No. 2812 of April 6, 1956, required Washington clearance with respect to the certain actions of the High Commissioner. It provided that the High Commissioner, in the exercise of his authority in the Trust Territory, shall obtain the approval of the Secretary of the Interior (a) of any proposed new Trust Territory law or regulation or amendment to an existing law or regulation which embodies important changes in policy, and (b) of any significant change in the budget as approved. The latter includes the transfer of funds between programs or between operating and construction funds, and the expenditure of local revenues in excess of the amount estimated in the budget as it was justified to Congress.

In much of its administrative relationships with the Department of the Interior, the Trust Territory government now deals with or through the Office of Territories in that Department. This office is headed by a Director whose major responsibility is to serve "as the principal staff advisor to the Office of the Secretary of the Interior" on territorial matters. He initiates or reviews major policy and program proposals and broadly directs the implementation of policies and programs approved by Secretarial Officers (i.e., the Secretary, Under Secretary and Assistant Secretaries). While the office does administer Canton and Enderbury Islands, Jarvis, Baker, Howland, and Palmyra Islands, its main function is to provide administrative and liaison services for the larger territories.

Department of the Interior Order No. 2658 provides for certain specific relationships between the Office of Territories and the Trust Territory government. Section 3(c) states in part that "with freedom to consult directly with the Secretary (of Interior) when necessary, the High Commissioner of the Trust Territory shall normally communicate with the Secretary of the Interior through the Director of Territories." Paragraph (d) of the same section provides that, in dealing with Federal agencies outside the Department of the Interior on other than routine matters, initial contact shall be made through the Office of Territories. Thereafter, direct contact may be maintained by the Trust Territory, but the Office of Territories must be kept informed of significant developments. Thus, though it is evident from a review of the various sources relating to the authority of the Trust Territory government that it is fully subject to the control and direction of the Secretary of the Interior, it is equally evident that the Office of Territories is not in the line of command of this relationship.

B. Administrative relationship with Washington

As indicated in the preceding paragraphs, Washington has imposed a minimum of restraints on the administration of the Trust Territory by the High Commissioner. Congress has not provided for a government of the territory except to authorize the continuation of the present one which was established by executive action. Similarly, delegation orders issued by both the President and the Secretary of the Interior have provided hardly any substantial restricting policies on the administration of the Trust Territory by territorial officials.

While under optimum conditions such lack of administrative restrictions might be desirable from an administrator's point of view in that it would provide for administrative flexibility, the fact is that during the past years this minimum of supervision and guidance by Washington has fostered the development of territorial government machinery which does not readily respond to policy changes prescribed by Washington. For example, the Mission found that even after over a year since the issuance of NSAM No. 145, many of the responsible officials of the Trust Territory government were still unfamiliar with the United States objectives as outlined in that instrument. Yet, it would be these same officials on whom we must rely for the achievement of those objectives.

Responsibility for any problems resulting from the present situation cannot be focused on any one cause. Over the years the Trust Territory government has learned to function without significant guidance from Washington.

With only three territories remaining under the international trusteeship system, international pressures for the United States to meet her commitments under the trusteeship agreement will markedly increase during the next few years. Public interest in the territory will also continue to increase as it has increased during the past year since the relaxation of entry controls into the area. Further, Washington is beginning to respond to pressures to prepare the Micronesians for participation in the world of the Twentieth Century. Congress has recently doubled the annual appropriation for the territory; the President has directed the substantial upgrading of public services for the Micronesians. The next few years of the administration of the Trust Territory accordingly will be subjected to more intense examination by both national and international interests.

To protect fully the interest of the United States during those critical years, Washington must provide more supervision and direction over the administration of the Trust Territory. It not only must provide general policy guidance, but also must establish specific guidelines which the territory must follow if the recommendations in Parts I and II of this report are to be effectively implemented. Accordingly, the Mission recommends the following with respect to the working relationships between Washington and the Trust Territory government:

First, the Task Force created by NSAM No. 145 or some similar group should continue to serve as a program and policy advisory group to the Secretary.

The Task Force consists, at the Assistant Secretary level, of representatives from Federal agencies most concerned with the Trust Territory -- the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Department of the Interior. Observers from the National Security Council and Bureau of the Budget are also included in the group.

The Mission believes the Task Force provides a necessary mechanism not only for calling to the Secretary's attention the effect of Trust Territory programs and policies on the agencies it represents but also for involving those agencies on a somewhat continuing basis in Trust Territory matters of concern to them. A "master plan" of priority programs such as that represented by the recommendations of the report should be reviewed by this group for appropriate recommendations to the Secretary of Interior. It would review periodically with the High Commissioner and appropriate officials of the Office of Territories the status and progress of programs contained in the "master plan" to ascertain that pre-set goals and objectives have not been altered. Where such alterations have occurred, or should change in goals be desired, it would so advise the Secretary.

Second, an evaluation team should be organized to visit the Trust Territory preferably on an annual basis for the next few years. The primary function of such a team would be to ascertain by field inspections that programs are being implemented in accordance with the terms of reference

approved by Washington. Secondly, and only if it would not jeopardize the primary mission of the team, it would provide on-the-spot advice to officials and agencies of the Trust Territory government in accordance with the type of expertise found in the membership of the team. Thus, if a personnel expert is a member of a particular mission, he should be available to render assistance to the personnel staff of the Trust Territory government.

The team would consist of persons who are individual experts in the various fields of public services which would be reviewed. The members could be either Government officials or private citizens and each mission need not consist of the same individuals. Though it would be very useful for the Task Force mentioned above to nominate the membership, the team should serve the Secretary of Interior. Copies of any team reports, however, should be made available to the Task Force for such consideration and action as it determines appropriate.

Third, the High Commissioner's legislative authority should be clarified and his legislative enactments should be approved by the Secretary. As noted earlier, Department of the Interior Order No. 2812 requires the High Commissioner to obtain Secretarial approval of new laws and regulations embodying important changes in policy. However, neither that order nor the Secretary's basic delegation, Order No. 2658, expressly gives the High Commissioner any of the legislative authority delegated by the President to the Secretary. Order No. 2658 only delegates

executive authority to the High Commissioner. The Mission believes that omission should be corrected in an updating of those orders.

The Mission also notes that since December 31, 1959, 10 new laws amending the Code of the Trust Territory have been promulgated by the High Commissioner of which only one was submitted for approval by the Secretary of the Interior. Three sets of regulations, apart from amendments to the Code, were adopted, only one of which had Secretarial approval. Without going into the question of which ones should have been approved, and while the list of promulgations does not appear too impressive (see Appendix A to Part III), it appears that the issuance of new laws and amendments is a function of such importance as to merit Secretarial approval in every instance. Accordingly, the Mission recommends updating the current Secretarial orders to require approval of all new laws and amendments except in case of emergency.

Fourth, the annual budgets of the Trust Territory should be given more intensive examination by the Department of the Interior. As the annual budgets are the primary implementing tool of new programs, it is recommended that the budgets submitted by the High Commissioner for presentation to the Congress be subjected to more intensive examination by the administering agency. Budget items which would affect any long-range program for the territory must be reviewed thoroughly for consistency with that program before they are made a part of the President's budget. A comparison of recent estimates prepared by the High Commissioner and those

submitted to the Bureau of the Budget indicated that the Department of Interior has been serving merely as a transmitting agency.

Fifth, Interior approval should be required for those departures from the Business Investment Code (proposed in Part II, Section A of this report) that would have significant impact on the Trust Territory.

Sixth, the appointment of the High Commissioner should be made by the Secretary of the Interior. It was earlier explained how the High Commissioner came to be appointed by the President. That appointment may be viewed as a subtle and indirect Presidential control over the management of the affairs of the Trust Territory. However, it is somewhat anomalous in view of the President's complete delegation to the Secretary of the Interior.

Further, while it is not usual to have Presidential appointees serving under the supervision of other Federal officers, as far as the Mission can determine, the High Commissioner's appointment situation is now unique. We are not aware of any other case in which the President appoints an officer whose position is not specified in law and who has continuing operating responsibilities. The President's Executive Order No. 10265, incorporating by reference the memorandum of understanding which provided for Presidential appointment, has been superseded. The current delegation, in Executive Order No. 11021, does not refer to the office of High Commissioner and does not indicate any Presidential reservation of that appointment. Therefore, the only currently effective order relating

to the High Commissioner's office is Secretarial Order No. 2658 which is silent on the manner of appointment.

We believe this very unusual situation should be clarified, not only because of the doubts it raises but also because it is particularly important that the High Commissioner be completely responsible to the Secretary of Interior who has been charged with the administration of the Trust Territory. This will be most important during the next few important years. The Mission, therefore, recommends that High Commissioners be appointed by the Secretary of Interior as long as the latter official is held responsible for the overall administration of the Trust Territory and until such time as Congress enacts an organic act for the government of the Trust Territory.

(A draft of a new Secretarial order to replace the current Orders Nos. 2658 and 2812 and of the above recommendations is attached as Appendix B to Part III.)

C. Administrative organization under the High Commissioner

As noted earlier, the government of the Trust Territory is organized into a headquarters unit and six districts. The High Commissioner, as the chief executive of the territorial government, directly administers the headquarters unit in Saipan. A district administrator is the head of each district and is responsible to the High Commissioner through the Deputy High Commissioner.

Both headquarters and the districts are organized along functional lines. Headquarters, for instance, has a Director of Education, a Director of Public Health, a Director of Agriculture and Fisheries and a Director of Public Works. Similarly, there are counterpart officials in the district level who are subordinates of the district administrator. Thus, in all districts there are also department heads for education, public health, agriculture and public works. In addition, both headquarters and the districts have field activities. Pacific Island Central School and the Farm Institute in Ponape are examples of field activities which are operated directly from headquarters at Saipan. Field dispensaries and schools represent the most common type of field facilities which are run by the district centers.

In general, the organizational structure for both headquarters and the district administrations has been formed along basically sound lines. However, the territorial government has a most vexing problem of communications between headquarters and the districts. When one considers the

geographical distribution of the islands and atolls over an area covering over three million square miles, it is easy to appreciate the physical difficulties involved even working with the most modern of communication facilities. With the distances involved, face-to-face discussions between headquarters and field personnel and exchanges between districts are minimal. The district administrators only meet annually, for example. Throw in even a little confusion as to the allocation of functions between headquarters and the district organizations and one should not be surprised to detect feelings of frustration among many officials. An inquiry into this problem in one of the districts elicited this response from a district administrator: "It is difficult to communicate with headquarters, I have three dispatches now for which I have not received any reply. I don't know what they do with our inquiries. Maybe throw them in the waste basket." Another district administrator claimed he did not know what happened to his current (FY 1964) budget estimates since the district administrators' annual conference in July 1962. An assistant district administrator stated that headquarters had no confidence in them, referring to the staff in his district. How much of these beliefs are true is beside the point. These and other similar instances point to the general problem of communication in the organization.

In a setting such as that which obtains in the Trust Territory administrative organization where geographical, technical, language and cultural considerations have vital roles, the development of effective communication media and devices becomes critical. Goals and objectives prescribed by

headquarters staff must not only be understood but must also be accepted by the district personnel who are responsible for the realization of such goals and objectives. Adequate manuals of procedures, policy directives and especially staff conferences must be utilized if the organization is to develop any semblance of single-purpose mindedness.

In this regard, the Mission was informed that the development of an integrated manual of procedures is being planned, incorporating therein procedures which have been developed on an intermittent basis. The Mission further recommends that a regular procedures-improvement program be adopted and that a middle-grade organization and procedures specialist be employed for the purpose. The Mission also recommends that the district administrators' conferences be held more often than once a year.

However, in the Trust Territory, the physical problems of communication and dispersal over a vast area, in the Mission's opinion, are further complicated unduly by an over centralization of authority at headquarters and a lack of appropriate delegation of powers to the functional departments. Essentially, the High Commissioner utilizes his department heads as staff officers. They have no real operating authority delegated to them and do not directly deal with or supervise their district counterparts. The latter are subordinate to and supervised by the district administrators.

Thus, the channels of communication from the district department head to his counterpart on even minor technical matters are most circuitous since

they involve going through the district administrator and High Commissioner and their key aides in both directions. Since all directives and messages must pass through the High Commissioner's office and the district administrators, those points have a great bottleneck potential. The Mission also heard complaints that supervision of district department heads by district administrators, who did not understand the technical problems of the programs, resulted in arbitrary department budget cuts and unjustified transfers of funds. For whatever reason, there are some district department heads who believe they should be directly supervised by their counterparts at headquarters.

The Mission agrees that there should be more direct communication between district department heads and their headquarters counterparts. We recommend that headquarters department directors be delegated the authority to take action and to supervise directly their district subordinates in technical and professional matters. This action should be taken quickly in those programs -- education, health and agriculture - which do involve a high degree of professional activity. Without such action, the channels of communication and authority will continue to be unduly complex and stymie effective operations.

This change should not totally remove those programs from the cognizance of the district administrators. They must still perform a coordinating role and provide for certain common services and logistics.

In order to spell out the specific and orderly steps needed to achieve these objectives, it is further recommended that an organization and management specialist be sent to the Trust Territory on a short term contract (or detail) which could be financed from the President's Management Improvement Fund.

D. Execution of the Master Plan

The Mission believes that in addition to the improvement of the United States and Micronesian personnel of the Trust Territory government dealt with later in Section G, a new approach to territorial administration is required if the Executive and the Congress want results. This should be the conscious effort to utilize the services of other Federal agencies or to contract out the implementation of the new and expanded programs recommended in this report. Based on its survey the Mission is convinced that results will be quicker and the overall and long-run costs of such a policy cheaper.

Recommendations for contracting the new and expanded capital and operations programs have been made in various sections of this report. It is worth listing here the more important of these programs and activities that should be contracted out to indicate the scope of this approach.

<u>Program or Activity (or implementing personnel)</u>	<u>Contracting Organization or Agency</u>
1. American elementary and secondary teachers	State of Hawaii Department of Education
2. American physicians	Medico
3. Community action	Peace Corps
4. Tropical agricultural research	University of Hawaii, School of Agriculture
5. Fisheries research	Bureau of Commercial Fisheries and the Scripps Oceanographic Institute
6. Quarantine	U.S. Department of Agriculture

7. Immigration	U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
8. Cooperatives and credit union specialists	Cooperative League of U.S.A.
9. Programming and Development Unit	Private consultant organization
10. Surface transportation (inter-district)	Competitive bidding by U.S. firms
Surface transportation (intra-district)	Negotiated contracts with Micronesians
11. Air transportation	Federal Aviation Agency or new contract with Pan American by Civil Aeronautics Board
12. Vital statistics, and Public Health Laboratory backstopping	Public Health Department of Government of Guam

There has been sufficient exploration by the Mission to be reasonably sure of the general appropriateness, and in most cases the particular willingness, of the suggested agencies and contractors to undertake those functions. Contract supervision will pose its own set of problems for the Trust Territory government, but it can handle these problems more readily. To charge the Trust Territory government with the task of implementing with its own staff a relatively large and complicated program will not only involve many years' delay and much waste, but will saddle that government (and the United States) with the costs of permanently swollen bureaucracy necessarily recruited in many cases without full qualifications owing to the pressure of time. The need for many of these contractual services will disappear as certain programs are completed and others are increasingly staffed by qualified Micronesians.

E. Budgeting

The desire to bring education and a higher standard of living to the Micronesian, however strong it may be, cannot be fulfilled without adequate planning. Even a single individual pursuing this goal must face the necessity of careful planning -- financing must be provided, physical resources mobilized, labor applied and accomplishments evaluated. While the effective individual may follow the planning process without an overt consciousness, the effective large scale organization must include planning as an integral part of its operations as an overt rational process. For government organizations, the budget process, through its cycle of formulation, execution, and evaluation, has become a primary mechanism for planning.

When budgeting was discussed with officials at the district and headquarters levels, the usual reaction was -- "The budget is too small." While this response would not be unexpected in almost any government organization, it was evident that most of the officials only thought of the budget in this narrow sense, i.e. -- an amount of money currently available for expenditure. Very few line officials thought of budgeting as a planning process through which a program is developed to make optimum utilization of whatever amount of funds were or could be expected to be made available.

Heads of departments and district administrators seem to consider the formulation and execution phases of budgeting as two separate processes. Typical district department heads said they submitted a budget estimate

in the spring and didn't hear anything further until the next June or July. Then, in most cases, the budget allotment received in June or July bore little relationship to the estimate submitted a year ago. Other than being accompanied by a ceiling on non-resident and Micronesian employment, the budget allotment was simply a dollar amount that could not be exceeded during the fiscal year. Line officials were not told which parts of their budget estimate submitted a year ago had been approved or disapproved nor were they given guidance on what to use the funds for. Headquarters made the allotments in a lump sum, and instructed the districts to show how the funds were distributed among its programs. The budget office at headquarters indicated, however, that the distribution of allotments by programs submitted by the districts to headquarters was primarily for information purposes and not for program control. Given these conditions, it is not difficult to see why effective planning has not been done through the budget process.

The lack of an effective link between the formulation and execution phases of budgeting and the lateness of allotment advice from headquarters (usually just prior to the beginning of the fiscal year) leaves inadequate time for district planning. In most instances, planning by the district department heads consists of figuring out where to add any additional personnel, if the personnel ceilings are greater than the current employment, and determining what would be left over to buy supplies after the salaries of all personnel were paid.

This past year, when a Micronesian pay increase went into effect and increased personnel costs, the funds remaining for supplies and equipment in some departments were inadequate to support effective operations. Aside from the lack of appropriate planning to allow for the pay increases in the government's overall budget, line officials had not adjusted their programs to accomplish more limited amounts of work which may have required reducing personnel to provide funds for supplies and equipment so the remaining portion of the program could be carried on effectively. The operation of the public works departments, for example, were hindered by a lack of spare parts, but action had not been taken to reduce personnel costs so additional funds could be made available for purchasing spare parts.

The bifurcation of budget formulation and execution, and the allotment of funds on a lump-sum basis to the districts, has also left executive officials without a means of insuring that funds would be spent for the purposes for which they were justified. The department heads at headquarters could not through the budget execution processes insure that the program justified to the Congress was in fact being carried out. As an example the 1963 budget request presented to and passed by the Congress, indicated that \$300,000 would be used to establish a revolving stock fund for supplying the districts with POL (petroleum and other lubricant) products. As of the end of the 1963 fiscal year funds still had not been used for this purpose.

Amid these problems, it is of some encouragement to note that the deficiencies of the budgeting process have not gone unnoticed by the High Commissioner. On February 15 of this year he established a Budget and Fund Utilization Subcommittee consisting of the executive officer, programs officer, a special assistant to the High Commissioner in charge of construction projects, the director of property and supply, the comptroller and the budget officer. This committee was given responsibilities for reviewing budget estimates prior to their submission to Washington, evaluating performance in relation to the budget program, making recommendations on proposals for changing the budget program, and reviewing long-range plans and programs. The High Commissioner identified a number of current problems in budget preparation, reporting, program evaluation and auditing, long-range planning, and budget execution for the committee's attention.

Several changes made in the accounting system and the allotment procedure during the last few months should also improve the budget process. A newly issued accounting manual provides for setting up a system of accounts which will produce information on the cost of each program and activity and more detailed information on unit costs. Unfortunately, the district finance officers' lack of accounting training may slow the implementation of the new system and limit its reliability. Only one out of the five district finance officers questioned said that he could set up the new accounting system without help.

Headquarters also recently issued a new cost accounting system for construction projects and delegated to the districts the responsibility for cost accounting. However, the new system appears to be poorly conceived in that it requires distributing costs to 41 different object classifications. This amount of detail seems to be excessive without providing any useful end-product information. The public works departments at the district level indicated that they would have difficulty in distributing costs this finely -- the increase in paperwork would also be significant.

To facilitate some of the actions already underway and to overcome other budgeting problems, the Mission recommends:

1. A qualified accountant should be employed by headquarters to assist the districts with their accounting. Most of his time should be spent with the districts, preferably on a rotation basis so each district would be visited at least twice a year.
2. District finance officers should be given additional formal training in accounting. Short training sessions at headquarters can be used as a stop-gap measure, but if the incumbents are to remain in their positions, they need to have additional training outside the territory.
3. The cost accounting system for construction projects should be revised. A new system should be developed which will accumulate cost information on the same basis as detailed estimates are made for construction projects. The end product which the

cost accounting system should provide is actual cost information which can be evaluated against the elements of the original construction estimate. Then, upon the completion of construction, actual cost information would be available for evaluation purposes and use on future estimates for similar construction. If certain object classification information is needed for other purposes, it should be obtained by coding vouchers.

As mentioned earlier, the High Commissioner, in a memorandum of March 6, 1963, recognized the need for improving the budgeting process. Although some specific changes have already been made, a general plan of the budget planning process has not been established. The following recommendations are made as a general outline for the process --

1. Preliminary budget estimates should be required in March, or 15 months before the start of the fiscal year in which the funds are to be used. Preparation of these estimates should be the primary responsibility of the headquarters staff. The districts should, however, be canvassed to identify any significant changes they expect to request in their next budget submissions.

2. Budget policy guidance and instructions for the regular budget request should be sent to the districts by May 1. If only a target amount is given to the districts as a guide for budget preparation, they should be asked to prepare a priority listing of programs or program elements which would be included or

excluded if their target figure were increased or decreased by 10 percent. Very few of the district budget justifications are now based on workload data. Headquarters should insist on workload data to support budget requests. Districts should submit their budgets to headquarters by July 1. (When the Territorial Congress is given the power to participate in the budget review process this date will need to be advanced.)

3. As described in Part II, Section A, chapter 5, the Programming and Development Unit (to be established by contract) in headquarters will play a key role in the budget formulation process. It would provide direct staff assistance to the High Commissioner and would be responsible for the overall programming and budget coordination. In addition to evaluating the merits and soundness of individual proposals, the headquarters' review should identify program priorities. New programs requiring additional transportation, supply, public works and other auxiliary activities should be carefully coordinated to insure that adequate support will be available. As tentative conclusions are reached on a budget program, changes proposed by headquarters should be specifically identified by activities within each district, rather than a lump-sum amount for the district as a whole and should be discussed with the district administrator concerned. Material prepared for final decision making by the High Commissioner should contain a complete analysis, including the evaluation of the department heads and

district administrators, of alternative program proposals.

The budget program request should be submitted to the Department of the Interior by September 1. Alternative program levels should be submitted to the Department for review as requested.

4. The districts should be advised as soon as the budget request is submitted to Washington of changes in their programs. This will permit them to keep abreast of the planning program and to revise their plans as necessary.

In December, the headquarters will be advised of the programs and amounts that are to be included in the President's budget. Again the districts should be advised of any changes affecting their programs.

At this time the districts should be requested to provide an apportionment plan by quarters (the first quarter should be broken down by months in case the annual appropriation bill is not passed by the beginning of the fiscal year) for those programs that require larger apportionments in some quarters than others. The Mission observed that the districts had to delay requisitioning needed supplies when apportionments did not allow for normal peaks in requisitioning. This problem becomes particularly acute when the annual appropriations bill has not been passed and the districts receive only monthly apportionments. Medical supplies

and spare parts, which are used at a fairly uniform rate, are normally requisitioned the first month of each quarter. When the requisitioning is delayed by a month or two, programs are disrupted. The continuing resolution passed by the Congress, when final action has not been completed on the annual appropriation bill, is flexible enough to permit larger apportionments in the first month of the quarter to meet normal purchasing schedules. The headquarters should allow for the normal peaks in requisitioning when the quarterly or monthly apportionments are made.

5. The Department of the Interior should keep the headquarters advised of changes in the budget request as it moves through the Congress. Unless a significant change in program would be required as a result of House of Representatives action, the districts should wait until after the Senate has acted (by this time a reasonably accurate estimate can usually be made of the final program and amount that will be approved by the Congress) before taking further action to adjust their programs. If the budgeting process described above is followed, the headquarters and districts will have a planned program for the coming year available when the Congress takes final action on the appropriation bill. This program should be used by the districts to request apportionments from headquarters.

6. After apportionments are made and programs are implemented, the district administrators and headquarters should be furnished

progress reports monthly or quarterly -- depending on the type of program. These reports should relate the work performed and the costs incurred with the workload and financial plans prepared during the earlier phases of the budget process. Data obtained from these reports should then be used for estimating purposes as the budget planning process begins again.

If a process such as the one described above is used, to link the budget preparation, execution, and evaluation, the deficiencies noted earlier in the present operations can be corrected. In addition to changes in the process itself, several other changes relating to budgeting are needed.

Recommendations for immediate changes:

1. Starting in 1965 all construction projects should be fully funded. The past practice of funding annually increments of buildings has been accompanied by inadequate estimates of total project costs and the stretching of construction over a period of years has increased costs.
2. Detailed cost estimates should be made on all construction projects. For large or complex projects this may require funding final design and engineering in one year and construction costs in a subsequent year. On other projects funds should not be apportioned for construction until final design and engineering has been completed.
3. The distribution of funds between capital outlay and operating costs as justified to Congress should not be changed

without approval from the Department of the Interior. Changes in the distribution of funds among operating activities and separately programmed capital outlay items should be approved by the Department of the Interior unless the changes involve amounts less than 10 percent of the activity or project or \$50,000 whichever is the smaller.

4. A fund should be established to finance emergency expenses such as epidemics, typhoon damage, repair of damage to ships, planes, and power and water facilities resulting from "Acts of God." Initially, the fund should be established at \$200,000. The uses of the fund during the past year should be presented in the annual budget justification as a basis for restoring the level of the fund to \$200,000.

5. Accounting for water, power, sewer and hotel operations in the districts should be handled on a business type basis as soon as the districts are capable of setting up the accounting systems. Since the government is the sole supplier of these services, this type of separate accounting is needed to determine accurately appropriate charges.

F. Supply

The procurement of most supplies for the Trust Territory government is done centrally by headquarters. District purchases are permitted only for items costing less than \$75, except in the case of fresh food supplies for district institutions where no limits are applied.

It is estimated that a substantial portion of those supplies has heretofore been procured through the General Services Administration's San Francisco office. However, last June, the territory's Director of Property and Supply indicated that it would further expand its direct-vendor buying from non-GSA sources and rely on GSA sources only when it is in the territory's interest. Vendor buying generally does not involve the solicitation of sealed bids because of the limited number of suppliers but rather the obtaining of informal written quotations.

Again, in the area of supply, the remoteness of the territory and transportation difficulties loom large as sources of problems.

Because of the length of its supply lines, the government must maintain a sizable inventory -- valued at \$900,000 on June 30, 1963. Most of the supplies are kept in the central warehouses in Saipan, but each district has a general warehouse, a medical supply warehouse (under the public health department) and a spare parts warehouse (under the public works department).

Despite this effort, in every district visited a concern was expressed for the inadequate flow of supplies. In some cases, expensive equipment was idle because of the lack of spare parts. Hospital staff stated that medical supplies were short except in Saipan where the hospital "does not have too much difficulty as headquarters can always lend supplies to the district."

Whatever the reasons -- distance or lack of funds for adequate stock -- the supply system is vital to the success of the operation. With the complexities of supply in the Trust Territory, the operation requires professional management. The Mission also believes that a periodic outside review of the operation is necessary to insure that it is currently updated. Since the last such review was about five years ago, it is recommended that another review be made in the next year.

The Mission was advised that an inventory level of four to six months of supplies is necessary. This level appears reasonable in view of the length of supply lines with the increased activities underway in the government, the Mission recommends an increase of about fifty percent -- about \$500,000 -- in the current supply inventory to meet expanding needs. Any further increases will depend on the overall rate of government spending and changes in levels of activities. The supply staff should be apprised of such changes well ahead of time.

G. Personnel

The Trust Territory has two classes of employees, those whose normal place of residence is outside the Territory (or conversely those whose residence in the Territory is attributable solely to their employment) and indigenous personnel. There were 241 of the former and 2191 of the latter as of June 30, 1962. The first group, consisting almost entirely of United States citizens, are employed under a grade structure and wage system which follows the Classification Act of 1949, as amended. Indigenous personnel are employed under standards and rates of pay prescribed in the Micronesian Title and Pay Plan. The three pay schedules provided under this plan are (a) labor, crafts, and domestic work (annual salary range \$634-\$1,851), (b) professional, administrative, and protective (annual salary range \$520-\$3,785), and (c) senior professional and executive positions (annual salary range \$2,080-\$4,840). The government gives first opportunity in filling positions to qualified Micronesians. If none are available, selections are made through U.S. Federal Civil Service Registers with preference given to Guam, Hawaii, and San Francisco, in that order.

The Trust Territory has pursued an active policy of replacing non-indigenous personnel with Micronesians. Since this policy was adopted, Micronesians have taken over 76 positions formerly held by non-indigenous staff members. Given an adequately trained supply of manpower, such a policy would be very desirable as a means of creating an increasing degree of local self-government in the area. However, while Micronesian

employees seem to have met the minimum personnel qualifications for the positions they entered in terms of on-the-job experience, the Mission observed that their level of competence and performance was significantly below the level expected from non-indigenous personnel. We attributed much of this deficiency to the employees' meager educational achievement prior to their appointment. For example, a Micronesian administrative assistant to a district administrator, who was appointed to a position formerly held by a IGS-9 non-indigenous employee, had the following educational background: 4 years elementary school, 2 years intermediate school, and 3 months at the College of Guam during a summer session. When the employee was first appointed to this position he had only the minimum qualifications of 5 years on-the-job experience. In other cases, Micronesians who had had a good educational background were moved into advanced supervisory positions before they were capable of assuming the full responsibilities of the position. One department head at the district level candidly admitted to a member of the Mission that he needed additional experience before he adequately could supervise the non-indigenous employees under him.

These accounts reflect a most urgent personnel requirement in the Trust Territory -- the need for adequate training of Micronesian personnel. If the native population is to make progress toward a greater degree of local self-government, there is an urgent need for more training, particularly in the area of professional and technical skills. Even with additional scholarships recommended in the education section of

Part II of this report, it will take a number of years to meet the need for professional and technical skills. Micronesians are now filling most of the manual and clerical jobs in the government, but their productivity is relatively low. The government has relied heavily upon on-the-job training as a teaching mechanism for manual and clerical employees, but the effectiveness of this training appears to have been limited by inadequately trained supervisors and a lack of supplementation with formal training.

To strengthen the personnel system, the Mission recommends:

1. Micronesians should be placed in jobs held by non-indigenous personnel only when they are fully qualified and can meet the standards of competence and performance expected of non-resident personnel. Qualification tests, similar to the U.S. Civil Service Commission's entrance examinations, should be developed and used to screen applicants for administrative, technical, and professional positions. A one-year probationary period should be established for Micronesians who replace non-indigenous personnel and immediate supervisors should be required to make a detailed evaluation of the Micronesian replacement's performance after nine months.
2. A formal training program in public administration should be established for Micronesians who are promising candidates for positions at the district administrator, assistant district administrator, and district department head level. The training could be provided through

a contract with one of the United States public administration schools. An intensive three-month summer program at headquarters is suggested.

3. The educational scholarship program for Micronesians should be expanded. (Detailed recommendations on this are included in the education section of the report, II-B-5.)
4. Because of the special needs in the area, the Micronesian medical practitioners should receive additional training not only at the East-West Center but also in the new program being worked out by the Hilo hospital in Hawaii. Although this additional training will still be short of United States M.D. standards, it will increase the effectiveness of the medical practitioners who still have a vital role in the public health program of the Trust Territory.
5. Additional emphasis should be given to clerical and manual labor training and to the training of first-line Micronesian supervisors. Formal training which would supplement to on-the-job training is particularly needed. Evening classes taught by qualified United States personnel could be organized for this purpose and small bonuses paid to those employees who successfully complete them.

There is also a need to broaden the horizons of Micronesian employees. Micronesians are now appointed, with very few exceptions, to positions within their own districts. This practice tends to perpetuate parochialism which is already too prevalent in the Territory. The

Mission recommends that Micronesian employees at the higher executive and supervisory levels should be offered and encouraged to accept positions in other districts as a means of getting more interaction among the people of the Territory.

With the additional responsibilities brought on by the new and expanded development program for the territory, several key positions at the headquarters department head level need to be upgraded. The Director of Education at the present time does not have direct responsibility for the operation of the school system. Earlier in the report the Mission has recommended that the Trust Territory government assume full responsibility for education and that the Director of Education have direct responsibility for the operation of the schools. Similarly, the responsibilities of the Director of Engineering and Construction (now called Public Works) will increase with the expansion of the construction program. The Mission specifically recommends that the following positions be upgraded because of the additional responsibilities:

	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
Director of Education	IGS-13	IGS-15
Director of Public Works	IGS-13	IGS-15
Director of Engineering and Construction	IGS-14	IGS-15

The program recommended in this report envisions additional responsibilities, not only greater in scope but also different in character from those carried on by the present Trust Territory government personnel, even though the majority of these programs are to be executed on a

contract basis. Therefore, a timely evaluation of the capabilities of the present staff to carry out their responsibilities should be made, and therefore, the Mission recommends that the Department of the Interior detail three qualified employees to the High Commissioner for service as a personnel evaluation committee.

At the present time the Trust Territory government does not have a program for periodically rotating its professional staff to stateside jobs. Periodic rotation to the United States seems to be a desirable method of overcoming the limited educational and training opportunities for professionals in the territory. A number of the U.S. professional staff at headquarters and in the districts have served in the territory for over five years without a stateside rotation. While this record of devotion to duty is commendable, the need to periodically widen one's horizons and gain additional training should not be overlooked. The Mission recommends that professional employees who have served four years or more in the territory be requested to take a stateside position for a two-year period. The Department of the Interior should have the responsibility for finding appropriate positions for these personnel.

Traditionally, one of the sorest points in the territorial administrations of the United States has been the differences in treatment accorded non-indigenous and indigenous personnel. This problem is already becoming apparent in the Trust Territory and will grow as Micronesians are trained for, and advance into more responsible positions. The evolution toward increasing self-government also requires the elimination of

distinctions and the appearance of treating Micronesians as second-class employees in their own government. Finally, since it is anticipated that Micronesians may soon have free access to the United States, the government must be able to offer competitive salaries and employment conditions to its citizens who otherwise would be attracted to United States jobs. A significant difference between the professional salary levels in the United States and Micronesia when full access to the United States is offered would undoubtedly result in a loss of urgently needed Micronesians who have full professional training. This must be avoided. The objective then, should be to work toward a gradual change in the personnel program to achieve a single system. To achieve this goal, it is recommended that:

First, a new schedule D should be added to the existing Micronesian pay plan. This schedule would be reserved for use only by Micronesian senior professional employees and officials who meet every qualification requirement for comparable grades in the Federal civil service. This new schedule would be the link or bridge between the existing Micronesian pay plan and the Federal employees' pay plan. Accordingly, any grade in the new schedule would begin about the top step in the present Micronesian pay plan and end about the beginning step of the comparable grade in the General Schedule. The new schedule D should have not less than six steps nor more than ten. For example, GS-9 grade is equivalent to C-1 grade in Micronesian pay plan. The beginning step for grade D-1 in the proposed schedule D would start at Step 2 of C-1, i. e., at \$3,265 per annum, and

would increase annually to a top step which is the beginning step of GS-9 in the GS scale, i.e., to \$6,675 per annum.

It is intended that the plan would not only be a transitional schedule but would also serve as an incentive for Micronesian employees, both present and future, to obtain the necessary training to meet professional standards. Admission to the plan therefore should be based on a rigid examination and qualification system. No admission should be made unless the entrant has met every qualification standard requirement in the Federal service for comparable grades. The use of experience in lieu of academic credits for grading entrants should be tightened as much as possible. The new plan would also be used for promotion of persons with exceptional ability. A board should consider cases of this type before the person is permitted to come under the proposed pay schedule.

Second, action should eventually be taken to change the status of U.S. employees from Federal to territorial employees depending on the availability of qualified Micronesian replacements and the anticipated ability to recruit non-Micronesians without offering Federal employee status. U. S. employees employed by the Trust Territory government at the time of the change should be permitted to continue participating in the Civil Service retirement system as long as they continue in the employment of the Trust Territory. However, U. S. employees hired after this date should participate in social security system and should not be eligible for the Civil Service retirement system.

Third, action should be taken to give Micronesians sick leave of 13 days a year as a step toward integrating the two personnel systems. With this additional benefit, the absence of a limitation on the accumulation of annual leave is no longer justified and should be replaced with a limitation of 30 days. The interest of the Micronesians in the establishment of a group life insurance plan should also be explored. Finally, since the level of premiums for the U. S. health benefits program is based on a United States medical fee structure, it would not be appropriate to extend this program to Micronesian employees. The level of fees for medical care in the Trust Territory and the policy of providing medical care regardless of a person's ability to pay, lessen the need for a special medical insurance program for Micronesian personnel. When U. S. employees are no longer eligible for Federal benefits as described above, it may be appropriate to establish a medical insurance program open to all employees of the Territory.

H. Judiciary

The President has delegated all judicial, as well as executive and legislative, authority for the Trust Territory government to the Secretary of the Interior. As noted earlier, in Department of the Interior Order No. 2658, the Secretary has provided that the judicial authority shall be independent of the executive and legislative powers. The order provides that judiciary budgets should be drawn up by the Chief Justice and submitted to the Department of the Interior by the High Commissioner. The latter is only given the function of calling the attention of the Department to any budgetary questions he may have. All regulations bearing on the judiciary must have the prior approval of the Secretary.

The organization, jurisdiction, and functions of the Trust Territory judiciary are detailed in the Trust Territory Code which provides for a High Court, district courts and community courts. Except for the Chief Justice and one Associate Justice appointed by the Secretary, the judges of those courts are Micronesians. Only two major problems were mentioned to the Mission with respect to the territorial judiciary:

First, despite the language of the current Secretarial order, the budget of the judiciary has been subject to review and change by the High Commissioner. The Mission recommends that the procedure called for in the order be adhered to and that the High Commissioner simply transmit the judiciary budget unchanged to the Department of the Interior together with any comments he may wish to make.

Second, cases decided by the territorial judiciary may not be appealed to higher Federal courts. In effect, at present, cases that are decided by the Trial Division of the High Court, which include cases appealed from lower territorial courts, may be appealed only to the Appellate Division of the High Court which includes the same judges as the Trial Division. That the arrangement does not give the appearance of a sound appellate system is recognized by territorial judges, and the Chief Justice has recommended that the Appellate Division be abolished and, instead, that appeals go to the appellate division of the District Court of Guam. The Department of the Interior is working on draft legislation to accomplish this, and, as a result, provide a right of further appeal through the Federal court system. The Mission endorses such action.

The Chief Justice also made several other recommendations to the Mission which we would endorse: (1) the translation of the territory code into local Micronesian languages and distribution of such translation to the numerous non-English-speaking local court judges; (2) increased training for Micronesian judges, trial assistants and other court employees by a law professor serving on a contract basis or as a temporary territorial employee; (3) increased legal scholarships; and (4) improved courthouse facilities (which are provided for in the capital investment program recommended in Part II, Section C). The Chief Justice has also indicated a need for a second Associate Justice. The Mission did not have the opportunity to study this matter, but suggests that it merits serious consideration in view of the workload of the present American judges,

the lack of training of Micronesian judges and the travel and communications problems which exist.

APPENDIX A

LIST OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS, REGULATIONS AND AMENDMENTS TO THE TRUST TERRITORY
CODE SINCE REVISION ON DECEMBER 31, 1959.

Executive Order No. 83 - Dated: August 9, 1960

An Order Establishing the Office of the District Treasurer and amending the Charter of the Palau District Congress, the Yap Island Congress, the Truk District Congress, the Ponape District Congress, and the Marshall Islands District Congress.

Executive Order No. 84 - Dated: December 23, 1960

Amendment of Chapter 6, Section 398 of Trust Territory Code extending the offense of malicious mischief to include littering, and Section 406 clarifying the penalty for bigamy.

Executive Order No. 85 - Dated: December 23, 1960

Amendment of Section 661 of the Code of the Trust Territory concerning requirement for citizens to obtain travel documents prior to departure as prescribed by the High Commissioner.

Executive Order No. 86 - Dated: July 27, 1961 - to be effective September 27, 1961

Amendment of Emigration and Immigration Regulation No. 2, requiring a valid International Certificate of Vaccination and indicating required inoculations.

Executive Order No. 87 - Dated: July 27, 1961

Amendment of the following Sections of the Trust Territory Code: Section 691 pertaining to application for license to marry; Sections 1305, 1309 and 1310 pertaining to eminent domain; and the elimination of all reference to the Island Trading Company of Micronesia wherever the same appears in the Code.

Executive Order No. 88 - Dated: September 18, 1961

Amendment of Section 577, Trust Territory Code, to lower the age requirement for school attendance.

Executive Order No. 89 - Dated: October 11, 1961

Amendment of Chapter 15 of the Code of the Trust Territory concerning Zoning of certain land by District Administrators and regulations pertaining thereto.

Executive Order No. 90 - Dated: September 6, 1962

Amendment of Sections 249, 390, 430, 489, 814, 924, and 926 of the Trust Territory Code - concerning issuance of Process; Arson, Principals and Accessories; Process obligatory upon police; Rules of the Road (Speed Restrictions); Office of Land Management; and, Land and Claims Administrator; duties.

Executive Order No. 91 - Dated: May 18, 1962, to be effective July 1, 1962

Amendment of Chapters 3 and 4 of the Trust Territory Code, concerning the territorial waters and the repeal of Section 39(g) of Chapter 3 and Section 151 of Chapter 4.

Executive Order No. 92 - Dated: November 27, 1962

Amendments and Additions to the Trust Territory Code concerning jurisdiction; Court Fees; Commitment of Insane Persons; Naturalization; Simplified Procedure of settlement of estates of deceased persons where the value of the personal property does not exceed \$1,000.00; "Delinquent Child" defined; Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings; Liability of parent for acts of delinquent child; Registrar of Corporations: duties; Charters; Use of the terms "Co-operative" and "credit union"; Articles of Incorporation; Audit of Accounts; General Application; Existing Corporations; and Violations enjoicable.

Executive Order No. 93 - Dated: March 4, 1963

Amendments and Additions to the Code of the Trust Territory concerning Burglary; Reckless Driving; and Locally produced handicraft.

Executive Order No. 94 - Dated: July 1, 1963 Approved by the Secretary of Interior on July 8, 1963

Revision of Chapter 10, Nationality, Emigration and Immigration - Permission to enter or remain in territorial waters.

Executive Order No. 95 - Dated: July 1, 1963 Approved by the Secretary of Interior on July 8, 1963

Revision of Emigration and Immigration Regulation No. 2 concerning entry of non-citizens into the Trust Territory.

Chapter IV, Board of Marine Inspectors' Regulation, Certificates of Competency - Dated: June 27, 1963 and approved by the High Commissioner, June 28, 1963, concerning Certificates of Competency to be issued by the Board of Marine Inspectors for certain categories of Merchant Marine personnel.

APPENDIX B

Department of the Interior Order No. _____.

Subject: Government of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

Section 1. Purpose. The purpose of this order is to delimit the extent and nature of the authority of the Government of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (hereinafter called "the Trust Territory"), as it will be exercised under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to Executive Order No. 11021 of May 7, 1962, and to prescribe the manner in which the relationships of the Government of the Trust Territory shall be established and maintained with the Congress, the Department of the Interior and other Federal agencies, and with foreign governments and international bodies.

Section 2. Executive authority. (a) The executive authority of the Government of the Trust Territory, and the responsibility for carrying out the international obligations undertaken by the United States with respect to the Trust Territory, shall be vested in a High Commissioner of the Trust Territory who shall be appointed by the Secretary, and shall be exercised and discharged under the supervision and direction of the Secretary.

(b) The relations of the Government of the Trust Territory with the Congress of the United States on all legislative matters, including appropriations, shall be conducted through the Department of the Interior.

(c) With freedom to consult directly with the Secretary when necessary, the High Commissioner of the Trust Territory shall normally communicate with the Secretary of the Interior through the Director of the Office of Territories. The High Commissioner shall be responsible for all United States property in the Trust Territory which is required for the operation of the Government of the Trust Territory and to which the Department of the Interior has custodial title or which it may use under permit. The High Commissioner shall perform such other functions for the Department of the Interior in the Trust Territory as may be delegated to him by the Secretary.

(d) Initial contact by the Government of the Trust Territory with Federal agencies outside the Department of the Interior on other than routine matters shall be established through the Office of Territories of the Department of the Interior. Once the relationship has been established, direct contact between the Government of the Trust Territory and the Federal agencies concerned may be maintained and the Office of Territories kept informed of significant developments in the relationship. Federal agencies should be encouraged to extend their normal Federal services and assistance to the Trust Territory whenever practicable, and the Government of the Trust Territory should be reimbursed for services it performs for other Federal agencies.

(e) Communications of the Government of the Trust Territory with foreign governments and international bodies shall be cleared through the Department of the Interior for transmittal by the Department of

State, unless some other procedure is approved by the Secretary of the Interior.

(f) In exercising his authority the High Commissioner shall obtain prior Secretarial approval of any significant deviation from the budget justification presented to the Congress, any expenditures from local revenues beyond the amount estimated in the budget justification, and any significant transfer of funds between programs or between administration and construction funds.

Section 3. Legislative authority. The legislative authority of the Government of the Trust Territory shall be vested in the High Commissioner of the Trust Territory and shall be exercised and discharged under the supervision and direction of the Secretary. The High Commissioner shall obtain Secretarial approval of any proposed new law or regulation or any proposed amendment to an existing law or regulation, except in the event of an emergency in which case the law or regulation or amendment thereof may be promulgated by the High Commissioner but the Secretary's approval shall be obtained as soon thereafter as possible.

Section 4. Judicial authority. (a) The judicial authority of the Government of the Trust Territory shall be vested in a High Court for the Trust Territory of which the Secretary shall appoint the Chief Justice and the Associate Justice and such other courts as may be established pursuant to law. The judicial authority shall be independent of the executive and legislative powers. Budgetary requests for the territorial judiciary, with supporting justification, should be drawn up by

the Chief Justice of the Trust Territory and submitted for the approval of the Department of the Interior by the High Commissioner of the Trust Territory as a separate item in the annual budget for the Trust Territory. The High Commissioner should call the attention of the Department to any question which he may have regarding the budget for the judiciary. Regulations bearing on the organization or operation of the judiciary shall be submitted to the Secretary of the Interior for approval prior to issuance.

(b) The Solicitor of the Department of the Interior is authorized to exercise all the power of the Secretary of the Interior respecting decisions of the territorial judiciary.

Section 5. Prior orders. Department of the Interior Order No. 2658 of August 29, 1951, and Department of the Interior Order No. 2812 of April 6, 1956, insofar as it pertains to the Trust Territory, are hereby superseded.

Section 6. Existing laws. Existing laws, regulations, orders, appointments, or other acts in effect immediately prior to the effective date of this order shall remain in effect until they are superseded pursuant to the provisions of this order.