

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Trust*

*Territory*

*right that*

*requested*

*was*

*was*

*France*

*Office*

tion concerning  
the Pacific Islands  
is:

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A generous gesture toward its  
people for many things that  
it has done, such as trade, buildings,  
and small machines to help

acknowledge their liability  
to the then mandated islands

Washington--first on a bi-  
lateral basis by the end of 6 months. Interior

has taken the position that compensation must be in money, and has re-  
fused to consider a gift in kind such as the VM suggests. If bi-  
lateral negotiations fail, the Secretary General of the UN might be  
asked to assist.

2. War Damage Claims against the United States

Problem These claims arise from losses sustained as the result (1)  
of US actions during the war or ~~after~~ or actions afterwards in securing  
the area (land claims for airports, etc), or (2) from fallout of nuclear  
experiments in Rongelap.

The US holds that no legitimate claims exist "for losses sus-  
tained as a result of US actions committed in violation of the laws  
of war". This has been a point of great confusion in the minds of the  
Micronesians because we did compensate them for losses of postal savings, etc.

Possible Solutions Interior should correct this misinformation

*Handwritten:*  
National Security Council  
Committee on the Pacific Islands

Random Notes on our conversation concerning  
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

Problems emerging within the next 6-12 months:

1. War Damage Claims against Japan

Problem  
These are claims of long-standing against the Japanese Government  
UN  
The 1964 Visiting Mission strongly recommended that the US should  
renew its representations to the Japanese Govt. with "increased vigour"  
and suggested that the US "might enlist the help of the UN in the  
person of the Secretary-General or a representative chosen by him".  
It further hoped that Japan would make a generous gesture toward its  
one-time ward and mentioned the TTPI had need for many things that  
Japan produces so well--vessels for inter-island trade, buildings,  
machinery, equipment for public utilities, and small machines to help  
village agriculture and industries.

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~  
The Japanese have up to now refused to acknowledge their liability  
by countering that their citizens resident in the then mandated islands  
should be compensated for their losses.

Possible solution

These negotiations could be moved to Washington--first on a bi-  
lateral basis, looking toward a solution by the end of 6 months. Interior  
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immediately for it effects the relations between the US and  
and has since 1946.  
the ~~TTT/~~ Micronesians. The inhabitants undoubtedly ascribe responsibility  
for war damage to the origin of the planes dropping the bomb. The  
UN Visiting Mission suggested that the U S take urgent steps to clear  
up the confusion and dispel any misconceptions that may exist among  
the inhabitants.

So far as the Rongelap claims are concerned, it appears that  
this may be cleared up by this Session of the Congress. A bill  
to compensate the claimants has passed the US House of Representatives,  
but has not been acted upon by the Senate where a sub-committee has  
reported out a bill somewhat different from the House-passed measure.  
This bill should be enacted soon or another set of claims will remain  
unnecessarily on the books. Some Senator might take it under his  
wing and steer it through the Senate. The Visiting Mission report states  
"The Mission realizes that the US Congress has much business to accomplish  
but the people of Rongelap, who live on a level of bare subsistence,  
have been waiting for ten years for justice from the great and rich  
country which holds the trusteeship for their welfare and caused them  
(admittedly by mischance) grievous injury".

3. Establishment of the Congress of Micronesia

The problem

The Visiting Mission recommended that the US Government should  
urgently review its proposed Executive Order, establishing the  
Congress of Micronesia, to ensure that the capacities of the Congress  
will be adequate to fulfil the hopes placed in it. The Mission  
suggested that the US provide for the establishment of select committees  
of the Micronesian Congress with power ~~to investigate~~ of inquiry and  
reporting on important matters of policy and administration including  
economic, political and constitutional development of Micronesia.  
It further suggested the enlargement of the financial responsibility  
of the Congress by granting it authority over the budget and relaxing  
the restrictions on the power to appropriate US subsidies, ~~as some~~  
*and* concurrently with these developments, every effort should be  
made to expand Micronesian control over and participation in the Executive.

The draft Executive Order was given to the Visiting Mission in January 1964. It has not as yet (July 1964) been promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior although apparently Interior has revised it. Delay in issuing the order may be ~~an embarrassment~~<sup>necessary</sup>, but it puts the USG in ~~an embarrassing~~<sup>an embarrassing</sup> position if we now issue it without regard to the ~~many~~<sup>above</sup> recommendations of the Visiting Mission.

The USG has definitely promised that the first elections under the order will be held in November, 1964. Time is running out on us for the establishment of a Micronesian Congress is a new and large concept for which the public must be prepared and educated.

#### Possible Solution

The Order should be issued immediately in order that adequate preparation may be made for the November 1964 elections. If we cannot accept all of the recommendations of the Visiting Mission in regard to the extension of ~~the~~<sup>Micronesian</sup> powers of the Congress, we should be able to issue a strong statement (by the Secretary of the Interior) at the time of promulgation of the Order about the significance of the establishment of ~~the~~<sup>this</sup> Congress as well as ~~a~~<sup>a</sup> statement on the intensive training which the US will provide for Micronesian civil servants, etc. (which are part of the recommendations on strengthening the Executive).

#### 4. Political Future of the Territory

##### The Problem

The Visiting Mission found both the US and the Micronesians vague and undecided about the future; the US Government had no precise ideas ~~about the future of the Territory~~; no date has been set for self-determination; the US does not intend to make them American citizens and does not ~~itself~~ itself contemplate integration. ~~PTI~~ The US Government's vagueness is matched, said the VM, by an equal vagueness--indeed confusion--among the peoples in the TTPI, although most of those queried seemed to want integration with the US.

They state that the conditions for self-determination do not yet exist.

and urge the US to let the Micronesians exercise the act of self-determination at the earliest possible moment consistent with a real choice. They add that self-determination now would come at the high point of dependence on American aid and would almost certainly result in a request for integration, either with the US or with Guam -and add that this would amount in practice to a continuation of a trusteeship by other means--a trusteeship without international supervision.

The Solomon Mission to the TTPI of 1963 reached much the same conclusion that conditions were not ripe for the meaningful exercise of self-determination and that a period of preparation is necessary.

NSAM number 268 still has not been answered, although State and Defense ~~agreed~~ submitted their comments ~~of~~ in December 1963,

Possible Solution

that  
The political education/must go along with educational development has lagged ~~far~~ behind. We should follow up the openings provided by the Visiting Mission report and ~~send~~ put a group to work on it immediately. In this connection, Dr. Robert R. Robbins, Chairman of the Department of Government, Tufts University, was approached by Interior in the spring of 1964 to do such a job, some of the time here and some of it in the field in the TTPI. Dr. Robbins has a sabbatical this year and could be available but apparently Interior has not proceeded with its planning to put him on the job.

The NSAM should be acted upon; a political scientist (preferably Dr. Robbins who is not in government but knows the TTPI and the UN intimately) should be assigned immediately to work out details of political education of the people looking towards a plebiscite. Legislation should be prepared for introduction at the earliest time in the session of the next Congress which would establish a broad framework for political development of the TTPI and early dissolution of the Trusteeship Agreement.

General observations: Handling of the TTPI is and has <sup>been</sup> considered a domestic matter; the area is lumped along with our territories as

a domestic problem; ~~the~~ legislation is handled by the Congressional Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs. At any time, the TTPI could be catapulted into the international scene by the USSR or some of the Asian-African bloc. If ~~the~~ <sup>it</sup> could be considered both by the Executive and Legislative Branches of the US Government as ~~a~~ <sup>a</sup> foreign policy matter, we could get more consideration for the complex issues and problems.

There should be continuing attention paid to it by a coordinating or review body which was charged with the responsibility of preparing ~~plans~~ <sup>plans/legislation</sup> long-range plans for economic development, political development and the necessary legislation including time-tables. The ~~Task Force~~ Inter-Departmental Task Force should be dissolved and a new committee with a new name set up--with membership having access to the Executive ~~branch~~.