

1
99D.140
Box 15560

2052

E 25
B 135
EXCIS

SECRET

This document consists of 29 pages;
No. 11 of 15 Copies, Series A. 03

DRAFT

SECRET

FOR DEPT OF STATE
ERNEST K. LINDL 7

PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE OF
UNITED STATES TERRITORIES AND THE
TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

file on 6/10/65
4/9/65

BACKGROUND

The United States administers four dependent areas:
The non-self-governing territories of Guam, the Virgin Islands,
and American Samoa; and the United Nations Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands (TTPI). No precise policy exists on the
future status of the non-self-governing territories beyond
the obligations in Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter.
National Security Action Memorandum 145 calls for giving TTPI
inhabitants "a real option at the appropriate time to move
into a new and lasting relationship to the United States
within our political framework;" however, NSAM 268's require-
ment that a specific date be set for a plebiscite to realize
the policy objectives of NSAM 145 has not been met. Meantime
the United States has continued to submit information on the
territories to the United Nations in fulfillment of obligations
undertaken under Article 73 of the U.N. Charter.

Extended discussion of U.S. territories and the TTPI in
various United Nations bodies and the prospect of even closer
scrutiny as other colonial problems are solved, coupled with

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY B.H. BAAS DATE 3/2/87
CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL
RDS FOR XDS DATE OADR
TS AUTH. 20X REASON(S) E.O. 12356
ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS [SEC. 1.3 (2) (5)]
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASABLE IN PART
RELEASE DENIED
PA OR FOI EXEMPTIONS B1, A5; B5

SECRET

SECRET

05-421835

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

-2-

the expanded membership of the United Nations and the new strength of the Afro-Asians, pose for the United States complex problems, in dimensions heretofore unprecedented, of both immediate and potential impact on the international political and military posture of this country.

Appendices I, II, and III to this paper discuss in detail the character of the three major problem areas that lie ahead. These are:

1. The growing desire of the inhabitants of the U.S.-administered territories for more self-government and for clarification of their relationship with the United States.
2. The increased importance of the territories, and insular areas in general, for present and potential military use and the consequent need to insure their continued availability.
3. Increased international interest, manifested by Afro-Asian and Communist initiatives, in directing attention to U.S. territories and the TTPI.

COURSES OF ACTION

The range for possible action by the United States is

DECLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~

OS-421836

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

-3-

relatively small. It can continue to do nothing and ignore any international censure and the political pressures within the American territories for a new status. Or, it can begin now to draw up a coordinated plan which will remove the non-self-governing label and culminate in a clear definition of the relationship of the territories to the United States which will effectively terminate the international obligations of the United States relative to their administration. This would call for an immediate, coordinated approach which takes into full account pertinent international obligations and political and military realities. We conclude in the light of our existing international obligations and the political factors described elsewhere in this paper that the United States should draw up and move now to implement a coordinated program which effectively removes the non-self-governing label and clearly defines the relationship of the territories to the United States.

Our international obligations are such that the effective removal of the U.S. territories and the Trust Territory from international scrutiny will require United Nations approval or acquiescence. Such UN approval, acquiescence, or tacit agreement

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

05-421837

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

-4-

can be obtained only if the U.S. territories and the TTPI are given freedom to select their own future status -- independence, or some form of association or integration with the United States.

Although the administering authority determines when a non-self-governing territory has reached the point of self-government permitting the cessation of reporting to the United Nations under Article 73 of the Charter, a 1948 General Assembly resolution, which recommends that the United Nations be informed of such constitutional change, means that international criteria cannot be ignored. L

Historically, the United States has not given its territories an opportunity to choose their future status but has independently moved them into one of the three categories mentioned in General Assembly Resolution 1541: Integration (Alaska and Hawaii), independence (the Philippines), and free association (Puerto Rico), in each case in response to what it judged to be public opinion and political requirements, both in the United States and in the area involved.]

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

05-421838

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

-5-

There is nothing to indicate that, given the right of free choice, the American territories would select independence. Rather, aware of the political and economic costs of independence and of the benefits they have enjoyed as American territories, they would probably choose integration (statehood or becoming a county of an existing state) or some perfected form of free association similar to the relationship between the U.S. and Puerto Rico. At the present time statehood does not appear practical, and proposals for integration by means other than statehood (e.g., making Guam and the TTPI a county of Hawaii or the Virgin Islands a county of Florida) present difficulties for both sides. Integration carries with it a loss of individual identity and a permanency which may in time create new political problems. Although some new form of integration might be developed, an amendment to the U.S. Constitution might be necessary because the right to vote in Presidential elections and some form of representation in the Congress would also be involved, and more time would be needed than political realities allow.

This leaves some form of association, a relationship for which there is precedent in American practice, which would

DECLASSIFIED SECRET

OS- 421839

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

-6-

not permanently determine the extent of the relationship and yet would remove the territories from international scrutiny. Free association would permit either party to the agreement to opt out of the association and thus would not guarantee permanent association with the United States. However, it follows American practice, as illustrated by President Eisenhower's pledge to recommend independence for Puerto Rico if the Puerto Ricans so desired. No desire for independence now exists in the American territories, and Americanization, which would automatically grow with association, coupled with conscious efforts, should strengthen the ties and progressively reduce any remaining pressure for independence. In any case, any future pressure for independence would probably develop for reasons extraneous to the type of association selected.

A successful plan to end international scrutiny and bring the territories into association with the United States must at the outset fully recognize the special considerations involved in its ultimate implementation. Of particular importance are the following:

(a) There are crucial differences among the territories, involving such matters as the relative state of development of the territories,

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL
05-421840

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

-7-

the implications of some alternatives on individual cultures, and the need to work out details of constitutional importance.

(b) Intensified United Nations efforts directed toward achievement of independence in all dependent areas must be anticipated and effectively met.

(c) Inhabitants of the territories (citizens in the case of Guam and the Virgin Islands and "nationals" in the case of American Samoa) tend to resent UN discussion of their status, although basic questions concerning their future status increasingly are being raised in Guam and the Virgin Islands.

(d) Certain opinion in the United States, while conceding some international obligations in relation to the Trust Territory, views the non-self-governing territories as strictly internal matters.

All four considerations present formidable but not insurmountable obstacles. The pressures for movement in our territories are mounting, but they have not reached the point where the United States has lost flexibility or where its ability to act is restricted by forces beyond our control. This favorable

DECLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~

05-421841

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

-8-

situation will not continue to exist indefinitely.

In moving ahead now, the following steps will help assure an outcome carrying forward U.S. objectives:

- 1) All aspects of the program should be handled in absolute secrecy.
- 2) Early action should be taken in order to capitalize upon the present favorable Congress.
- 3) To avoid the fate of the Task Force on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, action responsibility for planning and coordination should be placed in the White House, which would draw as necessary upon the various Government Departments.
- 4) Since Congressional approval is ultimately necessary, key Congressional leaders should be consulted at an early stage. In order to emphasize the domestic, defense, and foreign relations aspects of the situation, the problem should be simultaneously brought to the attention of Senate and House Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs, Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, and Armed Services.

(5) There should be early consultation with territorial representatives to insure that the views

SECRET

05-421842

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

-9-

of the inhabitants are taken into account and that their rights are protected.

6) Because Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom share our strategic interest in the Pacific area and because our actions concerning the TTPI may affect the Australian position on Nauru and New Guinea, close liaison with these allies, particularly Australia, should be maintained. They should be informed of our plans at about the point at which Congressional leaders are consulted.

7) United Nations action should be sought only when the planning has reached the stage where all that remains is to obtain international acquiescence in the new status for the territories, probably by providing some form of international supervision for a plebiscite.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the United States begin immediately to plan for the early exercise of the right of self-determination through separate plebiscites in the U.S. territories and the Trust Territory designed to:

DECLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

05- 421843

SECRET

SECRET

-10-

(a) provide a terminal status which effectively removes these territories from international scrutiny; and

(b) bring these territories into a continuing association with the United States.

2. That the attached National Security Action Memorandum calling for the preparation and implementation of a program for the attainment of these objectives on an urgent basis be approved.

3. That an official at the White House be designated with action responsibility to direct and coordinate the planning and implementation of the program.

4. That Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom be kept informed as closely as possible.

IO:UNP:DFMcHenry/EABrown:rem
4-9-65 (Revised 6-10-65)

SECRET

SECRET

05- 421844