

100

09-01-85

DRAFT

This document consists of 30 pages;  
No. 39 of 46 copies, series A

13  
8, 17

DECLASSIFIED  
SECRET

EXCISE

PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE OF  
UNITED STATES TERRITORIES AND THE  
TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS\*

E  
B1, A5

BACKGROUND

The United States administers four dependent areas: The non-self-governing territories of Guam, the Virgin Islands, and American Samoa; and the United Nations Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI). No precise policy exists on the future status of the non-self-governing territories beyond the obligations in Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter. National Security Action Memorandum 145 calls for giving TTPI inhabitants "a real option at the appropriate time to move into a new and lasting relationship to the United States within our political framework;" however, NSAM 268's requirement that a specific date be set for a plebiscite to realize the policy objectives of NSAM 145 has not been met. Meanwhile the United States has continued to submit information on the territories to the United Nations in fulfillment of obligations undertaken under the U.N Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement.

This paper does not deal with the status of Puerto Rico; a question now under discussion in the U.S.-Puerto Rico Commission on the Status of Puerto Rico. The findings and recommendations of that group have direct bearing on the future status of the territories discussed here.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/AGE

REVIEWED BY BHB DATE 6-27/88

- ( ) REMAINS ( ) DECLASSIFY
- (X) RECLASS (X) DECLASSIFY IN PART
- ( ) DENY ( ) Non-referable info.
- ( ) FCJ, EC or PA exemptions (b)(1)

CLASSIFY AS CONFIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO: OADR  
( ) DOWNGRADE TO ( ) SECRET ( ) CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

OS-425750

SECRET  
REF ID: A66022

Extended discussion of U.S. territories and the TTPI in various United Nations bodies and the prospect of even closer scrutiny as other colonial problems are solved, coupled with the expanded membership of the United Nations and the new strength of the Afro-Asians, pose for the United States complex problems, in dimensions heretofore unprecedented, of both immediate and potential impact on the international political and military posture of this country.

Appendices I, II, and III to this paper discuss in detail the character of the three major problem areas that lie ahead. These are:

1. The growing desire of the inhabitants of the U.S.-administered territories for more self-government and for clarification of their relationship with the United States.
2. The increased importance of the territories, and insular areas in general, for present and potential military use and the consequent need to insure their continued availability.

REF ID: A66022  
SECRET

SECRET  
DECLASSIFIED

3. Increased international interest, manifested by Afro-Asian and Communist initiatives, in directing attention to U.S. territories and the TTPI.

COURSES OF ACTION

The range for possible action by the United States is relatively small. It can continue along present lines and ignore any international censure and the political pressures within the American territories for a new status. Or, it can begin now to draw up a coordinated plan which will remove the non-self-governing label and culminate in a clear definition of the relationship of the territories to the United States which will effectively terminate the international obligations of the United States relative to their administration. This would call for an immediate, coordinated approach which takes into full account pertinent international obligations and political and military realities. We conclude in the light of our existing international obligations and the political factors described elsewhere in this paper that the United States should draw up and move now to implement a coordinated program which effectively removes the non-self-governing label and clearly defines the relationship of the territories to the United States.

SECRET

OS- 425752

Our international obligations are such that the effective

removal of the U.S. territories and the Trust Territory from international scrutiny will require our attempting to obtain United Nations approval of or acquiescence in that removal. Such UN approval, acquiescence, or tacit agreement can be obtained only if the U.S. territories and the TTPI are given freedom to select their own future status -- independence or some form of association or integration with the United States.

Although the administering authority determines when a non-self-governing territory has reached the point of self-government permitting the cessation of reporting to the United Nations under Article 73 of the Charter, a 1948 General Assembly resolution, which recommends that the United Nations be informed of such constitutional change, states that international criteria cannot be ignored.

B/

It is not too early to declare our tactics to secure that tacit agreement. We must, however, proceed in such manner as to take advantage of presently favorable conditions and to confine the opposition to only the more radical anti-colonialists and the Soviet Union.

SECRET

REF ID: A66510

Historically, the United States has not given its territories an opportunity to choose their future status by plebiscite but has in each case in response to what it judged to be public opinion and political requirements, both in the United States and in the area involved, moved them into one of the three categories mentioned in General Assembly Resolution 1541: Integration (Alaska and Hawaii), independence (the Philippines), and free association (Puerto Rico).

There is nothing to indicate that, given the right of free choice, the American territories would select independence. Rather, aware of the political and economic costs of independence and of the benefits they have enjoyed as American territories, they would probably choose integration (statehood or becoming a county of an existing state) or some perfected form of free association similar to the relationship between the U.S. and Puerto Rico.

Although in the long run statehood may be the most desirable arrangement, at the present time it does not appear practical. Current proposals for integration by means other than statehood (e.g., making Guam and the TPI's county of Hawaii or the Virgin Islands a county of some eastern state) present difficulties for both sides. Although some new form of integration which, like

85-425754

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

statehood, would preserve a degree of separate political identity (e.g., the District of Columbia) might be developed, an amendment to the U.S. Constitution might be necessary, and more time would be needed than political realities allow.

Integration would in all probability be in the U.S. interest and should be borne in mind as a possible solution for the long term. The foregoing considerations, however, would make it advisable to put aside the concept for the time being at least. This leaves some form of association, a relationship for which there is precedent in American practice, which would not permanently determine the extent of the relationship and yet would remove the territories from present legitimate international consideration as trust and non-self-governing areas. Such a relationship would not foreclose, for all time, the examination of various alternatives to free association, such as independence, statehood, or some other status; clearly, the parties to any agreement should be able, upon mutual consent to alter it. Free association/would not guarantee permanent association with the United States. However, it follows American practice, as illustrated by President Eisenhower's pledge to recommend independence for Puerto Rico if the Puerto Ricans so desired. No desire for independence now exists in

05-425755

SECRET

the American territories, and Americanization, which would automatically grow with association, coupled with conscious efforts, should strengthen the ties and progressively reduce any remaining pressure for independence.

A successful plan to end international scrutiny and bring the territories into association with the United States must at the outset fully recognize the special considerations involved in its ultimate implementation. Of particular importance are the following:

(a) There are crucial differences among the territories, involving such matters as the relative state of development of the territories, the implications of some alternatives on individual cultures, and the need to work out details of constitutional importance.

(b) Intensified United Nations efforts directed toward achievement of independence in all dependent areas must be anticipated and effectively met.

(c) Inhabitants of the territories U. S. (citizens) in the case of Guam and the Virgin Islands and U. S. "nationals" in the case of American Samoa) tend to

OS-425756

-8-

resent UN discussion of their status. However basic questions concerning their future status increasingly are being raised in Guam and the Virgin Islands.

(d) Certain opinion in the United States, while conceding some international obligations in relation to the Trust Territory, views the non-self-governing territories as strictly internal matters.

All four considerations present formidable but not insurmountable obstacles. The pressures for political advancement in our territories are mounting, but they have not reached the point where the United States has lost flexibility or where its ability to act is restricted by forces beyond its control. This favorable situation will not continue to exist indefinitely.

In moving ahead now, the following steps will help assure an outcome carrying forward U.S. objectives:

- 1) All aspects of the program should be handled in absolute secrecy.
- 2) Early action should be taken in order to capitalize upon the present favorable Congress.
- 3) To avoid the fate of the Task Force on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, action responsibility for planning and coordination should be placed in the White House, which would draw as



necessary upon the various Government Departments.

4) Since Congressional approval is ultimately necessary, key Congressional leaders should be consulted at an early stage. In order to emphasize the domestic, defense, and foreign relations aspects of the situation, the problem should be simultaneously brought to the attention of Senate and House Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs, Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, and Armed Services.

5) There should be early consultation with territorial representatives to insure that the views of the inhabitants are taken into account and that their rights are protected.

6) Because Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom share our strategic interest in the Pacific area and because our actions concerning the TTPI may affect the Australian position on Nauru and New Guinea, close liaison with these allies, particularly Australia, should be maintained. They should be informed of our plans at about the point at which Congressional leaders are consulted.

(Although France too is involved in the Pacific area, its attitude in general would seem to make liaison on the program not worth-while.)

SECRET  
-10-  
DECLASSIFIED

7) United Nations action should be sought only when the planning has reached the stage where all that remains is to obtain international acquiescence in the new status for the territories, probably by providing some form of international observation of the plebiscites.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the United States begin immediately to plan for the early exercise of the right of self-determination through separate plebiscites in the U. S. territories and the Trust Territory designed to provide a terminal status for United States territories and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands which ensures their continuing association with the United States and fulfills the obligations of the United States under the United Nations Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement;
2. That the attached National Security Action Memorandum calling for the preparation and implementation of a program for the attainment of these objectives on an urgent basis be approved;
3. That the White House designate a special senior representative vested with action responsibility under Presidential authority to direct and coordinate the planning and implementation of the program, and

SECRET

OS 425759

SECRET  
-11-  
DECLASSIFIED

4. That Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom be kept informed as closely as possible.

IO:UNP;DFMcHenry/EABrown:cap  
4-9-65 (revised 6-10-65 7 9-1-65-)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

OS- 425760

6/10/65

13

DECLASSIFIED  
SECRET

APPENDIX I

THE GROWING DESIRE OF THE INHABITANTS OF  
AMERICAN TERRITORIES AND THE TTPI FOR  
CLARIFICATION OF STATUS

A key element in planning the future status of the U.S. territories and the TTPI must, of course, be the wishes of the inhabitants. They increasingly desire greater self-government and clarification of their relationship to the United States. A survey of public opinion among the islanders would probably disclose that their present wish is for closer ties with the United States and at the same time for increased self-government.

Political movements in the territories have not yet reached the point of political embarrassment to the United States. However, these movements can increase in intensity, especially as other small territories succeed in getting their political status more clearly defined (as have, for example, the Cook Islands and Western Samoa.) So long as the United States territories are non-self-governing, the inhabitants could take advantage of the UN forum to express their grievances. We can reject as dogmatic propaganda UN and Communist calls for immediate independence for U.S. territories, but irritation

SECRET

OS-425761

with propagandists in the UN must not obscure the fact that there are likely to emerge in U.S. territories insular nationalists or political adventurers whose taste for tactical political gambling has not yet been dulled by their meager experience, and who will demand redefinition of their political status. Removal of the non-self-governing label may not silence these demands, but it will deny their exponents one of the principal forums in which to air them, the United Nations.

A brief review of political sentiment in each territory follows:

Virgin Islands

A Constitutional Convention recently took place in the Virgin Islands for the purpose of drafting suggested revisions to the Territory's Organic Act. The Convention generally recommended the same proposals put forward in the past by Virgin Island political leaders: Increased self-government (including an elected governor) and closer ties with the United States (including Congressional representation). In 1963 there were indications that some members of the majority party on the island were becoming impatient regarding the failure of the United States Government to respond to their requests and were considering raising their case in the United Nations. Recently, the President of the Virgin Islands Senate, Earle B. Ottley, discussed the

SECRET

-3-

Committee of 24's initial consideration of the Virgin Islands with representatives of the UN Secretariat and stated to the press that he might appear before the Committee to present the Virgin Islands' point of view.

Guam

The people of Guam have also pressed for increased self-government and a closer relationship with the United States. In 1952, when consulted about the UN Colonialism Declaration, the Guam Legislature addressed a petition to the United Nations stating that Guam wanted a continued relationship with the United States. The petition emphasized the Guamanians' desire for an elected governor and a territorial representative in the Congress.

In an interview appearing in the April 1964 issue of Pacific Profiles, the then Speaker of the Guam Legislature, A. Won Pat, was quoted as saying the election of a governor and a representative in the Congress were the next steps envisaged in the constitutional advancement of the territory. He said that the right to vote in Presidential elections was also a legitimate aspiration and should be sought after the first two objectives were achieved. In response to a question

SECRET

OS-425763

REF ID: A66000 SECRET

-4-

regarding the possibility of Guam's ultimate destiny as the leader of an American community composed of Guam, Saipan, Tinian, and Rota, Mr. Won Pat said that Guam had long provided leadership throughout all the islands of the Trust Territory and it was a matter of logic that it would continue to provide such leadership and would, in time, bring about the political unity of these islands under some form of government within the political framework of the United States. He rejected the idea of annexation of Guam to Hawaii on the ground that it "would be politically regressive and defeat our hopes for local government."

In May 1965 the present Speaker of the Guam Legislature, Mr. Carlos Taitano, came to Washington to urge replacement of the present Governor and announced to the press that, if he failed to receive satisfaction in Washington, he intended to present his complaints to the UN.

#### American Samoa

Development in the political sphere in American Samoa seems insufficient to make possible a meaningful expression by the people of their desires concerning the territory's future status. The Samoan Legislature has, however, clearly

SECRET

OS- 25764

DECLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~  
5

indicated that the Samoan people value their status as U.S. nationals and wish to maintain a relationship with the United States. There appear to be a few advocates of independence or of union of the territory with Western Samoa, but the overwhelming majority of the Samoan people oppose such possibilities.

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

The question of the views of the inhabitants of the far-flung islands of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is more complex. In reporting to the President in 1963, the Solomon Mission stated that American and Micronesian officials in the area appeared to be thinking in terms of independence for Micronesia as an eventual, distant goal. The mission also reported general awareness among the political elite of the territory that their political future was still to be resolved, but at the same time a tendency among these leaders to shy away from actively concerning themselves with the problem. This attitude stems from the realization they cannot stand alone and that independence, even if they wanted it, is so far away that meaningful consideration is not practical now. In addition, the United States has failed to suggest any alternative to independence, thereby producing among the

SECRET

OS-25765



SECRET  
-6-

elite a feeling of uncertainty and insecurity. According to the Solomon Mission, the masses of the Micronesians are not only not concerned with their political future but also are not even aware of it as a question.

These findings regarding Micronesian attitudes were generally supported in the report of the 1964 Trusteeship Council Visiting Mission to the territory. The Trusteeship Council Mission found thinking among the islanders regarding their future status vague and sometimes confused. Although the Mission reported some sentiment in the territory favoring Micronesian independence, it found that most of the few people who expressed an opinion to the Mission regarding the TTPI's future wanted some form of integration with the United States. Others, including Micronesian students at the University of Hawaii and the College of Guam, felt that the territory was not yet ready to make such an important decision.

The Visiting Mission reported that only in the Marianas was there consistent and organized public interest in their future political status. There the principal question was the reintegration of the Marianas by removing them from the TTPI and incorporating them within the framework of the territory

SECRET

05-425766

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

-7-

of Guam. The Mission concluded that this separatist movement to join Guam was strong.

The Visiting Mission predicted that recent developments, such as the establishment of the Congress of Micronesia and the stepped-up development program, may have considerable impact on Micronesian thinking.

IO:UNP:DFMcHenry/EABrown:rem  
4-12-65 (Revised 6-10-65)

031507030

SECRET

05-425767

6/10/65

13

DECLASSIFIED SECRET  
APPENDIX II

Strategic Importance of U.S. Territories

The strategic importance of the TTPI and, by geographic proximity, of Guam is specifically recognized in the Trusteeship Agreement between the U.S. and the UN. The pace of decolonization and the contracting possibilities for U.S. military facilities abroad have caused U.S. military officials to reassess the importance of these areas to the U.S. and to make recommendations which would insure the islands' continued availability on the ground that retention of these Pacific Islands in friendly hands is basic to control of the Pacific Ocean area.

On November 7, 1964 the Navy Department submitted a paper, strongly endorsed by the Secretary of the Navy, to the Secretary of Defense recommending action to change the present political status of Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands in order to bring them into permanent association with the United States. The paper made the following points inter alia:

1. The military utilization of Guam has remained comparatively unrestricted, although the defensive sea area around the island has been disestablished.

2. The decreasing dependence of our bases on

SECRET

OS-425768

DECLASSIFIED SECRET

-2-

foreign mainland soil in the Western Pacific and the emergence of Communist China as a nuclear power point up the importance of Guam as a U.S. power base in support of our forward strategy in this sector of the world.

3. Should political pressures force phase-down or inactivation of naval support facilities in Japan and the Ryukyus, installations on Guam would have to assume the major support of our deployed forces.

4. It is essential, therefore, that our political ties with Guam be continually strengthened so that any future subversion attempts may be forestalled.

With respect to the TIFI, the Navy paper recalled that NSAMS 145 and 243 set forth as U.S. policy the movement of these islands, by informed and free choice, into a permanent relationship with the United States. After noting that the Solomon Mission recommended a plebiscite in the Trust Territory in 1967 or 1968, the Navy stated:

9. The importance of these islands, which relates to their location and potential to support deployed naval forces as well as scientific and

SECRET

05 425769

SECRET

oceanographic research, makes it mandatory that the United States take steps now to strengthen the allegiance of the indigenous people and prepare them for a plebiscite.

. . . . .

"11. ...The great strategic gain in having these vital pieces of real estate incontrovertibly a part of the United States is such that a great deal of effort is worthwhile to bring off the result."

The Department of the Navy memorandum was followed on February 8, 1965 by a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Chiefs recalled:

(1) The Joint Chiefs' memorandum of April 5, 1962 stating that "continued exclusive" U.S. jurisdiction over the MIFI is essential to U.S. strategic posture and security in the Pacific.

(2) The Joint Chiefs' memorandum on "Security Controls in Guam and the Pacific Trust Territory" of June 2, 1962 indicating that Guam as the westernmost U.S. territory in the Pacific not only represents an extensive in-being military support site but also provides a strategically essential back-up for the existing ~~base of East bases that stretches from~~

~~SECRET~~  
DECLASSIFIED

Japan through the Ryukyus and the Philippines. The memorandum also noted that the value of other Pacific areas to the United States has been enhanced considerably by recent developments in military and space technology.

Noting with concern recent events and trends affecting the U.S. relationship with Guam and the Trust Territory, the Joint Chiefs stated: "On the one hand, the strategic importance of United States control of these areas has increased, while at the same time, efforts threatening the continuation of U.S. control have been intensified." The Joint Chiefs cited UN consideration of the U.S. territories and the Trust Territory, particularly efforts by Communist countries to exploit every opportunity offered by the discussion to "attack U.S. policies in the Pacific Islands, focusing attention on the questions of independence and U.S. military use of the area."

In addition the Joint Chiefs made the following points:

"1. The possibility exists that the United States may be faced, at some time in the future, with host governments in the Pacific that interpret their interests as being separate from those of the United

SECRET

OS-425771



SECRET

APPENDIX III

International Consideration of US Territories and the TTPI

Afro-Asian and Communist interest in highlighting U.S. territories, including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, as a part of the remaining "bits and pieces" of colonialism requires urgent U.S. action to ensure such interest does not jeopardize U.S. objectives in these areas. The freedom and extensive self-government traditionally present in American territories; the absence of a desire for independence on the part of inhabitants of American territories; and the fact that the United States has been one of the advocates of decolonization are not enough in present circumstances.

The United Nations has authority to consider U.S. territories and the TTPI under provisions of the U.N. Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement. Article 73 of the Charter provides that Members responsible for non-self-governing territories undertake inter alia:

- (1) To ensure political, economic, social, and educational advancement;
- (2) To develop self-government, taking due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development



# DECLARATION

of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of development;

(3) To transmit information on economic, social, and educational conditions.

Article 73 provides no basis for determining whether a territory is non-self-governing; nor does it set forth criteria by which Members are to cease submitting information under Article 73(e). Traditionally, these decisions are the prerogative of the administering authority.

The Charter sets forth comparable obligations for trust territories, but in addition to "self-government" mentions "independence" as an alternative future political status. As in the case of non-self-governing territories, there is no prescription of method for changing trusteeship status. In practice, a trust territory has chosen its future international status through a United Nations-supervised plebiscite. Virtually all former trust territories achieved independence in this way.

Until 1961, the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories and the Trusteeship Council considered conditions in dependent territories. In 1960, with

SECRET

admission of a large bloc of newly independent countries, the United Nations General Assembly adopted GA Resolution 1514 entitled "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples," by a vote of 89 to 0, with 9 (U.S.) abstentions. The resolution declared that "the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation ... constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights;" that "all peoples have the right to self-determination;" and that "inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence." In addition, the resolution stated:

Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed, or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.

The Colonialism Declaration was heavily weighted toward complete independence irrespective of political and economic realities and virtually ignored the Charter provision for "self-government" of dependent areas, possibly within a larger political entity.

UN discussion to have continued to focus on complete

SECRET

05-425775

SECRET

independence as set forth in the Colonialism Declaration.

However, the same General Assembly which adopted the Colonialism Declaration also adopted Resolution 1541, which defined three ways in which a dependent territory could reach full self-government:

- (1) emergence of a sovereign independent state;
- (2) free association with an independent state;
- (3) integration with an independent state.

Although an overwhelming majority of UN Members insist that given the choice a people will invariably select sovereign independence, the United States on a number of occasions has endorsed the principles of 1541 because of its recognition of the right of a people to choose a status other than sovereign independence and because these principles provide necessary flexibility to fit differing cases.

In 1961 the Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

now generally referred to as the Special Committee on Colonialism or the Committee of 24, was established with a broad mandate which empowered it "to examine the application of the [Colonialism] Declaration, to make suggestions and

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

recommendations on the progress and extent of the implementation of the Declaration, and to report to the General Assembly." In practice, the Special Committee has become the principal UN body considering dependent territories.

U.S. territories and the TTPI have so far escaped concerted decolonization efforts. The Special Committee on Colonialism has concentrated most of its attention on the remaining major dependent areas. In the Committee the U.S. has sought to preserve a full range of possible precedents for U.S. territories. Thus, the United States has resisted efforts in the Committee to make "independence" the only future status for dependent areas. Maintaining that the future status of remaining dependencies should be governed by flexible criteria, the United States has supported the variety of alternatives mentioned in Resolution 1541.

Last year, for the first time, the three U.S. non-self-governing territories were the subject of extended discussion in the Special Committee. The U.S.-administered TTPI, usually considered only by the Trusteeship Council on behalf of the Security Council, was also discussed. While the Special Committee's approach to the U.S. territories and the TTPI

SECRET

OS-425777

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

was not entirely unsympathetic, there was criticism of certain aspects of U.S. administration, particularly shortcomings in political development, and there was no indication that the Committee would exempt American territories in its determined push towards the ending of political dependency as soon as possible.

In each of its reports on the U.S.-administered territories the Committee (a) reaffirmed the right of the peoples of the area to self-determination and independence as asserted in the Colonialism Declaration, (b) urged the United States to undertake immediate measures to implement the Declaration, and (c) called for Committee visiting missions to obtain first-hand information on the political, economic, and social conditions in the territories and to ascertain the wishes of the people regarding their future.

During the Committee's deliberations the Soviet Bloc systematically attempted to exploit to the detriment of the U.S. the strong anti-colonialist sentiment prevalent in the Committee and enjoyed some success in getting the reports phrased in doctrinaire terms. (For example, the report called for a Committee visiting mission to the TPI despite

SECRET

05 425778

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

the fact of regular visiting missions of the Trusteeship Council and, indeed, a 1964 mission, which had just reported its 1964 findings.) However, the Bloc failed to eliminate <sup>all</sup> from the Committee's reports/references to Resolution 1541 (XV), which lists integration and free association as respectable alternatives to sovereign independence.

The Committee's conclusions and recommendations regarding dependent territories under U.S. administration stimulated substantial U.S. press comment about the United States' being "put in the dock" as a colonial power. Articles on the Committee's consideration also appeared in the press of the territories. The Committee's actions were not proportionate to the notoriety they received. However, unless significant signs of political progress in the territories appear in the next year or two, the U.S. can reasonably expect the discussion in the Committee and the General Assembly to sharpen to the point of creating considerable embarrassment to the United States Government in the UN, domestically, and abroad. This is particularly true if inhabitants of the territories take advantage of the UN forum to voice their desires for increased measures of self-government or if Afro-Asians, urged on by the Soviet Bloc, should attempt to use U.S. territories as a bargaining means to produce changes in U.S. policy on the major colonial areas.

OS-425779