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4. For additional facts, see Enclosure B.

DISCUSSION

5. For discussion, see Appendix to Enclosure A.

CONCLUSIONS

6. Continued US control of the Territory of Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is essential to US national security interests in the Pacific.

7. The transfer of these islands to a status within the political framework of the United States should be accomplished as a matter of urgency. The growing strength of decolonization pressures throughout the world and recent indications that anti-colonialist attention in the United Nations is focusing more on the Pacific area require the earliest possible implementation of a permanent relationship for these islands within the political framework of the United States.

8. Possible arrangements worthy of consideration by the Department of State include the following:

a. The United States to take the initiative in proposing a plebiscite in the TTPI as soon as possible, followed by congressional legislation to grant the people of the TTPI and Guam the status of US nationals.

b. Formation of a commonwealth under the United States with Guam as its focal point.

c. Incorporation of the Territory of Guam preparatory to either her eventual incorporation or her admission as a separate State.

RECOMMENDATIONS

9. It is recommended that:

a. The memorandum in Enclosure A which reflects the above conclusions be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense

b. Copies of this paper be forwarded to CINCPAC.

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ENCLOSURE A

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: US Control of the Territory of Guam and
the Trust Territorys of the Pacific Islands (U)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum* to the Secretary of Defense, dated 6 November 1964, in which the Secretary of Navy stressed the increasing strategic significance of the Territory of Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) and recommended that these islands be made an incontrovertible part of the United States.

2. In a memorandum** to the Secretary of Defense, dated 5 April 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that the continued exclusive US jurisdiction over the TTPI is essential to US strategic posture and security in the Pacific. In another memorandum*** to the Secretary of Defense, dated 2 June 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that Guam, as the westernmost US territory in the Pacific, represents not only an extensive in-being military support site, but also provides a strategically essential backup for the existing tier of far east bases that stretch from Japan through the Ryukyus and Philippines. The value of the Pacific Island area to the United States has been enhanced considerably by recent developments in military and space technology.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted with concern events in recent years which have resulted in focusing attention on the increasing strategic significance to the United States of obtaining control of Guam and the TTPI as soon as possible. A detailed discussion is contained in the attached Appendix. Items of concern:

a. Continuation of the US trusteeship is being seriously challenged in the United Nations. The United States may soon be the only nation, out of 11 trusteeships in 1947, left administering a trust territory. Communist and uncommitted nations are becoming increasingly critical.

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Recently the United States has been subjected to considerable pressures from the UN General Assembly "Committee of 24", made up predominantly of anti-colonialists, to grant independence to the non self-governing territories and the trust territory. The USSR, as a member of the "Committee of 24" has taken the initiative in attacking US policies in the Pacific Islands, focusing attention on the questions of independence and US military use of the area. Most Afro-Asian states are taking positions consistent with their traditional anti-colonial orientation.

b. US control of bases in the Western Pacific shows signs of eroding. The possibility exists that the United States may be faced, within the next decade, with host governments that may consider its interests incongruent with US interests.

c. Communist China is emerging as a nuclear power.

d. The evolving US reliance upon rapidly deploying CONUS based forces in place of forward deployed forces may result in an erosion or phase-down of existing far eastern bases on foreign soil.

e. The deficit in balance of payments has not been corrected.

f. Control of any of the islands in the TTPI or Guam by an unfriendly power would be detrimental to US national interest.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur with the conclusion inter al. of the "US Government Survey Mission Report" on the TTPI of 9 October 1963 that the United States should take the immediate initiative in action that would result in termination of the trust agreement and the permanent affiliation of Micronesia with the United States.

5. In view of the above factors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that:

a. Continued US control of the Territory of Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is essential to US national security interests in the Pacific.

b. The transfer of these islands to a status within the

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APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A

UNITED STATES CONTROL OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM
AND THE TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS (U)

BACKGROUND

1. The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands consists of some 2,100 islands with a total area of 700 square miles, scattered over an area of three million square miles of the western Pacific Ocean. It is populated by 85,000 people, almost all of whom are Micronesians, who live on 96 of the islands and speak nine separate languages. Formerly a Japanese mandate under the League of Nations, the territory became the responsibility of the United States during the second World War.

2. In 1947 the United States placed the territory under United Nations trusteeship through an agreement between the United Nations Security Council and the government of the United States. Under this agreement, which entered into force on 18 July 1947, the territory was designated a strategic area, as provided for by Article 82 of the charter of the United Nations. The United States retained the right to establish military bases in the territory and to close all or part of the territory for security reasons. Under the provisions of Article 83(1) of the charter, functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their amendments, are exercised by the Security Council.

3. Article 76 of the UN Charter, which enumerates the basic objectives of the trusteeship system, states the following objective: "to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and

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the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement."

General Assembly Resolution 1514 declares that all peoples have the right of self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

4. In 1947, TTPI was one of eleven United Nations trusteeships. With the rapid postwar movement toward independence for former dependent areas, only three trusteeships remain today. Two trusteeships will be terminated in the near future, leaving the United States with the only remaining trusteeship. Thus, trusteeship over the past decade has become almost extinct as a device for fostering the development of dependent peoples.

5. The continuation of the US trusteeship is being seriously challenged in the United Nations. If we are left with the sole trusteeship in the world, the United Nations pressure for action will grow. Both our enemies and the uncommitted or emerging nations can be expected to become increasingly critical. Our embarrassment could become acute and our prestige in the world community is certain to suffer. A difficult situation might result over which we would have little or no control.

6. The government of the Trust Territories has been created under the authority of the trusteeship agreement with the Security Council, approved by a joint resolution of the Congress on 18 July 1947 and the Act of 30 June 1954 of the Congress.

Article 2 of the agreement provides that the United States will have full powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory subject to the provisions of the agreement.

The Act of Congress vests all executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary for the civil administration of the territory in, and provides for the exercise of that authority by such persons and in such manner as the President may direct. The President currently, under Executive Order No. 11021 of 7 May 1962, has delegated that authority to the Secretary of Interior.

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7. Guam, a non-self governing island under US control, was ceded to the United States in 1898, at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War, and has remained a US possession ever since. Under Article 73 of the UN Charter, the United States agreed to transmit regularly to the Secretary General statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to the economic, social, and educational conditions on the island.

STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AREA

8. The security of the United States depends in large part on our ability to control the Pacific Ocean area. Control of this area to be effective must be complete. Such control will be required as long as military forces must be moved through or are required to function in the area and as long as it is necessary to deny to the enemy positions from which attacks of any kind against the United States may be launched. Our base system in the Pacific is a single strategic entity which facilitates full exploitation of the great mobility of US forces. Control by any potential enemy must be excluded from the entire area. The cost of lives, time, and resources paid by the United States in World War II to secure control of the Pacific is a direct measure of the vital need to establish and maintain unquestioned US control of this area.

9. The US interest in the Pacific area is based almost entirely on its strategic value. The area provides positions of potential military value for the defense of Hawaii, the Panama Canal, Australia, and New Zealand. The area is also a zone of transit, the continued control of which is based to the fulfillment of US security commitments under SEATO and ANZUS, and under the bilateral treaties with Japan,

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the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China, and the Philippines. The islands are important as sites for the network of transport and communications facilities essential to the maintenance of normal contact between the United States and the countries of Asia and Australia. Control of any of the islands in the Pacific Islands area by an unfriendly power would be detrimental to US interests.

10. The value of the area to the United States has been enhanced considerably by recent developments in military and space technology. The area also has considerable potential for missile testing, and the USSR has taken advantage of this asset. The progress of the US earth satellite program has also increased the significance of the area. In the interests of its longer range military and space programs, the USSR will be attentive to any political development that offers hope of cracking the western power monopoly in the Pacific Islands area.

11. By nature of their location, directly behind and across the lines of communication to existing far east bases, the islands of the TPII provides a natural back-up for our present forward posture. Together with the Bonin-Volcanos, they represent a latent military potential for meeting a wide range of requirements that could develop under various contingencies. Although our current military useage of these islands is limited, it is politically unfettered and therefore the range of possible utilization is broadened beyond normal military operations. The isolation of some of these islands and their sparse population make them ideal sites for weapons and other equipment testing programs, space launch, recovery, telemetry and control stations, underwater surveillance test operations, and bases for application of technological advances that have not yet evolved.

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12. Were unfriendly powers to achieve footholds in the TTPI, the United States would be faced with essentially the same situation that existed prior to World War II when the Japanese controlled the islands of the TTPI. These footholds could provide such unfriendly powers with air refueling bases, missile control stations, submarine bases, and other military facilities detrimental to the interests of the United States. The process of retaining complete jurisdiction over the TTPI for the foreseeable future constitutes the most economical method of assuring US future security in the Pacific.

13. Guam as the western-most US territory in the Pacific, represents not only an extensive, in-being military support site, but also provides a strategically essential backup for the existing far east bases on foreign soil. On 2 June 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded*: "That the role of Guam in the strategy of the Pacific dictates a capability for vastly expanded operations as a backup for our base structure in the far western Pacific, and that Guam must be capable of absorbing a redeployment from any or all of these far western Pacific bases".

[REDACTED]

In addition, the current military activities on Guam are invaluable in any rapid force build-up to support limited or general war in Asia. The above, and the need to maintain a strong US posture in the western Pacific for the foreseeable future indicate a greater requirement for military activities on Guam.

* JCS 2326/11

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14. There are presently discernable pressures including US deficit in the balance of payments, and an evolving reliance upon rapidly deploying CONUS-based forces, which may well result in an erosion of the existing far east bases.

Should these or other circumstances result in a phasedown of existing far east bases on foreign soil, use of Guam and the TIFI could well become a critical consideration in effective military operations in the western Pacific.

15. The increasing tenuousness of our bases on foreign mainland soil in the western Pacific and the anticipated emergence of Communist China as a nuclear power increase the importance of Guam as a US power base in support of our forward strategy in the Pacific. Should political pressures force phase-down or inactivation of naval support facilities in Japan and the Ryukyus, installations on Guam would have to assume the major portion of support for US deployed forces. It is essential, therefore, that our political ties with Guam be continually strengthened so that future subversion attempts may be forestalled and to groom this island for statehood, or for inclusion in the existing state of Hawaii.

16. The Chinese Communist nuclear explosion of 16 October 1964 could have an effect on the US strategy in the far east. Guam and the TIFI can be expected to have strategic importance to the United States. While not yet militarily significant, in view of the lack of a complete weapons system, the impact of the event has already been reflected in reconsideration by all Pacific nations of their policies in relation to the Chinese Communist.

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UNITED NATIONS PRESSURES

17. As a strategic area, the TTPI is a responsibility of the UN Security Council rather than the UN General Assembly, but in practice, has become subject to the demands of the latter body. The United States is under pressure to justify its administration to the Afro-Asian states in terms of local well-being rather than cold war demands. Recently the United States has been subject to considerable pressures from the "Committee of 24" made up of 12 Afro-Asian, 4 communist, 3 Latin-American and 5 western states. The committee has been established to make recommendations on implementing the General Assembly's resolution, "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples". The USSR as a member of the "Committee of 24" and of the Trusteeship Council has taken the initiative in attacking US policies in the Pacific Islands, focusing attention on the questions of independence and US military use of the area with allegations that such activities are detrimental to the health and welfare of the native population. In so doing, the Soviets hope to stimulate Afro-Asian sentiment against alleged US abuse of colonial peoples and misuse of a UN trust. Most Afro-Asian states are taking positions consistent with their traditional anti-colonial orientation.

18. The ultimate goal of the communist countries attention focused on the trust territory is the ouster of the west from its commanding position and the opening of the Pacific territories to communist influence. However, the more immediate and feasible aim is to stimulate sufficient disorder in the area to sustain Afro-Asian hostility toward the Western colonial system, to divert the west from problems elsewhere, to establish local sources of intelligence, and to begin at least, the erosion of western political control.

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19. There are several unique elements in the attainment of US control over the TTPI. The United States will be moving counter to the anti-colonial movement that has just about completed its goal and will be breaching its own policy since World War I of not acquiring new territorial possessions. Also, of all the 11 UN trusteeships, the TTPI will be the only one not to terminate in independence or merger with a contiguous country, but in a territorial affiliation with the administering power.

Such steps could begin by holding a plebiscite. As successive steps the US could, under the trusteeship agreement which permits the extension of laws of the administering authority to the trust territory, take the necessary action to grant the people of Micronesia the status of US nationals even though there may be protracted debate in the Security Council over the termination of the trusteeship agreement. Then, take the necessary action to provide territorial status for Micronesia.

US GOVERNMENT SURVEY MISSION REPORT

20. The report* by the US Government Survey Mission to the TTPI indicated, inter alia, that: the United States needs to retain control of Micronesia for security reasons; there is an increasing possibility that US trusteeship will be challenged; there is lack of a clear cut US policy and the need for a goal around which to build a realistic development program; the continuation of the trusteeship tends to reinforce our present custodial attitude and aimless policy; it is the true independence for Micronesia.

Recommendations, inter

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ENCLOSURE B

ADDITIONAL FACTS

1. In an 8 November 1963 memorandum* to the White House from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), the Department of Defense took the view that continued US control of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) is essential to our national security interests in the Pacific; that transfer of these islands to a status within the political framework of the United States should be accomplished as soon as possible; and that a plebiscite should be held at the earliest practicable date, but not later than 1966.

2. In August 1961, when dealing with the subject of protection of US interests in the Pacific islands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated** "The islands in the TTPI provide essential logistic, air transit, missile tracking, atomic testing, and navigational aid facilities. Necessary measures must be taken to insure their continued availability to the armed forces of the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the US ties with these areas should be strengthened, that retention of these areas is essential to insuring our strategic position in the western Pacific and that their use must be denied to the Sino Soviet Bloc."

3. In 1946, in reviewing the Trust Territory agreement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated*** "The Japanese mandated islands are a distinct and indissoluble strategic entity. Their control in their entirety is necessary not only to afford air bases for our own use but, also, to enable us to deny the entire area to a potential enemy. The subject islands have a vital strategic relationship to the security of the United States as was fully shown in the last war. This relationship

* On file in Joint Secretariat
** JCS 2326/3
*** JCS 1619/19

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will be even more vital in the future in view of the rapid advances in the science of aeronautics, the advent of new weapons, and the magnitude of the possible danger which would confront us with an east Asia comprising one-half of the world's population dominated by the Soviets."

4. On 2 June 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded* ". . . the role of Guam in the strategy of the Pacific dictates that it possess the capability for vastly expanded operations as a backup for our base structure in the far western Pacific and that Guam must be capable of absorbing a redeployment from any or all these far western bases."

5. The President, on 15 April 1962, approved National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 145** which set forth as US policy the movement of Micronesia into a permanent relationship within the political framework of the United States. The memorandum called for accelerated development of the area to bring its political, economic, and social standards into line with an eventual permanent association. The memorandum also established a task force to consider what action might be taken to accomplish this goal and to provide policy and program advice to the Secretary of the Interior who is responsible for the administration of the Trust Territory. It also proposed the sending of a survey mission to the Trust Territory to conduct a thorough study of the area's major problems.

6. By NSAM 243*** of 9 May 1963, the President instructed the mission to survey the political, economic, and social problems of the people of the Trust Territory and to make recommendations leading to the formulation of programs and policies for an accelerated rate of development so that the people may make an informed and free choice as to their future in accordance with US responsibilities under the trusteeship agreement.

7. On 9 October 1963, the survey mission completed its

* JCS 2321/11

** On file in Joint Secretariat.

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draft report* to the President. The report is a detailed and somewhat critical analysis of the complete spectrum of activities relating to the TTPI, with accompanying recommendations for improvements or corrective actions. The mission's recommendations sum up to an integrated master plan that would provide guidelines for federal action through fiscal year 1968 to secure the objectives of: winning the plebiscite and making Micronesia a US territory; achieving minimum but satisfactory social standards in education and public health; and, raising cash incomes through development of the current, largely crop-gathering subsistence economy. The mission concluded with the recommendation, inter alia, that the United States should take the immediate initiative in action that would result in termination of the trust agreement and the permanent affiliation of Micronesia with the United States.

8. By NSAM 263** of 25 October 1963, the President directed the Departments of State and Interior, in cooperation with other departments and agencies of the Government, as appropriate, to develop and carry out the necessary plans and programs to implement the recommendations of the survey mission.

9. In its report*** of 16 July 1964 to the Security Council, the Trusteeship Council noted that no fully matured opinions on the future of the territory have yet emerged among the people of Micronesia and urged that the United States continue to implement realistic plans and programs for the rapid and planned advance of the territory in all aspects of its political life in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the Trusteeship Agreement, and General Assembly resolution no. 1514 which stresses independence. The Soviet Union delegate declared that the Trusteeship Council

* "Report of the US Government Survey Mission to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands". On file in Joint Secretariat
** On file in Joint Secretariat.

*** Report of the Trusteeship Council to the Security Council on TTPI covering period from 27 June 1963 to 29 June 1964 of 16 July 1964. On file in Joint Secretariat.

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should require the United States to enact immediately a broad and concrete program directing the people to self-determination and independence, that the area should be exempted from the designation as a strategic area, and that the question of the Trust Territory be considered by the Security Council without delay.

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a. The United States should take the immediate initiative in action that would result in termination of the trust agreement and the permanent affiliation of Micronesia with the United States.

b. A plebiscite among the Micronesians is essential to such action and should be held as soon as possible in the interest of the Micronesians and the United States.

c. Study must also be given to the actions needed to prepare the United States and the United Nations for Plebiscite.

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c. This paper be forwarded to the US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

d. Copies of this paper be forwarded to USNMR, SHAPE and USLO, SACLANT.

Action Officers:

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