Memorandum

7401 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO

IO - Mr. Sisco

January 18, 1966 DATE:

FROM

UNP - Elizabeth Ann Brown

SUBJECT:

Your Meeting with Under Secretary Carver of Interior

You are calling on Under Secretary Carver of Interior at 2:00 P.M. Wednesday, January 19 to discuss proposed recommendations to the President on the future of the TTPI and the U.S. non-self-governing territories. Other participants from Interior will include Robert Mangan, Deputy Under Secretary, Harry Anderson, Assistant Secretary for Hand Management, Robert Vaughan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Land Management, Mrs. Ruth G. Van Cleve, Director of the Office of Territories, and John Kirwin and George Milner df the Office of Territories. Don Morris, Don McHenry and I will accompany you.

Talking Points:

I suggest you open the discussion with Under Secretary Carver by making the following points:

- 1) U.S. strategic interests require the continued davailability of our three territories and the TTPI. territories will be among the last collections expect steadily increasing pressure in the United Nations and connection both with the status of the territories and connection we take toward promotion of the interests of self-determinations. the inhabitants, including their right of self-determination.
 - We must begin now in the executive branch with full consultation from the outset with the relevant Congressional committees (Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Interior and Insular Affairs) to produce a coordinated plan which will remove the territories from the non-self-governing category, terminate our international obligations to the United Nations relative to their administration, and provide for a new relationship between them and the United States.

If we do not take such action, we may not lose control of these areas, but our continued presence can have high international political costs, and popular dissatisfaction which is bound to grow could lead to a change in the

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status of the territories under conditions unfavorable to the U.S.

4) Such a program will require extensive advance planning and consultation requiring direction of the program from the outset by a special senior representative attached to the White House. He would have responsibility for development and execution of the program in consultation with Interior, State and Defense.

Background

In connection with any comments Under Secretary Carver may make, the following background will be useful.

NSAM 268 and its covering White House Memorandum (Tab A) concerning the TIPI called for:

- (a) Necessary plans and programs to carry out recommendations in the Solomon report that are feasible and acceptable for implementation, and
- (b) the views of the interested agencies on the fixing of a date for a plebiscite and its public announcement.

In late 1963 Defense and State submitted to Interior, the coordinating agency, their views on the plebiscite and necessary developments which should precede a plebiscite. So far as we know, Interior took no further action to deal with the State and Defense comments. No reply was ever made to NSAM 268. (There was at least some opinion in Interior that the Kennedy policy ended with his death.) In mid-1965 the President abolished the Task Force on the recommendation of Interior without consultation with State.

Following the completion of a Navy paper in November 1964 and of a memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in February 1965, we prepared the paper "Future of the TTPI and U.S. Territories" (Tab B) and you sent the paper to Defense and Interior for comment.

In its reply (Tab C) Interior agrees that a plebiscite could be held in the TTPI at some future time but opposes plebiscites in other US territories on the ground that Con-



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gress would not act to implement the results. Interior argues further that no arrangement is possible that would have the effect of according a better status to the TTPI than to other US territories. Thus, in Interior's views, a plebiscite in the TTPI could include as a maximum, as regards the territory's relationship to the United States, a change from trusteeship status to the status of a non-self-governing territory with substantially less autonomy than that enjoyed by Guam, American Samoa and the Virgin Islands.

It is inconceivable that we would be allowed to solidify "colonial" control over the TTPI by such a step. Moreover, Interior's position fails to take into account the need to develop a coordinated approach to all the territories. Separate action on the TTPI will not really advance matters since our other territories -- and the TTPI and the since our other territories -- and would remain under UN consideration with every prospect for increasingly sharp criticism of our administration, in time our territories would stand out as the last vestiges of colonialism.



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