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		DEPARTMENT OF STATE ACDC/MR
TO:	The Under Secretary	REVIEWED BY R. H. RAAS DATE 7/25/87
THROUGH:	8/S	RDS or XDS EXT. DATE TS AUTH REASON(S)
FROM:	10 - Joseph J. Sisco	ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS
SUBJECT:	The Luncheon January Interior	28ª with the Secretary of the

I should like to suggest two objectives for the meeting with Secretary Udall.

## 1. The Anderson Report

The first is to give the Secretary an opportunity to hear personally some of Ambassador Anderson's first-hand observations on her recent trip to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. I would expect that this part of the conversation would conclusively show that the situation in the Trust Territory is a critical one demanding urgent action (a) to remedy the deficiencies on the medical, educational and economic side, and (b) to accommodate the dual political requirements of continued association with the United States and political advancement for the people of the TTPI.

John Macy, whose interest in the problem was kindled by the Vice President, will be present at the luncheon and can be expected to speak to the question of adequate leadership and staffing for the Trust Territory administration.

## 2. The Future of U.S. Territories

We can then move into the second, broader area, the need to move ahead with a program for the advancement of all U.S. territories. This would provide the occasion for Ambassador Goldberg to comment along the lines of his letter to the Secretary on the colonialism problem in the United Nations as it affects United States territories (Tab A).

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These comments can be used to urge the need for immediate development of an action program which would move the Trust Territory, as well as our other territories, to a new status within the American political framework. The objective would be to ensure their continued relationship with the United States under circumstances which would remove them from legitimate international scrutiny and keep to a manageable level future opportunities for their exploitation as evidence of U.S. colonialism.

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This task, we recognize, is most difficult, involving a complex inter-relationship of political and constitutional factors, not least among which is the need for coordinated Executive and Congressional action. We hope it would prove possible to deal with the TTPI and the three U.S. non-selfgoverning territories (Guam, the Virgin Islands, Samoa) as a package. We do not exclude the possibility, however, of starting with the TTPI. There is a range of possibilities and combinations that would require careful study covering such matters as conditions in the territories, the wishes of the inhabitants, U.S. strategic needs, Constitutional requirements, Congressional prerogatives and UN considerations.

We have concluded that probably the most effective way to develop a coordinated and effective program would be by the designation of a high-level Special Assistant to the President. Such a Special Assistant would prepare a detailed plan for bringing the territories into permanent association with the United States based on an act of self-determination. This plan would be pressed forward only if there is full agreement within both branches of the Government and a reasonable expectation that its implementation would achieve the desired objectives.

On the basis of consultations with Interior at the staff level, we believe Secretary Udall will be favorable disposed to this approach. However, it is essential that it be made entirely clear that the White House Special Assistant would not be involved in direct administration of the Trust Territory

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and the territories, which remains Interior's responsibility. Obviously Interior's administration will have to be coordinated with long-range plans, once they have been established.

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Attachment:

Ambassador Goldberg;s letter to the Secretary

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