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CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

TO: Welter Dostow

MAR 8 1966

OC: John Carver

FRCA: J. W. Rosenthal

SUEJET: U.S. Territorial Responsibility in the Pacific.

In accordance with your suggestion, there follows a survey of the impressions formed about U.S. policy and problems in the Trust Territory, Guem, Okinawa, and American Samoa during a recent survey trip relative to present and future air transportation requirements for these areas. The Department of the Interior sponsored the trip and a substantive report is to be unde to that agency. To a limited attent ache of the problems here adverted to may require exposition in that report. But, as will be seen, much of the following would be out of place in that document.

## I. Trust Territory

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By

7/21/87

John P. Flaherty, M-70

The United States has administered the Trust Territory (through the Navy and Interior at three different headquarters, Honolulu, Guam, and Salpan) for 20 years. Real cocial progress has been miniscule. The Territory was probably provided with better public services and facilities by the Japanese prior to World War II. Our performance has been criticized, with reason, on a number of occasions by more or leas responsible international bodies. Frior to the 1950's, our policy seamed directed towards preserving the "indigenous way of life." We are now apparently in the position of undertaking to provide the opportunity for these people to participate fully in 20th century society. However, we have not come to grips with the question of the political framework under thich this will be achieved.

In April, 1962, the Fresident approved NASM No. 145 which established as U.S. policy the movement of Micronesia into a permanent relationship with the United States within our political framework. The memorandum also established a Task Force to provide policy and program advice to Interior for accomplishing our goals. Formal instructions were given to the Mission through NBAM No. 243, and a report (Soloman Report) was made on October 9, 1963. There is no record of formal consideration and adoption of its policy recommendations.

The Solomon Report is an excellent diagnosis of the social, polital, and administrative malaise of the Territory. It is about as

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relevant a diagnosis today as it was then. Its administrative recommendations ware cogent and have equal currency today. On the other hand, its basic political direction appears questionable; although some steps appear to have been taken towards implementation of these recommendations, it may not be too late for a change.

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The Eoloron Report enviseges the Trust Territory becoming, over the long term, a part of the United States through union with Guem. It suggests, without onthusiasm, that eventually it might becaus a county of Mawaii. However, in the interim it recommends that our policy be directed towards developing (a) "consciousness" (mong the people of themselves as Micronesians, and (b) the political "unity" of the area. For this purpose, it accumes that the Territory will continue to be commistered as a whole. These recommendations are made despite recognition that there are substantial cultural and language berriers (mine basic languages and many more dialocts) separating the six districts of the Territory; that there are no traditions of unity (rather the contrary); that there is little economic interrelationship between the districts; and that the overhead costs enteiled in administration of this widespaced are are artraordinarily high.

But there is only an implied affirmative reason for the recommended disposition relative to the required plebiscite for ultimate affiliation with the United States. Moreover, the Report recognizes that just one political action by the United States could make the plebiscite issue accientic - extension of the status of United States nationals to the 88,000 Trust Territory people. I agree. Therefore, I would suggest that our policy ought to be directed towards making these people United States nationals, not as to how we have to hold plebiscites, or to win them.

On this promise, I believe that we are free to establish the most suitable and economic framework for administering the Territory provided that we make clear our intention to treat these people in practice, if not in fact, as United States nationals. (It is assumed that it would not be sound to extend full status to these posple until they are culturally and economically able to hold their som in our political and economic system.) In this connection, let me list some of the political steps which appear warranted now whether or not the solution here advanced is fully accepted.

1. All necessary statutory, budget, and administrative stops be taken to permit appropriate United States domestic programs and agencies to operate in the Trust as they do in other United States territories. It is unrealistic to attempt to provide, through a single infrastructure, a modern viable socio-economic system for eighty odd thousand people scattered over 700 miles of land mass in three million square





miles of ocean. One has not been created in the Trust and it is doubtful that one could be without greater infusions of money than Congress would over appropriate.

2. Fatend to the Trust Territory the same customs status as is enjoyed by other United States territories. Moday, any product exported to the United States from the Trust is subject to that as a "foreign" product.

3. Eliminate, or charply revise upwords the current quota on immigration from the Trust to the United States.

4. Extend the Federal revenue tax to Trust Territory nationals and runit the entire tax collected to the Territory as is currently done with respect to Guam.

5. Establish on aggressive and effective Territorial coministration. Though listed lest, this may be the primary requirement for the first four suggestions; it may also be the absolute requirement for the suggestions to follow.

As heretefore suggested, the limited population of the Trust on a chall lond mass scattered over three million square miles of the Facific cotablishes a most difficult and expensive government coministrative problem. Bealing with the Trust as a separate and independent antity reises practical problems which go beyond mere budgeting. This is recognized, in effect, by the Solamon Report which suggests that, ultimately, the combination of the Trust with Guam would make a more viable economic and political entity.

However, I question whether Guam has, or will have, a sufficiently large base to support the overhead involved in providing needed government services for the entire Trust Territory, parts of which are two thousand miles sway. Moreover, if the Trust is ever fully organized with its own governmental machinery the political problem of marging burecucracies with the smaller Guam set-up may preclude the arrangement.

Thus, I believe that it would be preferable, administratively and politically, to divide the Trust Territory promptly into smaller units. Tentatively, I would recommend that the Territory be divided into three parts. Responsibility for administration of the Marshalls should be assigned to the State of Hawaii; responsibility for the Mariannas would be assigned to the Territorial Government of Guam; the Trust Territory Government should, as soon as facilities were prepared, be moved to Truk; it should have administrative responsibility for Truk and Fonape, which together account for about 40 percent of the Territories' population. As for Palau and Yap, ultimately they should be

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acceigned to Quam for coministration but there is some question as to whether a transition period of two to three years might not be desirable both from the standpoint of Guam's ability to take on the job and for the Falcuans and Yapese to react favorably to the change. By the same token, it may well be that ultimately Truk and Fonape should also be coministered from Hawaii.

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Nith competition among the three administrations as to which was doing the better job, it would be my judgment that all the creas would make more rapid progress than would otherwise be the case.

Parenthetically, these recommendations presuppose the extension of the present Frust Territory air service to Honolulu; the machs for which will be a subject of the report to be made to Interior.

## II. Guam

Guen is certainly making progress. There is evidence of increased optimism as to the economic future of Guam by its people. But Guem has suffered and is suffering from military domination. Guem needs assistonce to place the role of the military in proper perspective. The quality of the military leadership at Guem today appears to be such as to role the time propitious for the effort.

The military controls about sixty percent of the land mass of Guam including much of the best land and beach areas. Much of this area is used little, if at all, but is being held fallow against possible future use. One of the major economic problems in Guam, as elsowhere in the Facific, is the unavailability of land for development. It is recommended that the military be directed to review the land being held for calculate use; to release all for which a specific need for a military purpose cannot be documented; to share with the civil population the use of established recreational facilities, which are not used as part of military training programs; and to adopt policies which will encourege the permanent caire to live outside the military reservation.

Moreover, now that commercial business in Guam has became competitive, the range of merchandise handled by commissaries and post exchanges on Guam should be no greater than it is on the mainland. This would be a direct help to the Guam economy. It would also result in making available to the military an even wider range of goods in the stores, and thus improve rather than diminish permanent cadre morals. Incidentally, Guam is already one of the lowest price sources of Asian products; Japanese electronic equipment, for example, sells for less in commercial establishments on Guam than in Japan.

Military procurement should recognize the desirability of shortened supply lines and development of the local economy, and seek to



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cncourage production on Guam and the Trust Territory of those food itans, for anample, which are now imported from California. I am edviced that, despite the serious shortage of shipping, military procurament has not given weight to the cost of movement from California in military realist in determining competitive prices for food stuffs.

Further, it would indirectly assist Guam, as the major supply headquarters for the East, and directly assist the Trust Territory if, when representional fightities become available, the military were to use these fightities for rest and recreation of troops. It is my understanding that the military have already undertaken to do this. But the fightities have yet to be built.

III. Cain wa.

It is difficult to be temperate about U.S. policy in Okinewa. Strenty years after our occupation, the civilian communities still give the impropriate of being jerry-built and temporary, designed for destruction when the avergency is over. Parenthetically, this is less true of the military installations and reservations which have their accustomed order and maintenance. It may have been valid twenty years are to appund that we would over the near term evaluate Okinewa. Outrinly the decision in the 1940's to expressly pecognize Japanese recident coversignty must have been premised on this judgment.

The quotion is does it have validity today? If we assume that it does not; that we would wish to stay on Okinawa indefinitely, then our policy for (binama acquires an immediate reexamination. Exercise of Japanese covareignty over Ekinawa is a significant political issue in Japan. The continued military presence of the United States, especially its use against Orientals, is also an increasingly perious Japanese public opinion on either the issue of Japanese covereignty over Ekinawa, or when that sovereignty that reestablished on the degree of U.S. military use of the island.

If the decision is to maintain our military position on Okinawa despite possible adverse Japanese reaction, it may be better to face Japanese public opinion on the issue of Okinawa sovereignty, where we may be able to command considerable Okinawan support, than on the issue of military use of Okinawa, where we may have more unified Japanese and Okinawa public opinion.

If this is the decision, we have some unplayed cards. First, it is a fact that Okinawans have historically been second-class (if that) Japanese. Second, there is a substantial and successful Okinawan enclave in Hawaii; about thirty-five to fifty thousand Hawaiians are



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Obination in descent, and they maintain continuing close relationships. Actually come of the more substantial Okination business people are Hautians and United States citizens. Hawaiian congressmen and senators frequently visit Okination. Unit is questionable thather Japan could afford to underwrite the Okination sconomy should the U.S. military presence be withdram. (Unit is, of course, a significant appanent cupporting our ability to stay in Okination, even if the Japanese ware to result coversignty.)

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
Moreover, there may be tactical means of changing direction which would not necessarily groupe Japanese public opinion. Thus, there is currently punding in the United States District Court an attack on the legality of the Oringuan court system as established by Executive Order. (Rose v. MacHamara, USDC/DC, Civil Action No. 996-65) A contention in this case is that without congressional action, there is no power to establish a court. Should the decision prove unfovorable to the Government, it could be the occcion for the Executive to seek on organic act from the Congress. Such an act could be fremed in such a way as to redirect the education of the Okinawans from Japanese law and customs, as it now is, to United States law and customs. It could provide the excuse for a crash program for the teaching of Inglish in the public schools. And most of all, it could be the prodicate for a massive step-up in the rate of U.S. investment in public and welfare purvices. Finally, with the least possible encouragement, those in Cuinana, such as the Hamilian business people, who foresee a better economic future through alliance with the United States would provide an open counter force to the presently vocal partisans of rounion with Japan. Although the Japanese could be concerned with these developments, if they appeared to stan from the requirements of United States Low, and were otherwise corefully bondled in explanation to the Japanese, they might wall be foosible.

Time is certainly running out on any basic change in the direction of our Guinawan policy. It may already be too late. But certainly the stakes are high enough to warrant immediate reaxamination. It may then appear that other alternatives are more advantageous than those here suggested.

## IV. American Scamoa

This is the site of the United States' most vigorous and imaginative effort to rease rapidly to the 20th Century an indigenous people who have been passed by. Our policy problems here are based upon our probable success. Already the massive effort the United States is making in American Samoa is placing pressure on New Zealand, for example, to do more for Western Samoa, just 90 miles away. And Tonga and Fiji, for example, are also watching developments in American Samoa, both hopefully and apprehensively. Fiji is a United Kingdom

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colony and Tonga, an independent country, accepts juidance and help from the U.K. It is questionable whether New Zoaland or the U.K. have the resources necessary to support equal advances in these creas to those anticipated for American Samoa. (This would be equally true for the Frust Territory, if it started to make real progress.)

There is a real need to concentrate on the development and funding of a regional program for this area. Otherwise success in American States might no for cutstrip development in other islands as to spect the type of public climate in which an outside intrusion would find a marsure of success. This is especially significant in view of the fact that Figi is already bodly divided ethnically, and Honga, an abult monarchy, also appears to be politically brittle.