MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

May 18, 1966

SUBJECT: Conversation Between Mr. George Milner, Office of Territories, Dept. of the Interior and T.C. Pinckney, G/PM, on Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

This complements my MR of May 2 which summarized conversations on the TTPI with various concerned officials in the Department and DOD.

Mr. Milner seemed somewhat reserved until I presented myself as a tyro in the subject, willing to be convinced, and appealed to his expertise. At this and with the prompting of several questions he expressed or agreed to the following viewpoints:

- a. The basic difference between Interior and State concerns (1) the domestic political feasibility of granting self-government to the TTPI, and (2) the readiness of the Micronesians for self-government.
- b. Interior's primary concerns are (1) protecting the US strategic interest in the TTPI and (2) properly preparing the Micronesians for economic and political advances.
- c. State's primary interest is in avoiding criticism on the colonialism issue, particularly at the U.N.
- d. The choices in a plebiscite should be kept few and as simple as possible. Only three should be offered: (1) in-dependence, (2) continuing the status quo, and (3) association with the US.
- e. The TTPI is far from ready to become a state or even to elect its own governor, and Congress would not approve either such action at this time.

CONFIDENTIAL

CO

TATEMED BY B. H. BAMS 11578 663/8

f. Using the criteria of protecting US strategic interests,

Micronesian welfare, and minimizing international criticism of the US, an early plebiscite is desirable.

.

TI,

h. At present a vote would be overwhelmingly in favor of association with the US, but as we educate the peoples, both expectations and disenchantment will rise.

i. A crucial factor is ensuring the US will abide by the results of a plebiscite. Congress could probably be persuaded to approve an Organic Act, a la Guam, to become effective if association were approved by a plebiscite.

Comment: Although Mr. Milner occasionally betrayed what others consider as Interior's characteristic lack of a sense of urgency, I believe his judgments -- if representative of Interior's upper echelons -- provide a basis for a unified approach to the President by State, Defense, and Interior or, failing that, of a joint State/Defense approach which Interior would find acceptable. Unless otherwise instructed I will attempt to draft such a position.

T.C. Pinckney

G/PM:TCPinckney:5/19/66

CONFIDENTIAL