

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROUTING SLIP**

R (D008)

TO	ADV ACT COPY TO	INFO COPY TO	TO	ADV ACT COPY TO	INFO COPY TO
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE		✓	ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (M)		
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE		✓	ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PA)		
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT			ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (SA)		
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY			✓ GENERAL COUNSEL		✓
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY			ASST TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (AE)		
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE			ASST TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (LA)		
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF			ASST TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE		
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENG			DIR, DEF CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY		
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (A)			DIR, DEFENSE SUPPLY AGENCY		
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (Comp)			DIR, DEF ATOMIC SUPPORT AGENCY		
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (I&L)			DIR, DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY <i>Mgr, National Communications System</i>		
1 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ISA)	✓		DIR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY		

**ACTION**

PREPARATION OF REPLY FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SIGNATURE	INFORMATION AND RETENTION
PREPARATION OF REPLY FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SIGNATURE	DATA ON WHICH TO BASE A REPLY
REPLY DIRECT ( <i>Forward copy of reply to Secretary of Defense files</i> )	COMMENTS AND/OR RECOMMENDATION
1 APPROPRIATE ACTION	SEE REMARKS BELOW
COORDINATE REPLY WITH:	

REMARKS

2	Mr. Vanke	✓
1	Mr. Niederlehner	✓
3	<i>Foman</i>	

**JHS**  
~~ALR~~  
 ② ILP-Trust  
 Territory

AGC(A) 5447

**SECRET**

THIS IS AN  ACTION COPY  ADVANCE ACTION COPY  INFORMATION COPY (14)

ACTION DUE NOT LATER THAN  ROUTING DATE  OSD CONTROL NUMBER

23 MAR 1967 1794 GC 666 1

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

JCSM-163-87

23 MAR 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Possible Limited Japanese Access to Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (U)

1. (C) Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I-3563/67, with enclosure, dated 16 March 1967, subject as above, which requested concurrence and/or comments on two proposals by the Department of State: first, to permit Japanese fishermen access to certain Micronesian ports for rest and recreation and for provisioning; and, second, to permit the Japanese to establish a fishing station in one Micronesian port for the special (though not necessarily exclusive) use of Japanese vessels and fishermen. The Department of State would offer one or the other of these proposals to the Government of Japan in return for settlement of the long-standing Micronesian claims problem.

2. (S) With respect to these proposals, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that:

a. The strategic character of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) is not only recognized in Article I of the UN Trusteeship Agreement of 1947, but the trust territory is also designated therein as a single "strategic area." In accordance with that designation, the United States retains the right to establish military bases in the territory and to close all or part of it for security reasons.

*high seas?*

b. US interest in the TTPI is based almost exclusively on its military-strategic value. The islands of the trust territory are astride our strategic lines of communication to east Asia, Australia, and New Zealand. With the growth of our political and military commitments in those distant areas, the importance of maintaining complete control of our lines of communication and the TTPI has increased

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10 August 1988 SM-636-88

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commensurately. Additionally, the long-term essential need of the United States for the many military installations in the TTPI, especially the Pacific Missile Range launching and tracking stations, is paralleled by our interest in denying any part of the territory to a potential enemy.

c. Current US policy in regard to the TTPI is based on NSAM No. 145, which states that it is our goal that the territory "move into a new and lasting relationship to the United States within our political framework." By JCSM-88-65, dated 5 February 1965, and JCSM-733-65, dated 6 October 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended the attainment of that goal as a matter of urgency.

d. If there is to be adequate assurance that the Micronesians will opt for permanent political association with the United States in a future plebiscite, it is important to exploit every opportunity to influence the outcome of the plebiscite toward that end. Conversely, it is equally important to exclude from the TTPI any influence which could be expected to impact adversely on US interests. At such time as the TTPI comes under US sovereignty, limited foreign interest/investment might be acceptable. Until then, permitting Japanese fishermen to have access to ports in the TTPI, for reasons other than emergencies, would probably necessitate granting similar access, by reason of the "most favored nation" clause of the Trusteeship Agreement, to all other UN members including communist countries. Although that clause includes a security proviso, it would be most difficult politically to deny similar access to professional anticolonialists and others who could be expected to agitate toward independence and otherwise complicate the attainment of our goal of incorporating the TTPI into the US political structure.

e. While granting TTPI access to Japanese fishermen for rest and recreation and for provisioning would not, of or by itself, seriously degrade the US position, the danger lies in the cumulative effect of such seemingly innocuous concessions. Experience indicates that the granting of this privilege would elicit a further request for a greater privilege. For example, the Government of Japan has made repeated requests for an increasing number of its citizens to visit the graves of their ancestors in the Bonin Islands, even though the first request to be granted was with the understanding that further requests would not be favorably considered.

*not in TTPI but like Okinawa*

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f. Previous US actions in permitting entry of Japanese vessels to the TTPI in an emergency, and in approving graves visits on a case-by-case basis, have been prompted by compelling humanitarian reasons. Additionally, entry to Palau has been authorized infrequently and on a case-by-case basis for Japanese vessels chartered by the US-based Van Camp Company which operates a fish processing plant in Palau. Incident to the operation of that facility, some Okinawans are admitted to Palau; however, since Okinawa is under US jurisdiction, the access of Okinawans to another area administered by the United States is essentially an internal matter. These instances are not considered to constitute a precedent for the Department of State proposals in the subject matter.

g. If the Japanese were to have the proposed access to one or more TTPI ports, such an event could bring into question the strategic nature of the islands concerned. The issue might then be raised in the United Nations as to whether the present arrangement, whereby the territory is administered by the United States as a strategic entity, should be continued. The Soviets could capitalize on such efforts by pressing for acquisition of a part of the TTPI, ostensibly for scientific reasons among others.

h. Long-term national security assets, exemplified by our politically uncomplicated control of the trust territory, should be protected rather than compromised for the possible attainment of the short-range political objective of a Micronesian claims settlement.

3. (S) In light of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the Department of State proposals addressed herein are not in the security interests of the United States with respect to the TTPI and recommend against their adoption.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

J. O. COBB

Rear Admiral, USN

Deputy Director, Joint Staff

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