



LBJ and Westmoreland (1966): How to persuade Hanoi that the U.S. meant business?

MR. JOHNSON GOES TO GUAM

In the chill of an inky evening late last week, Air Force I whined aloft over Washington, carrying Lyndon Johnson and his war counselors 8,100 miles to Guam and yet another top-level review of the struggle in Vietnam. Even before he left, the President had tipped the tone if not the content of the final communiqué: an ever deepening resolve to step up the pressure until Hanoi calls it quits. And circumstance forced him to break perhaps the biggest news in Nashville instead of on Guam's Nimitz Hill: Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge was coming home from Saigon—and veteran trouble-shooter Ellsworth Bunker was taking a brand-new command team into the field to replace him.

The premature disclosure was triggered by columnist Joseph Alsop, reporting in Saigon, who had got word of the switch and was preparing to scoop the President. Instead, Mr. Johnson scooped Alsop, inserting the announcement toward the end of a long defense of his Vietnam policy before a joint session of the Tennessee Legislature. He was, he said, "drafting" Ambassador at Large Bunker for the top job, switching Ambassador Eugene Locke, 49, from Pakistan to Saigon as Bunker's deputy, and dispatching Robert W. Komer, 45, the President's own staff expert on the "other war"—the pacification program—into the field with them. He announced the shifts so suddenly that not even topside Washington was immediately certain

what the new organization chart would look like. But the shake-up signaled Mr. Johnson's determination to press the war with a brand-new team tuned more closely to his own wave length.

His Nashville speech, otherwise, was less remarkable for what he said than for how he said it. Tennessee was, of course, the logical place for the President to celebrate Andrew Jackson's 200th birthday and an even more logical setting for a full-dress recital of his Vietnam policy to a legislature that had just gone on record as endorsing it. His mien was sober, his message determined, his emphasis heavily weighted to the military effort. He had been forced two years ago, he said, to choose between defending South Vietnam or abandoning it, and all free Asia, to "the forces of chaos . . . The choice was clear. We would stay the course, and we shall stay the course."

Punishment: He was at pains to defend the bombing of North Vietnam, this time not only as a tactical necessity but explicitly as a punishment for Hanoi's aggression. Once again he tendered a pledge to talk peace "at any time." But, he added dolefully, "it takes two to negotiate . . . and Hanoi has just simply refused to consider coming to a peace table." Once again, he quoted the price for de-escalation: a reciprocal move by the other side.

The main business on Guam would be a detailed review of U.S. strategy to hasten that long-awaited day. Some

skeptics in the Honolulu-based Pacific Command wondered aloud whether the trip was really necessary; one senior officer who has seen the secret agenda for Guam even speculated that it was a "political ploy to crowd Bobby Kennedy off the front page." But Washington and Saigon sources both insisted there was reason enough for the session. For all the Pentagon denials, Gen. William Westmoreland is reliably reported to want more troops—perhaps 100,000—currently budgeted for 1967. The President also will hear bids by the military to intensify the war—and reports by civilian officials on the piecemeal progress of the pacification program.

Unquestionably the first item on the agenda would be installing the Bunker-Locke-Komer combine with the least break in continuity. Lodge has been gradually phasing himself out of active management of the U.S. effort, and now—though he issued a pro forma statement of regret at leaving—he told one newsman privately: "I'll be glad to get out." When Lodge finally gave notice, the President seized the moment to assign Vietnam to Bunker, a tall, flinty Vermont patrician who won Mr. Johnson's respect by fielding a succession of tough diplomatic assignments—most notably the Dominican crisis.

Bunker's age—72—might seem a debit to anyone but Mr. Johnson, whose front-line diplomatic corps is a haven for

V
O
L
1
69
13

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

sexagenarians and up.* But age didn't stop Bunker from taking a bride (U.S. ambassador to Nepal Carol Laise, 49) only two months ago—or from ending Washington's intervention in Santo Domingo by forging a coalition civilian government and paving the way for withdrawal of U.S. troops. The inside word was that Bunker would be trying to repeat that kind of feat in Saigon by helping weave South Vietnam's bickersome civil and military factions into a new constitutional regime.

If Bunker is a model of diplomatic patience and tact, Bob Komer is all go-go—a professional enthusiast with a penchant for knocking heads and bruising feelings in the process. The news that he would be spending more time in Saigon was greeted there with almost unanimous dismay by U.S. officials who vividly re-



Bunker: Patience and tact UPI

called his previous field trips as a self-described "gadfly on the steed of state." The Saigon skeptics loudly criticized Komer as a Guildenstern at the court of Lyndon I—a man ready to tell the President what he thought the President wanted to hear. They complained that his field reports tended to be remorselessly roseate compilations. "Komer thinks everything can be done yesterday," said one diplomatic pro—but the President clearly valued precisely that snap-to-it attitude as much as Komer's sunny-side-up view of the war.

Though his title and exact duties re-

*Among the front-rank elder statesmen: Averell Harriman, 75, ambassador at large; John J. McCloy, 71, the U.S. representative in talks with Britain and Germany on Atlantic security; David E. Lilienthal, 67, a Vietnam pacification specialist; Llewellyn Thompson Jr., 62, ambassador to Moscow. And, at 73, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson remains a frequent unofficial counselor to the President.

HOW THE GENERALS VIEW THE WAR NOW



NEWSWEEK's Lloyd Norman (right) has just spent six weeks in South Vietnam, combining his insight as a veteran Pentagon correspondent with his findings in the field to evaluate the long-range strategic outlook. From Saigon, on the eve of the Guam conference, Norman cabled this report.

What most of the U.S. generals would like to press the President for at Guam is more men for combat operations as well as for the pacification program, and a sharp step-up in bombing operations against military targets in Communist North Vietnam. Even given such escalation, they make no bones about the fact that the U.S. would have to maintain a military presence in Vietnam for at least fifteen years and possibly longer.

They are optimistic about a military decision in the short term. "We can knock this off in a year or two at the most if we intensify and accelerate the war," says one general emphatically. "We could use several more divisions, perhaps 200,000 more men. We could bomb North Vietnam more effectively, and really cripple their lines of communication and war-supporting industry. My guess is that with between 500,000 and 700,000 men, we could break the back of the Communist main force by 1968-69."

Yet that would be only the beginning. "We are still in Korea after some seventeen years," says a colonel of the Military Advisory Command-Vietnam. "We will probably stay in Vietnam for a generation." At Da Nang, where he commands the Third Marine Amphibious Corps, Lt. Gen. Lewis W. Walt agrees. "We will have a strong nation here in Southeast Asia," says Walt. "It will take perhaps fifteen years. Breaking the back of the VC main force won't take that long, but rooting out the VC guerrilla is a long-term task."

Accounting: On balance, the feeling is that Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara would probably reject proposals that call for a sharp increase in troop commitment—at least for the foreseeable future. Apart from the cost in blood, the war is already costing far more than any Pentagon planner expected two years ago—and another four divisions could add another \$2 billion a year to the more than \$20 billion that Vietnam is already costing the U.S., not including the cost of more base construction and seapower.

How does the war look to strategists in Hanoi?

Gen. William C. Westmoreland's J-2 (intelligence) analysts are convinced that the North Vietnamese have abandoned all hope of a classic "Phase Three" drive to defeat the U.S. in large-scale military action. They think the enemy has already fallen back to "Phase Two"—the protracted guerrilla war—and that his strategic plans are unfolding clearly enough: to sap the strength of the allies, to wreck the Saigon government's pacification program, to exploit peace movements around the world for whatever they may be worth, and all the while to maintain a main-force offensive capacity that he can bring to bear when the time is ripe.

From Hanoi's point of view, Westmoreland's intelligence officers say, this is a cheap war that the U.S. cannot win. Thus the cost of the war to Hanoi is estimated at only \$47.1 million a year—compared with the \$20 billion-plus yearly cost to the U.S., with an end to the fighting and the spending still nowhere in sight.

Long War: For his part, General Westmoreland is scrupulously avoiding any of the "we-can-win-in-so-and-so-many-years" predictions. He and his staff content themselves with stressing the probability of a long war. Meanwhile, they press on with their own double-barreled strategy against a total enemy force that seems currently stationary at about 280,000 (consisting of 50,000 North Vietnamese regulars, 60,000 hard-core Viet Cong troops and 170,000 irregulars).

The goals of this strategy are (1) to protect the populated areas of South Vietnam, meanwhile supporting the pacification program and (2) to grind down the main force VC and North Vietnamese regular units, search out and destroy their bases and staging areas and the infrastructure that supports them, north and south.

"We now have the forces—415,000 and more coming—to engage in sustained combat," says one commander. "The enemy bases are lucrative tar-

ts. There are about 90 major bases that represent a considerable investment of labor and resources. Our objective is to disrupt and wreck the enemy's scheme of things. We will force them to move and keep moving until they are backed up into the jungles or across the borders."

Westmoreland's strategy is working. His wide-ranging battalions, using highly sophisticated intelligence techniques and electronic computers to locate the enemy, have been ripping up and demolishing thousands of bunkers, underground hospitals, food caches, ammunition dumps and staging areas. U.S., South Vietnamese, Korean, Australian and New Zealand troops have been eating down the jungles and the rice fields hunting down the guerrillas. The death toll for the enemy has soared from about 4,000 a month a year ago to nearly 8,000 now. The kill ratio is 4 to

1. Despite combat losses in 1966 of 55,000 dead and 20,000 prisoners and defectors, the Viet Cong force continues to be a formidable threat. Hanoi always has the option of continuing to send down more battalions. The North Vietnamese Army has ten to fifteen divisions, well-trained and -equipped, totaling 250,000 to 350,000 men and women (about 40 per cent of these are women). Hanoi can also draw from a pool of some 2 million men in the 18-to-30 age group.

But for all the pressure all along the line for more U.S. troops, it seems likely that Defense Secretary McNamara is still planning to keep the U.S. force in Vietnam below 500,000 this year. It is true that Westmoreland has asked for more troops, mostly engineers and support troops, and he has been promised much of what he has requested. Unlike MacArthur in Korea, Westmoreland seems generally in agreement with the White House's policy of restraint and moderation. Westmoreland believes that an avalanche of troops in Vietnam would swamp available bases and also further damage the Vietnamese economy. His policy is the simple one of asking only for those troops he can actually accommodate and employ effectively against the enemy.

Termites: Westmoreland likes to talk in the parable—apparently his own—of the termite-ridden house. "If you crowd in too many termite killers, each using a screwdriver to kill the termites," he says, "you risk collapsing the floors or the foundation. In this war we're using screwdrivers to kill termites because it's a guerrilla war and we cannot use bigger weapons. We have to get the right balance of termite killers to get the job done without wrecking the house."

It's a complex little parable, and was doubtless spawned by the nature of the war itself—a war from which there can be no turning back. It is a war in which the objectives themselves often seem as ambiguous as the slogans coined to celebrate them—a war beset with double-dealing, with apathy, corruption and distrust at almost every turn. But for all that, and for all the fog of controversy that boils up regularly from Saigon, Washington, or both, there are few military men in either place who question the idea that the U.S. is here to stay. "Once we have put our prestige on the line," says one high-ranking general, "we have no choice but to stick it out." This is the dominant refrain here. You hear it from headquarters in Saigon all the way to the frontlines.



Associated Press

S. gun crew in Vietnam: No retreat

in favor of the U.S. and its allies. The U.S. is losing about 3,000 defectors and captured prisoners a month—double last year's monthly average.

Besides the dead, captured and defected, the VC lose many wounded and sick who cannot be counted. Some analysts assume this debit may run twice the killed rate, or about 16,000 a month at the current pace. Thus the total loss would be approximately 27,000 a month.

Arithmetic: This is a highly misleading estimate, however, because there is no absolute certainty that the killed, captured and defected are counted accurately. Some of the killed may be relatively innocent rice farmers or fishermen caught by an artillery shell or bomb. The body counts are not always precise and their accuracy varies. The defectors may be VC troops or simple prisoners seeking refuge.

March 27, 1967

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

remained to be settled at Guam. Komer is likely to take over management of the pacification program from his regular deputy, William J. Foster, who is retiring, ailing and ready for reassignment (probably to Saudi Arabia). Foster's other duties—the day-to-day operation of the embassy—are likely to fall to a Texas friend of Mr. Johnson's whose credentials include a Phi Beta Kappa key, a Yale law degree and a successful first ambassadorial stint in Karachi.

New Math: With the new command cadre assembling on Guam for the first time, U.S. officials insisted that the talks would stress pacification rather than major new military decisions. Yet the President's will to press the military effort was plain. He was heartened by the latest enemy casualty totals—an estimated 12,000 dead in February. But the enemy was




Komer: No go with retreat

still infiltrating 7,000 men a month from the north and recruiting 7,000 more in the south—more than enough to offset their combat losses. The signs were that the Communists were regrouping their forces, stepping up supply runs from the north and digging in for a protracted guerrilla war of attrition. With field pressure mounting for the infusion of many more U.S. troops, Westmoreland could be expected to press the case—and Mr. Johnson indeed may dispatch 50,000 additional men by mid-1968. He is likely as well to approve some new bombing targets across the border in North Vietnam—though with most of Hanoi and Haiphong still off limits.

With the demise of the latest flurry of peace rumors, moreover, Washington has gone bearish on any early prospect for meaningful negotiations. United

V
O
L
69

13



Steve Northup

As Dodd solemnly confronted his peers (above), expert Appel read the handwriting on the wall

Nations Secretary-General U Thant launched another peace probe last week—a secret message to North Vietnam urging a cease-fire and a Geneva-style conference with Hanoi, Saigon and the Viet Cong all represented. Unlike some past Thant proposals, this one is acceptable to the U.S.—but Washington doubts the feeling in Hanoi will be mutual.

The Guam conference was yet another Johnson show of commitment to disabuse Hanoi of any notion that stalling would pay dividends. The President was persuaded that only the increased military pressure together with the painful transition to civilian rule in Saigon would soon bear fruit. In fact, at the weekend South Vietnamese Premier Nguyen Cao Ky's military directorate and the Constituent Assembly reached agreement on a new constitution—just in time for the Premier to bring along a copy to the Guam conference.

Moment of Glory: Guam may turn out to be a fleeting moment of glory for Ky. One of Bunker's most ticklish assignments may well be easing Ky out—and one of his prime allies may turn out to be Madame Ky, who has been telling friends that her husband's appetite for the high life might better be satisfied by a job as ambassador to Paris.

"It is a painful course we pursue," Lyndon Johnson summed up at a White House conclave of governors the day he left for Guam (though this time, in the face of Republican resistance, he did not ask them for a blank-check resolution of support). And the most painful task of all was persuading Hanoi that the U.S. still meant business. That was the message of Guam—and the meaning of a passage late in Mr. Johnson's Nashville speech, when, addressing himself directly to Hanoi as if Ho Chi Minh were somewhere in the room, he intoned: "America is committed to the defense of South Vietnam until an honorable peace can be negotiated."

INVESTIGATIONS What Dodd Did

When a gaggle of photographers swarmed around the senator during a lull in the hearings he snapped at them testily: "I don't look any different today than I did yesterday." Yet, for all his usual sharp tailoring and his striking coil of silvery hair, Connecticut's Democratic Sen. Thomas J. Dodd did look different. A year and two months of public controversy over his private fiscal affairs had dampened the starch in the senator's ramrod-stiff bearing. Nervously puffing a pipe and fiddling with his black-rimmed glasses, Dodd seemed to sag at the table last week as the Senate ethics committee conducted its final round of hearings into the charges against him. Suddenly he had about him the dazed look of a man peering into the bleak void of personal disgrace.

Tom Dodd's fate depended on the answers the select committee found to a seemingly straightforward question: had more than \$400,000 donated to the Connecticut senator from 1961 to 1965 been political contributions or personal gifts? As they dug for the answers last week, chairman John Stennis and his colleagues interrogated a parade of Dodd's former staffers and political associates—and finally Dodd himself. But their task was immeasurably simplified by one striking circumstance: scarcely any of the key facts in the Dodd case remained in dispute. For as the week-long hearings opened, Dodd agreed to a 162-page list of stipulations about his income from a string of testimonial dinners and about his wide-ranging use of the money that was collected.

From the dust-dry figures sprang a portrait of a politician who had dipped freely into political contributions to repay some \$82,000 in personal debts—as well as to indulge an appetite for gra-

acious living. Dodd acknowledged, for example, that he had spent money raised at "testimonial" dinners for such niceties as country club tabs (\$221.75), liquor for his Senate office (\$1,074), a limousine for a family trip from Washington to Charles Town, W. Va., race track (\$60), air fare for a pet dog from the Capital to New London, Conn. (\$21.24). Even traffic-ticket payments (\$32) came out of the testimonial kitty; so did \$8,000 that went to writer Edward Lockett to ghost a book on subversives, and \$9,479 that went for repairs and improvements on Dodd's North Stonington, Conn., home. The senator conceded that he had used \$28,588 in donations to repay money borrowed to cover 1962-63-64 income taxes, and that he had given \$4,900 to his son Jeremy for unexplained reasons. Other items set forth in the lengthy agenda included trips to London and the Caribbean, restaurant tabs, even tickets to the Army-Navy football game.

In all of this, had Dodd done wrong? **Rules:** If the donations made through the testimonial dinners were political campaign contributions, then Dodd had no legal right to spend the money for personal reasons. Under Internal Revenue rules, in fact, campaign money so spent is subject to income taxes and must be declared as personal income. The Stennis committee collected abundant evidence that the testimonial dinners for Senator Dodd were promoted as campaign-fund affairs. Dodd's former administrative assistant, James P. Boyd, said he had helped arrange for then Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson to attend a testimonial in 1963, and that Dodd instructed him to tell Mr. Johnson's staff that the money would go "for my campaign next fall."

Even so, the source of some of the funds was somewhat surprising. Boyd testified that one of Dodd's foremost money-raisers, a staffer on the senator's

Internal Security subcommittee, had told him that a week before the 1964 election International Latex board chairman A.N. Spanel offered to contribute \$100,000 in exchange for help in obtaining an ambassadorship.

Cash: The money, Boyd said, was to come through Irving Ferman, a Washington vice president for International Latex. Dodd acknowledged that Ferman gave him \$8,000 in cash a month after the 1964 election. When asked about the money, Ferman admitted he and other Latex officials had donated money to Dodd, and he conceded the senator had promoted Spanel's still unfulfilled ambassadorial ambitions. But he denied that the donations and the promotional effort were related.

Just before the hearings resumed, Dodd had risen in an almost empty Senate chamber to thunder out his innocence. He insisted that all the money used at Dodd Day testimonials amounted to tax-free personal gifts—to be spent as he pleased. And he charged that his troubles stemmed from disloyal staffers who had pillaged his office files and turned over confidential records to columnists Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson. Before the committee itself, Dodd's attorney pursued a similarly pious line. He vigorously attacked the anti-Dodd witnesses on the ground that they had probably violated Federal law by divulging Dodd's income-tax returns. Inexplicably, the defense also used much of one of its hearings to put on famed handwriting expert Charles A. Appel Jr. to prove that Dodd had not personally signed a number of the checks used to pay his personal bills—a point already sworn to by a former office staffer who said he had signed Dodd's name at the senator's reception.

In the Hole: His attorney also sought to cast Dodd as a frugal public servant struggling to maintain himself and his family on his \$30,000-a-year Senate salary. "Money was a daily problem," said Paul V. McNamara, a Bridgeport, Conn., lawyer and Dodd's longtime friend. McNamara said the testimonial dinners were simply intended to "get this man straightened out financially for the 1964 campaign so he would not become the nervous wreck he already was."

When Dodd himself took the stand for two and a half hours as the final witness before the hearings adjourned, he also maintained a posture of righteous innocence, a government official doing the best possible under trying financial difficulties. "I got into the hole in 1956," the senator said, "and I was never able to get out."

Mostly the committee was gentle with Dodd. Once the senator was unable to pay positively whether one \$16,000 loan as to pay a personal or campaign debt. "It's really impossible, almost, for me

to recall exactly..."), and at one point, Chairman Stennis wistfully commented, "I wish you could have a better recollection." Immediately, Dodd dismissed all accusations made against him. "My conscience is clear," he declared. "I don't believe there is anyone who can look me in the eye and say I did wrong."

The select committee had spent considerable time looking Dodd in the eye—and members were reportedly "mad as hell" at the senator's behavior. They adjourned, however, to ponder awhile before deciding just what they will say about all the things Dodd did.

REPUBLICANS:

Forever Amber

The operation had all the spontaneity of a calculating machine. There was private citizen Richard Nixon jet-stopping his way from London to Paris to Bonn to Rome and on to Moscow—the first leg of a two-month, round-the-world

envisioned in the ambitious table of organization.

The new Nixon apparatus comprises two groups: an older crowd of Eisenhower admirers and a younger bunch of pragmatic politicians. The Ike element includes such men as former Interior Secretary Fred Seaton; New Hampshire's Robert Hill, former Ambassador to Mexico; and ex-Connecticut Gov. John Lodge (Henry Cabot's brother). The guiding spirit and key fund-raiser is Maurice Stans, once Eisenhower's Budget Director and now head of the New York brokerage firm of Glore Forgan, Wm. R. Staats, Inc. Numbered among the young set are ex-Goldwaterites Peter O'Donnell of Texas and Georgia's Howard (Bo) Callaway (who won't quite admit that he's on the Nixon team but talks that way).

Nixon's role remains shrouded by the circumspection American politics demands of candidates twenty months before Election Day. "Dick didn't give them the green light and he didn't give them the red light," said one associ-



Nixon (with Llewellyn Thompson) hit Moscow as Reagan popped candy

brush-up course in foreign affairs. And back in New York, fifteen of the old pro's most loyal retainers closeted themselves in the opulent privacy of the Plaza Hotel's Blue Room to officiate at the birth of—what else?—the "Nixon for President Committee."

"We're moving, boy! We're scouring the country!" exulted Nixon chairman Gaylord (Parkie) Parkinson, 48, last week as he returned to San Diego to close his obstetrical practice and turn over his 40 pregnant patients to his colleagues. The doctor promptly dispatched 2,000 letters to 1964 Republican convention delegates, state and county party chairmen, congressmen and fat-cat contributors (sample sentiment: among Republicans, Nixon is "the best-equipped, best-qualified man for *The Most Important Job in the World*"). And after Easter, Dr. Parkinson, who recently retired as California state GOP chairman, will head for Washington to open the Nixon office and begin enlisting the 134 staffers

ate. "It's sort of amber." In truth, it is obvious that the committee could not have been formed without Nixon's consent—although he reserves the option to bow out if the grass roots don't catch fire.

The Stump: Not yet a candidate, Nixon was accentuating the positive on his European junket. He had little to say for the record, but at nearly every stop he managed to wangle appointments with VIP's—conversations that couldn't help but come in handy on the stump later. The English, Germans and Italians (and Pope Paul VI) obliged, but Moscow greeted Nixon with unseasonal chill. Only U.S. Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson was on hand at Sheremetyevo Airport to welcome him; Soviet officials turned his requests for appointments down cold. Nixon's irritable reaction further frosted the Russians. "I can understand, of course," he said, "that it would possibly be somewhat difficult for leaders of a nation which has no opposition to recognize the role of a private citizen

V
O
L
69

13

THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM

Lyndon Johnson's 48 communications to the 90th Congress encompass 66 pieces of proposed legislation. These are the major measures he wants:

KEY BILLS	THE OUTLOOK
WAR ON POVERTY Just over \$2 billion, up 25 per cent over last year, with much of the increase ticketed for Head Start	Cuts likely for Job Corps and community-action programs
CIVIL RIGHTS Essentially the same bill Congress defeated last year but with open-housing requirements spread over two years	May pass without fair-housing provision
MODEL CITIES \$400 million to finance rebuilding blighted city areas	Fund request will probably be cut
RENT SUPPLEMENTS \$40 million (double last year's appropriation) to help low-income families pay rent	New GOP strength in House may scuttle program
TEACHER CORPS Expand present corps of 1,200 federally paid teachers in urban and rural slum areas	Some trouble expected unless local control is assured
SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS Twenty per cent average increase in benefits with coverage increased to include 500,000 additional farm workers	Size of requested increases will be cut but coverage will probably be expanded
AIR POLLUTION CONTROL Set minimum pollution standards for smoke-stack industries and establish enforcement commissions	Passage of bill—perhaps without teeth for enforcement
CRIME CONTROL Grants to municipal agencies to aid police and crack down on street crime and juvenile delinquency	Will pass, perhaps even with unwanted funds tacked on
FOREIGN AID \$3.1 billion request, smallest in twenty-year history of program, emphasizes self help	Fund cut looks inevitable
SELECTIVE SERVICE Four-year extension of present draft law, leaving the President with power to set up lottery-style selection system and draft 19-year-olds first	Congress may try to block LBJ's lottery system, but will certainly extend the draft
TAX INCREASE Six per cent surcharge on present income taxes effective in midyear	Now doubtful, passage depends on state of economy; LBJ may withdraw the request
EAST-WEST TRADE Liberalized trade between U.S. and Iron Curtain countries	Very strong House opposition because of Soviet's supplies to North Vietnam

who is a member of an opposition party."

For all its premeditation, the latest turn in Nixon's career reflected a sudden change in the ex-Veeep's timetable. His boosters hadn't planned to make their move for at least two months. But GOP front-runner George Romney's fumbling and the smart showing by rookie Gov. Ronald Reagan of California (who popped into Washington at the weekend and delighted photographers by trying to pop jelly beans into his mouth in a contest with Romney) convinced them that they had to put Nixon in the field fast. "We had to show some activity," confessed one, "because before too long people would say 'to hell with it' and write Nixon off."

Brain Trust: Parkinson has the strategy all worked out. It includes a \$1 million effort in New Hampshire, the first Presidential primary, in March 1968. Beyond that, the Nixon brain trust has already penciled in primaries in Wisconsin (April), Nebraska and Oregon (May) and perhaps in California, in June 1968 if Reagan declares for the Presidency. And fast-talking Doc Parkinson has the prescription all written in advance. "We're going to stop these big parades rolling up and down the street," he said. "We've got to get Dick down out of the bleachers and talking to the people."

How to bury the "Tricky Dick" image? "Well, we've been around and around on that one," Parkinson told NEWSWEEK's Karl Fleming, "and we're just going to have to avoid those slippery things that look bad. He's going to have to change. We're going to have to close the likability gap." And what about the Nixon-can't-win stigma? "I'm saying first that in a time of crisis, when things get tough, a nation calls forth leaders with experience and background," said Parkinson. "I also point out a lot of men who have come back after defeats—Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Grover Cleveland."

THE PRESIDENT:

Laundry List

President Lyndon Johnson looked out last week on the United States of America and liked what he saw. After a seminar on Southern educational progress, the President was a relaxed and ebullient visitor in the Tennessee Governor's Mansion in Nashville. "I wish," he mused, "my mother could come down from heaven long enough to hear what I heard today." Mr. Johnson was also characteristically expansive. The years of his Presidency, he said unblushingly, have marked "the greatest era of American progress known since our Constitution was adopted."

By the President's reckoning, a full 85 per cent of the cornucopian promises he made in his 1964 campaign have already