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FOR WARD ALLEN FROM SISCO

1. This message necessitated by foul-up in delivery my April 4 letter to you.
2. Before meeting members Micronesia Status Commission you should know we attended five days of executive hearings before House Subcommittee on Insular Affairs and I myself spent full day testifying. Although following excerpts from ~~SISCO~~ my memorandum to Katzenbach contain sensitive points which should not be discussed with Micronesians, excerpts will help you deal with questions you may be asked. Since you should not take these excerpts with you to Saipan, we have also drawn up contingency questions and answers which are unclassified (except one on access) and can be taken

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with you.

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BEGIN QUOTE FROM MEMORANDUM

Executive hearings were held to permit members House Interior Committee who recently visited Micronesia to report . . . With hardly exception reports were extraordinarily critical of our administration of Territory, particularly in economic and educational fields. Several stressed that US could not afford such poor performance/and at same time expect satisfactory political evolution in Territory.

Predominating view in Subcommittee was that people of TTPI did not feel ready--and, in fact, were not ready--to make intelligent choice regarding Territory's future. There was also pronounced concern that we should not insist on maintaining Micronesia as an entity since it distorted more natural political and economic alignments. Much of political discussion was marked by degree of contradiction in views of Congressmen who argued that Administration was guilty of dragging its feet while rushing Micronesia toward goal for which it was not ready . . .

Little favorable was said about Administration's proposal for Status Commission. Several members asserted arrangements could be made more quickly through relatively informal process of Executive Legislative consultation concentrated in Interior Committee . . .

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I began my own testimony with statement of our broad objective of permitting Micronesians to exercise their right of self-determination in such way as to remove Territory from further UN surveillance and to enable us in our national interest to arrange permanent association of TTPI with US. I indicated that pending resolution was intended to provide mechanism through which all executive agencies involved, Congress and people of Micronesia could work together to achieve this objective . . .

Some points to which I had to return time and time again were:

(a) Undue delay in setting TTPI's political status would run risk of fostering conditions which could be exploited by hostile elements to jeopardize our defense interests;

(b) UN Charter and Trusteeship Agreement necessitated that we offer the Micronesians choice of at least self-government or independence;

(c) We would have to maintain entity of Micronesia up to point of self-determination, though not thereafter;

(e) Our interest in Status Commission was primarily as means of insuring cooperation between Executive and Congress . . .

END QUOTE FROM MEMORANDUM

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BEGIN QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. Why US Status Commission; why couldn't Micronesians select alternatives for plebiscite themselves?

A. Status Commission not essential in terms our legal obligations or UN practices. Proposal based entirely on practical considerations. For one thing, you Micronesians have proposed it. It would provide effective means by which US Executive Branch, Congress, Micronesians and American public could engage in systematic examination all aspects question.

Q. If Micronesia became self-governing territory of US, how could Micronesian rights be guaranteed from arbitrary Congressional action? What protection would replace our present recourse to UN?

A. Definitive answer would depend on nature of arrangements between Micronesia and U.S. Rights of Micronesians under association with US would be one of questions which status commission could presumably be expected to answer.

Q. Given Micronesia's financial and economic dependence upon US, ~~independence~~ is independence real ~~alternative~~ alternative?

A. Do not deny Micronesia's heavy dependence upon US poses special problems -- problems that both Micronesians and proposed

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status commission should examine in detail. Our awareness of this complication has prompted us to urge further acceleration of TTPI's economic advancement during period preceding plebiscite.

Q. Doesn't US want to hold on to Territory for military reasons because of strategic location?

A. Strategic importance of TTPI needs no explanation in light your own experience in World War II. Nevertheless US has assumed obligations under UN Charter and Trusteeship Agreement which we intend to fulfill. There also remains traditional attachment of American people for principle of self-determination, and continuing policy of USG in support of that principle. Accordingly, I have no doubt that independence would be one of alternatives offered.

Q. Would it be possible to fragment Trust Territory, with perhaps some of islands joining Guam or Hawaii while others choose their own future whether it be independence, association with US or Japan? Could parts remain as Trust Territory?

A. For both legal and political reasons TTPI must be treated as whole at least until people of Territory exercise their right of self-determination. Trusteeship Agreement is premised on Territory's remaining an entity. Moreover, given strong opposition among newly

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independent African and Asian countries to fragmentation of dependent areas, any parcelling of Territory prior to self-determination would provoke serious opposition in UN. UN visiting missions to TTPI noted in their 1961 and 1964 reports that secession of one part of Trust Territory not possible under the Trusteeship Agreement. Specifically, proposals for attachment of Marianas to Guam have been sharply criticized.

On other hand, in UN supervised plebiscite, northern half of Trust Territory of British Cameroons voted to join Nigeria, and southern half voted to join Republic of Cameroons. So, as you can see, there is precedent for division of a trust territory following or in connection with act of self-determination.

Q. Many Micronesians feel they not yet ready make choice regarding their future, and won't be ready ~~xx~~ even by 1972. Why can't we continue Trusteeship status?

A. Technically there is no reason why trusteeship status may not continue indefinitely. At same time trusteeship status was not intended and has never been regarded as permanent. The US, as administering authority, is under specific Charter obligation to promote development towards self-government or independence. As a practical matter fulfillment of some development

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programs, particularly economic development, may be inhibited or at least slowed so long as future status of territory remains uncertain.

1972 date is several years off, and it is our hope that in meantime concerted effort will be made, particularly by Congress of Micronesia, to ensure that Micronesians fully aware of and understand advantages and disadvantages of various alternatives.

Q. Would US aid continue if Micronesia chose independence?

A. I cannot speak for present or future Presidents or Congresses and their attitudes toward an independent Micronesia. On other hand, it seems to me that an intimate relationship would exist if there were continuing association.

Q. Would US accept arrangements for association of Micronesia that included continuing option for Micronesian independence, or association with some other independent states, such as the Cook Islands have with New Zealand and the various West Indies Associated States with the United Kingdom?

A. Relationship between any areas must be governed by the wishes of the peoples concerned and constitutional system involved. Under New Zealand constitutional system, option for further changes in association or for severing the association is possible. Although historically there have been changes in relations between the US

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and a territory, I can't say how ~~the~~ provisions to which you refer would fit into American constitutional system. That would be one of ^{questions} ~~the~~ ~~provisions~~ which we believe commission would have to study.

As practical matter any provision which resulted in continued uncertainty over territory's future status might have undesirable effect on such things as economic development.

Q. What is necessary for termination of Trusteeship Agreement in terms of legal and political obligations? Is plebiscite required?

A. Trusteeship Agreement does not specify how it is to be terminated. ^{Principal} ~~Principle~~ legal requirement for termination is achievement by Territory of self-government or independence. In practice, UN and administering authorities have followed a number of procedures in effort to satisfy themselves that inhabitants of trust territories have had genuine opportunities to exercise self-determination prior to termination. Among these have been plebiscites either under UN supervision or in some way associated with UN.

Q. Would alternatives to be offered to Micronesia in a plebiscite have to be limited to independence or self-government?

A. No, there is no reason why other alternatives, such as full integration into United States, or some other state, could not also be offered. Independence and self-government are simply range

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of choice indicated in UN Charter and Trusteeship Agreement.

Q. How about association with Japan; would US be willing to offer that alternative?

A. Unless there were an appreciable desire in Micronesia for this choice, I doubt it would be included in a plebiscite.

Q. What do you ~~xxx~~ mean by self-government? Could it involve status such as that of Guam?

A. Trusteeship Agreement does not define words "self-government" and there would be considerable latitude in establishing necessary institutions. In deciding what constitutes "self-government", we would be guided by: (a) what you feel is desirable and realistic, (b) US Constitution/practice, (c) standards generally used in UN. As you know, US classifies Guam, American Samoa and Virgin Islands as "non-self-governing territories" in terms of Article 73 (e) of UN Charter. While I don't wish to complicate things, or unnecessarily foreclose any alternatives, ~~my~~ my personal reaction is that formal non-self-governing status such as in Guam today would not conform with reasonable definition of self-government.

Q. Would there have to be substantial degree of self-government in the Territory before the plebiscite?

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A. There would have to be enough self-government so that it could properly be stated that people of Territory had made meaningful choice during plebiscite and that they had reached degree of political development and experience which indicated they capable of self-government. This does not mean that final rung on ladder of self-government would have to be reached prior to act of self-determination.

Q. What is relationship between US and Puerto Rico and non-self-Governing territories of Guam, American Samoa and the Virgin Islands, in matters of citizenship, voting, draft laws, defense, and foreign affairs? Would similar arrangements be adopted for Micronesia if it chose some form of association with US?

A. Interior Dept. will have answer to most of your questions in this area. ~~US~~ US would have to be responsible for defense and foreign affairs. ~~Most of the~~ ^{Other aspects} would have to be ~~fully~~ worked out by proposed status commission and agreed prior to plebiscite. Some details ^{might} ~~will be~~ be overlooked and would have to be resolved later. Still others ~~will not be~~ ^{would} be subject to evolutionary process.

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Q. Following act self-determination, how would Trusteeship Agreement be terminated in UN?

A. Agreement has no specific provisions for termination, but only states that it may not be terminated without US consent. Since there have been no other strategic trusts, no real precedent exists for termination of strategic trust agreement between an administering authority and UNSC. Other trusteeship agreements, which had provisions for alteration or amendment through agreement between administering authorities and UNGA, have been terminated by GA action at request of administering authority.

Q. Why do you feel we should hold plebiscite by 1972 at latest?

A. 1972 is not magic date. It was chosen having in mind need for adequate time for appropriate preparations; at same time we wish avoid undue delay. What are your feelings about timing of plebiscite?

Q. What can be done to provide easier access to TTPI for foreign tourists?

A. Within limits imposed by our obligations under Trusteeship Agreement and security considerations, Department of State

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favors widest possible access to territory for both US and foreign tourists, and would look favorably upon suggestions to streamline current entry procedures. Question currently under review.

END QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

BEGIN CLASSIFIED FOOTNOTE

Under current Navy-Interior agreement High Commissioner issues entry permits following Navy security checks. Reportedly this procedure can take up to 30 days, and no one has been refused entry since procedure was established several years ago. In order stimulate tourism Interior has proposed changes in these cumbersome procedures. Specifically, Interior would have High Commissioner issue provisional 30 day entry permits at port of entry upon presentation of visa valid for travel to US. Security checks could be initiated at time of issuance. Navy has been cool to proposal but so far has not rejected it. At working level UNP has indicated initially favorable reaction.

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