

world, change is the fundamental fact of our time. The developing countries have determined to fight their old enemies: hopelessness and poverty. They can have no hope of success in this fight, no matter how great their efforts, without adequate assistance from the wealthy nations of the world. We must choose between providing that assistance or destroying the hope of peaceful change.

Some say we should postpone or eliminate foreign aid because of the cost of our efforts to help defend freedom in Southeast Asia. But the freedom and progress of hundreds of millions of other Asians, of 250 million people in Latin America, and of 260 million people in Africa also engage our concern and are directly related to our own security and well-being.

I find it hard to accept assertions that we cannot afford to devote a fraction of 1 percent of our GNP to building a safer and more prosperous world by helping other nations to make peaceful progress.

In many of the less developed countries, development has been gaining in momentum. If that momentum is reversed, the consequences for our prosperity and for the peace of the world could be disastrous. Last year the foreign aid program was cut below the minimum level necessary to sustain that momentum. For fiscal year 1969 we must have adequate funds to get on with the job.

Status Commission Proposed for Pacific Islands Trust Territory

Statement by Under Secretary Katzenbach¹

Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for this opportunity to testify on the proposed joint resolution² on the status of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. We consider this a most important resolution and a matter of some urgency.

Developments have reached a point where we should clarify the status of the trust territory, both from the point of view of Micronesia as well as from that of the United States.

Our association with the trust territory, which began with military operations during World War II, is a unique one. It takes the form of a strategic trust set forth in our trusteeship

agreement of 1947 with the Security Council of the United Nations.³ The trusteeship agreement gives us authority to administer the TTPI virtually as if it were an area over which we had sovereignty. In law and in fact, however, our sovereignty does not extend to the territory. We remain obligated to the United Nations to foster the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the Micronesian people and cannot deal independently with it as though there were no trusteeship agreement.

The United Nations, for its part, maintains its surveillance over our stewardship by an annual review of our administration during Trusteeship Council meetings. In addition, visiting missions have periodically gone to the territory and reported back to the Trusteeship Council. Although we have not escaped criticism, this particular association with the U.N. has been constructive and devoid of the kind of hostile or destructive criticism which has fallen on most other dependent areas.

Despite some lean years in our administration and despite continued shortcomings, we have for the last several years engaged in a major effort to accelerate the territory's development. Now, after over two decades of trusteeship, it has become clear that a more definitive status for the territory is necessary and desirable. Two years ago the Congress of Micronesia petitioned President Johnson, stating that "This generation of Micronesians should have an early opportunity to determine the ultimate constitution and political status of Micronesia." It requested the President to establish a status commission which, after ascertaining the views of the people of Micronesia, would study and critically assess the available political alternatives.

Micronesia's petition was hardly surprising in a day when peoples throughout the world are seeking greater control over their own affairs. Moreover, the United States shares the conviction that there should be less uncertainty about the territory's political future.

The United States fully supports self-determination by the people of the trust territory. Both our history and our foreign policy have

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on Territories and Insular Affairs of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on May 8 (press release 100 dated May 9).

² S. J. Res. 106, 90th Cong., 2d sess.

³ For text, see BULLETIN of May 4, 1947, p. 791.

been deeply identified with the principle of self-determination. The only question before us is one of appropriate timing.

The trusteeship agreement does not specify procedures for its termination. Both the agreement and the U.N. Charter leave no doubt, however, that an exercise of self-determination in the TTPI would require that we offer the Micronesian people the choice of self-government or independence. Article 6 explicitly enjoins the United States to "promote the development of the inhabitants of the trust territory toward self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the trust territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned."

While neither the charter nor the agreement specify how self-determination should be brought into being, the precedent of similar cases indicates the need for a plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants.

The choices offered to the Micronesians in such a plebiscite must include self-government or independence. The plebiscite should represent a genuine and meaningful decision by all the inhabitants of the territory. As such, it would require all the preparation and care that must accompany such a solemn decision.

The proposed resolution envisages a plebiscite in Micronesia not later than June 30, 1972. The timing of a plebiscite must avoid two dangers. If the target date is postponed too long, we shall create serious disappointments which could cause us grave difficulties at a later time. A premature plebiscite, on the other hand, would not allow time to prepare a realistic program for carrying out the alternative chosen or to permit the education necessary if the Micronesian people are to make a meaningful choice. We believe that 1972 gives us enough time for preparation and education without risking the dangers inherent in extended delay.

We propose a status commission because we are convinced that a qualified body should recommend how to give a fuller meaning to terms like "independence," "self-government." It would not be fair if the Micronesians—who are looking for greater, not less, certainty—were presented with a plebiscite in which the bare words describing each alternative were not backed up by a plausible and practical program. For example, it would be meaningless to offer Micronesia some form of self-government in free association with the United States if our proposals on such things as citizenship, form of

government, budgetary arrangements, and economic relationships were not well understood ahead of time by the Micronesians. A status commission would study the range of possibilities and recommend to the President and the Congress the arrangements most suitable to the trust territory's special circumstances.

The joint resolution proposes that the status commission include, in addition to the chairman, eight members representing the Congress and eight members appointed by the President. This composition would, we think, allow the President and the Congress to work together in the smoothest possible way. The President has clear obligations regarding the TTPI, and the Congress has explicit constitutional obligations.

Before closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to urge the greatest possible support from this committee and from the Congress for programs of political and economic development in the trust territory. While an exercise of self-determination will usher the Micronesian people into a new era, their choice will obviously be affected by their experiences of the present. The best and most tangible way to prepare the people of Micronesia for a free and wise choice in their exercise of self-determination is clearly to build up present political institutions and to stimulate economic development. No other course could better insure that the choices offered at the time of a plebiscite would have real and attractive meaning to the people of the territory.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

90th Congress, 2d Session

Seventh Annual Report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Message from the President transmitting the report. H. Doc. 256. February 12, 1968. 77 pp.

Extension and Amendment of Public Law 480, 83d Congress. Report to accompany H.R. 18165. H. Rept. 1297. April 23, 1968. 56 pp.

Extending Authority of Export-Import Bank in Order To Improve the Balance of Payments. Report to accompany S. 3218. S. Rept. 1100. May 1, 1968. 6 pp.

Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments. Conference report to accompany H.R. 14940. H. Rept. 1347. May 2, 1968. 2 pp.

Amendment to the Act Creating the Atlantic-Pacific Inter-oceanic Canal Study Commission. Report to accompany H.R. 15190. S. Rept. 1112. May 8, 1968.

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