March 26, 1909

ROBERT ROBBINS, POLITICAL FUTURE OF MICRONESIA

AND THE TIMING OF SELF-DETERMINATION, Franch 1969 (dreft article)

There is cause for serious concern at the close of the first Hundred days of the Nixon Administration regarding the political future and status of the Territory of the Pacific Islands, placed under United States Trusteeship by Agreement between the Security Council and the Congress of the United States twenty-two years ago.¹ In his book, published at the time that he was setting out to seek the Democratic Party nomination for the Presidency of the United States, Senator Eugene J. McCarthy in ten brief, succinct chapters on foreign policy issues elaborating upon the principal

1. 8 U.N. Treaty Series, p. 190. The United States Government formally submitted its draft Trusteeship Agreement for approval by the Security Council on February 26, 1947 in accordance with articles 82 and 83 of the Charter. The Security Council approved unanimously on April 1, 1947 the United States draft agreement including three slight revisions which were accepted by the United States and the perfæction of article 7 requested by the United States representative. By Joint Resolution of July 18, 1947 the Congress of the United States approved the Agreement (U.S. Code 271, 61 Stat. 397). The Trusteeship Agreement was brought into force on that same date by Executive Order No. 9875 which ended military government in the Territory and made the Navy Department responsible for the administration of the Trust Territory "pending the enactment of appropriate legislation by the Congress of the United States providing for the future government thereof." For the Basic Instruments for the Governance of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1947-1965, see Congress of Micronesia Manual, Part I, Congress of Micronesia, Saipan, Mariana Islands, 1965. This compilation should be amended by Department of the Interior Order 2918 of December 27, 1968. /Federal Register Vol. 34, No. 3, January 4, 1969; pp. 157-160, Doc. 69-807 superceding Department of Interior Orders No. 2876 of January 30, 1964, as amended, and No. 2882 of September 28, 1964, as amended.

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theme that "our foreign policy should be more restrained and, insofar as prudent judgment can determine, more closely in keeping with the movement of history.² It is appropriate to add in a paper prepared for a meeting at Adlai Stævenson College, University of California, Santa Cruz, a particular comment by Senator McCarthy about his book:

> "If it has a personal mark, it is that which I believe Adlai Stevenson would have made on American foreign policy, had his ideas and his attitudes been translated into political reality."3

It is also appropriate to recall in this setting that when Ambassador Stevenson died in July 1965 during the first session of the Congress of Micronesia, the desk flags of the 33 members were lowered on their staffs, and the Congress paid homage to his memory, extolling his accomplishments in high office, the universal principles he cherished and defended, and noting his passing as "a great loss to all mankind who love and cherish freedom."⁴

One of Senator McCarthy's ten chapters, Chapter 8, "Micronesia: Our Trust,"⁵ deals in very broad strokes with the

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5. The Limits of Power, pp. 173-183.

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Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, <u>The Limits of Power: America's</u> <u>Role in the World</u>, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967, p. vii.

^{3. &}lt;u>Ibid</u>.

^{4.} Joint Resolution No. 1-19, July 28, 1965, <u>Laws and Resolutions</u>, Congress of Micronesia, Saipan, Mariana Islands, 1965, p. 64.

relationship of the United States to the islands of Micronesia in the Western Pacific which he describes as ". . . not U.S. possessions; they are wards of the international community, with United States acting as a kind of foster parent to whose care they have been entrusted." Those few who have had opportunity to become deeply concerned about the welfare and advancement of the people of the Trust Territory should be grateful to Senator McCarthy for including "The Problem of the Trust Territory" within his 1967 listing of ten United States foreign policy challenges. Events since the Congress of Micronesia met in January 1969 for its fifth regular session⁶ have been startling, and may well serve to vindicate Senator McCarthy for choosing to include the "minuscule" problem of the Trust Territory within his list of ten pressing foreign policy problems. A quick reading up on Micronesia in his recent "tract for the times" will also serve to show how much change in political thinking has ebbed and flowed in the lagoons and channels of the Trust Territory during the past two

^{6.} This was the first time the Congress has met in January. Department of the Interior Order 2918 (Sec. 11) provides that in addition to the regular session of the Congress held in each year beginning on the second Mondayof July and continuing for not to exceed 45 consecutive calendar days, there shall also be a regular session beginning on the second Monday in January in each odd year (the January following the biennial Congressional elections in November) and continuing for not to exceed 15 consecutive calendar days.



years, which can be applied to test some of his assertions, such as:

"As far as the Micronesians themselves are concerned, not even the United Nations mission could find any significant sentiment in the islands for independence, particularly if independence would mean loss of the American subsidy. The population of less than one hundred thousand and limited economic potential argue against independence. 7

And elsewhere he declares:

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> "The theory that we should just let the Micronesians be happy in their simple life and ignorance is untenable. Micronesia is in the modern world, and we cannot remove it. We cannot return the Pacific Islands to the era of the 'simple savage,' the ideal of eighteenth century Europe before what Alan Morehead calls 'the fatal impact' of Western civilization." 8

Since its first organizing session in Jonuary of this year. some of the members of the Congress of Micronesia have spoken boldly on the matter of future status of the Territory, declaring themselves in favor of independence. Such opinion has been voiced by some members of Congress's Future Political Status Commission as they have passed via Honolulu enroute to study the governmental arrangements in other Pacific Island entities such as Fiji, Western Samoa, and the most recent of the trust territories to achieve "ultimate" political status--the tiny independent state of Nauru to which the business of copra collecting in the Marshall Islands extends. The impact of Nauru's recent independence has been felt in the Trust Territory. Returning home

- 7. The Limits of Power, p. 180.
- 8. Ibid, p. 178-179

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from the United States in January and visiting Saipan enroute, the President of Nauru, Hausmer De Robert, was invited to address the Congress of Micronesia.⁹ This first foreign head of state to visit Micronesia reportedly impressed the members of Congress with his presence and remarks in which he propounded the popular anti-colonial shibboleth that "good government is no substitute for self-government." It may be noted parenthetically that a senior spokesman for the United States military establishment in the Ryukus expressed the same sentiment publicly at Naha in revealing his sympathy and understanding of the feelings of the Okinawans who long to be reunited with the Japanese homeland.¹⁰

The Congress of Micronesia has recently disconcerted the Administration in the Trust Territory by going outside its circle of American contacts in seeking advice and guidance on future political status. Nothing precludes the Congress from doing this. but its members should expect a strong reaction against it if such consultation produces advice contrary to American concepts of democracy and a willingness to compromise with principle and uphold the islands' version of feudalism. Moreover, the Senate of the Congress of Micronesia adopted a resolution at its 1969 organizing session requesting the United Nations to reconsider

^{9.} House Joint Resolution No. 13.

^{10.} See also, David K. Willis, "Battle of Ckinawa, '69" Christian Science Monitor, February 14, 1969

the legal and political status of the Trust Territory.¹¹ If this should be done in the course of the annual review by the Trusteeship Council of the administration of the Territory by the United States, the process might be regarded as unexceptional. Indeed. it might be held that this is what takes place each year as the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council enters the docket and submits to prolonged questioning and probing. However, if this resolution is intended to invite new elements of supervision and perhaps give impetus to the United Nations General Aseembly's peripatetic "Committee of Twenty-Four" to become involved in the Trust Territory, a firm reaction from within the American Government might be forthcoming. The "Special Committee on Colonialism" some time ago took note of the Trust Territory and listed it for future examination in greater detail.¹² The position of the last administration in Washington held that the Special Committee on Colonialism would have no call to examine a Territory administered under the Trusteeship System, and it is doubtful that the new administration and the atmosphere of the times will dictate a different policy on this issue.

An interesting question to ponder is the extent to which the Micronesian politicians who are now speaking out for

^{11.} Senate Resolution No. 18

^{12.} Report of the Special Committee on Colonialism, A/5446, October 30, 1963, Annex I.

independence have chosen the period of change-over in administration in Washington to state their position. They might do so in the realization that this is an appropriate time to register fresh hopes and aspirations and win attention for their They may also have come to realize that this is a time views. marked by political confusion and uncertainties in Washington when the political broom of the victorious party, be it Democrat or Republican, sweeps vigorously to clear places for the party faithful in numbers far in excess of the dictates of good government and sacrifices an enormous amount of continuity and talent in the process. Nowhere within the Governmdnt does partisan politics reach down so deeply into the administrative hierarchy to remove Office Directors and administrators in the field than in the Department of the Interior. The Trust Territory far out at the end of the line has experienced the repercussions of this dubious process. It would not be surprising if its local leaders were bewildered and disturbed by it.

The Micronesian political leaders who are speaking out in favor of independence for the Trust Territory at this time are reported to hold that they could sustain such sovereign status without loss of the American subsidy which, at the present time, is within a U.S. Congressional ceiling of 50 million. They reason that the United States, desiring to withdraw from the Asian mainland, will be obliged to rely heavily upon the Pacific Islands for military installations comparable to those on Guam.



In this assumption, they will be in accord with the thinking of Professor Hans Morgenthau contained in his new book which has just been published.¹³ A preview of it sets forth the author's view that

> ". . the United States is overcommitted insofar as it has committed its military power on the mainland of Asia for the purpose of containing China at its periphery of its empire. It can convert this error by returning to the policy which Secretary of State Dean Acheson enunciated in his speech to the National Press Club of January 10, 1950, and which this country pursued before the outbreak of the Korean War: to limit its commitments to the local defense of the island chain from Japan to the Philippines, supported by its retaliatory nuclear power." 14

Unless Professor Morger thau's case is spelled out in greater detail than in the above newspaper report, the Micronesians may be considered to be ahead of him in their thinking insofar as the chain of islands from Japan to the Philippines are concerned. Political attitudes in Japan and the Philippines at present do not suggest that we can comfortably rely on island bases located within the sovereign territory of those nations. Hence, to the Micronesians, the importance of their islands militarily to the United States looms large and clear. They are concerned that the United States should and would make very substantial payments for the use of land bases in Micronesia and

14. Otto Zaussmer, Boston Globe, February 22, 1969

Hans Morgenthau, <u>A New Foreign Policy for the United States</u>, New York, Praeger, 1969

that an independent government of the islands could have the final say on what lands would be used for military bases and on what terms. They know that the United States government has appropriated astronomical amounts in the past to buy agreement rights to establish its far-flung network of military bases around the world, and they have before them the present case of Spain demanding 51.2 billion over five years as the price for renewal of American rights to use a submarine base at Rota (not Rota of the Marianas) and air bases at Moron (Seville), Torrejon (Madrid), and Zaragoza in the north.¹⁵

It is understandable that the Micronesians should place a high estimate on the military importance of their islands, for as Professor Thomas R. Adam has pointed out;

> "United States acceptance of a strategic tract obligates its government in the eyes of the rest of the world to treat the inhabitants of the region as if they were making a substantial contribution to the defense of the metropolitan country. A strategic trust is based on the assumption of the overriding importance of national defense and the preservation of world order as against the cultural and political freedom of the indigenous inhabitants. Fortification of the area, with the consequent perils and restrictions imposed on the localities, represents the degree to which indigenous interests are subordinated to metropolitan necessities. 16

- 15. <u>New York Times</u>, March 23, 1969. The <u>New York Times</u> correspondent reporting from Madrid has indicated that Spain's price would come down if the United States made some kind of formal guarantee of Spanish security; also, that the last reported assistance offer was for about 100 million: see also, <u>Christian Science Monitor</u>. March 22-24, 1969, week-end issue.
- 16. Thomas R. Adam, <u>Western Interests in the Pacific Realm</u>, New York, Random House, 1967, p. 173.

They have had opportunity to have at least heard of the awesome sight of the daily sorties of fleets of B-52 bombers from Guam. But it should be added hastily that the Vietnam War, which forces upon the United States the compromise of making Guam a garrison community, has been pursued by a primarily "dovish" America, seeking the middle course of action, despite the dangerous and vexaticus public debates of military policy in Southeast Asia in the simplistic, either/or terms of "hawks" and "doves." And there is no doubt that the present sight of America in the pursuit of its ideas and ideals for a better world are now focused hopefully upon the post-Vietnam War period.

The military worth of the islands of Micronesia now and in the post-Vietnam War period is not an easy subject to debate, for security considerations prevent us from knowing how they are viewed in the Pentagon in the light of changing concepts and technology. In addition to the military establishments on Guam, there is at present the tightly guarded missile base at Kwajalein with the nearby, overcrowded islet of Ebeye serving as a dormitory for communting Micronesian workers. A few years ago, the Yale University geographer, Professor Herold J. Wiens, discussed briefly the "Role of Micronesian Bases," against the experience of the War in the Pacific 1941-45, and the total expanse of defense considerations in the entire Pacific Ocean area.¹⁷ He concluded that "the

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^{17.} Herold J. Wiens, <u>Pacific Island Eastions of the United States</u>, Princeton, N. J., D. Van Nostrand, 1962, Chapter VII, "Our Strategic Base Organization."

tremendous value of such protected coral reef enclosures as the deep water lagoons of Kwajalein, Eniwetok, and Ulithi in future strategic considerations is very clear, since they greatly reduce the problem of safe logistics supply bases in forward areas." This is immediately modified, however, by the ambivalent statement that "On the other hand, the development of nuclear bombs of farreaching power has made such concentration of ships in one lagoon or harbor extremely dangerous in the event of any future hostilities." Professor Weins ends with the often-heard theme that the complete abandoment of already developed facilities which lend themselves to a considerable measure of dispersion may seem pennywise and bound-foolish.¹⁸

The participation of the United States in Far Eastern affairs as a Pacific power means, of course, that the factor of military necessity cannot be disregarded. But this negative aspect of American involvement should not obscure for Micronesians and Americans alike that the major emphasis ought to be on economic, social, and political development of island peoples. The dictates of military necessity are progressively ephemeral in the swift pace of our changing times, and at best a dubious basis for building a polity's infrastructure and achieving its long-range goals. If certain Micronesians wish to use the present U. S.

18. Ibid., p. 62.

negotiations with Spain to continue the use of military bases in the latter, they should appreciate that this argument is not without obvious flaws. They should realize that the military necessity as well as the propriety for having such bases is seriously questioned within both Spain and the United States, and that such arrangements under short-of-war conditions are progressively harder to justify and sustain. /n indicator of such current public opinion is the <u>New York Times</u> editorial of March 23, 1969, which concludes:

"Spain's easing of totalitarian controls is welcome, but it does not make the bases agreement automatically acceptable. Certainly if the Spanish air and submarine 6 facilities are essential for American and Atlantic security, the need is for menewal of the agreement at minimum possible cost. But if technology in this era of the intercontinental missiles has made these bases obsolete, this country should withdraw its military forces from Spain as soon as possible. The latter course is particularly desirable because of the spur United States bases give to anti-American sentiment in The burden of proof is on those who would keep Spain. the existing arrangements intact despite the vast increase in the nation's missile capacity since the original 1953 agreement."

Micronesians may well take note of the growing public opinion in the United States which maintains that if such bases are merely "useful though not essential, there are compelling reasons for closing them."

If Micronesians who are suddenly demanding independence for the Trust Territory are doing so as a matter of leverage to gain increased attention and to obtain added momentum for programs of welfare and advancement, one might be inclined to praise the

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level of political sophistication which they have achieved, and their determination to do all they can to pioneer their own political, economic and social development. Certainly they have received in the last several years a large amount of State-side and United Nations encouragement to develop and press for more rapid fulfillment of their aspirations. A listing of sourses of such encouragement which have flowed together to produce a current of considerable swiftness and power would include the following, but not necessarily in the rank order indicated:

(1) The impact of United Nations Trusteeship Council Visiting Missions Reports of 1961, 1964, and 1967, evaluating the achievements of United States administration, which have become more positively critical than previous reports, and the increased attention which the Trusteeship Council, no longer preoccupied with the former trust territories in Africa, could direct to the United Nations trusteeships in the Pacific Area;

(2) The impact within the United States Government of the Fresidential Commission, headed by Anthony M. Sole on, which made an intensive survey of the Trust Territory in 1963. Despite frequent references to the Solomon Report, it is still a confidential document which is in process of being "sanitized" before being made public.

(3) A spate of literature, marking the beginnings and developing controversy in regard to the issue of future status-books and articles in periodicals, much of which has been abrasively critical of conditions in the Trust Termitory.¹⁹ It should be noted that authors have had much encouragement and cooperation from the Office of Territories in Mashington and the Administration in the Territory in assembling and checking their data. This is as it should be. Collectively such reporting has served to meet the Trust Territory's allegedly most serious need--a greater awareness within the United States of Micronesia and its problems. There is no doubt of its worth to those endeavoring to secure governmental attention and support for appropriations and programs for the Territory.

Illustrative of recent dramatizations of affairs relating to 19. the Trust Territory are the following listings: Don Oberdoofer, "America's Neglected Colonial Paradise," Saturday Evening Post, February 1964, with photographs by Jack Fields which are so absorbingly interesting and beautiful that they negated the thrust of the narrative; Edward Behr, ". . . There Time Has Stood Still for Far Too Long," <u>Washington Post</u>, Sunday, October 24, 1965--an arresting article by the Paris correspondent of Newsweek in the American newspaper most influential in commanding attention in the Nation's Capital; E. S. Kahn, "A Reporter at Large: Micronesia,"--three lengthy articles appearing in the New Yorker June 11, 18, and 25, 1966, and published subsequently as a monograph; Ed Engledow, "Trust Territory," a siz-part series published in The <u>Honolulu Advertiser</u> during October 1965; A.A. Smyser's "Pacific Forum" of the <u>Honolulu Star-Bulletin</u>, which carried full-length articles on the future of America's three Pacific responsibilities -- Guam, Samoa and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands -- in December, 1965, by such knowledgeable individuals as Professor Norman Meller of the University of Hawaii, Senator Henry M. Johnson, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Byron Baker, then Managing Editor of the Guam News, the Honorable Stewart L. Udall, then Secretary of the Interior, M. M. Goding. then High Commissioner of the Trust Territory, Carlos P. Taitano, Speaker of the Eighth Guam Legislature, and Carlton Skinner, first civilian U. S. Governor of Guam (1949-53) and

(4) The rapid increase in the parsimonious annual budget in the 1960's from 37 million to the figure of 30 million for fiscal year 1969. President Johnson requested 341.6 million for fiscal year 1970.²⁰ In addition to providing very much needed additional funds to cover operational costs, the Trust Territory has been provided means for stepped-up programs in Education, Health, Community Development, and Capital Improvements. Increased funds and assistance have also enabled the Trust Territory Government the latitude of seeking advice and guidance from agencies

U.S. Commissioner 1961 and Senior U.S. Commissioner 1964-69 on the South Pacific Commission; Byron Baker, a series of six articles in The Pacific Journal (Guam) in July 1966 during the Second Regular Session of the Congress of Micronesia; Senator Hiram L. Fong (R), of Hawaii, "Inclusion of the Trust Territory in the Pacific in the State of Hawaii," Congressional Record--Senate, August 18, 1965, pp. 20066-69, being the Senator's impressive and informative statement in introducing Senate Concurrent Resolution 50 on behalf of himself, the late Senator Gruening of Alaska and Senator Yarborough of Texas; Willard Price, America's Paradise Lost, New York, John Day, 1966--being a narrative covering a second journey through Micronesia retracing the places visited thirty years earlier when the area was a closely guarded Japanese mandate; David S. Boyer, "Micronesia: The Americanization of Eden," <u>National</u> <u>Geographic</u>, Vol. 131, No. 5, May 1967, pp. 702-744; and Philip W. Quigg, "Coming of Age in Micronesia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 3, April, 1969, pp. 493-508.

20. TTPI Press Release, 2-69, Saipan, January 22, 1969

both within and outside the U. S. Government framework.

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(5) Implementation of a suggestion of the report of the Solomon Committee to employ Peace Corps volunteers in Micronesia and the server water water and the server and the server and in a program which the Director, Peace Corps/Micronesia described in a February 1967 report as ". . . unique--in the full sense of that adjective; singular, unusual, extraordinary." This is the first employment of the Peace Corps in territory under United States jurisdiction; the aims from the start have been to use the saturation technique -- "the greatest possible involvement on the part of the Peace Corps" in Micronesia, said Peace Corps Director Jack Hood Vaughn, and to complete its program in a minimum of time. Suffice it to say here that despite the Peace Corps mandate to its recruits to abjure involvement in politics, it would be against nature to have expected that this would be the case. Moreover, Peace Corps volunteers were called for in the first instance by advertisements in college newspapers noting that there were difficulties in paradise, with the inference that in taking an assignment there one would have the exhilerating opportunity of helping

^{21.} The High Commissioner contracted with Robert R. Nathan Associates of Washington, which prepared an <u>Economic Development Plan for Micronesia</u>: a proposed long-range plan for developing the TTPI, Pt. 1-4, 3 vols., Washington. He contracted with the Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, which submitted in December, 1967, its Final Report--<u>Planning for Education and Manpower in Micronesia</u> (SRI Project 6579); and the Trust Territory Government has had the added stimulus to improving health conditions and medical services by the reporting by the World Health Organization team which visited Micronesia late in 1965.

to straighten things out. The problems of receiving, absorbing and channelling the efforts of this separate organization (whose services, without cost to the Trust Territory, were endorsed in many quarters and could not easily be refused) has placed added strain upon the Administration of the Trust Territory. A very serious situation might have ensued had the Peace Corps not been obliged to channel all of its activities in the Territory via the High Commissioner with his approval. At its January 1969 session, the Congress of Micronesia resolved to establish a joint Congressional Committee to evaluate the operations of the Peace Corps in Micronesia.²²

(6) Finally, and perhaps most important in its long-range implications, has been the evolution of the legislative function of the Trust Territory Government and the spawning of the Legislative Branch marked by the convening of the First Session of the Congress of Micronesia on July 12, 1965. The nature of government in the Trust Territory was changed markedly from that moment though many on hand at the time failed to sense the significance of this development and lingering proconsul-type mentalities, which still can be found within the territorial administration, continue to be short-sighted, insensitive and unimaginative with respect to the many changes which have been occurring.

All of these developments and many more, most of them sparked by the United States Government and the Trust Territory

22. House Joint Resolution 21.

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Administration, have produced the present sentiments and have produced no little amount of shock, disappointment and frustration to those Americans who are concerned about the Trust Territory and who must now contemplate seriously the possible eventuality of independent status following termination of the trusteeship. Micronesian leaders know that the alternative goals written into the Charter and the Trusteeship agreement are "self-government" or "independence" and they are thereby entitled to opt for the latter. If the situation continues to deteriorate by more and more Micronesians pressing for independence, they may achieve that status with the United States blessing and some initial financial support in the near future. In that case, there doubtless would be a momentary extolling of the advent of independence from many quarters -- from a large majority of United Nations members, from a large segment of American youth, both those who think that the primary emphasis should be on the challenging problems of the home front and those who see only the idealistic aspects of applying the vaunted principle of self-determination, as well as from other Americans in large numbers who are not even aware of the Territory and the issues involved. It would be foolhardy indeed to predict what the outcome of such a demand on the part of Micronesia to depart from American jurisdiction would be. At the same time one may have difficulty in keeping a bridle on emotion and refraining from stating that while the United States Government and the American people could easily withstand the "shock," and turn it to

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the nation's credit, it is doubtful whether the oncoming generations in Micronesia, confronted by "the strenuous conditions of the modern world" would cherish the wisdom of their forebears in making such a political decision.

It is difficult to bring into focus the many dimensions of the subject of the Political Future of Micronesia and the Timing of Self-determination at this particular moment when the tide of opinion seems to be turning against the United States. It is particularly difficult to grapple with this subject when one has scarcely had time to assess this changed situation and its signi-It is indeed, fortuitous that we have Philip W. Quigg's ficance. excellent and timely article in Foreign Affairs, April, 1969. He has recently visited the Trust Territory and written on our subject in masterful fashion. He would have to have been on an inside track to produce much of the information he presents, and his article suggests to me that the recently-expressed idea of independence as the ultimate status is more deep-rooted and more apt to grow than one might suspect. Quigg's article is most pertinent for this Santa Cruz symposium, and I am indebted to him for taking me "off the hook," I hope, in not coming more to grips with the subject. At the same time it moves me to make some assertions of my own which may contribute some points for discussion to this symposium.

I agree with the point of view expressed as early as 1965 by former Under-Secretary of Interior John A. Carver, Jr.,

who worried sincerely and with background knowledge of the situation that the United States had probably waited too long in developing a plan for terminating the Trusteeship if we wished to have influence in the outcome of the determination.

Now four years later such a plan has not yet been forthcoming, and the obvious place to start is on a <u>Proposal</u>, agreed to by the several Executive departments and agencies, strongly supported by the President, and accepted by the leadership in both the Senate and House Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs. It will have to be a plan reasonably acceptable to the Micronesians, and at no stage will it be easy to come by. It will be more difficult now with talk about independence and "loose association."

The announcement of possible fixed dates for the exercise of self-determination which have been bandied about for the past several years within the government has proved to be unfortunate, particularly in the absence of any agreed plan and a fixed goal. The administration of a trusteeship in its latter stages without a fixed goal to work toward is frustrating and hinders the making of basic decisions to hasten advancement.

Philip Quigg proposes that the whole problem of administering the Trust Territory should be taken out of the Office of Territories in Interior and placed directly under the President. The evidence he provides to justify his proposal is real and of long standing. However, it may be argued that such a move would, in reality, be submerging the Trust Territory beneath the enormity

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of crises with which the President and the "hite House Staff must cope. It also fails to show appreciation for what is involved in the day-to-day operations relating to the Territory. No one who was privy to what the White House attempted in regard to Puerto Rico at the outset of the Eisenhower administration, by its determination to set in motion immediately a move for independence by the Puerto Ricans, could respond favorably to this proposal.

A suggestion was made some months ago that a way for coping with the bureaucratic difficulties with the Government in Washington over matters pertaining to the Trust Territory would be to refer to a chapter from the past when the post-World War II interdepartmental Committee on Non-Self-Governing Territories function effectively in developing positions on dependent area The outcome of this proposal was the establishment of affairc an interdepartmental consultative committee on the Trust Territory consisting of a basic group of representatives from the Departments of State, Defense and the National Security Council under the chairmanship of the Director of the Office of Territories and with such other agency representatives as may be useful from time to time. A notable aspect was that the usual trappings of committees which might hinder useful exchange and understanding were omitted. If such a committee continues to function in the new administration, it will certainly have important substance to handle. When representatives of the committee made a field trip to Micronesia a while ago, the group was mistaken in some quarters for the U.S. Status

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Commission which the Congress of the United States has not yet established and may not do so.

Some weeks following my 7-month tour of duty in Micronesia as the initial Legislative Counsel for the new Congress of Micronesia and later special adviser to the High Commissioner on Political affairs, I was invited by the Department of Interior to come to Washington for a brief period of consultation. I prepared a lengthy draft memorandum of my analyses and views so as not to waste the time of people in Washington. The timing of my visit, fixed some days earlier, did not prove to be the most propiticus. It happened to coincide with the unsettling business of Secretary Udall's retiring the High Commissioner, and the Office of Territories was unsettled. Nonetheless, I was given a careful hearing by the Office Director and had an extended meeting with Under-Secretary Carver and several Assistant Secretaries, My Memorandum, dated April 25, 1966, concluded with the following "proposal in preliminary form calculated to draw together and give sharp focus to efforts within the United States Government to help propel the Trust Territory toward precise and agreed goals." The proposal:

/ Proposed Method for Up-Grading the Pace of Development and Improving the Status of the Trust Territory and the Position of the Unite: States as the Administering Power.

It is suggested that a fresh approach under the most favorable and prestigious auspices possible should be undertaken. These might be a joint commission perhaps known officially as the U.S. Advisory Commission on Micronesia. Its Chairman should have status comparable to a Justice of the Supreme Court whose name would provide the ultimate popular title of the





Commission and for its reporting and enhancement of public appeal.

Members of the Commission and its working groups would need to be carefully selected. They should be drawn from all three branches of both the national government and the government of the Trust Territory. The Commission should be empowered to draw upon the services of the two governments across the board, and to utilize the assistance of private agencies and individuals.

The Commission's endeavors should be focused primarily on political development and future status of the Trust Territory. It would not be realistic, however, to conclude that this could be done without involvement in all other fields of development or by excluding consideration of the Territory of Guam.

With regard to method, it would be a happy situation if the Commission could proceed quietly and efficiently with its tasks, building upon the accelerated programs now underway in the Trust Territory and providing impetus and support to the Office of Territories and the Government of the Trust Territory. Hopefully it would have sufficient influence to obtain quiet and favorable support for its findings and recommendations before they were pub-It could apply the methods and hope to achieve lished. an outcome like the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunities in the /rmed Forces, 1948. The so-called Fahy Report of that Committee, under the chairmanship of Judge Charles Fahy of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, dealt most efficiently with what was in its day an extremely delicate and stubborn problem with classic reporting and results.

The work of such a Commission would be of assistance to the Trust Territory administration, the Department of the Interior, and lead to some knot-cutting with the necessary concurrence of Congress. The Commission would operate under an extended though definitely limited mandate. It would need funds to provide for staff. materials, and its political work. Its prime object would be to insure preparation of the Territory and its people for selfdetermination by 1970. At that time the basis for representation in the Congress of Micronesia will require revision in accordance with Secretary of the Interior Order 2882 as amended. Hopefully, within that time an infinite number of improvements, large and small, the






plans for which have already been projected, would have been accomplished to challenge the local inhabitants and improve the positions of their Territory and the Administering Power. Even more "face-lifting" could be launched.

The Hemorandum concluded by an imaginative random listing, which could have been extended and expanded at length, of some of the very important immediate and long-range by-products of the careful and extensive work the Commission would be expected to perform. My views were not disparaged, and only the suggested timing in relation to ideas already in the mill was brought into question. I bring up this matter simply as a basis for expressing the personal view that had the Congress established a Micronesian Status Commission with representation along lines of my proposal, the present state of United States-Trust Territory relationship would be different with coordinated effort going forward to achieve a fixed goal.

One can have an enormous amount of sympathy for the Department of State which must handle our representation at the United Nations which have been affected so markedly by the worldwide anti-colonial revolution. The anti-colonial majority of the General Assembly has succeeded in delegitimizing colonialism with the implications that colonial possession does not give good title and that sovereignty over colonies is invalid.²³ It is appreciated

^{23.} Innis L. Claude, Jr., <u>The Changing United Nations</u>, New York, Random House, 1967, Chapter 3, especially pp. 60-61.



that operations at the United Nations, where anti-colonial sentiment runs high in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960, require delicate handling. But such responsibility would not justify the former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from developing and seeking concurrence among other agencies in Washington for his own pet plan for transferring responsibility for administering the Trust Territory from Interior to State six months before informing the Department of the Interior of his proposal. The proposal also came to embrace the idea that the Peace Corps area director in the Pacific region should be named High Commissioner of the Trust Territory. The notion that the people of Micronesia should be submitted to this additional traumatic experience, which the President could have accomplished with an absent-minded stroke of the pen, was worrisome indeed, and, fortunately, friends of Micronesia on Capitol Hill in Washington helped to shunt the idea.

The importance of the role of the U.S. Congress in territorial matters and the jealousies regarding them on the part of the Senate and House Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs cannot be over-estimated in seeking a U.S. policy for meeting the current problem posed by the Trust Territory. The Congress not only takes its time in these matters but habitually has considered the priorities for political advancement for the Virgin Islands of the United States, Guam, American Samoa and the Trust Territory to warrant their attention in that rank order. The obvious

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problem is how to persuade the two Committees that now is the time they must focus priority attention on the future of Micronesia.

In the past I have maintained the belief that there was but one direction in which the people of the Trust Territory could reasonably go and would want to go, and that would be in closer association with the United States. But I am not a Micronesian. I am, instead, an American brought up in the former Northwest Territory where importance is still attached to the spirit and letter of the Ordinance of 1787. In the dome of the rotunda of the State House in Columbus are inscribed the words of Abraham Lincoln:

"That Ordinance was consistently looked to whenever a new territory was to become a State. Congress always traced their course by the Ordinance of 1787:"

and those of Daniel Webster:

"I doubt whether one single law of any law-giver, ancient or modern, has produced more distinct, marked, and lasting character than the Ordinance of 1787."

Whether they are mindful of the fact or not, all people living under the American flag have been effected by the spirit of the Northwest Ordinance--the policy for developing self-government by the United States laid down before it established its "more perfect union." It is a basic part of the American heritage and has influenced the making of the kind of people we are. It provides a basis for underlining the belief, which American spokesmen are sometimes called upon to express, that "self-government" is a more precious commodity than "independence" and should

be obtained first; that people can achieve independence in the world without ever experiencing the blessings of freedom. We do not equate the two concepts as so many Members of the United Nations are wont to do. We are, moreover, "not a self-meeking nation" as the wise, steadfast, and patient former Secretary of State Dean Rusk told his television audience this week. "If we were, the history of recent times would have been much different." One might add that the history of the Pacific Islands might have been much different. The people of Micronesia might have had a far different lot from the 20-odd years of experience in the progressive development toward self-government which the United States as administering power has provided.

If the Micronesian opted for and were accorded American citizenship, their opportunities to share in the benefits and responsibilities of "going with the American Flag" would be widened immeasurably, and a hopeful and challenging course for them to steer would be charted. There is immediate and coricus need to ponder such ideas in the search for decisions which may prove wise in the long run..

Robert R. Robbins Tufts University March 26, 1969 27