

TAB 2: Excerpts from the Study on Future Status of the TTPI circulated to the Under Secretaries Committee on April 24, 1969 for discussion at their meeting of April 26, 1969.

This study was the result of the interagency committee deliberations. It provided the basis for the instructions under which Secretary Hickel operated when he went to Micronesia in early May 1969 and for the first time expressed official U.S. interest in a permanent future relationship with all of Micronesia. The study reviews the history of the problem, alternatives, UN considerations, Congressional thinking and so forth.

The first three pages are from the text of the memorandum and summarize U.S. strategic needs that must be met in any future relationship with the TTPI. It emphasizes the objectives of denial of the area to any foreign power, the use of the area for maintaining a forward base structure after conclusion of hostilities, and the desirability of achieving U.S. sovereignty.

The last several pages were Annex A to the memorandum. It lays out in more detail the various scenarios under which the U.S. would lose base rights in Japan or Okinawa, the desirability of establishing an early presence in the TTPI, the kind of installations that might be built on various of the islands, and the desirability for site surveys in 1969.

My questions are:

1) How serious did you perceive the risk to be that U.S. access to bases in Japan, Okinawa or the Phillipines might be lost in the near future, i.e. within the next 5-10 years?

2) Some commentators in later years have disputed the asserted need for U.S. control over the TTPI because of its location. Putting aside the issues of denial and the possible use for military bases, the Defense Department and others emphasized that the location of the TTPI placed in the middle of our communications and transportation lines to the Far East. These commentators take issue with this contention and state that in neither the Korean War nor the Vietnam War was the TTPI used in this way; they say that the transportation etc. all went to the north of the TTPI. What is your reaction to this contention? Of the various arguments advanced in support of seeking permanent U.S. control over the TTPI, which did you find most persuasive?

3) It was about this time that the State Department was overruled as to its long-standing contention that the Micronesians had to be offered the option of independence in any plebiscite. It was apparently feared at the time that changing circumstances in Micronesia presented a new risk that the people, if given this option, might accept it. Do you recall any discussion about political sentiment in Micronesia and the risk of offering them an independence option?

4) Do you recall any discussion with Secretary Hickel after his return from the TTPI?

5) I have no record that any surveys or other Defense Department activity took place during 1969 as recommended in Annex A. Do you have any recollection of whether you thought this was necessary at the time?

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number of extremely disturbing petitions and communications recording, in some cases quite vehemently, the political discontent in the Territory. While many of these petitions are intemperate, exaggerated and unreasonable, they reflect growing frustration in the Territory, both with the shortcomings of U.S. administration and the limited role now played by the Micronesians. In the absence of some authoritative statement of U.S. plans and objectives, we may face a most unhelpful international airing of our difficulties - - an airing which could serve to stimulate and encourage the Micronesians in the use of the leverage which their trusteeship status provides them.

C. Requirements for Status

Any proposed status which is to be offered to the Micronesians in order to bring about the transition of the Territory from trusteeship to permanent association with the United States must meet certain requirements.

1. U.S. Strategic Needs


The strategic value of the Territory has two sides which pose entirely different requirements. On the one hand, considering its expanse and location, it is imperative that we continue to deny the islands to potential enemies. The TTPI, in the hands of unfriendly powers could present a formidable threat to the security of the United States. In particular, the vulnerability of Guam, surrounded by the TTPI in other hands, would be significantly increased. Any manner of extending U.S. sovereignty to the area <sup>or even</sup> ~~other than~~ continuation of the status quo would serve to deny the area to others.

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On the other hand, we have a continuing positive strategic need for the Territory. It is essential, upon cessation of hostilities in South Viet-Nam, that redeployment of U.S. forces should not result in a loss of our forward base structure such as to impair our capability to monitor and control areas of the Western Pacific most exposed to any Asian communist aggression. For this reason, the option of military bases and associated facilities in the TTPI will assume increased importance for post-hostilities posture of U.S. forces.

If, despite our best efforts, the intensifying political pressures cause future denial or curtailment in the use of certain of our forward bases, the TTPI provides the only territory, with the exception of Guam, on which the required capability to project U.S. power into the Western Pacific could be securely based



Current control of the TTPI, favorable balance of payments considerations and the prospect of acquiring U.S. sovereignty in a friendly atmosphere offer the possibilities of long-term stability required for planning and development of a lasting base structure. This is increasingly important with the impending withdrawal of U.K. forces east of Suez. Kwajalein will remain strategically significant in view of facilities associated with DOD research and development programs.

To insure the continuing availability of the TTPI to meet our strategic requirements, U.S. control of the Islands, as an optimum, would not be subject to challenge either by the residents of the TTPI,

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other countries, or the United Nations. U.S. sovereignty over the TTPI clearly affords the only real assurance of maintaining such control in the future, and any arrangement giving the TTPI residents the right to terminate their association with the U.S. clearly would not do so. Sovereignty would provide the U.S. with assurance of retaining the following powers necessary for the national defense:

- a. The right to take land for military purposes on the same basis that it may do so within the States and territories of the United States, subject to the requirement of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, providing for just compensation when such lands are taken for public use.
- b. The application of internal security and immigration laws.
- c. Control of all relations with and access by foreign powers.

Annex A is a further discussion of tentative views of military plans and requirements.

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ANNEX A

MILITARY PLANS AND  
REQUIREMENTS

Partially Declassified/Released on 11/24/89  
under provisions of E.O. 12350  
by F. Graboske, National Security C.

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1. (TS) The extent of development of a military complex in the TTPI is directly related to the U.S. freedom of action in the Western Pacific. Should loss of base rights in Okinawa progress beyond [REDACTED], [REDACTED] which portends a serious degradation of our operational capability, consideration should be given to an immediate effort at building on a large scale within the TTPI. It should be noted that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in Okinawa could not be satisfactorily offset through alternative arrangements for [REDACTED] mission adjustments.

2. (TS) Under the worst case situation, which includes the loss of supporting bases and the base logistical structure in Japan and Okinawa, there will be a need for the construction of additional Korean airfields and the transfer to Korea of many logistical functions which cannot be adequately provided from as far away as the TTPI. In addition, there will be a requirement for additional development of our naval facilities at both Guam and Subic Bay, tempered by any future decision to make use of naval facilities in Singapore and Sattahip.

3. (TS) It would be prudent to establish an early military presence within the TTPI irrespective of the loss of any base rights in Japan or Okinawa. A candidate project would be the upgrading of Isley Field and its facilities serving both military and local interests. The storage of mobility airfield assets (two airfield packages) at Isley Field would reduce excess assets in Southeast Asia, provide retrograde of this materiel in air and sea transportation which would otherwise transit empty, develop a

package of mobile resources which will allow entry of air forces into ground environments inadequately developed for air operations, and provide employment to local labor.

4. (S) The US objective is the establishment of a permanent political association between the United States and the TTPI. Until a permanent political association is attained, our military effort must be very cautiously planned and carefully executed in order to avoid an unfavorable reaction. Accordingly, development of an initial presence should be oriented toward permanent alignment. Military construction efforts could have the side effects of upgrading local facilities and contributing to the local economy, but recent history has clearly illustrated that while US bases provide economic benefits to host societies, such bases do not always stimulate the desire for closer association with the United States. Therefore, each proposed project to establish military presence must be thoroughly examined and a reasonably high assurance obtained that expenditure of military resources will actually support the objective of permanent political association.

5. (TS) Should the United States be denied all base rights and privileges in Japan and Okinawa, major bases and forces would need to be positioned in the TTPI. In addition, an augmentation of forces and acquisition of additional bases in countries of the Western Pacific amenable to a US presence would be required.

a. Based upon preliminary planning to date, ultimate requirements for major forces and key installations in the TTPI and Guam could include

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(1) Army: One airborne brigade; one logistics command;

[REDACTED]

(2) Navy/MC: One Marine Expeditionary Force (possibly minus 1 brigade); [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(3) Air Force: One composite air strike force, two F-111 wings, [REDACTED]

b. Details, by island, are as follows:

(1) Guam. Airborne brigade, engineer construction battalion,

[REDACTED] (Estimated 6,700 Army personnel).

(2) Saipan. Joint USAF/USN/USMC air facilities at Nobler and Is. Fields, 5 USAF fighter squadrons, Army logistics command, Marine battalion (estimated 26,500 service personnel).

(3) Tinian. Joint USAF/USN/USMC air facilities at North and West Fields, 5 USAF fighter squadrons, 4 transport squadrons, 1 air refuel wing, [REDACTED] and POL storage, 3 Marine air groups, 1 Marine battalion (estimated 35,000 service personnel).

(4) Rota. Marine Division (minus either 2 battalions or 1 brigade and 2 battalions), major training area (estimated 11-16,000 Marines).

(5) Zabelthuap. [REDACTED] POL storage (estimated 2,600 Navy personnel).

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6. (S) The joint facilities proposed for which require further examination to determine whether the real estate available to US Forces is sufficient to support all the facilities and aircraft. Alternatives, such as the reactivation of Northwest Field on Guam, the positioning of a portion of the Marine Expeditionary Force on Babelthwap and greater use of Saipan and Guam, also must be considered. The fact that commercial enterprises are encroaching rapidly on the remaining unused land in Saipan and Guam must be considered in any recommendations regarding these two islands.

7. (TS) The dispersion of [REDACTED] in three locations must also be subjected to further examination. There is considerable merit in [REDACTED] Guam, Tinian and Babelthwap, but this advantage must be weighed against the disadvantage of increased costs involved in the development of three facilities.

8. (C) The alternatives mentioned above will be subjected to further examination in the development of final requirements for bases in the TTPI.

9. (S) The following additional factors must be considered:

a. The requirements for labor in the TTPI, should this area be developed in any magnitude, will far surpass the skills and numbers available in the local market. Importation of labor could become an unpopular issue with the Micronesians. Public relations aspects must be prepared carefully in advance to minimize any adverse impact.

b. The limited land available where most of the bases would probably be located will require the maximum use of each parcel available. This will require joint facilities, elimination of duplicative functions and consideration of developing multi-story facilities to conserve land space.

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c. Basically, there are three categories of land in the TTPI. These are privately held, public domain and military retention land. Public domain land is held by the Trust Government and requests for its use are considered individually. On Saipan, more and more of the public domain land is being granted to commercial enterprises. On Tinian 458 acres are privately held, almost 9,000 acres are classified as military retention land and the remainder of the approximate 26,200 acres on the island are categorized as public domain land. As planning continues for the possible military use of the TTPI, particularly in the Marianas, the Trust Territory Government should give careful consideration before honoring any further non-military request for public domain land.

10. (S) Tentative conclusions:

a. Our capability to continue support of current U.S. forward strategy in the Pacific should the United States be forced into a retrograde to the TTPI, will be degraded significantly. Actual U.S. capabilities at such loss must be continually assessed.

b. An early establishment of a military presence within the TTPI in consonance with attaining permanent US-associated political alignment, appears prudent.

c. Alternative base sitings and force deployments must be examined.

d. Before conveying to private parties public lands which are designated by Defense as priority areas, the Trust Territory should consult with appropriate DOD authorities.

e. Preliminary engineering site surveys are in order for Saipan, Tinian and Babelthuap.

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f. Joint facilities must be established to preclude duplicate functions, to conserve land and to reduce costs.

g. The overall costs will be substantial and the requirements for labor will be high and far beyond the capability of the limited Micronesian labor market.

11. (C) The results expected from continuing analysis will provide gross order of magnitude costs and will avoid duplication of functions within each base complex. The analysis will provide an evaluation of the base requirements, forces required and a phased development of the bases. Completion of initial analysis, without the benefit of site surveys, is contemplated by early July 1969. As site surveys are completed and new factors are introduced, such as the terms of settlement of the conflict in Vietnam and the clarification of the Okinawa issue, additional analysis will be required and will be undertaken.

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