E 62 491

	ZO	- 0	AY	: P (A.	153: W		MANUE	19 P	AC T	7
RM/R	REP	AF	Original Contract of the Contr	al to be Filed in	Decentrali:	2 0 1 0	<u> </u>			
ARA	EUR	FE	CA=5708	n io de i med in			FIL	LE DESIGNATIO	<u> 7</u>	
NEA	cu	INR	NO.		SECRET		— —	ANDLING INDIC	CATOR	
	P	10	то :	CANBERRA, I	LONDON, WE	LLINGTON				
	FBO	AID	INFO :	SUVA, USUN			COPY NO	o. 1, seri	ES A	
AGR	сом	5/5 56	FROM :	Department	of State		DATE: CT	N 3 20 P	er n	
INT	LAB	TAR		•						
TR	XMB	AIR	SUBJECT: Future of the TTPI: Discussions with Micronesian Delegation							
			REF :							
OSD	CIA	NAVY	LIMDIS						٦	€
0.50		NSA	Departme	ent Septembe	r 30 call	ed in Brit	ish (Spend	llove)		
			Austral:	ian (Smith)	and New Z	ealand (Pl	immer and	Williams	·)	Ē
	<u> </u>		Embassies to bring them up to date on US Government position							
•			regarding TTPI just prior to discussions with Micronesians which started October 1 in Washington.							
			Departme	ent officers	reviewed	current s	ituation.	stressin	g that	
	•		it was n	not that we	had much	new inform	ation to o	ffer, bu	t that	
 			discuss: said US	ions we had Congress wa	mentioned s pressin	earlier we go for reso	ere about lution of	to begin	ı. We honing	
4		ر ر	to have	legislation	which co	uld be int:	roduced th	is year		
3	-	₹ '4	United S	g new status States. Thi	s optimum	onesia in a schedule l	associatio had alread	n with t	he d with	
77		ر م 19	delay of	f a month in	Micrones	ian arriva:	 Nevert 	heless,		
DATE 3		≟]	Congress	sional inter	est in ke	y committee	es was hig	h and Ho	use	1707
		学 石	hearings	r Committee s in the Ter	ritory on	Aspinali wa whatever	as reporte legislatio	orn was	~	
, .	10 H	BASABLEIN MC B	introduc	ed.			6		οργ	707
3	NEW.	ANG OME	As for I	Executive Br	anch wierw	n wa aaid	+ho1	d h.a. t	OPYFLO-P	
3	. ত		describe	ed as flexib	le. We ju	ust do not	know how	things w	e -} i11≌	7
-	TIS:	X	come out	t. The Exec	utive four	nd itself l	between th	e US Con	gress	O
BY III		मा जाता श्रीता स्थाप	and the	Micronesian any firm ide	s and our	problem wa	as compoun	ded by n	ot	7
SWE		13.33 13.53 13.53	liaving e	iny lilm ide	a or wilar	the Micro	lestans we	re tnink	ing	
REVIEWED BY]ရပြ ကြောင်း			,	SEC	CRET		FOR DEPT. L	SE ONLY	
Drefte	(목표)	4 24 4	4 63 DS 23						Out	
	10	UNP	SRP le:	kb 10/15/69	Drafting Date:	Contents an IO: U	nd Classifio (1974) NP - Arthu	r R. Day	~~~	
Clears	inces:			Mr. Frisb ī	Z E I	EA/ANZ - Mi	r. Moore	Moder	4	
			• •				·			_

Deraitment Or STAIR A/CDC/MR

421590 05-

2



SECRET

of what they wanted. In this connection we pointed out that Status Commission report not always clear and not entirely consistent in the positions it advocated. We said we were also uncertain as to the meaning of the Congress of Micronesia's delay in appointing a delegation and then at last minute postponing their trip for a month. With all of this uncertainty, we could not be more definite about where we were going, but once this round of talks was over we would hope to have a better idea and we would plan another meeting with the three Embassies.

Department officers also commented on timetable, pointing out much depended on the mandate of Micronesian delegation. If they were prepared for serious bargaining and ready to make decisions, things could move quite rapidly with plebiscite taking place perhaps as soon as a year from now. If, as we suspect, however, the Micronesians are primarily interested in listening -- in getting our ideas -- and then returning to the Territory to-consider their position further, this optimum time schedule would most likely slip substantially. We pointed out such slippage in no way distressed us, since we felt that it was not only to be expected, but that extra time could be put to good use in Territory.

Finally, we touched on progress made in the program of reform and development highlighted by Secretary Hickel during his May trip to the Territory. We stressed that much of this effort was just now getting under way but that progress did seem to be being made in number of areas: (1) seabee teams were in area working on projects of Micronesian choosing and stressing training of Micronesians to carry on; (2) efforts were continuing on Micronization of the administration and a Micronesian had been appointed as District Administrator in the Marianas; (3) as a first step towards pay equalization, a ten percent pay increase for Micronesians had been requested; (4) a task force had been studying development and other problems in the Territory over the summer and had submitted recommendation to High Commissioner and Congress of Micronesia.

In discussion which ensued the following additional points were raised:


SECRET



RET 3

- 1. Two Delegations -- We said the Micronesian Delegation consisted of ten members, five from each of two houses of Congress of Micronesia. It included all members of Status Commission as finally composed and would be chaired by Senator Salii and Congressman Silk. As for US Delegation, it would be chaired by Interior, with State participation and observers from Defense and US Congress.
- 2. Nature of Discussions -- We presumed that discussions would center on defining the two points raised in the Status Commission report -- i.e., the form of self-government and the form of free association. The end product would be a piece of legislation which would establish the relationship with the United States. Although the schedule of events was not firmly established, we said we expected the US Congress to approve the legislation first after which referendum would be held in Micronesia.

4. Micronesian Thinking -- Plimmer drew attention to the August 27 article in Christian Science Monitor (see enclosure 1) and asked whether it was accurate. We replied that it was a mixture of truth, half-truth and some inaccuracies. We felt basic theme of article -- that Micronesians felt they were suddenly being rushed into something and were trying to put on the brakes -- was probably true. We pointed out that this was quite natural in view of our inaction in the past several years while Micronesians moved rapidly ahead. The sudden movement on our part was bound to produce certain nervousness amongst the Micronesians. We said that the statement that



SECRET

Secretary Hickel had indicated an intent to absorb Micronesia into a political association with US in a unilateral move was quite inaccurate. We reminded three Embassy representatives that the Micronesian Political Status Commission had issued its preliminary statement favoring an association with the US and that Secretary Hickel's statement was only in response to this apparent Micronesian preference.

5. Flexibility of Approach -- Plimmer said that in New Zealand's experience it was most important not to rule out alternatives too early in the discussions. Even if we were not considering independence, he felt we should not take a firm stand against such a choice early in the discussions. Further, he thought we should, if at all possible, remain flexible on an "opting-out provision" and on block grants of funds.

We explained we did not intend to take strong position against independence. Rather we intended to argue that the Micronesians' first choice was an association; that we should work on devising such a status first; and that once that is done we could consider what other choices should or need be offered. As for "opting out", while we hoped to avoid the issue, our room for maneuver, as we had stated before, was very limited and we might have to take a fairly clear position in opposition if it were raised. Finally, on funding, we had developed a position which would allow for payment of a matching amount equal to locally raised revenues which would be available for their appropriation without strings. Although this was far short of the New Zealand/Cook Islands arrangement, it was a significant step forward.

6. Readiness for Self-Government -- Spendlove asked just how ready we thought the Micronesians were for self-government. Did we plan significant changes from the current status to one which we would call self-government? We said that we did plan a change -- just how much, we would have to work out with the Micronesians. As for their readiness, that would depend on how you defined self-government and readiness-both of which were terms with many meanings. We did feel that the Micronesians realized that they would need help for some time and would not only accept but would desire the continued presence of advisors and technical assistance. We added we were not planning any major steps toward self-



5



SECRET

government -- aside from continuing Micronization and other measures outlined by Secretary Hickel for involving the people in decision-making process -- prior to the termination of the trusteeship.

Comment: Although all three Embassy representatives probed quite deeply and at some length at our position, they remained sympathetic to our problems and appreciative of our frankness. They obviously will be most interested in our report on the results of discussions.

ROGERS

Enclosure:

1. Christian Science Monitor article, August 27, 1969.

SECRET

