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Comments on Kuhn's Masterpiece

The Covering Memo

1. Alternatives - It seems to me there are two problems which AI has intertwined and that need to be considered separately. First, there is the possibility of re-examining the chosen objective -- to end the Trusteeship Agreement and to extend US sovereignty over the entire Trust Territory. If the Interagency Group thinks the chosen objective is unobtainable and that we could and should settle for less, then obviously it should so recommend to the Under Secretaries Committee. In doing so, it would obviously be quite proper to set forth the new objectives and various ways in which they might be achieved.

On the other hand, there is the possibility of re-examining the course of action chosen to achieve the objective approved by the Under Secretaries. Again the Interagency Group obviously has the right to decide that, in the light of the just-concluded discussions, we have been going about this the wrong way and that we should recommend a different course to the Under Secretaries if we are to achieve success. If we either stick to the present approach or recommend new tactics, we are by implication, at least for now, rejecting any change in objectives. We are indicating we think we can still achieve

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the chosen objective. So long as this is the case, it would be difficult if not impossible for the Interagency Group to recommend a change in objectives to the USC.

In examining Tab A, therefore, these two possibilities need to be kept in mind and the various "alternatives" offered by Kuhn need to be put in their proper category.

We also cannot accept the need to complete either his paper or anything else at this one meeting. If we conclude that we should follow a wait-and-see course, then perhaps one meeting will be enough. But if we are going to seriously examine alternatives, we cannot do so under the type of gun leveled by Kuhn.

2. Responses to Resolutions - I do not think we should accept any one policy as applying to all resolutions. In some cases a joint USG response may be appropriate, but in others it may be preferable -- particularly in terms of maintaining a low key and avoiding an overreaction -- to have individual agencies respond, or not, on their own behalf. Obviously, the latter course would only be followed after appropriate clearances, presumably with Interior acting as the coordinating agency.

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With regard to resolutions to foreign governments, there is obviously nothing to prevent the Micronesians from carrying on such exchanges directly. Thus we would look rather foolish, if not worse, to deny a request to forward such a resolution if asked. We should, as appropriate, however, also convey to the government in question our views on the issue involved and we should make it very clear that we are acting at the request of the Micronesians and that our action in no way represents approval of the contents of the resolution. Finally, we should ask the Congress of Micronesia to follow normal channels, through Interior to State and on to the Embassy in question, if they wish to use our official channels to deliver such resolutions.

3. Resolution of Military Land Activities - Let's hear what Al has to say. I think that the response should be very non-committal.

4. Reaction to Forthcoming Polls - No matter what we decide on the alternatives question -- even if we decide to pursue the Marianas option -- we cannot do so through this up-coming vote. We can perhaps cite the results in justifying our decision when the time comes to do so, but in reacting to the results at this time, all we should do is to note them and stick to the line we have taken in the UN on the

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reunification petitions -- a line which keeps all doors
open.

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TAB A

Al's Alternatives Paper

Option A - Current Objective, Current Course of Action -
This option has a major defect in that the degree of self-government to be included is not spelled out. Obviously with such an important variable undefined any assessment of advantages and disadvantages is very difficult. Nevertheless...

Advantages - These are predicated (particularly #1 and #3) on the assumption that the Micronesians are happy in this relationship. As Palacios said, nothing is more permanent than change. If the Micronesians are unhappy -- if they find their needs being treated in a fashion similar to those of the American Indian -- while they may not have a legal recourse, they could and presumably would raise enough hell to make our defense interests very shaky indeed. Thus it might be US territory but the atmosphere could be like Okinawa.

Disadvantages - #6 - Al is very free with his assessment of our problems in New York. In the first place there should be no "probably" in the second clause -- Micronesian support is an absolute minimum. And even it may not be enough. Here the lack of precision as to the amount of self-government makes any meaningful estimate impossible.

#8 - Again the degree of self-government seems important. If it is clear to the Micronesians that they will have substantial control of their internal affairs and adequate

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protection from US forces which they fear, the label may not be so important. Also I would not be so confident about the Marianas. Point about defense interests obviously could be true -- DOD must make this judgment.

#9 - This is only a disadvantage if you think other solutions will be much more rapid -- a highly questionable assumption.

#10 - Again the time factor -- since it is the Micronesians who have the right to self-determination, we are going to have to accede to their timetable, at least to a degree, if we are to make any case in New York. As for a pre-emptive move, this is obviously not desired, but is it not even more likely if the Micronesians feel rushed? Whose side is time on?

Option B - Current Objective, New Course of Action - Again the degree of self-government in matters other than land acquisition needs to be defined.

Advantages - The point made in regard to Option A remains valid although obviously control of the land would be an important element in making the Micronesians content.

#1 - Phrased so it sounds like a disadvantage -- we need a value judgment perhaps -- ie, which is more important, denial or use?

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#3 - True, but other aspects of self-government are probably more important.

#5 - Do not think the word "doubtful" is nearly strong enough. It would almost have to be a wartime situation for us to violate an agreement with the Micronesians which had been put before the UN as part of an act of self-determination.

~~#6~~ - Not sure how strong the economic pressures would be, but in any case the increasing value of land is probably a fact of life in all solutions. I do not understand the last clause.

Disadvantages - #1 - Question of exorbitant payment is an unproven assumption. The Micronesian land proposal does not deal with this point and it is possible they would accept our proposal concerning evaluation so long as they had a veto on the actual acquisition.

#2 - Add at end "- i.e., war."

#3 - If we are willing to grant Micronesian veto and other controls, it is quite possible that this could be changed to "publicly and privately".

#4 - Obviously disadvantage re UN is lessened. Subpoint (b) was ^{supposed} ~~supported~~ to take DOD 3 to 4 weeks to decide. Is this the answer? As for (c), isn't this true now in the US --

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i.e., you cannot know what it will cost until you know what you want and when you want it.

#5 - First sentence is true, but it is equally true that it appears negotiations will go nowhere if we do not solve this problem. So maybe the time is past for the niceties of negotiating tactics. Heartily agree re the Law of the Seas. But re permanent association, while point probably well taken, we should not assume so until we see what is involved.

Option C - Current Objective (but later), New Course of Action.

Advantages - #3 - Somewhat overstated in that we would be accused of prejudging the outcome of self-determination, but probably manageable.

Disadvantages - Seems to play the question of whose side time is on in a different light than that presented in Option A. Obviously this is the critical question. Among its aspects are those cited by A1, plus our ability to maintain a high quality administration, developments in New York, etc., etc.

#4 - Perhaps true, but isn't the basic reason for Micronesian distrust -- for their desire that the association

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be so "free" -- their distrust of the US? Has not our record over the years forced them into this position? Thus isn't it possible, if we give them a chance to see that we have mended our ways -- that we really do have their interests at heart, that they won't want any leverage against us to speak of -- that they will welcome such an association? If we assume otherwise, aren't we talking about a subject territory -- of people who will always be opposed to us and who will cause us problems for years to come? Is it worth it?

Option D - New Objective - This assumes "the trusteeship" -- i.e., the TTPI -- will continue despite the fact that part of it is removed. This appears to be a logical and legal impossibility. Of course, we could seek UN approval for the creation of a new Trust Territory of the Marshalls and Carolines, but I assume all would realize the impossibility of that -- at least in terms that we could accept. To look briefly at specifics even if they are irrelevant --

Advantages - #1 - The relationship to Option C is hard to see since we would obviously be treating the remainder of the Territory as a poor cousin -- i.e., it would not benefit from the maturity and development envisaged in C. Again, is use of the Marianas more important than denial of the whole?

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#3 - An unproved assumption. Even if the upcoming vote is favorable, in the event of the real thing -- a vote where the alternatives were spelled out on both sides -- it might be different.

#4 - Possibly, but it could easily have the opposite effect -- i.e., to hell with the US -- let's have independence and offer facilities to the Russians.

#5 - Any new trusteeship agreement would undoubtedly deny us this right.

Disadvantages -- #1 - This is an assessment for us to make and I couldn't disagree more completely.

#2 - If this is true then any form of splitting very difficult. I.e., if the rest of the Territory, or 88% of the people, want a unified territory (plus the opposition in the Marianas themselves which could bring it to over 90%), then how do we justify splitting it apart. We do not favor the partition of Nigeria or Cyprus, etc., just because some of the people desire it. Both our assumption of responsibility for one territory as a whole and our longstanding international position on such questions would make any effort to split off the Marianas very difficult in the face of such opposition.

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#3 - Divisive influence would almost certainly be overwhelming in rest of Territory.

Option E - ^eNow Objective - This at least a theoretical possibility; one other TT was so split, but in that case the two halves had been administered separately for years and a UN Visiting Mission determined that the two halves had totally different attitudes toward the future, with neither half favoring continued union. This is hardly the case in the TTPI.

Also Al's assumption that the other portion of the TTPI would enter into free association with the US after independence and without the economic and other benefits which makes such an association attractive seems questionable at best. The rest might well go shopping -- to Japan or the USSR.

Advantages - #1 - True, but don't you have to offer the Marianas the same choice you are offering the rest of the TTPI? If so, are we so sure how they would choose?

#2 - Thanks a bunch - this may be true, but not by much if over 90% of the people are opposed to the split.

#3 - ~~a~~. If really optional then free association unlikely. We would also have strong moral pressure for continued assistance. We have for example joined in urging

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Australia to commit itself to continuing aid to Papua and New Guinea after independence so as to make that choice a real one for the people of the Territory.

b. Not necessarily true if you give the appearance of ditching the rest ^{to} ~~of~~ get the Marianas.

c. The Status Commission is talking about a unified territory. It also defines free association quite differently than what is envisaged here.

d. Is forced splitting of territory and abandonment any better?

Disadvantages - #1. b. This assumes relationship begins.

c. See b on advantages side.

#2 - See 2 of disadvantages on Option D. If this is true whole idea very difficult indeed.

Option F - New Objective - If the rest of the Territory is not opposed you can justify giving the Marianas its own choice since it has on a number of occasions expressed a unique viewpoint in this direction. But this is not true in the case of the other districts to any clear degree. Thus such a series of choices would appear to be an act of divide and conquer rather than an act of self-determination and be very hard to sell to anyone.

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Option G - New Objective

Does not seem very real. Certainly the aspect of Marianas succession is not realistic at all.

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Answers to Al's questions

1. It is the elite who count.

2. I would think so. I would seriously doubt that anything put out by the TT Govt or the USG would have much credibility in the face of the past 25 years if opposed by the local elite.

3. I do not know. It would appear there is very little give and Hickel's offer certainly won't encourage them to reconsider. But I am not convinced ~~that~~ if they saw that they would have a large measure of internal self-government - that they would, to be blunt, be ~~x~~protected from the USG - that they might not accept some ~~form~~ proposal such ^{as} our final offer. One further indication of some flexibility on the part of the Micronesians is that in previous eminent domain legislation introduced in the Congress of Micronesia, there has been no provision for an absolute veto on land acquisition.

4. Hard to answer. I think the desire for self-government ^{will} ~~might~~ continue to grow, but, to the extent we are able to improve our administration of the TTPI and show the people that their record of the past 25 years is no longer valid as an indication of what to expect in the future, I think this self-government might have fewer aspects of "free-association". I agree that

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the two factors cited could push toward independence, but good administration with Micronesian involvement, and growing economic ties and expectations could pull the other way.

5. I do not think that the sentiment for reunification will decrease at least in the short run. It has been on record for a long time now (the first vote was in 1961) and there is no reason for it to die now. I also do not think it will increase to the ~~ix~~ exclusion of a pan-Micronesian arrangement. In fact I think the pan-Micronesian movement with possible later ties with Guam as expressed by Senator Palacios and others has been growing. Ten years ago reunification with Guam seems the only real possibility. This is no longer the case. In fact I am not convinced that, if given the choice of reunification with Guam vs participation in a self-governing Micronesia in association with the US, ~~ix~~ (with both choices being defined and a spirited campaign prior to the vote), the Marianas might not opt to stay with the rest of the TTPI.

Thus in the short run I think we have nothing to lose that we may not ^{been} have lost already. The long run is something else.

6. This goes back to Al's option C and the question of leverage. If leverage

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is really necessary, I think there is a real question as to the value of what we are getting. If we are not getting a territory whose people ~~freely~~ chose of their own free will to associate with us and who remain happy with that choice, have we really gained anything ~~xxx~~ except additional headaches? But to turn to Al's question, I question how much leverage the differences between the districts give us. If all districts but the Marianas really ~~xxxx~~ stand by the Micronesian land proposal what leverage do we have? They could not accept union with Guam under Guam's land laws. On the other hand the other districts could make it very difficult for us to carryout the splitting process successfully if they are opposed.

Finally I do think the economic ties are significant. The Status Commission report shows this very clearly. We could not threaten to cut off all support, but it would obviously go way down and this would hurt. But unless there is a greater feeling of trust established it might not hurt enough.

7. Who the hell knows. With a good administration, with increased Micronesian involvement, with ever increasing self-government, I think in the short run time is on our side. We have a lot to make up for - a high credibility gap - and we could use such time to do so - but it could not be half ^a ~~way~~ ^{Leader} ~~way~~ ^{process}

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But in the longer run - probably ^{another} more than a few years - I think time

will be against us no matter how well we do. The anti-colonialism forces, the newly educated etc - all will work against us in the long run if we don't get this locked up.

3. If we are talking about introducing legislation right now - if we think we know Micronesian views after the recent discussions and can draft legislation to meet them - I think nothing would be more likely to lead to a pre-emptive move. If we are talking about later, after we have had further talks and assuming we do reach a fairly detailed agreement, and we then refuse to introduce the appropriate legislation, that is another matter. But to just go ahead now would be the most arrogant act of bad faith and could quite easily lead to the result feared. If we carry on, at least for a time, I see no danger of this.

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