

REVIEWED BY B.H. BARS DATE 1/10/87

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Memorandum for the Record

The Interagency Working Group at its meeting November 20 made the following decisions which in some cases will have to be referred to the three Secretaries and Dr. Kissinger for confirmation.

1. As soon as he receives instructions from the Secretaries, Assistant Secretary Loesch will proceed to the Territory. Assuming that the Interior Land Proposal is rejected, the Group felt he should table some alternative proposal -- presumably the Constitutional Convention draft.
2. In discussing this proposal with the Micronesian delegation, individually and otherwise, Loesch will state that we would like to have any comments which they might have, in writing, a couple of weeks before our next negotiating session. He will say that we think the next session could most conveniently be at the end of January or early February after the Congress of Micronesia's special session. Loesch will put the emphasis on setting up the next meeting, not on demanding a reaction to our draft. He will tie the request for an early reaction to our departure from Washington and the need to consult -- not to having them prior to the Congress of Micronesia session.
3. The Group was unable to reach final agreement on Executive Powers -- to choose one alternative over the other. Defense suggested offering both, leaving the choice to the Micronesians. Only the White House objected, saying that Aspinall might consider this a giveaway. Lindsay Grant suggested the more subtle approach of leaving the "until (date)" on the appointed Governor provision blank. He felt this would indicate to the Micronesians that not only the date, but the whole issue was open. But it wouldn't look so bad to Aspinall.

Mr. Day said he wasn't sure the Micronesians would think it was that open -- that they might think we were saying an appointed Governor was essential. Furthermore, they would know we meant to have an appointee for more than a week -- probably a year at a minimum. So our offer would not look very good in New York and might not look very good in Micronesia.

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Interior came down on the side of the Defense suggestion. They seemed to feel Aspinall would not be too impressed by subtle maneuvers. Moreover, they thought they could better meet Aspinall's concerns by telling the Micronesians, at the time the choice was offered, that the elected chief executive might pose real problems in the US Congress, so.... Obviously if this threat is too high-handed it could destroy the whole exercise, but we did not object mainly because we could not really control the situation in any case and because Loesch probably has the good sense not to overdo it.

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