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Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

General description	There might be an introduction with a brief history of the area and geographic description including land area, population, etc.
UN oversight	1. Under the terms of a United Nations trusteeship agreement, between the UN Security Council and the Government of the United States which entered into force on July 18, 1947, the TTPI is a strategic trust territory, the only one so designated. The US has the right under this agreement to establish military bases in the territory and to close all or part of the territory for security reasons. The Security Council exercises certain functions for the United Nations and the Trusteeship Council considers the reports of the administering authority and sends periodic visiting missions to the territory.
S Govt. oversight	2. The Act of Congress vests all executive, legislative and judicial authority for the civil administration of the territory in the President who has, in turn, delegated that authority to the Department of the Interior. The Office of Territories carries out that responsibility assisted by the High Commissioner and his staff. The Department of State has certain limited functions, related to the reporting to the United Nations.
Progress in the TTPI	3. Major emphasis was originally put on educational development to provide the proper underpinning for political growth. Our policy has been to develop political institutions gradually, starting with "municipal" councils and working up to the establishment in 1965 of a territory-wide "Congress of Micronesia". Economic development has lagged behind the other two, but has been given impetus with a two-year study by Nathan Associates and the more liberal budgets recently provided by the Congress. There has been no conscious wooing of the people to the American political system but they are quick to discern the differences between their treatment and the Guamanians who are American citizens.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY B.H. BAAS DATE 7/2/87

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4. While we have not defined political goals publicly nor declared political time-tables, the fact that we are gradually increasing political autonomy, educating hundreds of Micronesians through the university level, hiring Micronesian staff in the territorial government, sending a large contingent of Peace Corpsmen to the area and are increasing the budgetary allotments are ample testimonies that there is a positive policy of advancement of the peoples. The USG is accused of lack of imagination and interest and of failing (in the case of the VHO survey) of bringing standards up to American ones.

Problems

5. The decreasing number of trust territories and the critical surveing and hostile resolutions in ~~the~~ United Nations bodies are forcing the United States to review its policy towards the TTPI. Under the terms of the UN Charter, We are pledged to "promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned".

The USG is obliged to hold a plebscite to determine these wishes and must also obtain appropriate Congressional and UN action.

6. It becomes increasingly evident that the US security interests dictate that the strategic TTPI must be brought into a close and permanent relationship with the United States. in the words of the Joint Chiefs: "By nature of their location, directly behind and across the lines of communication to existing Far East bases, the islands of the TTPI provide a natural back-up for our present forward posture. Together with the Bonin-Volcanos, they represent a latent military potential for meeting a wide range of requirements that could develop under various contingencies. The isolation of

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some of these islands and their sparse population make them ideal sites for weapons and other equipment testing, programs, space launch, recovery, telemetry and control stations, underwater surveillance test operations and bases for application of future technological advances. Were unfriendly powers to achieve footholds in the TTPI, the United States would be faced with essentially the same situation that existed prior to World War II when the Japanese controlled the islands of the TTPI. These footholds could provide such unfriendly powers with air refueling bases, missile control stations, submarine bases, and other military facilities detrimental to the interests of the United States.

7. The uncertainty of a future relationship with the US fosters apathy, insecurity and resentment on the part of the inhabitants of the TTPI and postpones long-term decisions on the part of the Congress and private industry.

8. Despite the uncertainty of the people on their future, there is basically a friendly attitude towards the United States and a discernible desire on the part of present political leaders for a closer and continuing relationship with the United States. This friendly attitude could dissipate if an ambitious demagogue played up the failure of the US to act decisively upon the political future of these islands.

9. The Security Council of the United Nations must approve any change in the status of the TTPI and the Congress of the US must enact legislation to permit such a change.

10. Responsibility for making a decision on the termination of the trusteeship is dispersed among the Departments of Defense, Interior and State, both Houses of Congress and the White House.

There is no one office or officer within the Federal Government who has over-all responsibility for the TTPI. Furthermore, the State of Hawaii and the Territory of Guam have evidenced interest

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^{the TTPI}
in them. Suggestions from these areas have included a fragmentation of the TTPI to permit Saipan to be incorporated as a part of the territory of Guam and the complete absorption of the TTPI into the State of Hawaii.

11. It is generally agreed that the USG must take steps which will result in the termination of the trust agreement and the permanent affiliation of Micronesia with the U.S. Further, it is generally agreed that the plebiscite must give the inhabitants the choice between the alternatives of internal self-government and independence in accordance with the UN Charter.

12. The plebiscite, the legislation and the necessary follow-up actions by the Federal Departments concerned must be developed as a series of logical steps so that they can be presented to the United Nations for some final action by that body. A veto by the USSR in the Security Council can be anticipated and strategy can be anticipated and developed to include a unilateral termination of the trusteeship.

future political status
13. There are several possible forms for the political status of the TTPI after the termination of the trust arrangement. They include:

- (1) a non-self-governing territory similar to that of Guam.
- (2) A commonwealth (associated state) patterned after that of Puerto Rico.
- (3) incorporation of the TTPI and Guam as one non-self-governing territory or as a commonwealth (associated state).
- (4) incorporation of the TTPI with the State of Hawaii.
- (5) Incorporation of the TTPI with Guam as a State of the Union.
- (6) Statehood for the TTPI.

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14. Recommendations:

It is recommended that approval be given to the following:

(1) Establishment immediately within the Executive Office of the President a unit to supervise USG's steps to terminate the trusteeship agreement. This unit should be headed by a Special Assistant to the President. He would have a supporting staff, and a mandate to finish his work within a certain time limit, say two years.

(2) Development of a scholarship-fellowship-training program under which all political leaders of the TTPI would be brought to the US for educational briefings.

(3) Establishment of a TV educational network in the TTPI similar to that of American Samoa.

(4) Completion of the negotiation with Japan on the claims problems on an urgent basis.

(5) As soon as possible begin drafting the wording of the plebiscite questions.

(6) Initiate liaison with the various Departments and the Congress as soon as feasible.