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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JCSM-541-70

24 November 1970

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Strategic Importance of the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to JCSM-643-68, dated 31 October 1968, subject as above.

2. (S) In the post-Vietnam period, the requirement will continue for the forward deployment of US Forces in the Western Pacific to deter aggression and enable the United States to fulfill its treaty commitments. A Pacific base structure to support the forward deployment posture of US Forces will be necessary.

3. (S) The reference forwarded the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the strategic importance of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI). Therein, the Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasized that Guam and the TTPI provide the only real estate on which the required capability to project US power into the Western Pacific could be based should intensifying political pressures cause future denial or curtailment in the use of our present forward bases.

4. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their views provided in the reference. For use in future planning, they have approved the attached study which provides an FY 1973-1980 basing concept for Guam and the TTPI. This concept reflects five alternative basing patterns keyed to different circumstances and related decisions the United States could make concerning a Western Pacific base structure. The basing patterns are:

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a. Retain US bases in the Philippines, Ryukyus, and Japan to the extent permitted, and continue use of existing facilities in Korea, Taiwan, and mainland Southeast Asia. This pattern would result in the lowest requirement for bases in Guam and the TTPI.

b. Retain US bases in the Philippines, Ryukyus, and Japan to the extent permitted, and develop additional facilities in Korea and Taiwan. This pattern would result in a limited requirement for bases in Guam and the TTPI.

c. Retain US bases in the Philippines, Ryukyus, and Japan to the extent permitted, but do not develop additional facilities in Korea and Taiwan. This pattern also would result in a limited requirement for bases in Guam and the TTPI.

d. Withdraw all US Forces from the Ryukyus and Japan, retain bases in the Philippines to the extent permitted, and develop additional facilities in Korea and Taiwan. This pattern would result in a substantial increase in the requirement for bases in Guam and the TTPI.

e. Withdraw all US Forces from the Philippines, Ryukyus, and Japan, but do not develop additional facilities in Korea and Taiwan. This pattern would result in the greatest requirement for bases in Guam and the TTPI.

5. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that, of the five basing patterns considered, the pattern represented in subparagraph 4a most nearly fulfills US requirements and that Service and diplomatic planning should be directed toward its development while preserving options to progress toward the other basing patterns, should circumstances dictate.

6. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the basing requirements corresponding to the circumstances outlined in subparagraphs 4d and 4e would require substantial expenditures of funds, additional acreage on Guam, and substantial amounts of land on several of the principal islands of the TTPI. They also note that fiscal constraints reflected in the Joint Force Memorandum have been applied to the force structure used in the attached study and that the supporting base structure is relatively insensitive to certain types of force changes (such as the difference reflected between the Program Objective Memorandum Preferred and the 7th Revision). No actual physical development is contemplated for any of these five alternatives at this time, except for nuclear storage facilities to replace those planned for evacuation on Okinawa which is being handled as a separate but related issue.

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
7. (S) Several important issues have been circumscribed in part by the study assumptions; the resulting statement of requirements may be economically and politically infeasible except under grave circumstances. Dollar estimates shown particularly would require closer scrutiny to minimize facilities and simplify construction methods required and supportable at the time. However, the study usefully focuses attention on areas of common concern. Among these are: necessary variations of Service planning standards; the need for more intensive use of limited real estate, possibly through closely integrated base planning; base loading; the magnitude of construction and funding requirements that a new base structure of Guam/TTPI would entail; and the ability of a Guam/TTPI-based force to meet US national objectives and strategy.

8. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that this study, in laying out a first approximation of needs and resources, represents a useful basis for further detailed land use and facilities planning that would be required prior to negotiations for real estate or development of any basing pattern. They recognize that further refinements and scaling down of the requirements will probably be necessary in view of the political realities which have become apparent in our political status discussions with the Micronesians. In this regard, the Interagency Committee on the TTPI, with Department of Defense representation, is reexamining the entire political status situation in light of the rejection by the Congress of Micronesia of the US offer of Commonwealth status. A draft memorandum for the President, outlining alternative options and considering fully the strategic interests of the United States and possible military base requirement aspects, is being developed by the Interagency Committee for consideration by the Under Secretaries Committee on 3 December 1970.

9. (S) Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will direct further refinement of the military basing requirements in the TTPI set out in this study based on guidance as may be provided by objectives approved by the President.

10. (U) Without attachment, this memorandum is downgraded to SECRET.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



FRANK B. CLAY
Major General, USA
Deputy Director, Joint Staff

Attachment

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