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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Feb 24, 1971

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In reply refer to:
I-21093/71

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: NSC Under Secretaries Committee Meeting on Political Status
Negotiations with Micronesia, 3 February 1971

Participants:

Principals

Mr. John Irwin II, Under Secretary of State (Chairman)
Mr. G. Warren Nutter, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)
Mr. Peter Jessup, Special Group Officer, CIA
VAdm J. P. Weinel, Director, Plans and Policy, JCS
Mr. John Holdridge, White House Staff
Mr. Fred J. Russell, Under Secretary of the Interior
Mr. Harlinger Wood, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice
Dr. James Schlesinger, Assistant Director, OMB
Miss Barbara White, Deputy Director, USIA

Other Attendees

Mr. Samuel DePalma, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Affairs, Department of State
Mr. Harrison Loesch, Assistant Secretary of the Interior
Mr. Herbert Levin, Staff Member, NSC
Mr. Claus W. Ruser, Staff Member USC, State Department
CDR Edwin A. Kuhn, USN, East Asia & Pacific Region, OSD(ISA)
BGen Foster L. Smith, USAF, Chief, Far East Division, J5, JCS
LTC A. M. Smith, USA, Far East Division, J5, JCS
Mr. Orme Lewis, Department of the Interior
Mr. Tom Pickering, Department of State
Mr. Nick Veliotos, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State
Mr. Tom Whittington, Department of the Interior
Ambassador Harry Wright, US Representative to UN Trusteeship Council

Place: Under Secretary's Conference Room, Department of State

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1. Main Points of Discussion:

- Composition of the US negotiating team and its negotiating latitude.
- The number and manner in which the options are to be presented to the President.
- The feasibility and suitability of Option 1 (favored by Interior) compared to Options 3 and 4.
- Whether Option 3 (modified commonwealth) should be split into two parts, to wit: one part to contain compromises on eminent domain and federal supremacy and the other part to contain an additional compromise giving the Micronesians the right of unilateral termination.
- The use of Option 4 ("the Marianas Option" - district-by-district plebiscite) as a bargaining tactic and the necessity, in any event, to take some favorable action toward the Marianas before their enthusiasm cools.

2. Major Differences:

- Interior (Under Secretary Russell) argued strongly for Option 1 as a first step, contending that such a status could be viewed as a temporary solution, leading toward a more favorable solution, such as commonwealth.
- State (Under Secretary Irwin) argued that Option 1 ignored the conflict between foreign commercial/political operations in the TTPI and US security interests by granting these unrestricted rights to the Micronesians. It also depends heavily on Micronesian acceptance of the option or, in the event they do not accept, a US willingness to accept massive UN criticism. Furthermore, it falls short both of US objectives (e.g., a permanent solution) and UN requirements. State, in expressing its preference for Option 3 as a first step, represented the view generally expressed by the participants - other than Interior.

3. Decisions Reached:

- The Department of the Interior would, as previously, head the US negotiating team, with representatives of State, Defense, and JCS.
- The US negotiating team should have fairly wide latitude within which to negotiate and explore alternative solutions.
- The full range of options, with pros and cons, should be presented to the President.

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- Option 3 should be split into two parts (as noted above), and the second part - with unilateral termination (3b) - should not be part of the initial step.
- The virtual certainty of the Marianas opting for commonwealth could be used for bargaining leverage and would provide a reasonable fall-back position in any negotiations; we should take some favorable action toward the Marianas in any event.
- The strategic importance of the TTPI is magnified by the impending reversion of Okinawa. Without these islands as a fall-back position, our entire Pacific strategy would have to be re-examined.
- No further effort is to be expended in revising the basic options paper that had been prepared by the Interagency Group.

4. Follow-on Action Directed:

The Interagency Group should:

1. Restructure and shorten the memorandum for the President;
2. Include background, a summary of positions, options, and the dilemmas faced by the US in reaching status agreement;
3. Outline two "tracks" or approaches:
 - Start with Option 1 and progress through 3a, 4, 3b, and 5.
 - Start with 3a, then proceed as in the first track.

Memorandum for Record

Prepared by:

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MOASD/ISA/EAPR
Asst. for TTPI Matters

Approved by:



Date: 24 February 1971

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