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In reply refer to:  
I-22858/71

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
SUBJECT: Strategic Importance of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) (U)

Reference is made to JCSM-541-70, dated 24 Nov 70, subject as above, which forwarded a study outlining US basing options in the TTPI. A key assumption is that the US will continue to require, for the foreseeable future, the capability of implementing a "forward" basing strategy in the Western Pacific. On this assumption, the Guam/TTPI area is viewed as a possible fallback area in the event that basing in Japan/Okinawa or the Philippines is denied us or becomes undesirable for political reasons.

A memorandum recently was submitted to the President providing recommended actions to resolve the future political status of Micronesia (NSC-U/DM 62, 2 Apr 71). Action by the President is expected within the next few weeks. Since Ambassador Franklin Haydn Williams has been appointed as the President's personal representative for political status negotiations, it is anticipated that he will be given, within the limits of the above memorandum, a relatively broad charter to negotiate a solution. Accordingly, I consider it both appropriate and essential that we proceed now to further define our requirement for land in the TTPI.

The next negotiating session with the Micronesians may take place in late July or August. We should then be able, if required, to specifically identify our requirements--in the event retention of eminent domain is impossible--for real property to be purchased, leased, or for which we should obtain options to lease.

Your earlier study (JCSM-541-70) contained the statement that the "requirements may be economically and politically infeasible except under grave circumstances." To assist me in determining what basing options in the TTPI realistically can and should be provided for, I request, therefore, that you further refine our military land requirements, taking into account the following limitations among other appropriate assumptions:

- a. That the amount and use-category of land reserved for DOD purposes on any given island or atoll take political realities into consideration and be limited to that which is reasonable, in a less than all-out war situation, from the viewpoint of local civilian requirements.

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b. That DOD land requirements be the minimum to provide essential basing options, with full use, wherever feasible, of joint-Service basing, vertical construction, and use of land that has no economic value to the Micronesians (e.g., construction on reef areas, use of uninhabited islands).

In submitting the requirements, indication should be given as to the amount of payment--either lump sum or periodically--that the Services would be willing to support from their projected budgets in the event purchase or lease, within the next few years, becomes the only alternative.

Although the next negotiating session may not involve making a final arrangement for potential DOD land requirements, it is clear that--as a minimum--it will be necessary for us to outline the full extent of our possible future interest in TTPI land, in specific terms.

I would appreciate receiving your response by 25 June 1971 in order to permit further review within my office and possibly by the Under Secretaries Committee prior to the opening of negotiations.

28 APR 1971

*Signed*  
*D. Packard*

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