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Attachment 1
SD/T/621

1. Future of the Trust Territory

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THE FUTURE OF THE TRUST TERRITORY

A. General Position

PROBLEM

This subject is one in which the Council by definition takes considerable interest -- an interest which is increasing with the declining number of trusteeships and the current world attitude on colonial problems. We have further stimulated this interest as it relates to the TTPI by our encouragement of Micronesian consideration of this problem and more particularly by our considerable emphasis in the last three years on our own programs -- first the unfulfilled hope for a U.S. status commission and subsequently the series of discussions with representatives of the Congress of Micronesia (its Future Political Status Delegation) to reach agreement on a mutually satisfactory proposal for a solution to the future political status question -- to achieve progress in this area. Until recently this interest on the part of the Council has been quite manageable since we have taken clear and meaningful steps to prepare Micronesians for a more permanent status. Perhaps more important, the Micronesians until recently have stated both to the Council and to the 1967 visiting mission, that they were not ready to make a decision on their future, that they needed time to prepare themselves and to study the alternatives open to them.

Starting two years ago, this situation has changed. While the 1970 visiting mission found many Micronesians still not prepared, either for reasons of economic development or ignorance on the issue, to make a decision on their future status, the Mission's report found considerable interest in the subject, praised the thoroughness of the Future Status Commission's examination of the options available to Micronesia, and stated that the future political status issue should be resolved "sooner rather than later." Additionally, there has been a sharp increase in the last three years in the number of Micronesian petitions and communications to the Trusteeship Council dealing either directly or indirectly with the status question. This year the Council will consider eight communications and one petition concerning the future political status question.

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The final report of the Micronesian Status Commission in July 1969 recommended a status of internal self-government in free association with the United States. Subsequently, the Congress of Micronesia appointed a Political Status Delegation inter alia to engage in preliminary discussions with the United States "to identify the major political, legal, and administrative questions which will have to be decided in the event that Micronesia chooses to enter into free association with the United States, and likewise those which will have to be decided if Micronesia chooses to become an independent state.." Accordingly, the Micronesian Political Status Delegation engaged in such discussions with representatives of the U.S. Executive Branch. At the second and most recent session in this series of discussions on Saipan in May, 1970, the U.S. Delegation proposed that Micronesia become a Commonwealth in permanent association with the U.S., with internal self-government under a constitution drafted and approved by the Micronesians. For its part, the Micronesians Delegation, while agreeing to transmit the U.S. proposal to the Congress of Micronesia, put forth its definition of free association in the form of "four non-negotiable principles" and stated that the U.S. Commonwealth offer failed to meet their definition in certain critical areas.

In June, 1970, the U.S. Representative to the 37th session of the Council stated that he was unable to discuss in any detail the results of the May discussions since the Micronesian delegation felt that, in a matter of such vital importance to Micronesia, the first public report of the results of the discussions should be the one made by it to the Congress in July. The U.S. Representative stated, however, that the talks had been useful and promised that copies of the Micronesian report would be made available to the Council. This has been done.

In short, the Council will expect a complete report on the discussions held to date and on events since the last Council, particularly including consideration of the Status Delegation's report by the Congress of Micronesia and recent events surrounding separatist sentiments in the Marianas.

U.S. POSITION

The U.S. Delegation should be as forthcoming as possible with the Council in discussing developments on the future status question over the past year. This should start with the May

discussions on Saipan, and end with our present position. (The Delegation should not, of course, give any indications of the specifics of our future policy.) The U.S. Representative's opening statement will summarize developments since the 37th Session, but the Delegation should expect further questions, particularly drawing on the material in the Micronesian Status Delegation's Report (TAB E(1)). The Delegation should, of course, permit the Micronesian Special Advisors to respond to questions addressed to them and may, as seems appropriate, call on them for comment on other questions, particularly those regarding the Micronesian position. The Delegation may draw on the following more detailed summary of events, the exchange of statements made at the May meetings (TAB E(2)) and the pertinent resolutions of the Congress of Micronesia (TAB E(3)).

As for our present policy and our interpretation of the year's events, the Delegation should rely primarily on the position set forth in the U.S. Representative's opening statement. Further specific guidance and explanation on issues of likely interest is to be found at TAB B. Finally, the Marianas situation is discussed at TAB C and The Solomon Report at TAB D.

Summary of Events Starting With the May Discussions

As general background to the May discussions, it should be recalled that, with the exception of one or two issues, neither the US nor the Micronesian delegation had a very clear view of the other's position. After the May talks, with the advantage of hindsight, it was possible to realize that the significance of certain issues had not been fully appreciated in advance. It is also important to recall that both Delegations prepared their opening positions in advance and without prior knowledge of the other's statement. Thus the conflict which existed was not deliberate and was not necessarily intended as a rejection of any position taken by the other side. In fact, the May meetings were in essence an exchange of formal position papers, without in-depth exploration of either the meaning behind them or of the possibility of agreement at a more practical level. In discussing the US Commonwealth proposal, it should be emphasized that it was only offered as an example of how our Statement of Principles might be implemented in practice. (The Delegation may wish to draw on the Statement which is contained as Annex C of the Micronesian Report - TAB E(1)).

Stated simply, the Commonwealth proposal provided for a status of self-government with the economic support necessary to make this exercise of self-government meaningful. As our delegation stated, the proposal was felt to be responsive to the earlier expressed preferences of the Micronesians for self-government in association with the U.S. and, in particular, their desire for a constitutional convention. It provided for self-determination through an authorized procedure involving initially the Congress of Micronesia. Subsequently the people of the territory, would indicate their approval in two referenda and, of course, the Constitutional Convention. In submitting the proposal the U.S. Delegation pointed out areas where we felt Commonwealth was in agreement with the "Four principles" and stated explicitly that the U.S. Delegation was prepared to discuss any particular point of difference. In discussing the areas of agreement between the Commonwealth proposal and the "Four principles," the U.S. Delegation pointed out that the Commonwealth proposal recognized the sovereignty of the Micronesian people by providing that they would freely join the United States; that the Micronesians were free to draft their constitution within certain broad parameters of the U.S. Constitution that required a republican form of government, three separate branches of government, and a bill of rights; and, while the U.S. Delegation had no authority to agree to a form of association that would be unilaterally revocable or terminable by either party, that did not mean the relationship would remain the same forever. Evolution, change is a universal fact of life. The Commonwealth proposal, while not including a termination provision, did not preclude the possibility of amendment or even termination by mutual agreement. The U.S. Delegation also stated that, if for no reasons beyond economic and security considerations, it did not believe that a relationship that could be terminable unilaterally by either party would be practicable and still achieve its various purposes, both for the United States and Micronesia. On the question of the retention of the right of eminent domain by the United States, the US Delegation pointed out that the Commonwealth proposal provided more safe-guards for the rights of land-owners than was now enjoyed by any entity of the United States and that, as a matter of principle, the United States seeks to establish military bases where they are welcomed by the local population. It tries to avoid base construction in places where we are not

welcome. On the question of alienation of Micronesian lands by US citizens, the US Delegation pointed to, and offered to discuss any desired changes in, the provisions in the Commonwealth proposal providing coverage of such practices by Micronesian regulations.

On the question of independence, the US Delegation agreed that the Trusteeship Agreement envisages a possible ultimate status of either self-government or independence. The delegation pointed out, however, that the choice of either of these possibilities is qualified by the requirement that the status be appropriate first, "to the particular circumstances of the Trust Territory and its peoples" and, second, "the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned." In practical terms of US responsibility -- both morally and under the Trusteeship Agreement and the UN Charter -- to ensure that Micronesia is prepared for whatever status its people might select, the US Delegation expressed the view that considering the particular circumstances of the territory, independence would not seem a realistically appropriate status for some time to come; and that it would be remiss in its responsibility to say otherwise.

For its part, the Micronesian delegation stated that any association with the United States must recognize as non-negotiable components the following "Four Principles":

- "(a) That sovereignty in Micronesia resides in the people of Micronesia and their duly constituted government;
- (b) That the people of Micronesia possess the right of self-determination and may therefore choose independence or self-government in free association with any nation or organization of nations;
- (c) That the people of Micronesia have the right to adopt their own constitution and to amend, change or revoke any constitution or governmental plan at any time; and
- (d) That free association should be in the form of a revocable compact, terminable unilaterally by either party."

The Micronesian delegation further identified the features of the Commonwealth proposal, to which it had objection, in particular the lack of a unilateral termination provision, the US retention of the power of eminent domain, and the extent of powers reserved to the United States.

The subsequent report of the Micronesian delegation to the Congress of Micronesia set forth its assessment of the discussions held to date with the US. Essentially, the report stated that the United States was unable or unwilling to accept either "free association" or independence and that the US offer of commonwealth status was unacceptable since it was judged not to meet the requirements of self-government in "free association." The US proposal was also deemed unacceptable since it was viewed as sacrificing Micronesian interests on several basic issues -- control of land, laws, and any further consideration of change of political status -- and failing to respond to the four principles or legal rights which the Delegation offered as a non-negotiable component of any future association with the US. The Micronesian Delegation felt that, while it must report that it was unable to obtain a "resolution or determination of the future political status of Micronesia," there were some advantages to continuing negotiations with the US and that the Congress of Micronesia should consider on their own merits the three alternatives presented to it (free association, independence, and commonwealth) and decide which to endorse, and ultimately implement. The Delegation further recommended that, in light of the "impasse" on the future political status question and the ever-increasing "Americanization" of Micronesia, the Congress consider some transitional changes at territorial and district levels to prepare Micronesia for eventual self-government.

During its July-August session, the Congress of Micronesia adopted resolutions (1) endorsing the "Four Principles" as a non-negotiable component of any association with the United States; (2) declaring the Commonwealth proposal "unacceptable in its present form;" (3) inviting the US Government to continue discussions; and (4) establishing a congressional status committee which was directed to: a) conduct political education; b) study the political implications of free association and independence; c) study alternatives regarding internal

self-government; d) solicit support within the US and the UN for the Micronesian Congressional position on status, and e) continue negotiations with the US, consistent with stated policies of the Micronesian Congress and subject to ratification.

Except in the Marianas (see discussion TAB C), the question of future status played a relatively minor role in the November general elections for the Congress of Micronesia. In many cases members of the previous Congress who had expressed views on the status issue ran unopposed. Where competition was offered, it tended to focus on local issues within the district rather than on those of Territory-wide significance.

During its scheduled regular 50-day session beginning in January 1971, the Congress moved on a broad front to implement various recommendations contained in the Status Delegation's report that would move Micronesia toward greater internal self-government. A fire destroyed both Chambers of the Congress of Micronesia resulting in a premature adjournment of the Session in late February. At that point, the Congress had considered but failed to enact the following legislation: a joint resolution requesting the formation of an Executive Council that "would exercise final decision-making power in the Executive Branch of the TT Government; a bill to permit it to advise and consent to major Executive Branch appointments; a joint resolution requesting an amendment to the US Code to permit the election of the High Commissioner; and, a senate bill that would permit the election of district administrators. While the emphasis was on increased self-government, the Congress has not ignored items more directly related to status and has taken the following action: the Senate has passed a resolution requesting the Committee of 24 to send a visiting mission to study the present and future state of self-government in Micronesia; a joint resolution inviting Japan and "other governments that have diplomatic relations with the US" to enter into discussions on future trade and aid arrangements has been proposed although action was not completed; and members of a new Political Status Committee have been named.

The Congress resumed in Special Session on Truk on May 5 and only concluded its work on May 22. Just prior to the resumed session, Senator Lazarus Salii, Chairman of the Micronesian Joint Status Committee, issued a statement during a press conference in which he raised the prospect of the continuation of

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status discussion this summer. (See TAB E(4)). He viewed the appointment of Ambassador Williams as a hopeful sign. While acknowledging the defects in the May 1970 discussion procedures, he hoped and expected that the new talks would be more fruitful.

If other developments related to the status question arise during the resumed session of the Congress of Micronesia, they will be covered in an addendum to be attached.

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THE FUTURE OF THE TRUST TERRITORY

B. Specific Guidance on Points of Likely Interest

1. Denial of the Right of Independence

The United States may be accused of denying the Micronesians their right of independence. Alternatively, the Delegation may be asked if the United States is prepared to grant independence if that is the wish of the Micronesian people.

The Delegation should reject the accusation that we have denied the right of independence. Our statement on this question last May, quoted in the Micronesian report, shows clearly that we recognize it as one of the possibilities envisaged by the Trusteeship Agreement. We do not, however, believe independence is the only means of achieving self-determination and the Trusteeship Agreement and the Charter also recognize the existence of other alternatives.

As for our readiness to offer this choice, the Delegation should stress that we are concentrating on exploring with the Micronesians that which is their first preference--not independence but a form of association with the United States. Speculation as to other alternatives seems unnecessary. However, on a theoretical plane, the concerns which we expressed to the Micronesians regarding our trusteeship obligations relative to the circumstances of the Territory still seem relevant.

2. Denial of the Right of "Free Association"

The United States may be accused of failing to meet the necessary conditions of "free association" in its commonwealth offer--most particularly by not providing for unilateral change in the status at a future date.

The U.S. Delegation should respond that, in terms of an ongoing association, what the United States is obligated by the Charter

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and the Trusteeship Agreement to offer is a status of "self-government" and that this status must be approved by the people of Micronesia. If the people of Micronesia had approved the Commonwealth offer it would have fully satisfied our Charter and Trusteeship obligations.

"Free Association" may be one form of self-government, but it is a term which requires definition. The Micronesian concept, to the extent it has been defined, seems to follow the lines described in GA Res 1541 (XV). But, of course, that resolution has no binding force--it is only a recommendation, like all General Assembly resolutions, and it is one which the United States was unable to support. The Commonwealth proposal, on the other hand, is similar to the "free association" approved by the United Nations for Puerto Rico. Thus, there is no question of a rejection of "free association." The problem is one of reaching agreement on mutually acceptable terms for such an association.

As for the specific question of unilateral change, the U.S. Delegation should refer to the comments made on this point to the Micronesians in May (referred to the summary at Tab A). Any statement that the U.S. Commonwealth offer denied the possibility of future change should be rebutted. The Delegation may add that, like all other issues not yet resolved, this concept will undoubtedly be the subject of further discussions at subsequent status meetings.

2. a. Secretary Morton on Denial of Independence and Free Association

The New York Times in an article March 12 implied that Secretary Morton, speaking before Congress, said the United States had turned down "free association" and rejected independence. A close reading will reveal that the article does not actually say that Secretary Morton said these things, and he did not do so. In fact, he said nothing of

the sort. The Delegation should not quote directly from the transcript but may paraphrase to the effect that Secretary Morton stressed the importance he attached to meeting with the Micronesians to learn first hand how they feel and how they believe the status issue should be handled. As for the U.S. Executive Branch, he said he wished to achieve a unified policy not dominated by any particular interest. In essence, his remarks reflected his desire to explore fully all aspects of the situation before taking a firm position on the status issue. (Copies of the article and a rough transcript of the actual testimony are attached at Tab E (5).)

3. U.S. Position on Land Acquisition

The United States may be accused of denying Micronesia control of its land, possibly with the aim of establishing military bases in the area.

The Delegation should not get into a discussion of any military plans we might have for Micronesia. (The Delegation should use the general line denying immediate plans provided at Tab IV(b), Attachment 3, of the Basic Position Book.) Rather, the Delegation should stress that the right of eminent domain is a common and often necessary element of good government. Moreover, we had devised rather elaborate provisions--unique in the experience of the U.S.--to insure a Micronesian voice in any exercise of such a right. We had also made provision to prevent private alienation of Micronesian land without Micronesian approval. The Micronesians, as you know, found these provisions inadequate and this issue, like others, will have to be subject to further discussion.

4. Termination of the Trusteeship

The Delegation might be asked to comment on the discussion of termination in Annex A of the Micronesian Report (Tab E (1)). Specifically, the Delegation might be asked whether it agreed that a positive act of approval by the Security Council would be required? Or whether we would allow independence as an option on the ballot?

The Delegation should deal with these issues indirectly. With regard to the Security Council role, we should say that this is a procedural matter; that we believe the more important element of the termination issue is the requirement to offer a status consistent with the Trusteeship Agreement and which is strongly endorsed by the Micronesian people in the presence of UN observers. Beyond this point we do not consider the problems of termination to be major ones.

As for the options, again we believe this is a decision more appropriately considered at a later date. At the moment we are fully involved in trying to reach in agreement with the Micronesians on the terms of an association. Once this issue is resolved we can turn to the details of the plebiscite.

5. By-Passing of the Congress of Micronesia

The Micronesian report implies that the United States may intend to by-pass the Congress of Micronesia in seeking a resolution of the status question.

If questions are asked on the point, the U.S. Delegation should point out that we are currently dealing with the Congress of Micronesia in seeking a status solution, and we have every intention to continue to do so. The Delegation might refer to our position on the Marianas issue (see Tab C) as a demonstration of our attitude. Not only have we stressed our intention to continue to work with the

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Congress of Micronesia's Joint Committee, but we have also urged the Marianas leadership to work through the Congress on status and other issues. We do, of course, believe that the final decision must rest with all the people. We are also concerned that the Micronesian people not feel ignored in the formulation of status proposals. We believe this latter problem can be resolved, at least in some part, through political education as recommended by the 1970 Visiting Mission.

6. Overriding Significance of Strategic Importance

The Micronesian Report cites our strategic interests as apparently being an overriding consideration in our approach to the status question. If this issue is raised, the Delegation may reaffirm the quotation cited by the Micronesians (page 45 of the report) about the continuing strategic importance of the area, but should also point out that the United States was willing to assume the obligation to develop Micronesia toward self-determination. We saw no conflict between these two issues in 1947 when the Trusteeship Agreement was signed and we see none today. The attached editorial from the Honolulu Star (Tab E (6)) raises this same issue. The Department's response at the same Tab may be used either if the editorial itself is raised or is otherwise useful in handling this issue.

7. Refusal of United States to Discuss General Principles

The Micronesian report states that the United States was only interested in discussing its specific proposal and was unwilling to explore the general principles put forward by the Micronesian Delegation.

Should this point be raised, the Delegation should state that we do not believe this to be a real problem. The United States Delegation tabled the commonwealth proposal

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not because it insisted that this be the sole basis of discussion, but in an effort to provide a specific example of how its own principles might look in practice. We felt that even though there were obvious differences between the two positions, a specific proposal might provide a useful basis for discussion and would tend to direct attention to the practical problems involved. The U.S. Delegation did, moreover, offer to discuss the Micronesian position--their principles and the meaning behind them (see U.S. Delegation statement of May 6 (Tab E (2))). The Micronesian Delegation did not choose to accept this invitation, responding instead with further position papers analyzing the U.S. position. We would certainly expect that future discussions will address all the issues of concern to both sides.

8. U.S. Desire to Prejudge the Results of the Status Talks

The Micronesian Report states that the U.S. seems to have the attitude that it knows what is best for Micronesia; that the U.S. decided on an offer and it was up to the Micronesians to approve.

The Delegation may respond that the facts do not appear to support this allegation. The U.S. offer of a Commonwealth was presented in an attempt to be responsive to Micronesian desires as they had been stated. The Micronesians had requested a number of elements to be included in any future political status and a definite procedure by which that status was to be achieved. The Commonwealth offer was an effort to incorporate those elements and the constitutional convention procedure in a package which at the same time reflected principles which the United States believed to be important. The Commonwealth was not offered as a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. Rather, it was intended both to respond to previously expressed views as well as to serve as a basis for further discussion. Unfortunately such discussions did not develop, but we believe the tabling of our proposal was and will be useful.

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9. Future Plans and Policy

The Delegation can expect a number of questions dealing with our future plans for resolution of the status question and with changes of policy which we might be contemplating to achieve agreement. The Delegation should draw on the position taken in the opening statement of the U.S. Representative and should express the view that detailed discussions of the United States position and any changes therein are, in our view, more appropriately left to direct discussions with the Micronesian representatives. We have examined their position with care and we remain confident that with further exploration and discussion the apparent differences will diminish in magnitude and will be subject to resolution. The Delegation should stress the importance of the appointment of Ambassador Williams in this regard.

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THE FUTURE OF THE TRUST TERRITORY

C. The Marianas

The Problem

The issue is in many respects an old one with which the Trusteeship Council is very familiar. For at least the last ten years, the people of the Marianas have been expressing the wish to be separated from the remainder of the Trust Territory and to be reunited with Guam. Several unofficial plebiscites have shown a majority in favor of such a course, and every visiting mission has testified to the genuineness of this sentiment--though they have noted that there are those who disagree. The visiting missions have been appropriately cautious regarding how the views of Marianas should be handled in terms of self-determination. They have, however, made it clear that they would not approve of an administrative division in the Territory while the Trusteeship Agreement remains in effect. They would undoubtedly share our view that it is legally impossible to terminate the Trusteeship over the Marianas without obtaining Security Council agreement to an appropriate amendment to the existing agreement. They have acknowledged, however, that the desire for reunification must be considered as part of the process of self-determination.

In recent years the Marianas sentiment has also been expressed in petitions and communications presented to the Council on which we have had to comment. In doing so, we have stated that we have always viewed the Territory as an administrative entity; that we did not necessarily rule out any particular choice at the time of self-determination, but that such choices would depend heavily on the wishes of the people of Micronesia.

In the past year, particularly following discussion of the Political Status Delegation's report by the Congress of

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Micronesia, this sentiment in the Marianas has increased and intensified. The people of the District apparently strongly favored the US Commonwealth proposal. During the fall 1970 general election for the Congress of Micronesia, the Marianas elected a pro-Commonwealth slate, with status being the key issue of the election. Those members of the Marianas Delegation to the Congress of Micronesia who had registered positions in favor of free association and who were up for election (1 senator and 2 representatives) were voted out of office. During the January regular session of the Congress, the new Marianas delegation voted in the minority against various proposals designed to strengthen the position of the pro-free association and independence forces in the Congress. In addition to general disagreement with the majority sentiment on the future status question in the Congress, the Marianas delegation has found it increasingly difficult to work with delegations from the other districts. Particularly irksome to the Marianas was consideration of several fiscal measures by the Congress which were felt to be discriminatory against the Marianas due to its higher per capita income and level of economic activity.

The Marianas district legislature has also taken an active role in opposing the growing sentiments in the other districts for a looser form of association with the United States. The Council will have before it two communications (T/COM.10/L. 50 and 70--Tab IV (a)(6) Annexes D and S) and one petition (T/PET. 10/66--Tab V, Annex F) from the district legislature dealing with the future status question. The first communication endorses the commonwealth offer. The second, and more important, is its resolution declaring the district's intent to secede from the Territory. Subsequently, the Marianas members of the Congress of Micronesia decided not to participate in the Special Session in Truk as a sign of their solidarity with the separatist views of the Marianas District. (The boycott subsequently broke down, with all but one Representative changing his mind and arriving at

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Truk for the occasion, albeit a few days late.) While they did not commit themselves with regard to future sessions of the Congress, they did indicate that steps would be taken to convene a constitutional convention for the Government of the Marianas. Finally, they have also indicated their intention to present their case to the Trusteeship Council, presumably using the occasion provided by the earlier request to be heard on land problems.

U.S. Position

The opening statement of the U. S. Representative will contain our basic position which the Delegation may reiterate as necessary. This essentially builds on our earlier responses to petitions as cited above, on our recent written response to the secession resolution (see Tab IV (a)(6) Annex S of basic Position Book), and on the position taken with a Marianas delegation in Washington. We have urged the Marianas leadership to continue to work within the system. We have told them that precipitous action could make a settlement more difficult and is unnecessary to insure their right to self-determination. Rather they should continue to seek accommodation of their views within the Congress of Micronesia and as members of the status delegation.

If the issue of separate discussions with the Marianas is raised, the Delegation should reiterate the position in the opening statement that we are committed at this time to discussions on a territory-wide basis and do not now contemplate separate discussions. Further, if asked if the Commonwealth proposal is applicable to the Marianas alone, the Delegation should say that it is too early and not in the interest of any of the parties to speculate on such matters at this time. The Commonwealth proposal was offered as a possible territory-wide solution and the agreement on the terms of such a Micronesian solution remains the focus of our attention.

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If the Marianas group does present its position to the Council, the Delegation should generally take a low profile. The Council is not likely to be very receptive, at least not to the point of making any commitments. This cool reception may serve to temper the Marianas intentions. Moreover, it is not in our interests to seek to restrain the exercise of free speech by the Marianas delegation. Exposition of the Marianas position may make the Council more appreciative of some of our problems. If Council members should address questions to the Delegation, the earlier guidance should provide the basis for any response.

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D. The Solomon Report

The Problem

In 1963 President Kennedy appointed a commission headed by Mr. Anthony Solomon (who was subsequently to become first, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs and later Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs) to make a trip to Micronesia to study conditions and attitudes there, and to report back to the President with its views and recommendations. The various members of the mission spent up to six weeks in the Territory, drew up the requested report and in the fall of 1963 submitted it to the President.

Most of the report, with minor deletions, has subsequently been made public, but the opening section, the "Introduction and Summary," had remained a classified document. However, through some means a group of Micronesian students in Honolulu obtained a copy of the classified section and published it in the March 1971 edition of a student publication known as "The Young Micronesian" (copy at Tab E(7)). The published version is an accurate copy of the classified section of the report.

Although this portion of the report specifically discusses the needs to provide the Micronesians with an exercise of self-determination, including the option of independence, and devotes much of its attention to the need to correct the now readily acknowledged defects which existed in our administration at that time, it does leave room for the impression of desiring to manipulate both the Micronesians and the UN to our ends. The Micronesian students have characterized the report as a "ruthless five year plan" "to systematically americanize Micronesia into a permanent association in clear and conscious defiance of its trusteeship obligations."

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We do not know if any of the Council members have obtained copies of the student publication. However, the New York Times (see article Tab E(8)) has reported the surfacing of the document and contains sufficient information as to stimulate questions.

US Position

The US Delegation may acknowledge the accuracy of the published version, but should not engage in a detailed defense/rebuttal of the Solomon Report. While much of the report is fully defensible and other portions, as the result of loose drafting, are misleading as to existing administration policy at the time, any such point-by-point discussion can only lead to difficulty.

The Delegation should concentrate on the fact that the Solomon Report is not now nor has it ever been US Government policy. As High Commissioner Johnston said in commenting in Saipan, he has never read the report and had never been instructed to use it as a guideline or policy paper for the administration of the TTPI. It is also clear from reading the report that it was never implemented; e.g., not only was there no plebiscite in 1968, but there was never even any planning for one. Other suggestions have, of course, been adopted, but not as an implementation of the Solomon report. Rather they were good ideas which have been supported by the Council and almost all interested observers - e.g. the creation of the Congress of Micronesia, instituting of a Peace Corps program and greatly expanding the budget and development programs. Moreover, the timing of these steps is generally out of line with the Solomon report recommendations, again demonstrating that they were decisions independently arrived at.

Above all, the Delegation should point out that what is of interest to the United States at this point - and what we believe to be of interest to the Council and the Micronesian people - is current United States policy. This policy, as the US Representative will make clear in his opening statement, is one of continuing progress toward the full and free exercise of the right of self-determination by the Micronesian people. It is more than evident that the Micronesian leaders are taking care of Micronesian

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interests in this process -- as witnessed by their report before the Council -- and it is equally evident that the United States is in no way trying to evade its obligations to the people of Micronesia and to the United Nations.

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