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FILE DESIGNATION

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INFO: HICOMTERPACIS SAIPAN

NO. 58
JUL 28 3 38 PM 1971

FROM : USUN, New York

DATE: July 27, 1971

SUBJECT : Consultant to Congress of Micronesia Discusses Future Political Status

REF : HICOM FOR POLAD

Dr. Eugene B. Mihaly of the Institute of International Studies of the University of California at Berkeley met with Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett and the reporting officer at his request on July 20 during a recent visit to New York City. Professor Mihaly said that he was in New York to complete the research work necessary to the forthcoming publication of a book which he has in preparation on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. He said that his attitude toward the Territory with which he was personally well acquainted was a somewhat ambivalent one. He said he did not always know when he was viewing Micronesia as an academician and when he viewed problems as an adviser to the Congress of Micronesia's future status delegation. During his meeting with the Mission's officers, he appeared to speak from both points of view.

Professor Mihaly's most startling observation concerned the mood of the Micronesian legislature with respect to the evolving future status situation. He said he had been startled by the rapid growth of pro-independence sentiment in the Congress of Micronesia during its special session in May in Truk. He said it was his firm belief that if the United States wished to reach a mutually acceptable agreement with the future political status delegation, it had to do this in 1971 and before the next session of the Congress of Micronesia. In his opinion, if the Congress convenes in January of 1972

Enclosure: Exempt from automatic decontrol
Draft article by Professor Mihaly.

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Contents and Classification Approved by: POLSEC

Clearances: Ambassador Bennett

without an agreement in principle, there is a better than even chance that the Congress will unilaterally declare Micronesian independence. Professor Mihaly said this act could well be against the better judgment of a majority of the members of the Congress but that they would be pushed to it by the accumulation of frustrations at their inability to get satisfactory progress in the negotiations with the United States. Professor Mihaly spoke approvingly of two recent decisions of the United States Government. First, the assignment of a political adviser to the High Commissioner and the selection of FSO John Dorrance for the post, and, second, the appointment of Dr. Franklin Hadyn Williams as the President's personal representative to the future status negotiations. He said he knew Dr. Williams well and considered him an ideal choice.

Elaborating on the UDI idea, Professor Mihaly said he assumed this would create chaos in the UN. He observed that this type of UDI would be greeted quite differently from the UDI of the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia and he assumed the United States would be put in an impossible situation by such a development. He said that he planned to explore the UN aspects of such an eventuality at greater length during his New York visit.

In reply to Ambassador Bennett's question, Professor Mihaly said that in his opinion a substantial majority of the Congress of Micronesia and perhaps an even greater majority of the people in the Territory would support a free association status. In his personal view, free association offered the United States all of the necessary guarantees to its strategic interests in the area. Professor Mihaly explained that in his opinion the United States' chief strategic interest is the denial of the Territory to any other power. He thought foreseeable U.S. base requirements were relatively modest and could be met through negotiated agreements for the reactivation of some of the Marianas' facilities which the Marianas Islanders appear to be anxious to have. The continued use of the Kwajalein facility could easily be negotiated with the Marshall Islanders. Free association, in any event, left control of defense of the Territory in the hands of the United States which insured that no other power could gain a foothold in Micronesia and thereby threaten Guam or Kwajalein. Professor Mihaly did not think the United States needed to worry about the possibility of the Micronesians availing themselves of the "opting out" provision since it was widely felt that Micronesia could not make it

on its own anyway.

Professor Mihaly harbored some misconceptions about the present and future role of the UN's Special Committee of 24. He had seen both Senator Salii and Congressman Silk after their unexpected appearance before the Committee in early June and believes that by their appearance before this Committee, the Micronesians had obtained an additional "weapon" which they could hold at the head of the United States in case the negotiations broke down. However he correctly observed that any termination of the Trusteeship agreement on terms clearly not acceptable to the majority of the Micronesians would risk running into a Soviet veto hence the need for reaching an agreement on the future status of the Territory which so clearly reflected the views of the majority of the people that the USSR would not dare to oppose it.

Part of the problem in Micronesia, according to Professor Mihaly, was the conflicting advice that they were getting. He felt much of this bad advice came through the Micronesian students in Hawaii and to a lesser extent in Guam who were exposed to radical influences from irresponsible, extremist American fellow students. Another part of the problem was misunderstanding of the U.S. aims and objectives due to inadequate contact between the Micronesian elite and knowledgeable U.S. officials. Professor Mihaly said this had improved somewhat since the Polad had been assigned to Saipan but the information program in the Territory was still not as effective as it should be.

Before leaving the Mission, Professor Mihaly gave the reporting officer a copy of a draft article entitled Micronesia's Future and the Changing American Role in the Pacific which he hopes to have published by Foreign Policy or some similar journal. He requested that this article not be given wide distribution in view of his efforts to find a publisher. Copies are enclosed for the information of the addressees. The views expressed in his meeting with the Mission officers are reflected in this article. Professor Mihaly was also given names of members of several Missions on whom he could try to call for further discussions of the TTPI situation.

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Micronesia's Future and the Changing American
Role in the Pacific

The liquidation of the American empire, such as it is, has been leisurely and, to date, largely painless. Today, however, barring a fortuitous shift in the direction of events, the United States is about to find itself embroiled in one of those uncomfortable episodes of decolonization which made the fifties and sixties so trying for Britain, France and Belgium--episodes that elicited only a well moderated sympathy from the United States.

The territory in question is Micronesia--The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands: 2100 islands, of which less than 100 are inhabited, spread over a sector of the western Pacific as extensive as the continental United States. For the United States, preoccupied with avoiding conflict in the Middle East and in Central Europe, and with extricating itself from conflict in Indo-China, the problems and prospects of Micronesia--on the face of it--appear rather remote. One Congressman may have reflected this when he asked a reporter inquiring about Micronesia: "Mike who?"

The resolution of the political future of this small (100,000 people) territory, however, is not simply another case of shedding a contemporary embarrassment founded on yesterday's mistakes (or triumphs, depending on your current and retrospective politics) by a graceful withdrawal orchestrated with promises of post-independence financial assistance. In this case, the controlling power's security is--or at least is perceived to be--directly at issue. Specifically, the Administration and many of those concerned in the Congress view Micronesia as central to the United States' capacity to implement the Nixon doctrine or any facsimile of it in Asia, i.e., to withdraw from the Asian mainland while still sustaining the capacity to exert strong influence over events in Asia. Simultaneously, Micronesia represents a test of the American will to meet formal legal and moral commitments at a point where the cost of doing so may be quite high. Finally, the Micronesia case presents the imminent possibility of a fascinating, but quite ugly, donnybrook at the United Nations, with the United States cast as villain.

The three island groups constituting Micronesia--the Marshalls, Marianas, and the Carolines--were wrested from Japan at great cost of men and resources to both sides during World War II, and to the Micronesians whose lands were the battlegrounds. The names of Saipan, Truk, Pelilu and many others have a profound meaning, and thus a continuing political

commensurately governed. The Navy, which the President initially put in charge, did little to restore the considerable infrastructure (power, roads, schools, as well as some extractive industry--all developed to a remarkable degree by an expansionist Japan that clearly figured it was in the islands to stay) destroyed during the war. In fairness, the Navy did a presentable job within its limited terms of reference and even more limited budget.

The Department of the Interior (which has responsibility for all territories not in the interior) was put in charge in 1951. It did less for the territory than the Navy. Budgets were miserly--\$7 million was the maximum through 1960--and the Department limited itself to colonial housekeeping, i.e., paying the salaries of its own administrators to look after law and order and to operate a few schools. The ideological rationale which gave this indifference a patina of respectability was the so called "zoo theory"; indigenous cultures are a good thing; economic and political development jeopardize the preservation of those cultures, and are thus a bad thing.

The Kennedy administration rediscovered Micronesia and budgets began a spiral that, two administrations later, took the annual appropriation to \$62 million in FY 1971 (at roughly \$620 per capita, this must be some kind of record for colonial administration). Results were mixed. On the plus side,

social infrastructure--schools and health facilities--developed relatively rapidly, though in the conventional ethnocentric colonial pattern. The zoo was forgotten; miniature American systems, with only minor modifications to account for Micronesian cultural attributes, were the order of the day. Also, some roads were built or improved, and power supplies were increased. On the negative side, the new funds were funneled primarily into the territory's administration, the idea being apparently that the resulting large governmental apparatus would induce and monitor balanced economic development. In practice, a goodly number of Americans got jobs, and an even larger number of Micronesians were able to break into the ranks of the salaried. But productive enterprise of any sort was largely ignored. Today, Micronesia presents an all too familiar picture; a growing indigenous bourgeoisie earning good incomes from government employment; an economy based almost exclusively on government expenditure on the one hand and subsistence agriculture and fishing on the other; a high and rising level of imports, (including canned fish caught in the territory's waters by Japanese and processed in Los Angeles) and meager exports, now totalling only one quarter the value of imports.

Progress in the area of political development has been somewhat more encouraging. Each of the six districts now has an active and increasingly capable legislature. In 1965, a bicameral territory-wide legislature, the Congress of Micronesia,

was inaugurated. The Congress is flourishing both as a governing body (with its capacities constantly outstripping Interior's readiness to transfer power) and as a focus for the development of a Micronesian identity. The ground to be covered before Micronesia is an entity, a nation, rather than an aggregate of culturally heterogenous peoples speaking nine major languages, however, is enormous. Centrifugal forces are strong and may be growing. The Marianas have already asserted a desire to break away from the territory and to go with the United States as a territory, perhaps with Guam, or as a commonwealth.

Micronesia, in short, is in less than ideal shape to strike out on its own. But that, understandably, is what the Micronesians--particularly those active in politics and the administration--want to do. Again, a familiar picture.

The escalating demands of the ruled in this case, and the reluctant concessions by the rulers, fit the pattern. In 1967, the Congress of Micronesia petitioned President Johnson to establish a committee of U.S. Congressmen and executive branch officials to explore with them the possibilities of a revision in the territory's political status. The President proposed that the Congress create such a body but, for a complex of reasons, including a notable lack of enthusiasm on the part of Rep. Wayne A. Aspinall, Chairman of the House Interior Committee, the suggestion was greeted by silence. In 1968, the Micronesians went ahead on their own. They formed, from among their own Congress, a Commission on Future Status, which produced a study evaluating the alternatives.

In brief, the Commission found that a relatively new arrangement called Free Association, tried by Britain and New Zealand in the Caribbean and the Cook Islands respectively, was ideal. This provides self government, recognizes sovereignty both de facto and de jure but delegates responsibility for defense and foreign affairs to the former colonial power. It also implies, though does not necessarily guarantee, a commitment for continued economic assistance. If this were not possible, the Micronesians asserted, then the only alternative was independence. They ruled out territorial status, annexation and integration into an American state. "

Free Association would appear to have advantages for both parties in this case. For the Micronesians, it would almost certainly offer some of the economic support that the territory will need to dig itself out of the economic hole created by the pattern of American public sector spending since 1961. Association would also probably mean free movement of labor, a useful safety valve for the imminent moment when the schools overproduce, and of capital. Finally, these economic advantages, plus the fact of the association link itself, may well counteract the disintegrative forces that a suddenly independent and thus instantly impoverished Micronesia might not be able to handle. For the United States, association offers the prospect that Micronesia would be less likely to enter into embarrassing

(to the U.S.) foreign entanglements than would an independent state. More on this point below. Association, in short, is a moderate approach. It offers the men who take power at the end of colonial rule greater than usual resources. It may even offer a guarantee against violent overthrow, if the association agreement defines defense to include defense against internal rebellion.

The United States was cool to this rather modest proposal. Within the executive branch, the Department of Defense pushed hard for some kind of arrangement that would keep Micronesia under the direct control of the United States. The Department of State--responding to the issue of the long standing commitment under the trusteeship agreement to give the territory self-determination and concerned with the mess that the case could become in the United Nations--argued for a more liberal solution. Interior stood somewhere in the middle. The outcome was an offer to the Micronesians, in May 1970, of Commonwealth status, i.e., an arrangement similar to that of Puerto Rico: self-government but without the recognition of the territory's sovereignty and, equally important from the Micronesian point of view, without a transfer of eminent domain. Land is not only precious for survival's sake on the small islands of the Territory. It is the basis of social status and political power. Control of its use, on the other hand, has obvious benefits for the Department of Defense.

The Micronesians, not surprisingly, rejected the offer out of hand and restated their commitment to Free Association and, failing that, to independence.

The men from State, Defense, and Interior went back to see what they could do, but apparently were unable to make any progress to speak of. Then the issue captured the interest of the White House. In early 1971, President Nixon appointed Dr. Haydn Williams, president of the Asia Foundation, as his negotiator for the Micronesia talks, with the personal rank of Ambassador. (For convenience sake, Williams was placed on the Interior payroll, thus giving that department its first ambassador. One wonders what the founding fathers would have made of that.)

In May, 1971, exasperation with what was increasingly interpreted as foot dragging by the United States, and the resentment that inevitably surfaces when the colonized first articulate what has been happening to them and to their land over the years, converged and produced the first territory-wide political party: the Independent Coalition. The new movement was given much of its impetus and fire by young Micronesian radicals--some still in college in Hawaii and Guam--who were supported in turn by assorted Americans. The latter included a number who were not unhappy to find an issue with which to beat the establishment about the ears. The new party itself, as this is written, has an objective but no program. It also has the support of roughly one third of the Congress of Micronesia.

Two moves made by the Micronesians to prepare for a round of negotiations expected in summer, 1971, pointed to the kind of imbroglio that could occur if those negotiations failed. The chairman and co-chairman of the Micronesian Congress' Joint Committee on Future Political Status paid an informal visit in May, 1971 to the United Nations Committee of Twenty Four, the decolonization committee whose activities have been sufficiently offensive to the colonial and ex-colonial powers that several states, including the U.S., have dropped their membership. The Micronesians' purpose was clear: to signal the U.S. that they were prepared to take the entire matter to New York if necessary. The Committee of Twenty Four responded eagerly, offering to assist even though it had no formal jurisdiction in the trusteeship area. The Micronesians elicited a promise from the Committee to send emissaries to the territory to look into the problem, but then Senator Lazarus Salii, the Micronesian leader, asked the Committee not to act until the Micronesians formally requested them to do so. ("Don't call us, we'll call you.") In short, the Micronesians acquired a weapon and ensured that only their fingers could be on the trigger.

Simultaneously, five other members of the Micronesians' status committee flew to Japan to meet Japanese officials. The avowed purpose of the trip was to discuss possible Japanese

investment and assistance to an independent or associated (with the U.S.) Micronesian state. The primary objective, again, was to build the pressure on the U.S. The trusteeship arrangement was originally designed to ensure the exclusion of Japanese influence in the territory; and, notwithstanding the quality of contemporary U.S.-Japanese relations, American officials are watching the rapid spread of Japanese economic influence in the western Pacific with mixed feelings. Japanese commercial interests are well on their way to dominance in Guam. Major Japanese firms have been displaying a strong interest in possible investments in the Trust Territory. At present, all foreign (non-American) investment is barred by law. Pressure to open the door is becoming intense - most of it from Micronesians with connections in Japan.

These maneuvers would have a Ruritanian flavor if the stakes were not high. The future of Micronesia involves, as noted earlier, more than the political and economic status of 100,000 people. The Micronesia problem presents the United States with an intricate and potentially dangerous dilemma.

On the one hand, the U.S. has formally committed itself to granting "self-government or independence" to Micronesia. Those are 1947's words. Today, the perpetual colonial status implied in the former term is no longer feasible. Moreover, the organ with ultimate authority in the Micronesian case is

the U.N. Security Council. No change can be made in Micronesia's status without approval of the Council. Neither can any change be made without the consent of the "administering authority", the United States. In short, any solution unacceptable to the Micronesians will undoubtedly be vetoed by the Soviet Union, which has already begun to use the Micronesian case to embarrass the United States. Alternatively, any solution unacceptable to the U.S. will be vetoed by the American side. The prospects for impasse are excellent. Impasse, in turn could mean retention of the status quo. And that is now unacceptable to both the U.S. and the Micronesians. Or, impasse could lead to a unilateral declaration of independence by Micronesia. The virtues of independence in the near future notwithstanding, the legal and political ramifications of such means of attaining it are so complex that, rather than letting go with the free wheeling and enjoyable speculation that the subject calls for, I shall simply note (with some assurance) that the situation would be a hell of a mess.

The other horn of the dilemma is the strong--or so at least it is perceived--American national interest in the territory. That perception rests on the following set of assumptions: American bases in Korea and Japan are being rund down and, in any event, the uses to which those bases can be put are increasingly restricted, by agreement and by tacit understanding.

Japan, in particular, has made clear its determination not to be drawn into America's troubles in Asia. The American bases in the Philippines can no longer be counted on indefinitely. The political situation in that former colony is increasingly unstable, and relations with the U.S. can only deteriorate. The facilities in Taiwan are quite likely to become an embarrassment as the U.S. and China move toward some form of modus vivendi. That leaves the U.S. with facilities in Guam (which is geographically part of Micronesia, but politically a territory of the U.S.) and in Australia. Simultaneously, the argument goes, the alliances forged in the post-war years are deteriorating. SEATO has little substance today (it had precious little yesterday). The future of the Japanese-American security arrangements are problematic at best. They will survive until such time as Japan goes nuclear. Even the underlying forces that produced the ANZUS Treaty are shifting. Australia and New Zealand are beginning to question the wisdom of total reliance on a power whose role in the area is uncertain. There is talk, for instance, of a Japan-Australia alliance. The union seems unlikely, but the fact that it is even seriously discussed is a manifestation of change in the power structure in the Pacific.* The north-south wall containing China in the western Pacific envisioned

*For a comprehensive analysis of the power relationships in the Pacific, see Hedley Bull's "The New Balance of Power in Asia and the Pacific" in Foreign Affairs, July, 1971.

and largely constructed by John Foster Dulles, in short, is crumbling.

The United States, of course, still has its extensive complex of military facilities in South Viet Nam and Thailand. The future of those in Viet Nam is quite clear; and, given the American mood today, it is hard to imagine that any administration would attempt to preserve the Thailand bases at anything like their current magnitude long after the conclusion of the American combat role in Indochina. That, presumably, is what the Nixon Doctrine is about.

Bases in the island groups of the western Pacific, it is argued, permit the U.S. to play the kind of role that the President apparently envisages--to retain the capacity to offer air and logistic support to threatened regimes in East Asia while, simultaneously, retaining a credible capacity to intervene with ground forces. Island bases can be said to have two additional virtues, both arising from the growth of the Soviet naval presence in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. They preempt the possibility of Soviet use of the groups where the bases are located; and they facilitate the American response to the Soviet challenge (shorter lines of communication and thus less need for large and expensive self-supporting fleets). The argument can be stretched further to cover the day when China is a major naval power. The same could apply to Japan.

Micronesia's importance, given these assumptions, is clear. The Territory occupies three million square miles of the ocean space (north of the equator) dividing Australasia from Japan, China from Hawaii and the United States mainland. It is close to South East Asia. The Palau group in the Western Caroline Islands is only 600 miles from the Philippines. It surrounds Guam and thus, if in the wrong hands, could neutralize the effectiveness of that highly fortified island (a Strategic Air Command base for B-52s, a naval base for fleet support, a naval air station, an enormous logistic facility, etc.) which, it should be noted, is the only major U.S. owned and, thereby only reasonably secure, military bastion west of Hawaii. Micronesia offers the prospect of more facilities under the U.S. flag. Given the increasing public and Congressional distaste for foreign bases, this is undoubtedly another in the complex of reasons why the military is reluctant to let go of this turf for which it and the nation paid so dearly in World War II.

Can the dilemma be resolved? Or, to put the question differently, are the interests of the United States and of the Micronesians irreconcilable? I would argue that they are not.

The Micronesians want just about the same as the people in scores of ex-colonies have wanted since World War II; and they have been willing to settle for less. Their interest in the Free Association approach stems not only from an awareness

that independence, for the moment at least, will be very costly to them but also from a recognition of and some sympathy for the United States' strategic interests in their islands. They have been willing to limit the exercise of their sovereignty, in short, though not to concede that that sovereignty is less than comprehensive.

The United States, in contrast, does not have a clear idea of what it wants. The Government's uncertainty or, more accurately perhaps, the inability of several departments to agree, has been manifest in the agonizing slowness of the development of even modest and unimaginative proposals for Micronesia's future and, in the year following the 1970 offer of Commonwealth status, the inability to produce any kind of proposal at all. More to the point, the Department of Defense has not yet specified which, if any, islands it would wish to use for bases, now or in the foreseeable future. If any such determination has been made, i.e., if the issue has gone from the contingency planners who by the nature of their bureaucratic roles must have large appetites in such cases as this, to the Joint Chiefs for decision--then the Joint Chiefs' decision is being kept secret within the house more effectively than decisions on inter-departmental matters are usually kept.

In any event, there is one point on which the Executive Branch can agree; and that is what the U.S. does not want to happen in Micronesia. It does not want the territory to be open in any way for military use by other powers.

That danger is ruled out now by international recognition of the U.S.'s role as trustee and by the fact of occupation. It can be avoided in the future by treaty and by the power of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. I am suggesting that, as part of a package deal on either independence or Free Association, it be stipulated, first, that an independent Micronesian state's territory not be used militarily by any power without the consent of both the U.S. and Micronesia and, second, that there must be agreement of both parties in any case where there is question as to whether a use is military or not (to obviate dispute over, for example, the role of Russian trawlers). These provisions would constitute the heart of a treaty to go into effect immediately upon independence. In the event that a Free Association arrangement is agreed upon, then such a treaty would not become operative for years, if ever.

A treaty of this nature would be as reassuring to the U.S. as the Finnish-Russian arrangements to limit Finland's armaments are to the Soviet Union. That is, they would be quite adequate as long as the U.S. had the physical power, and the willingness to exercise it, to act in the case of a breach. It follows that the American interest in keeping Micronesia clear of foreign military will continue only as long as the U.S. has such power and such determination. Beyond that point, the islands will cease to be vital to the United States.

The issues of bases can also, I believe, be settled without strenuous compromise by either side. Assume, for the moment, that the case for bases in Micronesia is valid. At present, there is only one military facility in the territory. That is the ABM test site at Kwajalein, in the eastern Marshalls. The Air Force may want to reactivate one of the large airfields on Tinian (from which the atomic bombs were delivered) or Saipan and to secure at least an option to construct a field on one of the Palau Islands. It is also conceivable that the Navy would want access to the Truk Lagoon, one of the world's great anchorages and the World War II headquarters for the Japanese Navy. Beyond that, the islands are simply not suitable for military uses.

The Micronesians are highly unlikely to want to lose the Kwajalein facility. Salaries--at American scales--paid by the facility are a major, if not the major, prop of the economy of the Marshalls. I expect that an independent Micronesia would demand a more reasonable payment than is now made.

The airfield on Tinian or Saipan would present no problem. The Marianas group has already indicated a strong desire to break away from the rest of Micronesia and to remain closely affiliated with the United States. Mariana politicians, moreover, have been quite explicit that the return of the U.S. military would be welcome. Their motives are unquestionably

a mix of monetary and political--a desire to emulate the prosperity that the military has brought Guam and to have a firm umbilical cord to the U.S. or, to put it more bluntly, to enjoy the benefits of both heavy Japanese investment and sufficient political and military connections with the United States to off-set Japanese influence.

Facilities in Palau and Truk would be more complex to negotiate. The people in these areas are quite conscious of the dangers to their cultures that a large military presence carries. Their representatives thus might simply say no. If on the other hand, such facilities could be fairly well isolated, i.e., sited on a relatively isolated island, the employment possibilities they offer might prove irresistible. This is a practical alternative. An independent Micronesia might also insist on some degree of control over the management and utilization of bases--wage levels, types of weapons stored, etc. The United States, I would argue, can live with these minor restrictions. American bases in Germany are far more restricted.

Given the U.S. Congress' rather jaundiced views on the expansion of military facilities, this discussion may be meaningless. In the current atmosphere, it might make far more sense to talk in terms of options on Micronesian soil. At the moment much of the public land in the territory are designed as "military retention" areas. A few of these could be picked

up by the United States as options, for future use. The same kind of restrictions discussed above would have to be agreed upon in advance.

In either case, it would be incumbent upon the United States to pay a reasonable rent for any lands it uses or ties up. Such payments could prove to be a painless--for all concerned--form of transfer payments to the Micronesian Government. Rentals or fees on options would not need to be appropriated annually by the U.S. Congress; they would not be a form of aid, but rather a payment for goods received.

All of this begs what, in logical terms, should be a prior question: would the United States' interests be served by bases in Micronesia? The treatment of detail before principle is deliberate. It reflects my view that the matter of highest priority, for both the United States and Micronesia, is achievement of a settlement, preferably in 1971. Further delay can only accelerate the build-up of forces that are pushing events in a direction inimicable to the interests of both parties, i.e., toward an ugly divorce rather than a reworking of the marriage or at least an amiable separation on which cooperation can be based. If military facilities therefore, are thought to be vital by the United States, then the task clearly is to find a way to make them advantageous, and thus acceptable to the Micronesians.

The Nixon Doctrine notwithstanding, however, a good case can be made against bases. Given the uncertainty of great power relations in the Pacific and particularly of the future American role, it would seem to make more sense for the U.S. to advocate neutralization of all the independent and quasi-independent Pacific islands. The alternative could well be a costly and dangerous great power scramble for influence and base rights throughout the South and Western Pacific. The analogy to the competition for influence in Africa is disturbing: many poor countries needing assistance and willing to accept one or another power's influence to get it. Who has gained?

The American policy of excluding other powers from Micronesia is certainly valid as a first step in the direction of neutralization. It is also valid in so far as it reflects a concern for the security of Guam (which, in my view, is adequate to handle the military requirements of the Nixon Doctrine in that sector of the Western Pacific. And, if the northern Marianas are merged with Guam, any remaining requirements would be more than adequately met). To risk failure on the large issues, i.e., to risk a breakdown of the negotiations and all that that implies, for the sake of one or two bases that would be of uncertain value at best and very costly at worst seems self-defeating.

The United States can, of course, hang on to Micronesia by force majeure. I doubt that, in the long run, we have the stomach for it. This is a case where magnanimity and self-interest can coincide. Nations do not often get such opportunities. It would be unfortunate if the United States allowed this one to slip by.