



~~DENY~~ EXCISE 661 10/78
For the T.T

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ACTION IO-03

INFO OCT-01 SS-07 L-02 PRS-01 PM-03 INR-05 INRE-00 SA-02

EA-04 RSR-01 RSC-01 1030 W

P 192306Z NOV 71
FM HICOMTERPACIS SAIPAN
TO SECINTERIOR
COMTWELVE SAN FRAN CALIF
INFO SECSTATE
SECDEFENSE
WHITE HOUSE
CINCPACREP GUAM/TTPI

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR 01 3/87	
REVIEWED BY <u>Wad</u>	DATE FEB. 25 1987
RDS <input type="checkbox"/> or XDS <input type="checkbox"/> EXT. DATE _____	
TS AUTH. _____	REASON(S) _____
ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS <input type="checkbox"/>	
DECLASSIFIED <input type="checkbox"/> RELEASABLE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>IN PART</u>	
RELEASE DENIED _____	
PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS <u>B1</u> <u>A5</u>	

SAIPAN #1
11/19/71

CONFIDENTIAL LIMDIS SECTION ONE OF TWO
CORRECTED COPY FOR FIRST LINE PARA. 9
FROM POLAD 75C. INTERIOR FOR OFFICE OF MICRONESIAN STATUS
NEGOTIATIONS. COMTWELVE FOR AMBASSADOR WILLIAMS. STATE FOR IO/UNP
AND S/PC. DEFENSE FOR OSD/ISA AND JCS. WHITE HOUSE FOR MR. HOLD-
RIDGE (NSC).
SUBJECT: TTPI FUTURE POLITICAL STATUS
1. FOLLOWING CONFIRMS AND TO DEGREE SUPPLEMENTS COMMENTS MADE DURING
NOVEMBER 18 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR WILLIAMS.

ASSUMING NO FURTHER TALKS BETWEEN NOW AND
JANUARY, BUT AN UNDERSTANDING THAT TALKS WOULD RESUME IMMEDIATELY

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AFTER CONGRESSIONAL SESSION, MY BEST GUESS IS REPORT WOULD NOTE PROGRESS MADE, ISSUES THAT REMAIN, REJECT "MUTUAL CONSENT TERMINATION", AND SEEK CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION CONTINUE NEGOTIATE WITH UNDERSTANDING THAT, IF "FOURTH PRINCIPLE" NOT SATISFIED INFURTHER ROUNDS OF TALKS, STATUS COMMITTEE THEN AUTHORIZED NEGOTIATE FOR INDEPENDENCE. FURTHER, I BELIEVE MAJORITY IN CONGRESS WOULD ENDORSE REPORT OF THIS CHARACTER, AND VARIOUS POSITIONS TAKEN AT HANA BY STATUS COMMITTEE. THERE IS EVEN POSSIBILITY OF MINORITY REPORT BEING FILED BY YAPSE AND POSSIBLY PONEPEANS WHICH IN EFFECT WOULD REJECT INDEPENDENCE AS ALTERNATIVE TO ASSOCIATION WITH MUTUAL CONSENT TERMINATION PROVISION. (SUCH A REPORT WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED BY

PAGE THREE RUHJOSAI608 C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMDIS
EITHER HOUSE.) NEVERTHELESS, STATUS COMMITTEE AS A WHOLE IS A PRETTY UNPREDICTABLE ANIMAL, AND REASONING ABOVE, THOUGH VALID ON BASIS KNOWN INDIVIDUAL ATTITUDES, MAY STILL BE FAULTY. B/A

3. AS I UNDERSTAND SITUATION, TWO BASIC ALTERNATIVE COURSES EXIST AT MOMENT.

A) ANOTHER FULL ROUND OF TALKS BEFORE JANUARY SESSION DURING WHICH TERMINATION AND AS MANY OTHER ISSUES AS POSSIBLE WOULD BE RESOLVED. THIS IS DESIRABLE (AT LEAST IN MY VIEW), BUT ONLY IF WE CAN THEN MOVE TO POSITION II.

B) POSTPONEMENT OF NEXT ROUND OF TALKS UNTIL IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONGRESSIONAL SESSION, I.E. AWAIT CONGRESSIONAL TEST OF POSITIONS TAKEN

AT HANA. UNDERSTAND THIS IS MAJORITY VIEW CONCERNED OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON.

4. THERE ARE TWO SUBALTERNATIVES UNDER 3(B).

A) LETTER WOULD BE ADDRESSED TO SALII ADVISING THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE

FOR PRACTICAL REASONS TO MEET AGAIN PRIOR TO JANUARY, BUT WE HOPE TALKS

CAN BE RESUMED AGAIN IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONGRESSIONAL SESSION.

NO SUB-COMMITTEE OR "INFORMAL" TALKS PRIOR CONGRESSIONAL SESSION.

B) SAME AS 4(A) BUT PROPOSE IN LETTER THAT AMBASSADOR WILLIAMS OR

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HUMMEL MEET INFORMALLY WITH STATUS COMMITTEE OR SUB-COMMITTEE THEREOF PRIOR TO JANUARY SESSION WITH VIEW TO CLARIFYING SOME POINTS, AND PERHAPS RESOLVING SOME SECONDARY OR TERTIARY ISSUES.

5. COURSE 4(B) SEEMS TO ME TO BE DANGEROUS. STATUS COMMITTEE PROBABLY WOULD NOT NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON ANY POINTS IN ABSENCE OUR PREPAREDNESS TO DISCUSS UNILATERAL TERMINATION. RATHER, THEY WOULD PRESS HOME ON LATTER POINT. UNLESS WE ARE PREPARED CONCEDE ON THAT ISSUE AT THAT TIME, OUTCOME MIGHT ONLY BE SOLIDIFICATION FORCES FAVORING MOVING TO INDEPENDENCE OPTION (INCLUDING THOSE MEMBERS PREPARED TO DO SO ONLY FOR BARGAINING PURPOSES).

6. COURSE 4(A) THEN SEEMS TO BE BEST ALTERNATIVE (ALWAYS ASSUMING PRIOR DECISION POSTPONE NEXT ROUND FULL-SCALE TALKS UNTIL AFTER CONGRESSIONAL SESSION). SUCH A LETTER SHOULD DISPLAY REGRET THAT, FOR PRACTICAL REASONS (E.G. U.S. CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS, ETC.) IT IS NOT POSSIBLE MEET PRIOR JANUARY SESSION, BUT MAKE CLEAR U.S. WISHES ANOTHER ROUND OF TALKS AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE THEREAFTER. (MICRONESIAN CONGRESS ADJOURNS ABOUT MARCH 1.) THERE SHOULD BE BROAD STATEMENT TO EFFECT U.S. DELEGATION PLEASED WITH PROGRESS MADE AT HANA TALKS, AND IS OPTIMISTIC REMAINING DIFFERENCES CAN BE RESOLVED IN FURTHER TALKS. IT MIGHT BE BEST NOT TO POSE AGAIN QUESTION ASKED

PAGE FIVE RUHJOSAI608 C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMDIS
AT HANA TALKS: "IS TERMINATION ONLY REAL ISSUE BLOCKING SETTLEMENT?" IF WE ARE TO CONCEDE ON THAT ISSUE, WE SHOULD DO SO AT CONFERENCE TABLE AND USE IT AS LEVER ON OTHER ISSUES. IF SALYI REPLIES HE UNABLE AGREE TO ANOTHER ROUND OF TALKS UNTIL U.S. INDICATES WILLINGNESS TO CONCEDE ON TERMINATION ISSUE, REPLY SHOULD BE TO EFFECT U.S. WILLING TO NEGOTIATE THAT AND OTHER ISSUES, BUT ONLY AT CONFERENCE TABLE WITH FULL STATUS COMMITTEE, AND NOT BY MAIL

3/A:
ONE WAY
AROUND THIS PROBLEM MAY BE FOR ME TO ISSUE STATEMENT TO MNS AND OTHER MEDIA EXPLAINING, BY PARAPHRASING LETTER, ABSENCE ANOTHER ROUND OF TALKS PRIOR JANUARY SESSION. THIS WOULD BE LOGICAL ACTION GIVEN MANY QUESTIONS THAT WILL ARISE WHEN IT BECOMES CLEAR NO MEETING IS TO BE HELD. PURPOSE OF EXERCISE IS TO ASSURE STATUS COMMITTEE AND CONGRESS BOTH AWARE WE SEEK FURTHER TALKS, AND ARE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THEIR OUTCOME. SUCH ACTION SHOULD TAKE PLACE PRIOR STATUS COMMITTEE'S

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DECEMBER 10 MEETING IN TRUK.

8. AS FINAL COMMENT ON ABOVE POINTS, SHOULD CONGRESS OPT FOR INDEPENDENCE AT NEXT SESSION (WHICH AT THIS POINT I CONSIDER UNLIKELY),

PAGE SIX RUHJOS-1608 C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMDIS
THIS WOULD BE ONLY A TACTICAL MANEUVER FOR MOST MEMBERS -- AT THIS TIME

EVEN THEN, YAPSE (NOT TO MENTION THE MARIANAS), AND POSSIBLE THE PONPEANS COULD DISASSOCIATE THEMSELVES FROM SUCH A MOVE AND POSSIBLY PRECIPITATE ULTIMATE FRAGMENTATION OF MICRONESIA IN MORE THAN JUST TWO DIRECTIONS. TOO, WHILE SUCH ACTION MIGHT ONLY BE INTENDED AS BARGAINING LEVERAGE, OBVIOUSLY ANY SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATION OF ANY FORM

OF ASSOCIATION ACCEPTABLE TO US WOULD BE THAT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT. SHOULD WE THEN BE FORCED TO BY-PASS CONGRESS WITH A REFERENDUM, WE COULD WIND UP OFFERING BASICALLY WHAT WE COULD HAVE HAD AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE PRIOR TO THE "CONFRONTATION." BUT, ASSUMING WE WON THE REFERENDUM, WE WOULD HAVE TO LIVE AND COPE WITH AN ALIENATED POLITICAL LEADERSHIP.

9. SEPARATE SUBJECT. AMBASSADOR WILLIAMS MENTIONED POSSIBILITY BRIEFLY

VISITING TTPI IN MID-DECEMBER (COMMENCING ABOUT DECEMBER 11) FOLLOWING THIS HONG KONG VISIT. TIMING IS SUCH THAT BOTH HE AND AMBASSADOR HUMMEL

AND POSSIBLY BURTON SUB-COMMITTEE WOULD BE IN TTPI AT SAME TIME, OR ON

EACH OTHER'S HEELS.

10. FOLLOWING APPEAR BE POSITIVE FACTORS.

A) VISIT BY AMBASSADOR WILLIAMS WOULD FURTHER DISPLAY, TO U.S. ADVANTAGE, HIS DEEP PERSONAL INTEREST IN AND CONCERN FOR MICRONESIA
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P 192306Z NOV 71
FM HICOMTERPACIS SAIPAN
TO SECINTERIOR
COMTWELVE SAN FRAN CALIF
INFO SECSTATE
SECDEFENSE
WHITE HOUSE
CINCPACREP GUAM/TTPI

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMDIS
FINAL SECTION OF TWO
AND ITS FUTURE.

- B) WOULD PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY SET OUT U.S. POSITION, AND PERMIT HIM PERSONALLY RESPOND TO DISTORTIONS OF THAT POSITION. IN PARTICULAR, HE COULD HIGHLIGHT MERITS MUTUAL CONSENT TERMINATION.
 - C) WOULD PROVIDE EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY MEASURE REACTION TO HANA TALKS OF MICRONESIAN LEADERS WHO WERE NOT AT HANA.
11. NEGATIVE FACTORS APPEAR BE AS FOLLOWS.
- A) AMBASSADOR HUMMEL CAN ACCOMPLISH (B) AND (C) ABOVE.
 - B) MICRONESIAN LEADERS, PARTICULARLY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND

PAGE TWO RUHJOSA1635 C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMDIS
TRADITIONAL LEADERS, TEND BE ANNOYED AT BEING CONSTANTLY PARADED BEFORE

VIP'S PASSING THROUGH TTPI. THOUGH AMBASSADOR WILLIAMS' (AND HUMMEL'S)

CASE SOMEWHAT UNIQUE, FACT REMAINS PATIENCE OF LEADERS WITH THIS SORT OF EXERCISE MIGHT HAVE BEEN STRETCHED TO BREAKING POINT BY TIME AMBASSADOR WILLIAMS WOULD ARRIVE.

C) STATUS COMMITTEE MEMBERS IN PARTICULAR AND CONGRESS IN GENERAL EXTREMELY SENSITIVE ABOUT THEIR "PREROGATIVES" WITH RESPECT NEGOTIATION OF STATUS QUESTION. HAVING TWO AMBASSADORS IN TTPI AT SAME TIME WOULD APPEAR TO MANY HERE (NO MATTER WHAT EXPLANATIONS

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OFFERED) AS "END RUN" EFFORT. THIS MIGHT BE PARTICULARLY SO GIVEN TIMING STATUS COMMITTEE MEETING IN TRUK. IN SHORT, THERE COULD BE SOME

STRAIN PLACED ON EXISTING ESSENTIALLY POSITIVE ATTITUDES OF MOST COMMITTEE MEMBERS. WE MUST BEAR IN MIND WHICH MICRONESIAN LEADERS, IN FINAL ANALYSIS, MAKE BASIC DECISIONS ON STATUS. D) AM NOT SURE HOW MUCH TIME AMBASSADOR HAS FOR VISIT, BUT ASSUME HE COULD NOT VISIT ALL SIX DISTRICTS. THIS BEING SO, HITTING TWO OR THREE

DISTRICTS COULD BE MISREAD AND RESENTED. THOSE SKIPPED WOULD BE ANNOYED, AND THOSE HIT WOULD WONDER WHY THEY HAD BEEN SINGLED OUT FOR SO MUCH ATTENTION.

E) AMBASSADOR WOULD FIND HIMSELF IN DIFFICULT POSITION OF HAVING TO

PAGE THREE RUHJOSA1635 C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMDIS
FIELD QUESTIONS AND STATEMENTS REGARDING STATEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES OF BURTON SUB-COMMITTEE WITHOUT KNOWING PRECISELY WHAT THAT CODEL DID SAY AND DO.

12. BALANCING PROS AND CONS, I COME DOWN VERY SLIGHTLY (AND VERY RELUCTANTLY) AGAINST VISIT AT THIS TIME, EVEN THOUGH THE "PROS" ARE POWERFUL ONES, ESPECIALLY THAT IN PARA 10 (A) ABOVE. THIS HAVING BEEN SAID, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE STAGE TRIP IN SUCH A MANNER TO MAXIMIZE "PROS" AND MINIMIZE IMPACT OF "CONS."

A) SPEND NO MORE THAN TWO DAYS IN SAIPAN.

B) GIVE "EQUAL-TIME" (TO EXTENT AIR SCHEDULES PERMIT) TO TRUK, PONAPE,

AND MARSHALLS. MAKE CLEAR THROUGH ADVANCE NOTICES, PROGRAMMING, ETC., THAT PRIMARY PURPOSE OF TRIP IS TO "RENEW FRIENDSHIPS" MADE ON EARLIER TRIP, AND DO THINGS THAT WERE NOT POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF BRIEFNESS

OF LAST TRIP, I.E. DO SOMETHING DIFFERENT IN TERMS OF ACTIVITIES. ALSO EMPHASIZE TRIP MAINLY PERSONAL, UNOFFICIAL FRINGE BENEFIT FLOWING

FROM HONG KONG TRIP.

C) SPEND AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE WITH MEMBERS OF STATUS COMMITTEE, AND AVOID FORMAL MEETINGS WITH LARGE GROUPS.

D) EXPRESS REGRETS IN ADVANCE TO YAP AND PALAU LEADERSHIP THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE VISIT THEIR DISTRICTS AT THIS TIME. MAKE COMMITMENT

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PAGE FOUR RUHJOSAI635 C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMDIS
VISIT YAP ON WAY TO NEXT ROUND OF TALKS (ASSUMING THEY WILL BE IN
PALAU), AND POINT OUT THERE WILL BE OPPORTUNITY AGAIN VISIT PALAU
IN CONJUNCTION NEXT ROUND OF TALKS.
E) TO EXTENT POSSIBLE (I RISK REPETITIVENESS HERE) PLAY TOUR UP AS
PERSONAL VISIT RATHER THAN AS OFFICIAL "FACT-FINDING" EFFORT.
13. FINAL SUBJECT. DURING TELEPHONE CONVERSATION QUESTION OF
ATTITUDE OF ADMINISTRATION EMPLOYEES, THEIR INFLUENCE, AND DWIGHT
HEINE'S ATTITUDE ALL CAME UP. BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL
REAFFIRM FOLLOWING POINTS.
A) MICRONESIAN ADMINISTRATION EMPLOYEES HAVE PRACTICALLY ZERO
INFLUENCE ON CONGRESS OF MICRONESIA ON STATUS ISSUES. FURTHER, DWIGHT
HEINE'S ASSESSMENT THAT 75 PERCENT OF ADMINISTRATION EMPLOYEES WOULD
SUPPORT U.S. POSITION AT HANA IS AT LEAST DEBATABLE. I DOUBT THAT
MORE THAN TEN PERCENT HAVE A FIRM OPINION ON ANY PARTICULAR STATUS
ISSUE. EVEN MANY OF THOSE IN KEY POSITIONS ARE NOT COMMITTED ONE WAY
OR ANOTHER EXCEPT TO VIEW THAT CONTINUING ASSOCIATION WITH U.S. AND
U.S. FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE ESSENTIAL. AMONG THOSE WHO ARE FULLY
FAMILIAR WITH ISSUES, AND HAVE TAKEN POSITIONS (SUCH AS DWIGHT), IT
MUST BE REMEMBERED DWIGHT IS REPRESENTATIVE OF AN OLDER GENERATION
OF LONG-TIME EMPLOYEES. TOO, HIS OWN PERSONAL DIFFERENCES WITH THE

PAGE FIVE RUHJOSAI635 C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMDIS
PRESENT MARSHALLESE LEADERSHIP COLOR HIS ATTITUDES ON THE STATUS
QUESTION. YOUNGER MICRONESIANS NOW COMING UP THROUGH THE RANKS DO
NOT NECESSARILY SHARE VIEWS HELD BY DWIGHT AND MANY OF HIS
GENERATION. OFTEN THESE YOUNGER MICRONESIAN ADMINISTRATORS SEE THE
HANDWRITING ON THE WALL, KNOW SELF-GOVERNMENT IS NOT TOO FAR
AROUND THE CORNER, AND ARE NOT ABOUT TO TAKE PUBLIC POSITIONS ON
STATUS WHICH COULD CAUSE THEM PROBLEMS LATER ON. IN POINT OF FACT, MOST
ADMINISTRATION EMPLOYEES AT ALL LEVELS PREFER TO AVOID DISCUSSION OF
STATUS ISSUES IN ORDER TO AVOID BEING LABELED ONE WAY OR ANOTHER.
14. AS TO MAGISTRATES, TRADITIONAL LEADERS, ETC., MANY WILL MUMBLE AND
GRUMBLE ABOUT CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS, BUT FACT REMAINS MOST IN END
FOLLOW LEAD OF CONGRESS ON MOST ISSUES, INCLUDING STATUS. B/113

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THIS IS, OF COURSE, OVER-SIMPLIFICATION, AND ITS
VALIDITY VARIES IN DEGREE FROM DISTRICT TO DISTRICT.

14. MESSAGE PREPARED NOVEMBER 19. DORRANCE

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