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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE * PLAN FOR TINIAN DEVELOPMENT

- 1. CINCPAC was tasked to provide an integrated plan for Tinian development that would incorporate the requirements of each Service; the plan has received Service and Joint Staff concurrence. The JCS have authorized the Services to proceed with facility programming actions for the near term Tinian requirements defined in the plan.
- 2. Many factors combined to lead to the Tinian Development Plan. The reversion of Okinawa led to an immediate and associated requirement activities from that forward base. The President's Peking Trip, the Shanghai Communique, the Nixon Doctrine, and the Growing confidence of Asian allies leading to increased nationalism, all indicate a reduction of US force levels on the Asian periphery, nevertheless the US is resolved to support its strategic interests in the Pacific. The Marianas, having indicated a desire for a close political alignment with the US, represent a viable alternative for relocation of some of the forward based military activities, but by no means, all of them.
- 3. In a review of the topography of the Mariana Islands, Tinian and Saipan were found to be the only islands suitable for developing an airfield large enough to accommodate strategic operations and other military activities. The relatively large population and concentration of civil activities on Saipan indicate that is not a promising location, so attention has thus focused on Tinian in terms of military development.
- 4. In support of US strategic interests in the Pacific, the Secretary of Defense has stated that acquisition of the entire island of Tinian, for development into a joint military complex, is the desired objective. The development of a multi-service military complex is required; to provide a relocation site for strategic forces and activities previously situated on Okinawa; to support the surveillance and defense of Micronesia and the lines of communication
- * This paper has not been coordinated with the Departments of State and Interior.

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in the Pacific; to provide a Joint Service area for combined air-ground maneuvers; and to preserve an alternate location in the Western Pacific in the event of basing restrictions in forward areas, such as Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines.

5. These strategic objectives result in the near term requirements for an airfield, a port facility, a logistics complex, and a Joint Service maneuver and training area.

a. The airfield should be capable of supporting the following activities:

provide enroute support for airlift aircraft on transPacific missions during peacetime and in support of
contingencies such as fighter deployments and weather
and carrier diverts. As a staging base for US Navy
anti-submarine patrol missions, it will accommodate
logistic and transient aircraft; and will have a digital
data link capability to support deployment of US Navy
anti-submarine aircraft; it will provide support for US
Marine Corps aviation units deployed in training exercises;
and it will provide a safe haven for aircraft evacuated
or diverted from other Pacific bases due to severe weather.

- b. The port facility, when developed, should be capable of berthing a T-5 class tanker and a cargo ship simultaneously; off loading and storing bulk cargo; transferring petroleum, oil and lubricants from tankers to storage facilities; off loading and transferring munitions to storage facilities; supporting Joint Service training requirements; and expansion to accommodate cargo handling for future operations.
- c. A logistics area, when completed, should accommodate: storage and maintenance of the PACAF Vehicle Reserve Set (VRS) positioned in readiness in case of war or contingency operations in the Western Pacific, storage of the War Reserve Materiel (WRM) Contingency Assets including equipment and supply items excessed by base closures in SEA and other Pacific areas; storage of petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL) to offset current Air Force and Navy in-theater deficits; storage of conventional weapons for contingency operations supported from Tinian; current in-theater shortages.



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- d. The Joint Service maneuver and training area should be large enough to provide sufficient area for amphibious and subsequent training ashore of up to brigade size. By necessity, such an area would be larger than all of Tinian; however, less acreage can be successfully used with some training degradation by reducing either the scope of the exercise or the task organization of using units.
- 6. In reviewing these near term requirements, it is apparent that, for the above reasons and due to recent developments in the international arena, acquisition of the entire island is the priority objective.
- 7. While utilizing Tinian as a B-29 base during World War II, the Air Force recognized its strategic geographic importance and secured retention rights to almost 9,000 acres of public land on the island. This acreage includes North and West Fields and the related support areas. Additionally, about 5,000 acres are under retention on Saipan; this includes Isley Airfield and some adjacent land. With the returning US presence, near term construction actions will be primarily oriented toward air operations.
- 8. The Secretary of Defense designated the Secretary of the Air Force as Executive Agency for near term Tinian facility requirements development. In discharging this responsibility, Air Force planning will reflect maximum joint use of facilities, and accommodate the near and long term requirements of the other Services. Air Force planning will be completely in harmony with overall US Government objectives.
- 9. The Service programmers have refined the above requirements and are currently considering the development of Tinian in seven phases to satisfy the near term requirements. The cost of Tinian development through Phase VI is estimated to be \$114 million at the minimum. Each phase is programmed so that the function supported by that phase can be performed without the completion of subsequent phases. Each phase is planned to be completed in sequence; an exception is Phase VI, Logistical Support Base, which may be initiated any time; after the completion of Phase II.
 - a. During the first phase, certain actions are necessary to obtain rights to use the land and plan for the development of the island.

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- (1) The Micronesian Status Negotiations have resulted in the Marianas District negotiating separately with the United States. The result will most probably be a close alignment with the US with a relationship akin to territory or commonwealth status. The US land requirements are expected to constitute a major portion of the negotiations. The acquisition of the entire island of Tinian is the priority objective, in that it would allow accommodation of the near term requirements and many of the long term requirements.
- (2) The Marianas negotiations will establish the political relationship, the availability of land, and US commitments. Detailed planning by the Services will proceed when these parameters are established.
- (3) The Air Force will program for land acquisition of the entire island and out-grant required areas to other Services. The Naval Facilities Engineering Command, acting in its capacity as Department of Defense Land Acquisition Agent for the Marianas, will acquire the land according to the terms negotiated. Congressional funding will be required.
- (4) The Air Force will direct the development of the installation master plan. All facilities will be sited in accordance with that plan and designed for joint use to every degree possible. Duplication of facilities will be carefully avoided to allow maximum use of available land.
- (5) The politically undesirable necessity for relocation of at least some of the current population is dictated by ammunition safety requirements, as well as our actual basing requirements, and is therefore mandatory. It is believed that the small Tinian population could be resettled on Saipan, thus leaving Tinian uniquely free of local political encumbrances. The island is far enough away from the heavily inhabited islands to be a separate entity, but close enough (3 miles from Saipan) to draw on Saipan's labor force. This would preclude the development of one of our greatest problems, here and abroad, that of a developing civilian population which, in time, forces out the military activity which originally brought it there. A classic example is Mitchell Field on Long Island. 1 - 2432939

- (6) If the acquisition of the entire island proves possible, the Department of Interior probably will be requested to manage the relocation program.
- (7) The Air Force will prepare the Environ-mental Impact Statement.
- b. During Phase II, the preparation phase, the existing harbor and airfield will be upgraded sufficiently to permit transportation of construction materials and personnel support supplies to the island. Initial logistic support will be staged through Guam.
 - (1) The breakwater and causeway protecting the harbor have been damaged by typhoons. Their repair is necessary to prevent damage to the wharf facilities and shipping in the harbor. Portions of the wharf area are incapable of supporting heavy loads and require repair.
 - (2) The existing runway at West Field will be upgraded to provide frequent use by airlift for resupply missions and emergency evacuation and training. Aircraft will be staged through Andersen AFB, Guam.
 - (3) A construction camp to incorporate a batch concreate plant, aggregate plant, asphalt plant, storage areas and living quarters will be initially developed for use by contractor forces during the duration of the near term period.
- c. At the completion of Phase II, the complex will be capable of supporting construction required in Phase III. While this phase is necessary to permit subsequent phases, completion of this phase will also provide a facility which could be quickly expanded during contingencies. When Phase III is completed, the complex will include port facilities, airfield pavements, utilities, and POL facilities. These are the basic requirements necessary to conduct combat operations. The runway, taxiways, and parking aprons will be constructed to meet strategic aircraft requirements. The port will be upgraded to permit offloading of supplies and equipment necessary to support



contingency requirements. Utilities will be developed to the point where they can be expanded to accommodate subsequent requirements. POL systems capable of defueling tanker ships, storage transfer and truck or aircraft refueling will be developed.

- d. Phase IV, the dispersal base phase, includes construction of facilities necessary to support aircraft. The base will be a satellite of Andersen AFB, Guam. The home base will provide all maintenance, administrative and logistic requirements. Necessary communications will be provided. Only limited personnel support facilities will be developed. WRM storage areas will be developed and port warehouses will be constructed.
- e. At the completion of Phase V, the Main Base phase, the base complex will be capable of operations independent of Andersen AFB support. Aircraft maintenance capability will be developed. Administrative and personnel support facilities will be completed. The airfield will be capable of supporting normal daily operations by strategic, tactical, and airlift aircraft.
- f. Phase VI, Logistical Support Base, may be initiated at any time after completion of Phase II. Weapons Storage Areas will permit use of the weapons during operations conducted from Tinian or movement to forward bases by airlift or sealift. Vehicles required during contingencies, will be taken from the consolidated vehicle storage and maintenance facility. This logistical support base could be supported by upgrading the harbor and airfield and may be developed to provide an initial military presence consistent with the political negotiations. This construction phase provides the greatest opportunity to use local and national labor from Saipan, if this is deemed desirable.
- g. Dependent support will constitute the final phase of near term construction. This will permit accompanied tours for military personnel.
- 10. With the foundation provided by the near term construction, many of the long term requirements of PACOM can be accommodated as required. In the long term, CINCPAC has indicated, in his requirements, that the Army may relocate a depot supply and maintenance unit, a NIKE artillery defense

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battery, and a Special Forces unit; the Navy may position a complete anti-submarine patrol squadron; the Marines may base 2/3 of a Marine Amphibious Force, and the Air Force may station airlift and fighter wings, all on Tinian. The acquisition of the entire island, therefore, becomes much more than just a nice-to-have item. It is a definite and real requirement, whose attainment may very well be possible now, but extremely difficult if not impossible in the future.

Asia, to including Okinawa reversion, is causing changes in the US Pacific basing structure. The Marianas currently present an excellent opportunity for relocating some vital forward based activities. While Tinian cannot accommodate all the activities and forces that are now forward based, it can accommodate many of them. It is envisioned that Tinian will become one of the most valuable US defense installations in the Pacific area. Additionally, acquisition of the entire island of Tinian would provide the US with the availability of future options to cover unforeseen events not currently of future options to cover unforeseen events not currently available. In a constantly changing and evolving political military world atmosphere it would likewise be a positive US base planning asset, in that it would be US vice foreign soil in a forward strategic location.