

## SECRET

is passed by the Micronesian Congress we will be much freer to talk directly with the Marianas. If the resolution is rejected, we can consider other measures", Incluiding another declaration from the Marianas of their intent, in which they could cite Salif's recognition at Hana of their separate desires. In any event, our tactics will be strongly affected by events in the next: few weeks, and it is difficult to be precise at this stage. Perhaps the most useful approach to the problem is to delineate our chief objectives, whichil would put as: (1) the maintenance of mutual confidence with the leaders and people of the Marianas, (2) the fostering of Marianas' desires for integration into the U.S. community and for U.S. Cltizenshipg and (3) the acqutsition of permanent U.S. basé rights on Tinian. Alr of sthese are Interrelated and the most vital is; of tourse, the Timan batsen

For the imediate future; we awale action by thomarmesian ans Congress. For the slightly logger tehn we sholatd and ways to reassure the Marlanas leadership of our supportifor the frasptrations and at the same time continue to push them toward a close relationship with Guam. Later on, when we have reason to belleve that the iJoint conmitee would not object (or alternatlvely, if our urgent intevestsipequine that we face the risk of objection) we can proceed towardimote' spidelfic dealings with the Marianas leadership. We will have two main areas to deal with -their future status and support, and our need to negotiate our land requirements on Tinian.
U.S. BASE ON TINIAN: Thererts strong pressure from the Air Force for limediate outright purchase of all of Tinian, for the purpose that Captaln Crove and I have told you about. The Air Force is offering you a briefing on this matter, Col. Al Smith tells me.

I feel it would be a serious tactical mistake to start land purchase negotiations on Tinian while the Congress is in session, because of the inevitable and fmediate charges that would be leveled by members of the Congress. I have similar reservations bbout land acouisition negotiations at any time before the next round of status talks in Micronesia. The key element is the reaction of ilicronesians, particularly the Congress and the Joint Committee, but also the reactions of the people on Tinian. You will know from my report to you, and also from Roy Johnson's observations while we were on Tinian, that the Tinian leaders are less than enthusiastic about large-scale U.S. acquisitions. They do not yet have any idea that we may try to purchase the whole island, in order that the USG would control all the land so as to prevent any ghettos or other undesirable settlanents from being established. Under this play they would lease back some of the land for specified uses, but only to the present inhabitants, not to any new arrivals. As soon as land negotiations begin, directed toward total acquisition, I belleve we will face strong protests from the Marianas, which would introduce a new and disturbing element in our negotiations with the Marianas, and could cause us to lose the strong support we now have in that critical district.

1. that you arrange for the Alr Force briefing on Tinian that has been offered, and that you also ask for OSD views. level U.S. military visits to Tintan the time being to veto high-
2. that we continuan to delay OSD submission to OMB of (Drobably leak out and cause disturbing reactions in Nicronesia.
3. that we do not approve any tramediate moves toward land sacquisition on Tinfail fubject of course to your evaluation of informa tion that may be presented in the Pentagon briefings). plans for the whole of Tinfan, and invite about the land acquisition problems; this courd bo done by and invite his comments on likely this coutd bo done by letter rather than by on lelegram.

Apthur W. Hummel; Ir.

