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United States Department of the Interior

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Harlands will succeed in getting a resolution through the Micronesian Congress freeing them to conduct separate negotiations with the U.S. The leaders of the two political parties in the Marianas have net together and have also net with the Governor, Lt. Governor, and Director of Planning of Guan. I believe that the Marianas leaders fully widerstand that there is very small chance indeed that the USG could arrange a separate Commonwealth status for the Marianas, different from Guam; on my trip in December I made this point very forcefully.

According to both the Guamanians and Senator Pangelinan the talks with Marianas leaders went "very well", and both sides are exploring possibilities for a "two step" union - loose at first, and later on much closer, after the Marianas has a chance to develop itself further. Both sides are concerned about the level of U.S. support, so that in the initial stages Guam does not have to bear a heavy budgetary burden for the less-developed Marianas. You will have a chance to get more information about all this directly from Lt. Governor Moylan on Sunday when you see him. I expect we will also hear more from Dorrance from Saipan.

So far we have had no complaints from Senator Salii about our informal discussions with the Marianas, and I think it is a good bet that he has no objection, otherwise he would have complained to Dorrance. I have stressed to all the Micronesians with whom I have discussed this issue that the USG is very anxious not to give grounds for any accusation that we have taken action to split the TTPI. If the expected resolution have taken action to split the TTPI. If the expected resolution have taken action to split the TTPI.

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is passed by the Micronesian Congress we will be much freer to talk directly with the Marianas. If the resolution is rejected, we can consider other measures, including another declaration from the Marianas of their intent, in which they could cite Salii's recognition at Hana of their separate desires. In any event, our tactics will be strongly affected by events in the next few weeks, and it is difficult to be precise at this stage. Perhaps the most useful approach to the problem is to delineate our thief objectives, which I would put as:
(1) the maintenance of mutual confidence with the leaders and people of the Marianas, (2) the fostering of Marianas' desires for integration into the U.S. community and for U.S. citizenship, and (3) the acquisition of permanent U.S. base rights on Tinian All For these are interrelated and the most vital is, of course, the Tinian base.

For the immediate future, we await action by the Micronesian and Congress. For the slightly logger term, we should find ways to reassure the Marianas leadership of our support for their aspirations and at the same time continue to push them toward a close relationship with Guam. Later on, when we have reason to believe that the Joint Committee would not object (or alternatively, if our urgent interests require that we face the risk of objection) we can proceed toward more specific dealings with the Marianas leadership. We will have two main areas to deal with —their future status and support, and our need to negotiate our land requirements on Tinian.

U.S. BASE ON TINIAN: There's strong pressure from the Air Force for immediate outright purchase of all of Tinian, for the purpose that Captain Crowe and I have told you about. The Air Force is offering you a briefing on this matter, Col. Al Smith tells me.

I feel it would be a serious tactical mistake to start land purchase negotiations on Tinian while the Congress is in session, because of the inevitable and immediate charges that would be leveled by members of the Congress. I have similar reservations about land acquisition negotiations at any time before the next round of status talks in Micronesia. The key element is the reaction of Micronesians, particularly the Congress and the Joint Committee, but also the reactions of the people on Tinian. You will know from my report to you, and also from Roy Johnson's observations while we were on Tinian, that the Tinian leaders are less than enthusiastic about large-scale U.S. acquisitions. They do not yet have any idea that we may try to purchase the whole island, in order that the USG would control all the land so as to prevent any ghettos or other undesirable settlements from being established. Under this play they would lease back some of the land for specified uses, but only to the present inhabitants, not to any new arrivals. As soon as land negotiations begin, directed toward total acquisition, I believe we will face strong protests from the Marianas, which would introduce a new and disturbing element in our negotiations with the Marianas, and could cause us to lose the strong support we now have in that critical district.

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I recommend the following: (R)

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1. that you arrange for the Air Force briefing on Ifhian that has been offered, and that you also ask for OSD views.

- 2. that we continue for the time being to veto highlevel U.S. military visits to Tinian.
- 3. that we continue to delay OSD submission to OMB of Tunding request for Tinian because, as Mr. Selden has said, it would (probably leak out and cause disturbing reactions in Micronesia.
- 4. that we do not approve any immediate moves toward land sacquisition on Tinian (subject of course to your evaluation of information that may be presented in the Pentagon briefings).
- (1) AND ICS: that we tell John Dorrance about the land acquisition plans for the whole of Tinian, and invite his comments on likely problems; this could be done by letter rather than by telegram.

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Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.

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