



R Pol 19 PAC TT 778 10/7

# Department of State TELEGRAM

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ACTION INT-06

INFO OCT-01 IO-12 SS-14 PM-06 CIAE-00 INR-06 NSAE-00  
RSC-01 OEO-01 P-03 PRS-01 USIA-12 H-02 EA-11 RSR-01

1077 W

R 270615Z FEB 72 ZNZ-1  
FM DISTAD PALAU  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO COMWELVE SAN FRAN CALIF  
SECDEFENSE WASHDC  
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC  
CINCPAC  
CINCPACREP GAM/TPI

----- DEPARTMENT OF STATE 48/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY [Signature] DATE FEB. 25 1987

RDS  or XDS  EXT. DATE \_\_\_\_\_

TS AUTH. \_\_\_\_\_ REASON(S) \_\_\_\_\_

ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS

DECLASSIFIED  RELEASABLE

RELEASE DENIED

PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS \_\_\_\_\_

Reference Dept.  
2/27/72

UNCLAS.  
PASS TO DEPT. INTERIOR FOR OSN AND DASTA.  
FROM POLAD 108. STATE FOR IO/UNP AND S/PC. COMTWELVE FOR AMBASSADOR  
WILLIAMS. DEFENSE FOR OSD/ISA AND JCS. WHITE HOUSE FOR MR. HOLDRIDGE  
(N C). CINCPAC FOR POLAD.

- SUBJECT: TPI FUTURE POLITICAL STATUS
1. FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT ON FUTURE STATUS DELIVERED BY REP. DOMNICK (MARSHALLS) IN HOUSE ON FEB 26. BEGIN TEXT.
  2. I WOULD LIKE TO DELIVER SHORT SPEECH EXPLAINING WHY I HAVE INTRODUCED RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD ALLOW EACH DISTRICT TO NEGOTIATE ITS OWN FUTURE STATUS WITH UNITED STATES.
  3. FOR QUITE SOME TIME NOW, WE IN MARSHALL ISLANDS DISTRICT

- PAGE TWO RUHGSAA4969 UNCLAS.
- HAVE BEEN WILLING TO GO ALONG WITH REST OF OUR NEIGHBORS IN MICRONESIA IN WORKING TOGETHER FOR COMMON GOALS -- ESPECIALLY TOWARDS RESOLUTION OF THE STATUS ISSUE.
4. WE HAVE DONE THIS DESPITE VERY PLAIN FACT MARSHALLS, LIKE MARIANAA ISLANDS, ARE CHARACTERIZED BY DIFFERENCES WHICH GREATLY INFLUENCE AND AFFECT THEIR ASPIRATIONS.
  5. LATELY, HOWEVER, I HAVE BECOME AWARE THAT AS PACE OF OUR

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POLITICAL MERRY-GO-ROUND HAS SPED UP, OTHER DISTRICTS ARE SHOWING INFLUENCES OF CENTRIFUGAL FORCE, WHICH FINDS THEM INCLINED TO FOLLOW MORE DIRECT PATHS THAN CIRCULAR ONE WE ARE LOCKED INTO NOW. TO PUT IT PLAINLY, MORE AND MORE I CAN SEE EACH DISTRICT HAS ITS OWN VERSION OF WHAT KIND OF FUTURE STATUS THEY WOULD LIKE TO ACQUIRE. SOME DISTRICTS ARE PLAINLY FOR INDEPENDENCE, OTHERS, FOR FREE ASSOCIATION, STILL OTHERS, FOR COMMONWEALTH TYPE OF STATUS.

6. TO ME, MR, SPEAKER, THIS IS ONLY NATURAL DESIRE, SINCE ALL DISTRICTS HAVE DIFFERENT HISTORIES, CULTURAL BACKGROUNDS, LANGUAGES AND NEEDS AND WANTS. TRUE, WE HAVE HAD COMMON EXPERIENCES, SUCH AS OPPRESSION BY FOREIGN POLERS, AND AN UNWANTED WAR -- BUT IN THE MAIN, WE ARE DIFFERENT PEOPLES, WHO HAVE BEEN THRUST TOGETHER BY AN INDIFFERENT LOTTERY OF HISTORY.

PAGE THREE RUHGSAA4969 UNCLAS

7. BY INTRODUCING THIS RESOLUTION, IT IS NOT MY INTENTION TO DISRUPT CURRENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS, OR TO CREATE DISSENSION WITHIN OUR MIDST. I INTRODUCE THIS RESOLUTION TO BRING OUT INTO OPEN WHAT WE HAVE ALL BEEN PRIVATELY THINKING AND TALKING ABOUT. THE "NATION OF MICRONESIA," LIKE TRUST TERRITORY OF PACIFIC ISLANDS IS AN ILLUSION THAT HAS BEEN FOSTERED BY ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY. IT IS AN ILLUSION THAT UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA HAS USED TO ITS OWN BENEFIT BY DANGLING US BEFORE UNITED NATIONS AND NATIONS OF WORLD AS EVIDENCE OF ITS GOOD INTENTIONS, WHILE ITS REAL INTENT LIES IN FURTHERING ITS OWN STRATEGIC INTERESTS.

8. SOME OF YOU MAY NOT LIKE TO HEAR THIS, BUT I BELIEVE IT IS TRUTH

9. AS TO MARSHALL ISLANDS IN PARTICULAR, I THINK I HAVE ALREADY CLEARLY STATED HEAVY BURDENS THAT IT HAS BORNE ON BEHALF OF ALL PEOPLE OF MICRONESIA. IF THIS ARRANGEMENT IS TO CONTINUE, THEN AS HAS BEEN SAID BEFORE, KWAJALEIN WILL REMAIN AMERICAN AND EBEGE WILL REMAIN MICRONESIA. IN ALL GOOD CONSCIENCE, AND ON BEHALF OF MY CONSTITUENTS WHO HAVE SUFFERED SO MUCH IN PAST, I CANNOT PRETEND ANY LONGER ONLY FUTURE FOR MICRONESIA CAN BE FOUND IN

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PAGE FOUR RUHGSAA4969 UNCLAS  
NATION OF MICRONESIA COMPOSED OF SIX DIFFERENT PEOPLES,  
NINE DIFFERENT LANGUAGES AND SEVERAL DIFFERENT ASPIRATIONS.  
10. SO, MR. SPEAKER BECAUSE I BELIEVE JUST AS TRUST TERRITORY  
AS POLITICAL ENTITY HAS SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO NEGOTIATE FUTURE  
STATUS, SO EACH OF PEOPLE OF MICRONESIA HAVE SOVEREIGN  
RIGHT TO NEGOTIATE WHATEVER STATUS THEY DESIRE. END TEXT.  
11. DORRANCE.

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ACTION INT-06

INFO OCT-01 IO-12 EA-11 SS-14 NSC-10 L-03 H-02 P-03 PRS-01  
RSP-01 RSC-01 PM-06 SA-03 INR-06 1080 W

R 270449Z FEB 72 ZNZ-I  
FM DISTAD PALAU  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO COMTWELVE SAN FRAN CALIF  
SECDEFENSE WASHDC  
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC  
CINCPAC  
CINCPACREP GUAM/TTPI  
HICOMTERPACIS SAIPAN

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY Hef DATE FEB. 26 1987

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TS AUTH. \_\_\_\_\_ REASON(S) \_\_\_\_\_

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Defense Dept.  
2/27/72

UNCLAS.  
PASS TO DEPT. INTERIOR FOR OSN AND DASTA.  
FROM POLAD 0104. STATE FOR IO/UNF AND S/SPC. COMTWELVE FOR  
AMBASSADOR WILLIAMS. DEFENSE FOR OSD/ISA AND JCS. WHITE HOUSE  
FOR MR. HOLDRIDGE (NSC). CINCPAC FOR POLAD.  
SUBJ: TTPI - POLAD COVERAGE CONGRESS OF MICRONESIA  
1. OWING AIR SCHEDULES AND COMMITMENTS ON SAIPAN, I MUST  
DEPART PALAU FOR SAIPAN MORNING FEBRUARY 28 (ARRIVING SAIPAN  
EVENING SAME DAY) AND THUS WILL MISS LAST DAY OF CONGRESSIONAL  
SESSION. THIS IS REGRETTABLE AS MUCH MAJOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION  
WILL TAKE PLACE ON 28TH AND THERE MAY ALSO BE NUMBER SIGNIFICANT

PAGE TWO RUHGSAA/UNCLAS  
STATEMENTS ON STATUS QUESTION. HOWEVER, MNS WILL BE PROVIDING  
COVERAGE, AND I SHOULD HAVE TEXTS OF MAJOR STATEMENTS TOWARD  
END OF WEEK JUST PRIOR DEPARTURE FOR WASHINGTON. DORRANCE

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United States Department of the Interior

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20240

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Mr. John C. Dorrance  
Political Advisor  
Trust Territory of the Pacific  
Islands  
Saipan, Mariana Islands 96950

Note: See reply to this  
under  
1. Mariana Separation  
2. Tinian land.

Dear John:

This letter is meant to inform you of some developments here, and to ask you for your advice.

1. DOD has decided that they want to press very hard to acquire all of Tinian, and by purchase rather than by rental. Their rationale is two-fold -- partly because they want to control the use of the land by lease-backs to the present inhabitants thereby preventing ghettos, bars, and so forth, and partly because it now turns out that for safety reasons relating to offloading of ammunition they have to have a clear area with one-mile radius around the p&wb, which would wipe out San Jose village and necessitate the removal of the town-dwellers there.

We here are of course concerned about the effect of this plan on the inhabitants, and on the larger negotiations as well as on the Marianas District negotiations. I would like you to give us your thoughts, including constructive suggestions on ways we might go as far as possible to meet DOD desires. For instance, it has occurred to some of us that the deal might be made more palatable if it were described as a 50-year arrangement, renewable by negotiation, with the land to be held "in trust" for the people of the Marianas and to be returned to them when no longer needed, or some such formula. We are very anxious to hold all this closely, so I would ask you not to make any further inquiries about local attitudes but just to use your best judgement on the basis of the information you now have.

2. The Marianas separate negotiations are of course vital to our interests, and by the time you get this you may have more information from the Congress of Micronesia or from the Marianas people. I would hope that the separate Marianas resolution will pass, but in any event we need to do forward planning about our next steps, in either contingency. DOD has good reason to want to proceed as soon as possible to negotiate land requirements on Tinian; Amb. Williams has put an indefinite hold on this for

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obvious reasons. In giving us your thoughts on planning for separate negotiations with the Marianas I want you also to consider how and when we could begin to move toward land acquisition negotiations without endangering our hopes for a separate Marianas, and also without jeopardizing the larger negotiations with the Status Committee. DOD wants to move ahead at the earliest with planning for Tinian and Amb. Williams is under some pressure to grant his approval.

As I indicated to you on the phone, Amb. Williams is very anxious that you not become further involved in discussions between the Marianas and Guam, so I would ask you in this case also to give us your present advice and estimates without trying to collect additional information at this time.

3. The Air Force Weapons Laboratory already has people working on Eniwetok preparing for a series of more than 20 high explosive (not nuclear) detonations that are very important to national security planning. The detonations are mostly small-scale ( $\frac{1}{2}$  ton of HE) for the progressive calibration of instruments but wind up with larger ones, the biggest of which would be 400 tons of HE which would throw a cloud of dust visible 130 miles away. We have put an effective hold on all this, despite the fact that doing so will materially delay the collection of very important information.

We assume that the expansion program will inevitably become known and misinterpreted, so we are casting about for the best means, and timing, to present the true facts publicly. Interestingly, the Environmental Protection Agency has approved an Environmental Statement filed by the AFWL saying that no material damage will be done to the area. The tests will take place on the NE side of the lagoon, on islands that have no ground water and apparently were never inhabited. We can explain, also, that similar testing with HE has been done in the U.S., in two different areas of Colorado. We are presently thinking along the lines of announcing at the same time (perhaps during the April negotiations) both the impending return of Eniwetok to the Ujelang folks, and the present HE explosion series which we can say is positively the last, and which will be completed in a few months after April, after which cleanup and rehabilitation could begin. Accepting the fact, as we do, that these explosions are very important and that they are related to the old nuclear craters and cannot therefore be done elsewhere than on Eniwetok, we would like your advice on when and how we could best explain what is going on in a way that will not jeopardize the negotiations or cause other problems in Micronesia. This item should be held particularly closely and I would ask you not to involve the TTPI administration at this time.

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4. Asab. Williams plans to be in Washington virtually full-time from now on until the April talks. He wants you to know that he is tentatively thinking of asking you to come back here for at least the last two weeks before the negotiations, and earlier if possible. We would like to have your preliminary thoughts on when you could leave the TIPI, after the Congress has adjourned and after you have made whatever trips to other Districts you feel are advisable after the Congress, if any.

All these items add up to a big order, and I don't want to set any particular deadlines. We want your considered judgments as inputs into our planning, and the sooner the better, within reason.

Best regards,

Sincerely,

Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.  
Director  
Office for Micronesian  
Status Negotiation

PS, I've just seen your letter suggesting a trip back here in March, and we'll begin working on the funding; if IO can't afford it we'll pay.

PPS, I think the topics I have asked you to comment on should be addressed in classified letters rather than in telegrams.

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is passed by the Micronesian Congress we will be much freer to talk directly with the Marianas. If the resolution is rejected, we can consider other measures, including another declaration from the Marianas of their intent, in which they could cite Salli's recognition at Hana of their separate desires. In any event, our tactics will be strongly affected by events in the next few weeks, and it is difficult to be precise at this stage. Perhaps the most useful approach to the problem is to delineate our chief objectives, which I would put as: (1) the maintenance of mutual confidence with the leaders and people of the Marianas, (2) the fostering of Marianas' desires for integration into the U.S. community and for U.S. citizenship, and (3) the acquisition of permanent U.S. base rights on Tinian. All of these are inter-related and the most vital is, of course, the Tinian base.

For the immediate future, we await action by the Micronesian Congress. For the slightly longer term, we should find ways to reassure the Marianas leadership of our support for their aspirations and at the same time continue to push them toward a close relationship with Guam. Later on, when we have reason to believe that the Joint Committee would not object (or alternatively, if our urgent interests require that we face the risk of objection) we can proceed toward more specific dealings with the Marianas leadership. We will have two main areas to deal with -- their future status and support, and our need to negotiate our land requirements on Tinian.

**U.S. BASE ON TINIAN:** There is strong pressure from the Air Force for immediate outright purchase of all of Tinian, for the purpose that Captain Crowe and I have told you about. The Air Force is offering you a briefing on this matter, Col. Al Smith tells me.

I feel it would be a serious tactical mistake to start land purchase negotiations on Tinian while the Congress is in session, because of the inevitable and immediate charges that would be leveled by members of the Congress. I have similar reservations about land acquisition negotiations at any time before the next round of status talks in Micronesia. The key element is the reaction of Micronesians, particularly the Congress and the Joint Committee, but also the reactions of the people on Tinian. You will know from my report to you, and also from Roy Johnson's observations while we were on Tinian, that the Tinian leaders are less than enthusiastic about large-scale U.S. acquisitions. They do not yet have any idea that we may try to purchase the whole island, in order that the USG would control all the land so as to prevent any ghettos or other undesirable settlements from being established. Under this play they would lease back some of the land for specified uses, but only to the present inhabitants, not to any new arrivals. As soon as land negotiations begin, directed toward total acquisition, I believe we will face strong protests from the Marianas, which would introduce a new and disturbing element in our negotiations with the Marianas, and could cause us to lose the strong support we now have in that critical district.



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I recommend the following:

1. that you arrange for the Air Force briefing on Tinian that has been offered, and that you also ask for OSD views.
2. that we continue for the time being to veto high-level U.S. military visits to Tinian.
3. that we continue to delay OSD submission to OMB of funding request for Tinian because, as Mr. Selden has said, it would probably leak out and cause disturbing reactions in Micronesia.
4. that we do not approve any immediate moves toward land acquisition on Tinian (subject of course to your evaluation of information that may be presented in the Pentagon briefings).
5. that we tell John Dorrance about the land acquisition plans for the whole of Tinian, and invite his comments on likely problems; this could be done by letter rather than by telegram.

Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.

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