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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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by OJCS, 13 Dec 84

JCSM-78-72
28 February 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Early Development of a US Military Base Complex
in the Mariana Islands (U)

1. (C) Reference is made to:

a. Your letter to the Personal Representative of the President for Micronesian Status Negotiations, dated 9 September 1971, which forwarded the long-term requirements for military basing options in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

b. JCSM-456-71, dated 18 October 1971, subject: "Military Basing in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (U)," which provided rationale and requested approval for early construction and programming on initial segments of the Tinian base as conceived and approved in concept by reference 1a.

c. Your memorandum, dated 13 December 1971, subject: "Military Basing in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI)," which (1) delayed initiation of the action requested in reference 1b but anticipated inclusion of the Tinian development project in the FY 1974 budget and (2) requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on whether or not a short programming delay in the development of a joint military base on Tinian Island would jeopardize national security.

2. (C) The short-term delay in Tinian programming until after the next round of Micronesian status negotiations, with subsequent inclusion in the FY 1974 military construction programs, as indicated in reference 1c, will not create significant difficulties. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that the near-term development of Tinian is necessary to the security interests of the United States. The requirements identified in reference 1b have been recently reaffirmed by

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both CINCPAC and CINCSAC. In addition, CINCSAC has stated that the availability of satellite bases for dispersal and operational options will increase the credibility of a survivable force and decrease emergency war order response time, as the SAC Single Integrated Operational Plan alert role in the PACOM area returns to pre-Vietnam levels.

3. (C) The commencement of detailed planning and programming actions for FY 1974 following the next round of status negotiations could permit timely follow-on construction of a usable facility as early as CY 1975. This represents only a short delay in accommodating the near-term military requirements and is satisfactory to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, any delay beyond this timeframe may be detrimental to US security interests. Thus, the Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations (Ambassador Williams) should be urged to plan the next round of negotiations so as to advance the Tinian land issue sufficiently to permit full planning and programming action for development of the island in the FY 1974 budget cycle.

4. (C) The following additional factors should be considered in developing a DOD position on early Tinian construction if presentations to the Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations are required:

a. A delay beyond the FY 1974 budget cycle for programming action may necessitate undesirable shifts in some of the current, less critical activities planned for Tinian to other sites, which would delay the full development of the Tinian base.

b. Initiation of approved programming permits the detailed planning which must be accomplished before the military can specify the exact nature of the base development plans. This planning is, in turn, necessary to predict the civil benefits that will accrue to the Mariana Islands from specified levels of military presence. These factors appear critical to the bargaining for essential military lands on Tinian. Further, it appears that negotiations to gain control over all of Tinian Island, as specified in reference 1a, would stand little chance of success unless the Department of Defense can offer reasonable assurances of base developments.

c. The above steps, resulting from approved programming and planning, will allow US negotiators to make positive assurances on jobs, facilities, and other economic benefits and may materially reduce the cost of land procurement on Tinian.

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d. Having stated in the October round of status negotiations that an early development on Tinian is expected, the hopes of the citizenry of the Marianas have been built up, and they are anticipating that construction will begin in the near future.

5. (S) Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff:


a. Continue to view the early development of a joint US base on Tinian as the most advantageous method of satisfying known near-term military requirements.

b. Support the initiation of planning and programming action for incorporation in the FY 1974 military construction program, as indicated in reference 1c.

c. Believe that, when developed, the details of the Tinian base development package should remain classified, and all reasonable efforts should be made to prevent premature disclosure after the proposals are submitted to the Office of Manpower and Budget.

6. (C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend approval for the Services, following the next round of Micronesian status negotiations, to proceed with facility programming actions to permit inclusion of Tinian construction requirements in the FY 1974 budget submissions.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



T. H. MOORER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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