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February 29, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN GORDON SCHULLER, USN  
ISA/EA&PR

SUBJECT: Working Draft #3 - Ambassador Willam's Speech

1. The attached is a working draft - which needs your careful consideration of some of its content - setting forth the "theory" that the security of Micronesia is embraced within the wider understanding of the United States over its commitments under the Charter. This relationship draws upon a wide range of policy and legal factors, and I have attempted to give them some coherence.

2. The relationship with Micronesia links together the strategic trust territory and our reasons for creating it, in the first place, with United States obligations under the United Nations Charter, but without specifying a "balance of power" notion. The basis for the arguments is that of deterrence. The emphasis is upon the peacetime measures to be taken by the United States to carry out its responsibilities as far as international peace and security are concerned. I recommend that you consult with members of policy and plans (ISA) in this connection and ~~as to some~~ of the arguments proposed here.

3. Whatever posture the United States takes towards the "defense" of Micronesia, it must cope with the notions that "neutrality" would be enough, or that "defense" of the islands is unnecessary. If we fail to do this and clearly persuade the Micronesians of our perspectives in this area our position will be seriously weakened.


4. An additional copy is attached for Ambassador Williams in connection with our Thursday meeting.

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5. I have not expressed in detail, but we can add later, a few paragraphs in the speech relating to the matter of environment - and in particular to the major United States initiatives and interests in this matter, both on a domestic and on an international scale.

SIGNED

Harry H. Almond, Jr.  
Office of Assistant General Counsel  
International Affairs

cc: GC  
Chron  
Circulating  
File: ILP - TTPI 

Draft/Working Copy #3

H. H. Almond/February 26, 1972: (To supplement Working Draft #2)

DRAFT SPEECH

(Ambassador Williams)

To what extent will the reservation of authority and competence in the United States over the foreign affairs and security interests of Micronesia have an impact upon the domestic decisions and domestic decision-making of the Micronesian people? As I have indicated earlier, the impacts on decision-making in international matters compared with those to be found in domestic affairs are infrequent.

A major, and continuing interest of the United States is in assisting the Micronesian people secure the resources and the wherewithal to enjoy the benefits and undertake the responsibilities of independence. There is now even more reason to find the ways to step-up this process.

But what are the elements that go into the responsibility for security which the United States must assume? The perspectives of the United States extend to the entire Pacific Ocean. The use of modern weapons and modern weapon delivery systems has had the two-fold impact of requiring the US to establish strategic areas scattered throughout the globe. These perspectives must be read

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against the United Nations Charter and the realities of inter-governmental affairs engaging the great Powers. The call is made in that Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security and therefore burdens are thrust on various States in proportion to their power.

The United States as a great power must seek to maintain relatively large areas of the globe secure from major conflict in order to meet its commitments under the Charter. For the Charter necessarily must operate against secure public orders for the larger States.

Since the second World War we have become aware of the mobility of large numbers of armed forces throughout the oceans, while an advancing technology indicates that a posture of deterrence between the great powers is that upon which they must rely in meeting their obligations of maintaining international peace and security. A part of that balance in deterrent posture is dependent upon <sup>a continuing</sup> United States interest in the security of the South Pacific.

If, on the other hand, the United States were not to assume this posture including the deterrent elements which compose it - what then would be the impact upon Micronesia? First, there would

be a vacuum, which other countries would attempt to fill, or Micronesia might seek to become an area whose "neutrality" could be protected by "guarantees." But instead of "neutrality," being a strategic area, Micronesia would be subject to violations of that neutrality at the convenience of States engaged in conflict. In place of deterrence there would be an encouragement - in an unsecured area - of conflict. In other words, the deterrent balance between the United States and other Pacific powers would be in jeopardy and so also would be the security of Micronesia. This in the broadest terms is what we are talking about when we consider the interaction of Micronesian security and the security embraced in United States interests in international peace and security, operating under the United Nations Charter.


All of this was clearly anticipated, in a way at the time the Charter was drafted, when the Micronesian area was made a "strategic" trust territory. And in a slightly differing, but reinforcing way, it has remained an area embraced within the community of interests of the United States such that an armed attack within the area would amount to a threat to United States

security and <sup>its</sup> capability of maintaining international peace and security.

To return to our original inquiry: what impact would the maintenance of international peace by a United States presence in Micronesia have on the domestic decisions and decision-making process of the Micronesia people, and secondly what impact would arise if the United States were not able to engage in adequate preparations and deployments concerning its deterrence? The impact upon Micronesian decisions relating to their affairs is at best minimal. Micronesia during <sup>the coming future</sup> ~~this time in~~ relations between States would have, instead, every opportunity to share in benefits: the time, the resources concomitant with a United States presence and the aid and capabilities of the United States to exploit those resources such that they would insure to the growing benefit and advantage of the Micronesian people. Relatively small amounts of land would be taken, no interference would take place in Micronesian affairs, a sound basis would be instituted for regulating the conduct of American armed forces, so that benefits flowing from increased American interest in the area can readily be anticipated.

But suppose the United States could not engage in activities associated with maintaining its deterrent posture? Then it seems

clear that a major interest of the United States in the area would be ignored. Neither the Congress nor the people of the United States would find it advantageous to support a Micronesian economy where the benefits flow largely in one direction alone - while obvious disadvantages flow in their direction. Nor would Micronesia be spared the thrust of armed conflict. That is a matter beyond the control of any State. But Micronesia would be without the deterrent and security elements that would assure her people of their security. This - in our view - is what the United States position is broadly all about, and the reason why security and foreign affairs of Micronesia are wrapped up with ours. This is what we in more detailed discussions with the Micronesians will be talking about as these negotiations progress. (Other inputs to be made by State/Justice/Interior).



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