

Our Haphazard Empire

By C. L. SULZBERGER

HONOLULU — Military withdrawal from Asia causes the United States to fall back strategically upon its huge Pacific empire about which most Americans are almost wholly unaware. They do, of course, know that Hawaii is now a state of the Union and that this same political condition applies to Alaska's barren and sparsely inhabited Aleutian archipelago extending toward Soviet Siberia and Japan.

But they tend to forget about other possessions or administered areas which include a chunk of Oceania as large as the continental U.S.A. This comprises various categories:

Statehood, like Hawaii; territory, like Guam, whose inhabitants are U.S. citizens; governance, like American Samoa, whose inhabitants are only U.S. "nationals"; possession, like Midway or Wake; and trust territory, administered by the U.S.A. for the U.N. The last includes almost all the Pacific area called Micronesia (small islands) to distinguish it from Polynesia (many islands) and Melanesia (black islands).

Micronesia's vast expanse links North America to Asia. Except for Hawaii, its widely spread collection of Pacific islets is in fact under colonial rule, even if this is haphazard colonialism. In the area of its U.N. trust territory Washington behaves with the same sense of authority once applied by London and Paris to Palestine and Syria under League of Nations mandates.

Washington "accepted" the trust territory from the U.N. after World War II, during which it captured the islands. They had previously been administered by Germany and Japan, an experience giving them but a vague sense of cohesion. The U.S. pledged

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a most-favored-nation status allowing all U.N. members equal economic opportunities. This has quietly been ignored in order to exclude rivals.

The 98 (out of 2,100) populated islands contain less than 100,000 people who speak nine identifiable languages and have differing ideas concerning their ultimate future. In the meantime, however, they depend heavily on American military expenditures and a growing tourist trade.

Indeed, Governor Carlos G. Camacho of Guam, an island administratively carved out of the Marianas never included in the trust territory, says: "Guam is the fastest growing area under the U.S. flag." Its growth rate last year was 25 per cent, much expenditure is military.

The Micronesians, like other Pacific Islanders, are intended to choose their own political future but this is easier said than done. Who is going to support them? Will anti-colonial Americans be pleased to see potential adversaries move in and establish counter-parts of our existing missile, air and submarine bases and testing ranges? The question will become more crucial once U.S. forces have been evacuated from Vietnam and Okinawa.

Despite American generosity elsewhere in the world, economic advance in the trust territory has not been notable. A mission from the U.N. Trusteeship Council reported in 1970 that it "did not see signs of significant progress in the economy of the territory as a whole. In particular the basic infrastructure is still in a lamentable state. Agriculture is stagnant."

Washington doesn't seem to have yet elaborated any conscious, long-range policy for this region as have London and Paris. The British would like to give independence to the Solomons and the Gilbert and Ellice Islands and have already freed the Fijis. The French, if equally precise, on the contrary want to hold on to the Tahitian group where they conduct atomic tests and to New Caledonia which is enormously rich in nickel.

The future for freedom is not propitious. Of independent Tonga, West Samoa and Fiji, one can only say they need help. Nauru, with 6,000 people on eight square miles, alone prospers with one of the world's highest per capita incomes because of rich phosphate deposits.

There has been talk of offering U.S. administered areas "commonwealth status" while some Micronesians have advanced the idea of "free association" with America. Either solution implies a form of autonomy that would leave Washington in charge of defense and foreign policy.

A negotiation at Palau next month between Micronesian representatives and envoys from Washington could terminate the U.N. trusteeship. But any permanent arrangement must satisfy U.S. strategic requirements. This is going to be difficult to elaborate. The U.N., containing powerful elements hostile to America, is an interested party.

Yet it is imperative that something be done to straighten out an untidy administrative situation which has led Americans to rule an empire few of them know anything about. And, with the impending Asian pull-out, this area may become increasingly important to U.S. national defense.

The

By JOE MCCARTHY

Fifty years ago this day, a young exiled Irishman, Patrick Connor, made the mistake of coming to Fifth Avenue to watch the green-decked marchers on Saint Paddy's Day. He should have stayed at home. Connor was trapped into being the victim of the only known shooting staged by the Irish Republican Army on the sidewalks of New York.

The 26-year-old fugitive from I.R.A. justice—an alleged informer—was trailed to Manhattan, spotted at the parade, and confronted at Central Park West and 84th Street. His pursuer, Patrick A. ("Pa") Murray, was a prominent and tough I.R.A. stalwart who once volunteered to machine-gun British Members of Parliament from the visitors' gallery in the House of Commons. That plot was not carried out, but through no lack of willingness on Murray's part.

In the spring of '21, shortly before Eamon De Valera's Irish revolutionary war against the British was halted by a truce, a farmer's cottage near Clogheen in County Cork was surrounded by a force of British soldiers. A group of I.R.A. guerrilla fighters, hiding inside the cottage, were ordered to come out with their hands up. When the I.R.A. men obeyed and walked out unarmed, all were shot and killed. No one but an I.R.A. informer could have known that Irish soldiers were hiding there.

Patrick Connor, an active member of the I.R.A., was in a British prison at Cork. Shortly after he was released, around the time of the truce, Connor and his whole family emigrated to America. He was marked as the "talker."

Even though the war against the British had stopped, it was decreed that the deaths of the I.R.A. men at Clogheen be avenged. Murray and two companions were sent overseas to find Connor, traveling first to the Irish communities in Canada and then to Boston, where they learned that he was living somewhere in New York, address unknown.

Trying to find a single Irishman in New York City seemed like trying to find a needle in a peat bog. As Murray often told it before his death in Dublin in 1968, he had an idea.

"We'll find him at the Saint Patrick's Day Parade," for sure," Murray told his confederates. "He may be a bloody informer, but he's still an Irishman, isn't he?"

It was Murray himself, prowling through the crowd on Fifth Avenue, who saw Connor standing alone on the curbstone, watching the marchers. "I had all I could do trying to keep myself from crossing the street and

Advantages of a 'Weird System'

By ARTHUR SCHLESINGER Jr.

Presidential primaries are fully as haphazard and illogical as their critics say they are; and, now that half the states have adopted one form or another of the primary, the argument for transforming this *de facto* national primary into a uniform and rational system is strong indeed.

However, while I certainly don't want to lag behind other high-minded citizens in denouncing primaries, especially their price in time, money and human fatigue (of candidates as well as of voters), I think that our present crazy-quilt system has certain points. With all its illogicality it may even provide a certain rough justice.

For the range a candidate must roam in the 1972 primaries actually offers a not too unreasonable cross-section of the country—east and west, north and south, urban and rural, industrial and agricultural, prosperous and stagnant, white, brown and black. Moreover, combat experience provides not too bad a test of a candidate's capacity. Agreements to limit campaign spend-



single candidate, that candidate, deprived of the melodrama of primaries, would receive far less exposure, and the electorate, never having seen him under pressure, would know far less about him.

Nor would the electorate learn nearly as much about the Democratic case. From the Democratic viewpoint, one can almost (though perhaps not quite) say the more candidates the better, because each may reach a segment of the electorate inaccessible to the others.

All right, primary contests may increase popular familiarity with Democratic candidates and issues. But will they not also open up wounds that will not quickly heal and leave a divided and bitter party for the general election? Certainly pre-convention blood-letting damaged the Democrats in 1968. But there is a notable difference between 1968 and 1972. Then the party was profoundly split on the Vietnam war, and the losing side at Chicago could not easily embrace a candidate identified with a war they