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5,6

Crowe ✓  
Grant ✓  
Carpenter ✓  
Crawford ✓  
Schuller ✓

Trent ✓ Conversation between Ambassador Williams and Senator  
Marcuse ✓ Salii, October 5, 1972  
Stowe

Whittington ✓ ed  
deGraffenried ✓ Conversation last/about an hour. Found him in quite  
Kenty ✓

a serious and quiet mood, yet altogether friendly and, once again, willing to volunteer information that he never has in the past. I asked him about the meeting of the pro-independence advocates and he said he thought they might be ready this afternoon or tomorrow morning and he would let me know. I told him that I would like to propose that we have a final plenary session tomorrow. Didn't mention time although implication was afternoon.

Went on to say that I thought it was the wisest course of action in light of what we have said and what they have said, etc. His reaction was perhaps it was the wisest thing to do. I talked about conversation with Warnke. Salii echo'd Warnke's statement -- if wanted free association, ought to go ahead with the Compact. This led to further discussion of Ponape and, for what it is worth, this is what he said.

First, that there were non-Micronesians and non-Congressional member influences at work. For the first time he mentioned Roger Gale and said he was not the only American member of the Friends of Micronesia there for the deliberate purpose of interfering in their political affairs. He said that they were joined by some younger Micronesian members of the staff of the Congress and encouraged by some American

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Peace Corps people and others. I asked if this was pretty carefully organized. He said very much so. He said he saw it coming and that he thought that he had the votes to kill the independence movement and that he thought that the time had come and on SJR 117, he explained his conduct in this manner: He said he didn't think he could block it and he wanted to try to influence it by modifying the language. He said he argued that it was ridiculous to talk about concrete negotiations and he also said his (JFSC) mandate was to see whether free association would meet the needs first, he thought the timing was bad, etc. He then said that he drafted, after it had gone through the committee, an amendment to it which he wanted to introduce on the floor which would have stricken free association altogether and which would have made SJR 117 a mandate to negotiate for independence and he went to see the President of the Senate (he said he was not certain of A. Kabua's position, nor was anyone else, on the independence question) and Kabua convinced him not to do this, and that he had decided not to do it for 2 reasons:

- 1) there were about 3 members of the Senate that were not going to be there (4 free association people could have influenced the vote). He still thought the SJR 117 as amended would have lost in the Senate but was very afraid of Kabua;
- 2) that Kabua's influence in the house would have been such that it would not have passed in the House.

He went on to say that he felt that if the Marianas remained a part of the Senate that he had he thought a very clear 9-3 majority in the Senate. He said the only two certain (independence advocates) were Amaraich and Nakayama. He said he put both Tmetuchl and Kabua in the uncertain class. He said again he thought the Ponape session was a disaster and he acknowledged that he knew he had made a mistake. He said how difficult it was for him to carry on the negotiations with the Senate and the House always looking over his shoulder and introducing this and that new element, etc. In some ways he wished that they could have a stand down until he could complete his mandate and then take a look at it.

We got off on to the problem of misinformation, distortions, propaganda, and he admitted this was a problem. Talking about wide circulation of the pro-independence analysis, I asked how he could counter it; what about an analysis from his point of view. (He was talking like he was reading a script.) He said it is very hard to combat. He asked if I had the latest Friends of Micronesia Newsletter. He said it was highly inflammatory, all about Ponape. He said he had been told that they had printed an additional 3,000 copies for distribution in Micronesia. He said it was very hard because the local newspapers are controlled by the pro-independence advocates. He said the Catholic missionaries

and teachers are very strongly for independence and they are a very, very great influence. I asked if Father Castigan(?) was part of this. He said he thought he was but that the younger Catholic priests are very active and the hearings they had and the letter were widely distributed in advance throughout Ponape in the churches. Those on the other side are hard at work. (HW note - Setik said the center of anti-American sentiment and the independence movement in Truk was Xavier High School.) I said to Salii, Aren't you going to fight back? He said yes, there is a lot of talk about this. <sup>Para.</sup> /I brought up the District Legislatures. He said he thought the members of the Congress would be able to swing the District Legislatures. I said the record shows Palau Legislature rejected it. (His tone was a little different than yesterday.) He said I think we can get the approval of the land -- he and Roman together. I said, Lazarus, this is a way down the road, but if we get a draft Compact, we can't afford to just let nature take its course--it will be ripped all apart. If we are going to both agree to it and support it together, I think the best thing would be for a joint team to go to each District. He listened but didn't say anything.

Then we got back and philosophized about this round. He said the only thing I am afraid of is that those who oppose free association will take advantage of the fact that

we were not successful in completing the Compact here. I asked what we could do to minimize this. He didn't immediately come up with anything. I said what can I do to help and he said he thought if we could say something about just how difficult and hard this work was. That is when he brought in business of all the factors and forces at work in Micronesia playing on the people, on him, and on the Congress during the <sup>(Ponape)</sup> Congress. Then, I said, Lazarus, would it help or hurt you if I were to say we were aware of the problems your delegation has had. <sup>He said yes.</sup> Then he suggested that I say "and within his own delegation." Then he said that he hoped that we could leave the record here that this was in a sense a pause for both sides and that it was temporary and would be resumed. (I had the feeling he was a little disheartened.)

I have the feeling that Salii, unless he is totally dishonest, is in a position where he wants to work more closely to get a Compact of Free Association; that it is in his interest now to play ball more with us. It may be that some of his gyrations are going to make us angry. One could say his discussion with me on SJR 117 sounds pretty plausible; he was taking a risk and thought he might have it voted down.

He certainly did not open my eyes but gave me more reason to say that we have to face the fact that there is an organized campaign on the other side and no organized

effort to combat it. For instance, he said he had received a letter from someone in the Marshalls bitterly attacking the Compact; the next day copies of it were all over Colonia.

HW note: In final statement, feel it is necessary we weigh every word in terms of "Are we supporting our friends and not giving ammunition to our enemies?" That is the criteria against which we are going to have to weigh what we say.

Notes taken from  
debriefing. dt