

OJCS SUMMARY SHEET

TO: CJCS	CLASSIFICATION <del>SECRET SENSITIVE</del>	IDENTIFICATION NUMBER JSM 1 6 2 5 - 72 2 1 NOV 1972		
THRU: DJS	DJSM NO.	DJS CONTROL NO.		
	DATE			
SUBJECT: Point Paper for CJCS	ACTION			
	APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
			X	

REMARKS

1. We understand that there will be a working luncheon Wednesday, hosted by Under Secretary Irwin, at which the general subject of the Trust Territory Negotiations will be the main issue. Possible attendees are: Under Secretary Irwin, Ambassador Williams, Deputy Secretary Rush and Secretary Morton Rogers, and the Chairman.

2. From the Joint Staff point of view, the main issue is should Ambassador Williams have a 7th round of talks between now and Christmas; Ambassador Williams seems to think he should. The Joint Staff and the Services think it is premature. The pros and cons are covered at Tab J.

3. It is recommended that you stand firm on the position that there should be no 7th round of talks in the next 20 to 30 days. In fact, it is further recommended that the 7th round not be scheduled until after a USG position on an Independence Option is obtained.

*Declassified by JS  
FOIA 2480(3) (83-1711)  
1 Aug 89*

ACTION OFFICER LTC W.R. Kenty Northeast Asia Br, J-5 Ext 72400  DATE: 21 Nov 1972	COORDINATION/APPROVAL					
	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION
	OSD/ISA	Capt Schuller	59282			
	AF/XOX	Col Head	53281			
	DA/XO-RL	Col Harris	52257			
	Op-600	Capt Allred	55687			
	ATA-1	Col Scharfen	42824			
J-5	LTG L. T. SEITH					

Doc 175

10-431863

Point Paper for use by the Chairman, JCS, at the 22 November 1972 luncheon with the Honorable John N. Irwin, II, the Under Secretary of State

Subject: Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) (U)

MAIN THRUST OF POINT PAPER - Review the progress of the status negotiations and discuss the issues listed below:

- Background information on the TTPI.
- Review of sixth round of negotiations with Joint Future Status Committee (JFSC).
- Independence issue.
- Seventh round of negotiations with JFSC.
- Marianas negotiations.
- US participation in land survey and discussions in Palau.
- Eniwetok cleanup.

DISCUSSION

- Background Information on the TTPI: Contained at TAB A.
- Sixth Round of Negotiations: Conducted at Barbers Point, NAS, Hawaii from 26 September 1972 through 6 October 1972.
  - Delegations met with purpose of arriving at mutual agreement on the remaining Titles of the Draft Compact for Free Association.
  - Micronesian JFSC expressed desire to address an independence option along with Free Association.
  - US delegation did not have authority to discuss independence option, therefore, talks were recessed in order for USG to develop a position on this subject.
- Review of sixth round of talks contained at TAB B.

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FOIA 2480(3) 83-1711  
1 Aug 89*

~~CLASSIFIED BY CHIEF, FAR EAST DIV., J-5  
SUBJECT TO GDS OF EO 11652  
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO  
YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED ON DECEMBER 21, 1980~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- Independence Issue: Actions taken by the Congress of Micronesia (COM) in August 1972 regarding independence (SJR-117) and the JFSC at the sixth round of talks now require the USG to address the question of independence.

- JCS position (TAB C) which states that, for the present, independence for Micronesia is an unsatisfactory option forwarded to SECDEF on 13 November 1972. JCS also recommended that DOD take a strong position that the Micronesians not be offered an Independence Option and that negotiations toward Free Association be pursued.

- DOD position still to be developed.

- Ambassador Williams has not been officially advised of JCS position. His views on Independence contained at TAB I and will be forwarded to USC and the President for resolution.

- Seventh Round of Negotiations with JFSC: JFSC desires to meet again to complete Draft Compact for Free Association before COM reconvenes in January 1973.

- Ambassador Williams plans to meet with JFSC in December 1972 to complete Draft Compact even though Independence Option has not been addressed by USG.

- This represents a fallback from position taken during the sixth round.

- Details of his reasoning for seventh round contained at TAB I, Ambassador Williams' proposed letter to USC discussing preparation for seventh round and other TTPI issues.

- The Joint Staff and Service staffs feel that a seventh round of negotiations should not be held before the Independence Option is resolved by the USG in that it is a fallback from the position taken during the sixth round. Pros and cons for holding seventh round before Independence Issue being resolved contained at TAB J.

- Marianas Negotiations: Separate negotiations with Marianas District scheduled for early December 1972.

- Initial session to be both ceremonial and exploratory in nature.

- Details contained at TABs H and I.

- US Participation in Land Survey and Discussions in Palau:  
Scheduled for late November and early December 1972.

- Minimum DOD land requirements are contained in 9 September 1971 and 17 November 1972 SECDEF letters to Ambassador Williams and are considered irreducible minimums (TABs D and E).

- DOD, JCS, and Navy Department will assist in providing a politically, militarily, and technically oriented land team under the sponsorship and leadership of Ambassador Williams office. Details contained at TAB F.

- Memorandum with representative map that outlines military land requirements in Palau and requests SECDEF approval of the sites selected to meet US land requirements being staffed by the Joint Staff and Services (TAB G).


- OSD/ISA, J-5 action officers, and Service representatives will discuss this issue with Ambassador Williams on 22 November 1972.

- Eniwetok Cleanup: Scheduled to be complete by December 1973 at which time island will be returned to administration by TTPI.

- Pacific Cratering Experiment (PACE) tests suspended by court injunction until resolution of a suit brought concerning adherence to the provisions of the Environmental Protection Act. Expect issue to be resolved by February 1973.

- Typhoon damage has delayed survey and cleanup operations 30 days. Operations expected to resume by end November 1972.

- Defense Nuclear Agency has been designated the DOD Project Manager for matters concerning the cleanup.

Approved by  Director, J-5  
DJS \_\_\_\_\_ (Concur) (Nonconcur)

Prepared by: Lieutenant Colonel W. R. Kenty, USAF  
FE/SA Division, J-5  
NEA Branch  
Extension 57043

Attachments:

- TAB A - Background Information: TTPI
- TAB B - Review of Sixth Round of Negotiations
- TAB C - JCSM 477-72, "Micronesian Status Negotiations --  
Position of the JCS on Independence Option for  
Future Status Negotiations"
- TAB D - SECDEF letter to Amb Williams, "TTPI Land  
Requirements"
- TAB E - SECDEF letter to Amb Williams, "Revision of Tinian  
Land Requirements"
- TAB F - Land Survey and Discussion of Requirements - Palau
- TAB G - JCS 2326/101-3, "Micronesian Status Negotiations --  
Military Land Sites in Palau"
- TAB H - Forthcoming Marianas District Negotiations
- TAB I - Proposed letter from Amb Williams to USC, "Prepara-  
tion for Seventh Round, Independence, Land Survey  
in Palau, and Marianas Negotiations"
- TAB J - Pros and Cons for Holding Seventh Round Before  
Independence Issue is Resolved

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BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON  
TRUST TERRITORY OF PACIFIC ISLANDS (TTPI)

The TTPI includes three million square miles of the Pacific Ocean with 2,200 islands. However, they encompass only 716 square miles of land. The total population is approximately 110,000 with only 97 of the islands having resident population.

The US won the islands during World War II and in July 1947 the Congress authorized placing them under a strategic trusteeship agreement with the Security Council of the United Nations. The area was administered by the Navy until July 1951 at which time the responsibility was shifted to the Department of the Interior.

The TTPI consists of six administrative districts: Marianas, Paulaus, Gap, Truk, Ponape, and the Marshalls. General control is exercised by a High Commissioner. He oversees an elected congress and a largely Micronesionized executive structure. Each district is administered by a district administrator, and also has an elected legislature.

The TTPI is administered by the United States as a strategic trust under agreement with the UN Security Council. To assure long-term preservation of strategic interests in that area, the United States has been striving for a permanent status agreement with the TTPI with talks beginning in 1969. Six rounds of talks have been held to date concerning the future status of the TTPI. These have led to the drafting of a partial compact for free association.

The third and fourth round of talks held earlier this year resulted in agreement-in-principle on the fundamental issues of future status and provided the basis for the remaining talks to date.

During the fifth round of talks in July a partial draft compact for free association was negotiated. Joint agreement was reached on the Preamble and Title I (Internal Affairs), II (Foreign Affairs), and III (Defense).

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REVIEW OF SIXTH ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS  
Barbers Point NAS, Hawaii  
26 September-6 October 1972

The delegations met for this round with the purpose of arriving at mutual agreement on the remaining Titles of the draft compact. The Preamble and first three Titles completed during fifth round.

Ambassador Williams, when prompted by all members of the US delegation, took the offensive with a firm opening statement which required answers to questions dictated by the events and implications of the special session of the Congress of Micronesia (COM) as follows:

- COM introduced new developments which basically changed our previously agreed direction.
- The ground rules had been changed. Joint support of the Compact for Free Association was not evident during the special session of the COM in August 1972. Also, the original Micronesian objective had been expanded to include independence.

The Micronesians were surprised and visibly shocked by the US reaction to their behavior. They requested postponement of their prepared opening statement in order to consult among themselves.

The Micronesian response did not satisfactorily answer all of the questions posed by the United States, since the Joint Future Status Committee (JFSC) did not possess the authority to answer some of these questions. Most importantly, the response presented the requirement to discuss an Independence Option. Ambassador Williams' present instructions preclude him from offering or negotiating independence. He has only been authorized to say "The United States has not ruled out the possibility of independence."

Continuation of the draft compact at this round was not considered in our best interest. The United States would have been in the position of presenting the Micronesians with a fairly restrictive compact and a relatively low

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TAB B

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(\$25 million - \$35 million, as opposed to the current payment of \$60 million) dollar figure. It was believed that this would aid the independence movement. It was thought that in order to make the Compact more attractive a balancing zero dollars Independence Option might be presented at the same time.

Off the record meetings were held by Ambassador Williams and Senator Salii which were considered the most candid to date.

Meetings of the land and finance subcommittee were held, but not much substantive progress was achieved.

The final statements of Ambassador Williams and Senator Salii emphasized the following points:

- US

- Uncertainty remains about how negotiations are viewed by Micronesia and how any agreement reached would be endorsed and supported by JFSC and COM.

- Basic objective of the USG has not changed - to find a mutually beneficial relationship.

- US does not intend to abandon the above goal or neglect our international and national responsibilities.

- Sixth round has confirmed that previous understandings no longer exist. We do not even know, that if a compact were agreed to jointly, that the COM would accept it.

- It is essential that the USG consider the new developments and reassess its situation.

- US views on independence are unknown at this time.

- Circumstances which led to the TTPI designation as a Strategic Trust will continue to exist regardless of what the Micronesian future status will be.

- The US was calling a recess to report to the USG and Congress before proceeding with the negotiations.

- Micronesia

- The longer the talks go on, the US must recognize the inevitability of developments such as occurred at Ponape.

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- Early resumption of the talks was urged and presentation of specific proposals on financing and termination.

- Recess will be used by the Micronesians to provide answers to questions which will facilitate proceeding.

- They will cooperate with the US in the conduct of a land survey in Palau (bilateral vice unilateral, and hearings will be postponed until after the survey).

- They requested that Eniwetok residual rights be presented prior to completion of the compact.

- They again requested land details in the Marianas and were again denied by Ambassador Williams since the US is going to negotiate individually with the Marianas on this subject.

- The Micronesians will give further attention to appropriate measures for the orderly transfer of authority to the COM under the compact provisions - particularly with respect to land requirements.

- The independence issue will be explored, but at a later date. At this time it would only be diversionary and premature. This represented a pullback from their original position. The implication was that if a satisfactory Free Association Compact was negotiated, independence would be dropped.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JCSM-477-72  
13 November 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Micronesian Status Negotiations--Position  
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Independence  
Option for Future Status Negotiations (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to the record of the sixth round of Micronesian Status Negotiations held in Hawaii from 28 September to 6 October 1972, at which time the Micronesian delegation advised that it desired to consider an Independence Option along with Free Association during the negotiation process. Since the US delegation did not have the authority to discuss independence, a recess was called in order to develop a US position on this subject.
2. (U) It is expected that the Department of Defense will soon be requested by the Under Secretaries Committee of the National Security Council to comment on an Independence Option. Therefore, it is considered timely to forward the views and position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this important issue.
3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) is an area of high strategic interest and importance to the United States. Therefore, in considering an Independence Option, the strategic value of the area should be the primary consideration. Because of its strategic location, under any future status arrangement, the United States requires unequivocal guarantees of denial of military presence to all other nations, US military basing rights, free access and use, and termination procedures as specified below:
  - a. Denial of a foreign military presence is the foremost requirement for the indefinite future and must be absolutely guaranteed. A third nation military presence without US approval cannot be tolerated.

*Declassified by JS*  
*FOIA 2480(3) 83-1711*  
*1 Aug 89*

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Classified by Director, ~~TOP SECRET~~  
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE ON EFFECTIVE DATE 1992  
AUTOMATICALLY ON 12/31/90  
YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED ON DECEMBER 31, 1990  
10-431872

TAB C

b. The rights and powers agreed to in Title III of the Draft Compact of Free Association with respect to military land requirements and their uninhibited use are mandatory. These include such provisions as free access to Micronesian lands, airfields, and harbors and freedom of navigation and overflight throughout all areas in order to meet minimum US military requirements.

c. The Micronesians must be prohibited from specifying or implying any preconditions of type, quantity, or category of weapon systems or weapons carried, used, or stored in or on aircraft, ships, or facilities in the area. In addition, there must be no limitations on the numbers or mix of US personnel or the tactical employment of weapon systems or personnel.

d. Termination procedures that would protect US interests and insure that defense interests and military basing rights would survive any future changes in the relationship between the United States and the Micronesians must be assured.

Maintaining the status quo or establishing a concept of Free Association as envisioned in the titles of the draft compact would guarantee and insure that the basic US interests outlined above are protected. In itself, the concept of Free Association achieves the purpose of establishing a compromise between independence and commonwealth status, while insuring that US responsibilities for foreign affairs and defense so important for this strategic area are preserved.

4. (S) Independence for Micronesia would be inconsistent with maintaining any meaningful agreement on basing options. The very nature of Micronesia with its sparse, separated population enclaves leads to areas of localized opinion and development of self-serving concepts. Micronesia is economically underdeveloped and politically immature. A premature granting of independence may result in international criticism of the United States for lack of wisdom in administering the TTPI. A newly independent nation can easily resort to early abrogation of treaties and agreements for near-term gains. US agreements with the Micronesians not supported by a US presence protecting its prerogatives are unlikely to survive the commercial and military exploitation by nations and organizations whose interests may not coincide with those of Micronesia and the United States. Events in Cuba, Panama, and the Philippines demonstrate that agreements made after these nations were established as independent by the United States are often modified to the detriment of the United States.

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5. (S) Micronesia now provides an area for defense in depth for the United States and would continue to do so under Free Association. Creation of an independent nation would imply a US withdrawal, with a resultant power vacuum. The following adverse impacts could occur from a strategic point of view:

a. The strategic posture of the United States would be significantly degraded in a large portion of the Western Pacific. Defense in depth of the United States would be degraded.

b. Nations with interests divergent from those of the United States are likely to encroach on Micronesian territory and commercially and militarily exploit Micronesian vulnerability.

c. In spite of treaty arrangements, the United States might be denied access to and use of military facilities, land areas, ocean areas, and the airspace above. The planned and projected establishment of US military bases would be jeopardized. If base rights were denied, an important area for relocation of some US facilities and forces would be eliminated should US Forces be compelled to leave Japan and the Philippines.

d. Defense of Guam and Tinian would be more difficult. Bases for unfriendly forces could be established near Guam and Tinian. The sea lines of communication between Australia and Japan would become more vulnerable.

e. Micronesia may follow the lead of other island nations, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, and adopt the Archipelago Concept, claiming that vast areas of the Pacific comprise territorial or inland waters of Micronesia.

6. (C) It is the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, for the present, independence for Micronesia is an unsatisfactory option. In order to preserve US strategic interests in the TTPI, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Department of Defense take a strong position that the Micronesians not be offered an Independence Option and that negotiations toward Free Association be pursued.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

*M G Colladay*

MARTIN G. COLLADAY  
Major General, USAF  
Vice Director, Joint Staff

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

9 SEP. 1971

Ambassador Franklin Haydn Williams  
Office of the Secretary of the Interior  
Department of the Interior  
Washington, D.C. 20240

Dear Ambassador Williams,

This letter sets forth the long-term requirements of the United States for military basing options in the area encompassed by the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI). Requirements pertinent to other departments and agencies, including the Department of Transportation (U.S. Coast Guard) are not included.

I am sure you are familiar with the statement of U.S. strategic interests with respect to the TTPI concurred in by the interested executive departments and forwarded to the President on March 31, 1971 (NSC-U/DM 62).<sup>\*</sup> What follows below is consistent with and an elaboration upon that basic statement, which remains valid.

The specific requirements herein with respect to U.S. use of land in the TTPI are founded largely upon certain of what I believe to be the enduring interests of the United States. The interests of concern include the U.S. ability to:

- Implement a defense-in-depth in the Pacific to the West of the State of Hawaii.
- Defend Guam.
- Defend the islands of Micronesia, since they would become a permanent United States defense responsibility, as anticipated by each of the successive U.S. negotiating positions approved by the President on 20 July 1971.
- Defend lines of communication through the Central Pacific in order to assure continuing freedom of transit for essential strategic materials which would not otherwise be available in time of war.
- Carry out treaty commitments.
- Maintain a credible nuclear and conventional deterrent to armed aggression against the U.S., its allies, and countries considered vital to our security; and continue to maintain a balance among the great powers in Asia (China, Japan, USSR, and U.S.) which discourages the use of force as an instrument of national policy in the area.
- Meet future contingencies and satisfy research and development (R&D) requirements.

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR  
INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY  
DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10

\* Attachment to JCS 2326/52 00

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TAB D

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The following facts and evident trends are pertinent to any definition of our military land needs in the TTPI:

- Population pressure and economic development will continue both in Guam, Micronesia, and elsewhere in the Western Pacific; this will progressively diminish the land available for U.S. military purposes.
- Current U.S. bases in the Western Pacific (e.g., in Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan and Philippines) are subject to political pressures and decisions which could deprive the U.S. of operating flexibility to an increasing extent, with a tendency to limit the use of bases to the immediate defense of the country in which they are located.
- Threats against U.S. interests could arise in the future not only from countries which today appear potentially hostile but also from those with whom we currently have good relations or even defense commitments; for example, bases could be established by governments hostile to the U.S. in the wake of political turmoil in various Pacific Islands.
- Of the strategic and critical material imports the U.S. must obtain from external sources (i.e., from beyond the North American continent and the Caribbean) in a period of emergency, about 38% in dollar value (\$600 million annually) would be obtained by sea transport through the Central Pacific. This includes 32 of the 72 items on the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP) List of Strategic and Critical Material. In the future, U.S. reliance on these overseas sources is expected to increase markedly as will the importance of lines of communications through sea areas adjoining Micronesia.

It should be noted that:

- Our needs for basing options do not represent a new requirement; the U.S. currently possesses a legal right to establish military bases and facilities in Micronesia under the Trusteeship Agreement. This right was acquired on the basis of an assessment of U.S. long-term strategic interests made prior to establishment of Micronesia as a unique "strategic" trust some 24 years ago, an assessment that is hereby reaffirmed.
- Future political and technical developments, including future generations of strategic weaponry, cannot be predicted with certainty; the U.S. requires some flexibility in the future to take account of events that are unforeseeable today.
- The minimum requirements specified below are not predicated upon loss of existing U.S. bases in the Western Pacific (a military base structure in Micronesia which could only partially compensate for loss of existing Western Pacific bases would require substantially more than the minimum acreage specified).

In brief, the requirements set forth below would ensure continuation of options that are required not only for the foreseeable future but, for the most part, permanently.

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TAB D

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Under the circumstances set forth above, our ability to exercise eminent domain in a new political relationship with Micronesia, would best assure the U.S. ability to satisfy possible future basing requirements beyond those which can be predicted with relative certainty and satisfied in advance, since land generally is not a marketable commodity in Micronesia. Should an unrestricted exercise of eminent domain not be possible, virtually any reasonable limitations (e.g., national emergency declared by the President; rights obtainable limited to long-term lease) would be better than not having this right at all.

Finally, should eminent domain not be obtainable in any form, certain minimum essential requirements must be satisfied if the U.S. is to be assured of even a fair chance of preserving the interests set forth above over an uncertain future. These minimum requirements have been defined on the following basis:

- Certain land is of such overriding, long-term importance that it should be acquired as soon as possible by the U.S.--even if the ability to exercise eminent domain is retained. However, elsewhere, long-term leases or lesser interests will suffice.
- Political realities in the TTPI are taken into consideration to the maximum practicable extent, with full knowledge inter alia of the importance of land in the Micronesian culture.
- Joint Service basing is contemplated to preclude duplication and minimize requirements.
- Land of least relative economic value to the Micronesians is specified wherever there is a choice. In particular, a thorough study of possible basing alternatives in the Western Carolines was made and considered.
- Possible basing afloat and anticipated improvements in sea and air mobility also were considered.

Based on a thorough review of all these factors, the following principal, minimum long-term real property is required:

- Kwajalein, Marshall Islands. Retention of current land holdings associated with the missile testing facility, (about 1,320 acres; continuation of long-term leases and other use agreements, both current and pending).
- Bikini, Marshall Islands. Retention of 1.9 acres for emplacement of future, unmanned instrumentation.
- Tinian, Mariana Islands. To provide basing options for all of the Services, outright acquisition of the entire island is a highly desirable objective, which would permit us to avoid many predictable future problems. But obtaining the northern part, with its World War II airfields, and acquisition of the harbor on a joint-use (civilian-military) basis, are essential. (16,518 acres out of a total of 26,200 acres.) Population on this good-sized island is relatively small (about 800), and much of the essential land currently is in a military retention status.

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-- Palau Islands: (1) access and anchorage rights in Malakal Harbor, (2) acquisition of 40 acres of fill rights and connecting land in the Malakal harbor area for a small support facility; (3) joint-use (civilian-military) of an airfield capable of supporting military jet aircraft operations (possibly a new airfield constructed on a reef area off Carreru Island), (4) a right that will permit acquisition or the long-term assured use of 1,500 to 2,000 acres on the west coast of Babelthuap as a logistics and basing area, and (5) an arrangement that assures the right to use 25,000 to 30,000 acres on Babelthuap as a ground force maneuver/training area. (Involves use of about one-third of Babelthuap, a large island--28 miles long, 7 miles wide--with a population of about 4,000.) The Palau Islands, 700 miles Southwest of Guam and some 1,200 miles to the North of Australia and Indonesia, would provide assured options with respect to the increasingly important Southwest Pacific area as well as constitute a key defense outpost on the Western fringe of Micronesia.

It should be recognized clearly that satisfaction of only these minimum requirements entails acceptance of a number of inherent and associated strategic risks. In particular, I wish to highlight the fact that lands retained for ground force use in Micronesia will only support staging of forces or basing and training of units up to brigade size. In the light of all relevant circumstances, I believe that our needs are reasonable and, if anything, understated. Our national security requirements, moreover, of which basing options are an important part, are the only real justification we will have in asking the U.S. Congress to enter into a new relationship with Micronesia involving the continuation of a substantial level of financial support. Accordingly, the above requirements should be approached as an irreducible minimum.

The attachments contain additional information concerning the minimum requirements described above, together with certain other requirements; a list of current military retention holdings that might be released during negotiations; and comments on compensation to be offered for acquisitions. Data of a more detailed nature is being provided separately.

To facilitate any subsequent discussion of this subject, I am providing Secretary Rogers, Secretary Morton, and Dr. Kissinger with copies of this letter. In closing, I wish to emphasize the importance that I attach to satisfaction of the above requirements.

Yours truly,



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TAB D

10 - 431878



~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

~~SECRET~~

17 November 1972

Ambassador Franklin Haydn Williams  
Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations  
Department of the Interior  
Washington, D.C. 20240

Dear Ambassador Williams:

Reference is made to my 9 September 1971 correspondence regarding minimum Department of Defense land requirements in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

In the referenced correspondence it was specified that, with regard to Tinian land requirements, control over all of Tinian Island was the primary and desired objective. It was further stated that, in the event it was impossible to acquire the entire island, an absolute minimum of 16,518 acres were required.

Subsequently, it has been found that the stated 16,518 acres minimum requirement did not consider land necessary to satisfy ammunition safety radius requirements around the Tinian port when transferring ammunition. This safety requirement adds at least 2,000 acres around the port to the previously established minimum military land requirements, for a new total of at least 18,518 acres.

Accordingly, it is desired that this correspondence serve as an amendment to my 9 September 1971 land requirements letter, to reflect the Department of Defense revised minimum military land requirement for Tinian to be 18,518 acres.

Sincerely,

/s/

MELVIN R. LAIRD

Classified by Dir, EAPR  
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SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED  
AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 31 Dec 80  
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TAB E

10-431879

LAND SURVEY AND DISCUSSION OF REQUIREMENTS - PALAU

During the sixth round of talks, after much discussion, Micronesian delegation agreed to cooperate with the United States in the conduct of a joint land survey and discussions.

DOD, JCS, and the Navy Department will assist in providing a politically, militarily, and technically oriented team under the sponsorship of Ambassador Williams' office.

- Team will go to Palau in late November 1972 to help dispel rumors and resolve issues concerning military land requirements in Palau, visit the selected sites, and present the Micronesian land subcommittee with maps depicting the sites selected to meet US land requirements.

- Maps have been prepared depicting the 30,000 acre maneuver area, three alternative 2,000 acre logistics and cantonment sites, and the 40 acre Malakal Harbor tract. These will be presented to and discussed with the Micronesian land subcommittee and other interested parties.

- Aerial photographic survey of the 30,000 acre maneuver area to be completed by the Navy as soon as possible.

- The selected sites all meet DOD long term military land requirements for Palau.

- Anticipated instructions for the land survey team follow:

- Land Suitability. Examine the general land areas specified by the Department of Defense and determine their suitability. US needs should be examined in light of the following considerations:

- The military and technical criteria.

- Palauan political alignments and attitudes toward the United States and military activities in general.

- The receptivity of the local people to having a US military facility in their district. In this regard, the present status of land ownership must be examined. In case of disputed land, an estimate should be made as to what influence this problem will have on the availability of the land and the ability of the United States to use it.

TAB F

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- Any interference which a prospective installation might cause to the local population. An important objective is to keep the disruption of local activities to a minimum. In this regard, the following factors, among others, must be considered: population distribution, agricultural activity, road and communication networks, any planning for future use of the area, ways in which military activity could fill civilian needs as well.

- Land Definition. Following examination of the land, attempt to define with some specificity, as many locations as possible which would meet US needs and offer good prospect of Palauan acceptance. It is conceivable that there may be some kind of meeting of the minds on a specified plot which would be ideal. At the other end of the continuum would be a complete rejection of any US suggestions. A much more likely outcome would be some type of partial agreement with a request for compromises by one or both parties. To effect a compromise, it may be necessary to define more than one site and make recommendations as to preferences based on all the circumstances. The following are offered as guidelines:

- Alter boundaries where there are pressing local reasons for doing so and the overall usefulness of the land is not unduly affected.


- In arriving at general boundaries it is, of course, preferable to do this in conjunction with Palauan leaders and landowners, if practical.

- At the same time, the Palauans must not be given the impression that their desires are overriding. If the United States Government cannot obtain land that meets its technical needs, then it is not possible to do business.

- Authorization. Once the United States has settled on specific sites, it is desirable for the Palauan leaders to be informed as soon as possible. It is impossible to foresee what political and organization constraints will govern work in Palau. If US land needs are adequately met the team is authorized, at their discretion, to inform Senator Salii and those leaders whom he nominates that the United States specifically desires certain identified sites. If this appears to be inadvisable, inform Senator Salii that survey team must consult with Ambassador Williams before any final decisions are made.

- Land Prices. Unfortunately, the Micronesians have not resolved the question of what body will negotiate and commit their lands. No doubt Palauans would prefer that the United States deal directly with them regarding Palauan land, but we are not in a position to ignore the Joint Future Status Committee by agreeing to talk price directly with local leaders. Nevertheless, the survey group, through informal conversations, should make every effort to sound out Palauan views on land values and on what they expect from the United States. It would be permissible to express informal views as to what certain parcels of the land seem to be worth. The head of the delegation, in coordination with the Department of Defense representatives, should develop reasonable figures and insure that the delegation speaks with one voice in any such informal conversations.

- Expected Queries. It is inevitable that the survey group will be confronted with politico-military questions and challenged as to US land requirements, US use of any future bases, and frictions which may arise between US bases and the local population. Not only should survey team be prepared to respond to such queries, but the group should take every opportunity to acquaint local leaders, landholders, and interested inhabitants with the facts regarding US land needs. Undoubtedly, the US position on land has been distorted in Palau, either intentionally or unintentionally, by a variety of elements. It is incumbent upon the survey group to do everything it can in a short visit to place an accurate picture before the people of Palau. At a minimum, team should be prepared to speak on the following subjects:

- Future use of sites.
- Limitations on use.
- Functions of leases.
- 
- Biological and chemical weapons storage.
- Status of US forces in Palau.
- US position on disputed land in Palau.


PROPOSED  
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Micronesian Status Negotiations--  
Military Land Sites in Palau (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to your letter, dated 9 September 1971, to the President's Personal Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations which set forth the long-term land requirements of the United States for military basing options in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI).
2. (C) During the sixth round of the subject negotiations, recently completed in Hawaii, the United States and Micronesian delegations agreed that the United States would participate in an initial joint land survey and discussions concerning US military land requirements in Palau. The American team will be politically, militarily, and technically oriented. Its purpose will be to: dispel rumors concerning military land requirements and issues in Palau through discussions with the Micronesian land subcommittee and other interested parties, visit selected sites, and present the Micronesian land subcommittee with maps depicting the sites selected to meet US land requirements.
3. (U) It is expected that detailed negotiations on site requirements in Palau will await the results of the initial survey and discussions and the reaction of the Micronesian land subcommittee to US requirements.

4. (S) In the attachment hereto for your approval is a representative map depicting the site requirements on Palau. The US team will provide the Micronesian land subcommittee with large-scale maps during the forthcoming initial land survey and discussions, scheduled for late November and early December 1972. All areas are located within the parameters established by the referenced letter with the exception of the two alternative sites provided for the naval cantonment and logistic area. The following factors were considered during the site selection for the cantonment and logistics area: proximity to the airfield, ease of access from land and sea, suitability of roads and terrain, drainage, relatively sheltered anchorage area with adequate depth, proximity to the 30,000 acre maneuver area and Malakal harbor, and the proximity to the main channel to Malakal harbor. In addition to the military considerations, planned or anticipated Micronesian civic and commercial interests were considered and provided for where possible during the site selection. These included: "aqua-culture" projects, potential tourism sites, historical sites, conservation areas, fishing areas, refrigeration facilities, and agricultural areas. US concern for and consideration of these factors should improve the bargaining power with the Micronesians.

APPENDIX



- NOTE:
- I - Primary Site
  - II - Secondary Site
  - III - Third Site

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FORTHCOMING MARIANAS DISTRICT NEGOTIATIONS

Separate negotiations on the future status of the Marianas are tentatively set for the second week in December 1972 in Saipan.

- DOD and JCS representatives will attend.
- Three actions are required with respect to the Marianas before negotiations begin.
  - Separate the Marianas from the other districts administratively by amending the current Secretary of Interior order dealing with administration of the TTPI. This is being investigated by Ambassador Williams' office.
  - Will pave the way for our separate negotiations.
  - Will keep COM from interfering in the negotiation process.
  - Marianas legislature must take the initiative and inform the JFSC and COM that they do not desire them to represent the Marianas in the future.
  - Although US can unilaterally amend the Secretarial Order, the Marianas should formally request such action.
  - Some reluctance on their part to do this. Efforts are underway to convince them of necessity for initiating such action.
  - Will stem adverse criticism of US from UN and other agencies in the way we are administering the TTPI.
  - First round of negotiations is to be open to the public and primarily ceremonial in nature. However, US delegation should be prepared to discuss the following major elements of future negotiations, but not in depth.
    - Land requirements -- total acreage.
    - Financial arrangements.
    - Type of political status and association.

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TAB H

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- Type of initial status to be offered is Commonwealth.
- Long range goal of US is integration with Guam.

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PROS AND CONS FOR HOLDING SEVENTH ROUND BEFORE  
THE INDEPENDENCE ISSUE IS RESOLVED

Pros

- Would aid Senator Salii, Chairman of the JFSC, and satisfy the desire of the pro-Free Association advocates of the (JFSC) to move forward without delay so that they will have a complete Draft Compact for Free Association to present to the COM in January 1973.

- Majority of members of JFSC eager to complete work on Draft Compact.

- US refusal to negotiate during sixth round may have impressed upon JFSC the fact that there are limits beyond which the US delegation will not go.

- Will maintain momentum of the talks and pattern of progress accomplished to date.

- Uses pressure of time to accelerate negotiating process.

- Would counter the influence of the pro-independence coalition in COM.

- Important for US to work cooperatively with and strengthen position of pro-Free Association members of JFSC.

Cons

- Would represent reversal of strong position US took during sixth round that we could not go ahead until independence issue resolved by USG.

- Could appear as a sign of weakness and misgiving on part of US by revising position taken at sixth round.

- US bargaining position on Free Association could be severely undermined and conceivably the Micronesians could view our strong desire to negotiate in December as a last ditch salvage operation, hardly the atmosphere in which to negotiate rest of compact which includes sensitive discussions on financing, land requirements, and termination.

- Independence issue far too sensitive and complex to open up on a piecemeal basis.

- Should not try to describe what an independence option might entail in terms of finance or US strategic requirements without prior development and approval of a position by the White House.

- Doubtful whether compact could actually be completed since talks would resume under some conditions which led to breakup of last round; i.e., no real US position on independence and no commitment on part of JFSC to endorse results of negotiations.

- Further discussion of implications of independence in negotiating context will lead to extensive discussion by JFSC of implied or actual US position on Independence Option.

- Could lead to inflated levels of financial support due to pressure to obtain JFSC endorsement of the compact.

- JFSC, faced with newly elected COM and containing two lame duck members, itself, may not be in position to complete drafting of compact on terms acceptable to US; an additional fruitless negotiating session would put advocates of free association under pressure to compromise their positions at the January 1973 COM session.