

Washington, D.C. 20520

## NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE

SECRET

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TO:

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Deputy Attorney General

The Under Secretary of the Interior

The Assistant Director, Office of

Management and Budget

Mr. James Wilson, Jr., Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations, Department of the

Interior

SUBJECT: Micronesian Status Negotiations

I attach for your comment and/or concurrence a proposed Memorandum to the President, to go forward with Ambassador Williams' memorandum of November 22, 1972 and the dissents to that memorandum received from the Departments of State, Defense and Interior. The Memorandum to the President is intended to be a brief summary of the respective positions, noting that additional studies are required and have been requested.

Because these papers are already overdue at the White House, please telephone your comments and/or concurrence to Mr. Harvey Feldman, Department of State, telephone extension 632-9306, by 12 noon on Friday, December 8.

> Seýmour Weiss Acting Staff Director

DRAFT MEMORANDUM TO PRESIDENT FROM USC CHAIRMAN

Subject: Micronesian Status Negotiations

I attach at Tab A Ambassador Franklin Haydn Williams' memorandum of November 22, 1972, responding to Dr.

Kissinger's November first request for a reassessment of the U.S. negotiating position on the Micronesian status question. I also attach, at Tabs B, C and D respectively, very substantial dissents from that memorandum received from the Departments of State,

Defense, and Interior.

The thrust of Ambassador Williams' memorandum is:

- 1. We should resume negotiations with the Micronesians as early as possible and exert every effort to complete a Compact of Free Association.

  (Ambassador Williams had hoped to resume in December, but the Micronesians were unprepared.)
- 2. In the next round of talks, we may find it necessary to tell the Micronesians that we have not ruled out an offer of independence and point to certain "stark contrasts" between free association

and independence, but we can neither commit ourselves
to offering independence for specify what such an offer
might entail in advance of Presidential approval. After
noting certain pros and cons of a possible future offer
of independence, the memorandum concludes that an in-depth
study is required before the issue can be moved to you for
decision.

3. We should negotiate separately with the Marianas on permanent association, responding to their request of last April. The initial session with the Marianas in mid-December will be largely ceremonial and intended to draw out Marianan views on the future relationship. More definite proposals for the Marianas will need further study and will be presented subsequently by Ambassador Williams for your approval.

The State Department dissent takes the view that:

1. The negotiating situation has been fundamentally changed by the August decision of the Congress of Micronesia to seek an independence option as well as a free association option. We should not resume negotiations until we are ready to offer an

independence option (i.e., completed the required study and obtained your approval) since our failure to do so would give ammunition to the pro-Independence forces. In the meantime, we should try to deflate pro-Independence sentiment by an open letter from Ambassador Williams to the Micronesians negotiators which points out some of the negative implications of independence. The State dissent attaches a draft letter.

- 2. We should move immediately to put our military leases in the Marshalls into such shape that they could survive either independence of possible future termination or free association.
- 3. Because it is important to conclude an early agreement with the Marianas, we should surface our own proposals as quickly as possible rather than simply probing for Marianan desire or expectations (which might inflate them in any case).

In its dissent, the Department of Defense:

- 1. Also takes the view that the Micronesian negotiations should not be resumed until we have a USG position on an independence option.
  - 2. Makes clarification of the Micronesian


negotiators' ability to guarantee meeting DOD minimum land requirements an additional precondition for resuming talks.

The Department of the Interior:

- 1. Believes Ambassador Williams' memorandum does not lay out the full range of options open to us. Specifically, Interior calls for a study of whether we should continue negotiating with the Congress of Micronesia at all, or whether we should instead move to ascertain the views of the Micronesian people more directly.
- 2. Recommends that we take no initiative to resume negotiations in any case, but consider responding to an invitation from the Micronesian side.
- 3. Urges that there be no discussion of independence with the Micronesians until the issue has received full study and your approval.

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In view of these serious disagreements, I have asked Ambassador Williams to have an Inter-Agency Group prepare and submit by January 30, 1973 the following studies:



A. A full study of all the options open to the United States concerning the future status of Micronesia. In addition to full consideration of the advisability of offering to negotiate an independence option, this study should consider the more basic question, raised by Interior, of whether we should continue to negotiate solely with the Congress of Micronesia's Joint Future Status Committee, should make recommendations with regard to the military land problems raised by State and Defense, and should lay out a coherent negotiating strategy.

B. Definitive recommendations for the negotiation on permanent association with the Marianas, together with a negotiating strategy and recommendations for necessary legislation.

I hope to forward these studies to you in early

February for your approval. In view of the fact that

the Congress of Micronesia will begin a 50-day session

on January 8, 1973, it does not seem possible to resume

negotiations before March in any case.

S/PC:HJFeldman

