

74 D 497

DECLASSIFIED

E. KRANCE

2406

X20260

File
TTP
M
J
4

of
SRO
R

~~EXCISE~~

150

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

TO : D - The Deputy Secretary
FROM: EA - Marshall Green

The Future Political Status of the Mariana Islands --
Department of State Position

By memorandum dated December 26, 1972, you (in your capacity as Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries' Committee) asked the Interagency Group on Micronesian Future Status to prepare a study on the future political status of the Mariana Islands. That study was completed and forwarded to you on March 19, 1973 by the President's Personal Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations.

The Departments of Defense, Interior, and State were, by memorandum dated March 23 from the Staff Director of the NSC Under Secretaries' Committee, requested to provide their comments and positions on the study.

The concerned bureaus and offices (EA, IO, PM, L) of the Department of State have reviewed the study, and have prepared a State position paper. It is attached for your review and approval.

Recommendation: That you sign the attached memorandum, in your capacity as State Representative on the NSC Under Secretaries' Committee.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY B.A. BAAS DATE 3/2/76

RDS or XDS EXT. DATE _____

TS AUTH. _____ REASON(S) _____

ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS

DECLASSIFIED RELEASABLE

RELEASE DENIED

PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS _____

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY B.A. BAAS DATE 3/2/76

CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RDS or XDS EXT. DATE OADR

TS AUTH. JCS REASON(S) EO 12356

ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS SEC 1.3(2)(5)

DECLASSIFIED RELEASABLE IN PART

RELEASE DENIED

PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS B1, A5, B5

EA/RA: John C. Dorrance:
3/23/73 ext 20260

Clearances:

EA - Mr. Hummel
PM - Mr. Pickering

IO - Mr. Herz
L - Mr. Stowe (draft)

05 424515

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED BY: _____
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE

Subject: The Future Political Status of the Mariana Islands District, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands -- Department of State Position on March 19 Interagency Study and Recommendations

The Department of State, with minor reservations and qualifications, considers that the subject study on the future political status of the Mariana Islands, and the recommendations of the Interagency Group, provide a comprehensive and adequate base for decisions by both the Under Secretaries Committee and the President, as well as guidance for the President's Personal Representative in his negotiations with the Marianas Future Political Status Commission.

However, the Department of State believes that certain ambiguities and potential conflicts do exist which require decisions beyond those recommended in the study of the Interagency Group. These decisions and appropriate recommendations are discussed in Tab "A".

Beyond the recommendations in Tab "A", the Department of State wishes to draw attention to its views on several other important aspects of the study. These relate to: (a) the impact of Japanese economic penetration in the Marianas Islands on the future political status question; (b) legal problems and considerations relating to termination of the Trusteeship Agreement; and (c) differing views on the strategic importance of the Mariana Islands, and on the Department of Defense's development plans for Tinian and Saipan Islands. These subjects are addressed under Tabs "B", "C", and "D".

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

OS- 424516

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Recommendation:

That the Under Secretaries Committee endorse and forward to the President the recommendations of the Interagency Group as described in the Marianas study, but as amended in Tab "A" of this memorandum. It is additionally recommended that the Under Secretaries Committee take the other actions suggested in Tab "A" which do not require a Presidential decision.

Kenneth Rush

Attachments:

- Tab "A" - Additional U.S.C. Recommendations to the President, and Actions for the Under Secretaries
- Tab "B" - The Impact of Potential Japanese Economic Activity in the Mariana Islands on the Status and Land Negotiations
- Tab "C" - Strategic Importance of the Mariana Islands and DOD Planning for Bases in those Islands
- Tab "D" - Termination of the Trusteeship Agreement

Drafted: EA/RA:JCDorrance:mjh
3/23/73 ext 20260

Clearances:

EA - Mr. Green IO - Mr. Herz ~~SECRET~~
PM - Mr. Pickering.
L - Mr. Stowe

DECLASSIFIED
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OS 424517

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

TAB "A"

I. Additional U.S.C. Recommendations to the President

A. Termination of the Trusteeship and the United Nations: Section VII of the Marianas study, and Section G(i) of the summary of the study, briefly highlight the legal and political problems associated with termination of the trusteeship agreement, the importance of obtaining UN consent to termination of that agreement, and the fact that actions and decisions which may be taken in the near future could significantly bear on our ability to seek and obtain UN consent to termination. A critical recommendation of that study is that: ["No action should be taken with regard to the Marianas which would prejudice the United States ability and option to seek Security Council approval."] Through oversight this recommendation was omitted from those made to the Under Secretaries.

B1, A5
B5

Recommendation: That the above omission be corrected by adding the following language at the end of Section 2 ("Status") of the proposed draft instructions for the President's Personal Representative.

["No action should be taken which would prejudice the United States' ability and option to seek Security Council approval of termination of the Trusteeship Agreement."]

B1, A5
B5

The extremely important legal and political considerations behind this recommendation are elaborated on in Tab D to this memorandum.

B. Marianas Basing Requirements and NSSM 171: The Defense Department's plan for the development of Tinian Island, and contingency planning for Saipan, were developed prior to the NSSM 171 requirement, and conceivably could be in conflict with the assessments and decisions that will flow from that NSSM. These concerns are elaborated on in detail in Tab C to this memorandum.

Recommendation: That the Under Secretaries recommend to the President that a final decision on the development of Tinian Island be deferred until it can be considered within the context of a completed NSSM 171 study. This recommendation is not intended to defer or delay the acquisition of land in the Mariana Islands for basing purposes, nor does it require any change in the negotiating instructions for the President's Personal Representative.

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

OS- 424518

II. Recommendations for Action by the Under Secretaries

A. Defense Department Planning for Saipan and Tinian Islands: Annexes III and IV of the Marianas study provide detail on Defense Department planning for Tinian and Saipan Islands, including an estimate that a minimum of \$114 million will be required for the early phases of base development on Tinian. [Since one of the primary inducements to the Marianas to accept the defense land requirements will be the potential for employment flowing from base development and operations, it would be helpful if the President's Personal Representative could use, for illustrative purposes, Defense Department planning figures for Tinian.]

B1, A5
B5

Recommendation: That the Under Secretaries Committee request the Department of Defense to make available to the President's Personal Representative expenditure planning estimates for Tinian by fiscal year period. These must be unclassified for use in the forthcoming status and land negotiations.

B. Land Requirements and U.S. Negotiating Goals: Throughout the Marianas study it is clearly stated that a priority U.S. objective should be early agreement on and implementation of a close and permanent Marianas relationship with the United States. This is explicit in the objectives described on page 1 of the Summary, and again in the draft instructions for the President's Personal Representative (summary page xxi).

B1, A5
B5

[Elsewhere (in the summary discussion of defense land requirements on page vi), it is recommended that a "determined effort" be made to negotiate acquisition of the Defense Department's maximum land requirement, i.e. all of Tinian Island, two parcels of land on Saipan, and Farallon de Medinilla Island.

The Department of State concurs in both recommendations, i.e. that priority be given to achievement and early implementation of a status agreement, and that a determined effort be made to obtain the Defense Department's maximum land requirements.

However, the Department is concerned that the two goals could come into conflict and that an unrealistically determined effort to obtain the maximum Defense land requirement could threaten the priority objective of an early status settlement.]

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

3

[The Department of State believes there is little or no prospect of actually acquiring the maximum land requirements, and that the effort to obtain those requirements must be considered as no more than a useful tactical device to assure that minimum land requirements will be met.

It is the Department of State's understanding that the Department of Defense concurs in the relative priority of the political status and optimum land requirement objectives. In particular, we understand that it is not the intent of the Department of Defense that negotiation of the optimum land requirement be pressed in the event that it becomes clear: (a) that the requirement cannot be satisfied under reasonable conditions, and (b) that a continuing "determined" effort to obtain that requirement may significantly delay or threaten the objective of early agreement on and implementation of a satisfactory status settlement.]

B1, A5
B5

The Department of State believes that, if this interpretation of the Department of Defense's position is correct, no amendment or change in the Under Secretaries Recommendations to the President, or in the proposed draft instructions for the President's Personal Representative, is required.

Recommendation: To assure that there will be no future misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the respective positions of the concerned departments, the Under Secretaries should request the Department of Defense to confirm that the above interpretation of its position is accurate.

C. Views of the Departments of Defense, Interior and State on the Interagency Study: This memorandum and its attachments, and similar memoranda from the other concerned departments, should be considered an integral part of the Marianas status study.

Recommendation: That the Under Secretaries instruct the Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations, and the Departments of Defense, Interior, and State to annex such memoranda to the record copies of the Interagency Group study on the future political status of the Mariana Islands.

3/23/73

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

OS- 424520

REF ID: A66000
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

TAB B

The Impact of Potential Japanese Economic Activity in
the Mariana Islands on the Status and Land Negotiations

There is a strong presumption in the study that the Marianans see their future economic growth as almost totally dependent on the establishment of large scale U.S. military facilities. This may well have been true when the Marianas leaders first began actively pursuing separate status. Defense activities had been the corner-stone of the prosperity of nearby Guam which they have looked upon as an example of what they might achieve. Other sectors of the Guam economy have boomed, however, in the last few years with heavy influxes of investment from the United States, Japan and Taiwan. The Marianans have been in close touch with Guamanian leaders who continue to attach great economic importance to U.S. defense activities on the island but have become increasingly concerned that military land requirements not inhibit the growth of conventional commercial activity.

The Marianas political leadership is well aware that their islands have a considerable potential for the development of tourism and agriculture. Saipan already attracts more tourists than the rest of Micronesia and further heavy investment in hotel construction is soon to come. The exercise by Japan Airlines of landing rights on Saipan which they already hold is only a matter of time. The Mayor of Tinian has publicly discussed plans for the construction of a four hundred room hotel on that island which would hardly square with Department of Defense plans for the utilization of Tinian. Tinian is also the site of one of the few attempts at large scale agricultural development in Micronesia with several thousand cattle now grazing on TTPI public lands.

As in the case in Guam, the Marianas leaders will probably welcome our defense requirements to the extent that they do not preclude other types of development. [The opening position suggested by Defense (all of Tinian, and harbor and airfield requirements on Saipan) will considerably exceed Marianan expectations and could delay completion of the negotiations if pursued for any length of time.] Economic perspectives in the Marianas are changing rapidly and it is important that our requirements be quickly agreed upon before they become unattainable or unduly expensive.

B1, A5
B5

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
REF ID: A66000

OS-424521

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

2

The above considerations do not require any change in the Under Secretaries' recommendations to the President, nor in the proposed draft instructions for the President's Personal Representative. But they do underscore: (a) the importance of our primary objective of early agreement on and implementation of a status settlement; and (b) the fact that the Defense Department's optimum land requirement is, realistically viewed, not a feasible negotiating goal and should be considered only as a tactical tool to obtain at least the minimum land requirement.]

B1, A5
B5

3/23/73

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL

OS-424522