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July 18, 1973

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EXCISE

MEMORANDUM


TO : EA/ANP - Mr. Dorrance
FROM : PM/ISO - Jonathan D. Stoddart
SUBJECT: Strategic Importance of Micronesia

DEPARTMENT OF STATE - A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY B.H. BAAS DATE 3/25/87
CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL
RDS or XDS EXP. DATE OADR
TS AUTH. REASON(S) EO 12356
ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS SEC. 1.3(2)(5)
DECLASSIFIED RELEASABLE IN PART
RELEASE DENIED
PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS B1, A5

The following represent PM views regarding your draft comment on DOD's paper on the above subject:

1. Suggest expansion of text beginning at sixth line, p. 2 as follows: "For example, it is difficult, except through the most remote linkage, to relate the TTPI to the defense of the Panama Canal and the continental United States. As also stated on page one, it is claimed that the TTPI is a zone of transit, the continued control of which is basic to the fulfillment of our bilateral treaties with Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China, and the Republic of the Philippines. In reality, the normal great circle transits from the continental United States to these countries pass well to the north of the TTPI, the islands of which have played no significant role whatsoever in any of the several crises since World War II (i.e. Korea, Taiwan Straits, Vietnam) which have affected these bilateral relationships. Further on page two it is stated, etc."



B1, A5

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Attachment No. 23
Document No. 2442
C.A. No. 86-1102

3. Add to end of paragraph 6), p.9 "In terms of meeting future DOD requirements in the "vital LOCs and choke points between the Indian and Pacific Oceans" the liability of

[REDACTED]

B11

4. Revise 1st two sentences of para 9), p. 9 as follows: "More specifically, we consider that the strategic rationale for Palau is credible only if a clear and persuasive Southeast Asia mission for US forces deployed there can be identified. We do not consider that such a case has been effectively made when set against the usual advantages posited in favor of forward deployment."

5. Add to para 10, p. 10 "Finally, marine training requirements in the TTPI should be capable of accommodation on Tinian where the DOD paper (p. 10) identifies as part of the base development plan a requirement for "a Joint Service maneuver and training area." "

6. We also suggest your paper incorporate the Department's reservations on some specious augmentation advanced in the DOD paper on "hard" vs "soft" bases (p.4 ¶) It should be emphasized that lateral leverage on "soft base" host nations can be effective only if the alternative basing option is credible and will be invoked by the U.S. For instance the fiscal resources and indigenous manpower requirements to relocate our current base structure in WESTPAC to the TTPI are formidable.


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In connection with the foregoing the DOD paper clearly indicates that DOD is viewing Tinian as additive to our current WESTPAC basing structure and intends to proceed

with the development of facilities there without adequate reference to the status of our current base structure in WESTPAC or to the conclusions of the NSSM 171 Study. In our judgment BOD should be closely queried on what may at this time be a redundant base complex at Tinian developed at considerable cost. (\$114m). This particularly applies given the relative viability of our current WESTPAC base structure where we have little reason to assume our presence in Japan (to include Okinawa) or the Philippines will be terminated or significantly altered in the foreseeable future. Consequently, a final decision on development of the Tinian base complex, as well as Palau contingency options, should be deferred until it can be considered within the context of NSSM 171.

There are other inherent weaknesses in the plans for the base development plans on Tinian, as we understand them. Vehicle rehabilitation and repair and ship repair facilities will operate much less efficiently on Saipan than the comparable facilities do now on Okinawa and at Subic Bay. These two proposals are probably not cost effective. In fact we seriously doubt that indigenous labor is sufficient in quantity or potential technical proficiency to perform the high quality skills now carried out at the Navy ship repair facility at Subic. B1

 The Defense Department's plans for resolving these problems need to be carefully weighed before any future base construction on Saipan is approved.

We have also made some editorial or substantive inter-linear comment on your draft which we commend for your consideration.

PM/ISO:JDSoddart:JRDewenter:ml
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Clearance: PM/ISP - Mr. Brown