

November 10, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MARIANAS FILE

Subject: Meeting with Mr. Doolin of Department of Defense  
on November 8, 1973

Pursuant to arrangements made by Mr. Carter, we (Messrs. Carter, Helfer and I) met with Deputy Assistant Secretary of ISA, Dennis Doolin, on November 8, 1973. The purpose of the meeting was to inform Mr. Doolin generally of our view of the current status of negotiations, specifically with respect to the U.S. military proposals, and to alert him to our concern that an impasse in the negotiations on this subject would be in the interest of neither party. Mr. Doolin met with us alone for approximately 30 minutes. The meeting was very frank and amicable. The following points arose during the meeting:

- (1) By way of introduction, I reviewed the negotiations up to this point on the question of U.S. military needs. I identified four issues as being the critical ones:
  - (a) The extent of the Tinian land needs.
  - (b) The question of civilian control over that portion of Tinian not needed by the military.
  - (c) The question of lease rather than sale.
  - (d) The contingency needs on Saipan.

I briefly summarized the positions of the parties on these issues and emphasized that no meetings or other negotiations on this subject had occurred since the last session, notwithstanding the indication in the Joint Communique that such discussions would be undertaken to clarify and refine the U.S. proposals. I said that we had no indication that the U.S. Delegation was prepared to modify its proposals in any respect whatsoever and that, if no modification was made in these demands, we did not believe that progress could be made on this issue during the next session. I generally emphasized the need for flexibility and greater sensitivity by the

U.S. Delegation to certain of the broader policy questions involved, such as the need for eventual approval by the people of the Marianas and the United Nations and the necessity of good military-civilian relations in the future on Tinian and in the Marianas.

- (2) One of the first issues to which Mr. Doolin responded was the sale/lease question. He stated that he believed that Congress would be very reluctant to fund the expensive construction involved on leased land. We indicated our awareness of U.S. preference for purchasing land within the United States but suggested that the foreign practice is more relevant. He did not accept this comparison and seemed fairly firm in believing that the United States would insist on purchasing the lands needed for its facilities.
- (3) Mr. Doolin informed us that he had participated in briefing at least one of the responsible Congressional subcommittees, that headed by Congressman Sikes. He said that the members of this subcommittee at least were very supportive of the Executive Branch's desire for the Tinian base. I informed him of our experiences on the Hill which suggested that other of the concerned subcommittees did not feel that they had been adequately briefed concerning the Tinian base. Although he was glad to have this intelligence, Mr. Doolin did not evidence any concern about eventual Congressional support for the base.

Several times during the meeting, Mr. Doolin said that we were talking to the wrong person. He stated that his office is currently playing only a supportive role and that our comments should be addressed to Ambassador Williams. I said that we had been trying to have this kind of dialogue with the Ambassador and his staff and hoped to meet with him in the near future to make yet another attempt. Mr. Doolin did indicate, however, that he has a full-time member of his staff, one Captain Weyland, concerned only with defence requirements and activities in Micronesia. He encouraged us also to talk to Captain Weyland if we thought that it would be useful.

At one point in the meeting Mr. Doolin expressed the opinion that our clients did not have as many options as they might think. He did not elaborate on this view, which was expressed in friendly way, but seemed to reflect a sharing of the Ambassador's views that the Trust Territory was after all under U.S. control and the United States might see fit to build a base there whether or not the people consented to their doing so.

With respect to the contingency needs on Saipan, Mr. Doolin emphasized the need to preserve the "access" to the harbor and the airfield by U.S. military forces in time of need. He spoke frequently in terms of access or use, rather than ownership, in relation to these two ~~bases~~ <sup>uses</sup> on land in Saipan. We suggested that these rights could undoubtedly be assured by means short of outright purchase of the land by the United States and he seemed to share our view that this was a matter which could be resolved by the negotiating parties without too much difficulty.

On the subject of the extent of the Tinian base, Mr. Doolin did not have any useful advice or comments. He did not seem to know, or in any event was not willing to share with us, the results of the recent planning and surveying efforts on Tinian. He did seem reasonably confident that the negotiations would be successful on this issue because he stated that both parties needed them to be successful. We emphasized on several occasions the need for the members of the Commission to be able to defend the results of any negotiated agreement with the United States to their constituents and the fact that some modification of the Tinian proposal, even if it involved only a few thousand acres, would be very helpful in this respect.

At the conclusion of the meeting, I was somewhat more direct than previously and told Mr. Doolin that we hoped that the civilian side of DoD, represented by his office, would take a hard look at the military proposals and see if any modifications could be made. We stated that we had a high opinion of the capacity of the civilians in DoD to put hard questions to the military proponents of such plans and that we hoped he and his staff would undertake this effort again regarding Tinian. We also stated that we hoped that he would use his best efforts to see that the U.S. Delegation exhibited somewhat more flexibility and sensitivity on this subject than had been demonstrated to-date. He seemed to understand what I was saying, which was really not difficult, but we have no idea what message, if any, he will communicate to Ambassador Williams and his loyal staff.