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(After disclaimers)

I'll get right to the point. I believe in the necessity and the validity of the U.S. military plans for Tinian and the rest of the Northern Marianas. But at the same time I get the feeling that, for a number of reasons, the implications of such a military presence, beyond the present needs now being negotiated for, have not been outlined in detail to your people. The people of the Marianas are going to have the opportunity in the near future to ratify or reject the agreements now being made in their behalf at the negotiating table. I believe, as I know you all do, that the decision they make should be an educated one, based on full knowledge of the issues. If they are not provided with the information necessary to make such an educated decision, then contingencies which may well arise in the future could cause much resentment, and possibly a feeling of having been deceived, which would annul the good faith efforts made by their negotiators. If ^{you people} ~~they~~ make the decision after considering all of the facts and contingencies, as I myself hope they will, then we really will have created the partnership concept that our negotiators have been speaking of for the past two years.

What I'm going to do today is to attempt to define very clearly for you the Northern Marianas' place in the United State's overall strategic picture, looking 10 to 15 years ahead. I will agree with you at the outset that this is a speculative venture, but I hope that you will agree with me when I'm finished that the speculation it involves is based on facts, and clear inferences

made from those facts, and as a result that what I'm saying is not really as visionary as it may initially seem.

Before I do this, however, I would like to clarify two important matters. First of all, let's make certain that we understand what it means to grant the military base rights. On Tinian, for instance what you are not in the process of doing is giving the military a 2500-man base. What you are doing is giving them rights to a base which will initially house 2500 permanent personnel. I believe that this is an important distinction. The manpower figures that are being used in the negotiations reflect current needs. Once it is granted base rights, the military will be free to use the base area in any way that future contingencies dictate. This isn't necessarily bad-- but you should understand that this is the nature of the agreement.

Secondly, I would like to clarify just what is meant by a contingency. There seemed to be some initial question about this last year when the U.S. NEGOTIATORS outlined their contingency requirements for Saipan. Senator Pangelanian objected to the contingency requests and labelled them "hypotheticals". Ambassador Williams countered by assuring the Mariannas delegation that they were "not hypothetical~~s~~ but contingent; that is, (it) will be needed immediately if we were to move out of some other location or if another location could handle a new requirement." In other words, contingencies are part of a plan. To illustrate, we might examine the most common form of contingency planning -- the will. The average will that a man makes out contains a provision which reads something like, "all my belongings to my wife, Mary Ann, but if she is not living at my death, to my children in equal portions." The children

032336

in this situation take under the will only as contingent beneficiaries -- that is, their bequest is activated only if the man's wife dies before him. But they are included in the testamentary plan. Similarly, military base planning includes present sites and alternates, or contingent areas that would house bases if the present sites were for some reason deactivated. Thus, our Pacific base plan might read, "bases in Korea, Japan, Okinawa, and other sites, but if certain of these bases are abandoned, then bases in the Mariana Islands." This in essence, is the present function of most of the land here in the Northern Marianas, as well as the large areas on Guam which are not presently being used. Existing bases would be expanded, and new bases built, as contingencies occur which make our present forward basing system unworkable.

So the contingencies that could affect military base relocations to the Mariana Islands aren't local events, with the exception of the initial base grants now being negotiated. They are regional political and strategic realities, and internal fiscal ones, which could quite conceivably cause the U.S. to relocate much, if not all, of its military forces to the Mariana Islands, in a modified posture of course, over the next two decades. What I am going to discuss with you today is: first, why the U.S. would decide to move out of its present forward base structure; second, to what extent such a withdrawal can be anticipated, and, finally, the effect such withdrawals might have on the structure of the military presence here in the Mariana Islands.

First, let's talk a little bit about why the U.S. is altering the structure of its Pacific presence. The present basing system that

032337

the U.S. employs places combat troops in Korea, Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Thailand. It was, for the most part, established under a "forward deployment" strategy following W.W. II in order to carry out the policy of containment of the Communist powers. It also had a valid function under Truman Doctrine principles relating to ^{the protection of} "free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures.": by being present in the countries where conflict was possible, the U.S. placed itself in a position to provide for the local defense of those countries, and thus to accomplish Truman Doctrine goals.

Vietnam taught us that containment was not a viable strategy, and that the Truman Doctrine, which came to be labelled "interventionism" had no sound application in the volatility of East Asia. As such, the original justifications for our combat presence in the individual countries lost much of their credence.

At the same time, it became apparent that the three historical Asian powers, Russia, China, and Japan, were reasserting themselves, each in its own way, in Pacific Asia. Once again the structure and the size of our Asian presence created difficulties, both with our desires to allow the other powers their natural "elbow room" in the name of area stability, and with the desires of many of the countries that housed our combat troops to deal with the other Asian powers

The Pacific had changed from an "American Lake" following W.W.II into the only area in the world where these four powers interact. As such, it became apparent that regional stability required a "normalization" of the U.S. Pacific presence, which would allow it to perform its very necessary area security functions

without needlessly antagonizing other members of the Pacific Community.

These three pressures -- the failure of containment, the failure of interventionism, and the new regional developments which have resulted in a four-way power structure--plus the fiscal limitations of the more recent DOD budgets, caused the implementation in 1969 of a new strategic concept for the Pacific that has been termed the "Nixon Doctrine."

The Doctrine itself is founded on three basic principles. They are:

- 1) That the U.S. will continue to honor all treaty commitments,
- 2) That ~~the~~^{we} U.S. will continue to provide a nuclear "umbrella", and hence protection against intervention by another major power, for both its allies and those other countries whose survival is deemed in our national interest, and
- 3) That we will now look to the nation directly threatened to assume primary responsibility for its own defense.

The Doctrine has two very significant implications with regard to the U.S. PRESENCE IN THE Pacific. First, it recognizes

the need for a continued superpower standoff in the area. Some may question such "cold warriorism", citing the present lack of a direct major threat by another superpower in the Pacific Asia region. However, I personally agree with policy makers that the present low probability of such altercations is a direct function

of the fact that we remain diligent in our preparation for them.

In other words, one would hardly consider removing a police department from the streets because it has finally succeeded. It's sort of like birth control is, really those who practice it would hardly maintain that the probability of an "incident", in controlling crime. Human nature isn't like that. And aggression, while now low, would remain low if they stopped taking the necessary precautions. Like crimes, is an ongoing thing that must be continuously countered.

032379

This superpower standoff is what is meant by "area defense."

The other premise of the Nixon Doctrine with important implications for Pacific Asia is our ultimatum that we will now look to the nation^s directly threatened to assume primary responsibility for their own defense. Such a requirement has two inferences, both of which seem welcome. First, it represents a complete about-face from our interventionist policies. The United States has given clear warning that it will not involve itself in the internal affairs of its allies, or even with regard to external threats, absent very compelling justification. Some policy analysts have termed this concept "selective involvement". Certain of our rather worried allies have labelled it "selective non-involvement". Secondly, it logically follows that our combat forces are being relieved of local defense requirements, since they would ideally be committed to the defense of an ally only in an extreme situation. As such, U.S. combat troops in those countries will not only no longer be necessary, but their continued presence actually goes against the grain of what we are trying to do in Asia. It's no secret that the presence of U.S. combat troops in a country is a de facto guarantee that, if that country is attacked, the U.S. is also attacked and will go to war with it. ~~As such~~, it is rather meaningless to maintain that the country itself is responsible for its own defense, unless the U.S. is in fact free to react to a situation in the country with flexibility. That flexibility is present only when U.S. troops are not present.

By now, I hope it's becoming clear to you that our "forward deployment" strategy, as it pertains to the actual basing of U.S. combat forces in the countries I mentioned, has lost its initial justifications as well as its appeal. Physical containment of the Communist superpowers is no longer viewed as a valid policy objective.

032340

Interventionism has not only gone by the boards, but we now are carefully avoiding any prospect of direct intervention. We also need to "normalize" our presence to make room for a hopefully tranquil, if not particularly comfortable, co-existence with the other powers in the area. In short, we need to alter the structure of our Pacific presence while continuing the aims of regional stability as outlined in the precepts of the Nixon Doctrine.

Another very real input to the need to alter this structure is the fiscal and manpower constraints that the DOD is now being forced to operate under. Domestic pressures and the implementation of the costly Volunteer Army has had a startling and rather disconcerting effect on the size of our general purpose forces, which are now at their lowest level since before the Korean war. Since the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine, the number of ground combat divisions has dropped from 22 to 16; the number of ships in the active fleet has declined from just under a thousand (976) to 535; and ^{THE} number of Air Force tactical squadrons has dropped from 210 to 163.

These constraints have already helped alter the DOD strategic planning concept from a pre-Vietnam "2 1/2 war strategy", to its present "1 1/2 war strategy". Prior to Vietnam conventional force levels were established that were theoretically capable of fighting a major war in Europe, a major war in Asia, and a "brushfire war" anywhere - all at the same time. Hence, "2 1/2 wars". Today, conventional forces are geared to fight a major war in Europe or Asia, and a minor war elsewhere. Hence, "1 1/2 wars". An analysis of DOD policy statements indicates fairly clearly that the major war planned for under the "1 1/2 war" strategy is a European, not an Asian war.

032341

All that, in a nutshell, is why the U.S. is altering the structure of its Pacific presence. The second point that I indicated that I would discuss is the possible extent of this alteration.

To make a long story short, the indications are that it could result in a complete withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from each of the forward deployment countries. In fact, since June, 1969, the total number of U.S. forces in the Pacific, not counting those which were then in Vietnam, has ^{already} been reduced by more than 40 percent, and the political situation in each forward country makes it desirable that, once contingent areas can be secured, the withdrawals should continue. Let me illustrate.

Korea is the most potentially dangerous "hotspot" in East Asia, and as a result our continued presence there poses the most serious risk of becoming involved in a local conflict against our will. As such, it is not surprising that the U.S. has announced its intention to withdraw all combat forces from that country as soon as the present modernization program for its armed forces is completed. Our Korean presence has already been reduced by a third over the past five years, from 61 to 42 thousand.

Japan has benefitted from the U.S. military protection on both a regional and world scale. Nonetheless, there are strong pressures inside Japan to assume a more centrist position in world affairs, and there is much discontent with a policy that calls for an extensive U.S. presence in Japan under a basing agreement that was intended to be temporary. This, coupled with the fact that Japan has undertaken a limited rearmament program, at our urging, which may soon enable her to provide for her own conventional defense, could call for

032342

a total withdrawal from that country in the future. Our ^{Combat} presence there has already halved since 1969, from 40 to 20 thousand.

The same logic applies to Okinawa, which has been the cornerstone of our Pacific presence since W.W.II, but which reverted to Japan in 1972, and is now covered under the U.S. -- Japan Security Treaty. Our Okinawan presence has been the most stable since 1969, but has declined from 43 ~~39~~ ^{to} 38 thousand men.

Our military presence on Taiwan has been a major point of friction in our now-emerging relationship with the PRC. This, plus the fact that the U.S. has recognized since 1972, ^{“Shanghai Communiqué”} that Taiwan is part of "one China," and that our "ultimate objective" is to withdraw our forces as a peaceful settlement is achieved, makes it clear that we are on the way out. By the end of this year our forces will have been reduced by 2/3, from 9,000 to 3,000.

Our Thailand presence was instituted as a result of the Indo-china hostilities. As our role there has diminished, so has our Thailand presence. Our presence ^{there} in Thailand will have decreased from 48,000 in 1969 to 27,000 by the end of this year.

The Philippines are an example of a country where the political and psychological liabilities of a continued military presence simply outweigh the strategic advantage of retaining combat forces there. The country is heaving with dissension and internal ferment, and although we have base rights there until at least 1991, there is no overwhelming strategic need for them if alternative sites could provide the logistical and voyage repair facilities now housed there. ^{If we leave the other forward areas,} As such, a complete withdrawal simply makes good sense. Since 1969, troop levels there have almost halved, from 27,000 to

032343

14,000.

So --- with regard to the extent of the withdrawal from these forward areas, I think that we can safely say that ^{the "consequences" are very real, and} it is quite conceivable that we will totally withdraw our forces from the forward areas in the next ten to fifteen years.

Which brings us to the third point of our discussion: what effect would this have on the Northern Marianas? I personally believe that the withdrawal of our forces from the forward countries will be accompanied by a consolidation here in the Mariana Islands.

...y. Given the fact that it is both desirable and necessary that we alter the structure of our Asian presence, coupled with the fact that it is the intention of the U.S. to remain a Pacific power, the most logical strategic option is to consolidate our forces into an interior position. From there they could perform area security functions without having to be tasked with local defense responsibilities in the forward countries and without the fiscal and logistical burden now present in our scattered base system.

What, you may be asking yourself, is an interior position? It is a term used by strategists to denote a posture taken by a force, usually inferior in numbers, to enable it to react in more than one direction and thus maximize the use of its numbers by concentration. Such a consolidation also decreases logistical burdens by eliminating multiple supply lines, and enables a maximum percentage of forces to be deployable, since it reduces the number of places to be defended. Given the fiscal, hardware and manpower constraints that the U.S. is facing in the Pacific, it looks like an interior position would be an ideal solution.

And the Mariana Islands would make an ideal interior position. First, Guam and the northern Marianas are centrally located with

032344

respect to possible Asia commitment points. Guam is approximately 1,500 miles from Tokyo and Manila, 2,000 miles from the Chinese and Korean coasts, and 3,000 miles from Singapore. Secondly, they are on American, and what will be American, soils. Thirdly, they are readily defensible. And fourthly, there really isn't anywhere else to consolidate! If the U.S. does pull out of its forward positions, and does attempt to remain a Pacific power on an operational basis, it must either consolidate in ~~and around~~ ^{the Mariana Islands,} Guam, or completely alter the nature of its military presence to the extent that it would, in effect, cease to be a Pacific Power. There is no point between Guam and Hawaii that could house a credible military presence. A fleet's operational radius from Hawaii would add 7,400 miles, roundtrip, onto a naval presence which would otherwise emanate from the Mariana Islands.

What does this mean? Basically, it means that, if the U.S. retrenches from its forward position, as it appears that it should and will, Guam and the Mariana Islands will likely absorb the consolidation of military forces.

What would such a consolidation consist of? That is a most difficult question. The forward deployment countries currently house 144,000 men -- but don't let that figure scare you. A large percentage of those are committed to local defense missions in the countries themselves. They would be eliminated altogether, rather than be consolidated. Another significant percentage of the forces are involved in logistical missions which would be streamlined by a consolidation. Still others might be eliminated as area responsibilities themselves are changed from the traditional offensive and defensive mission to one that is primarily operational and aimed at area stability.

032345

I personally would not feel comfortable making a prediction regarding the exact structure of a consolidation at this point. It's pretty hard to look 15 years ahead and outline which missions would be assigned to Tinian, which to Guam, and which might activate contingencies with respect to Saipanese lands. I don't even regard that as being particularly important right now. What is important, I think, is that the people of the Marianas understand two things before they exercise their vote in a plebescite: first, ~~they should understand that it is~~ quite conceivable that ^{in future years} there will be a larger military presence ~~in future years~~ that what is now being planned for. And secondly, they should understand why: that such an increased military population will be the backbone of our future Pacific presence, and as such, the absolute key to the stability of the area.

032346