

DOD PROGRAM FOR DEVELOPMENT OF BASE ON TINIAN

July 2, 1974  
(revision) 03  
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PURPOSE

- To review with DepSecDef the state of planning and activities regarding a base on Tinian, and seek his support for the proposed program to fund development of the base.

PROBLEM

- As a basis for decision by the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense the paper on Issue 5 is considered to be misleading. It takes a negative approach to a request to fund a multi-service base on Tinian and does not highlight adequately the fact that DepSecDef on 29 March 1973 and SecDef on 5 December 1973 approved the development of a base, including its general missions. Consequently, during the Marianas Negotiations the President's Personal Representative for these negotiations has publicly committed the US to the development of such a base over the next 7-10 years.

BACKGROUND

- The Draft Logistic/Materiel Support Issue Paper, prepared by OASD/PA&E and currently scheduled for review with Secretary Schlesinger next Wednesday, 24 July, contains "Issue 5: Future Plans and Funding for Tinian" (Copy at TAB A).
  - The background and discussion of Issue 5 (TAB A) paint a negative picture, deemphasize the importance of the base and its relation to the Marianas negotiations, and does not adequately highlight the degree to which DOD and the US is committed to developing a base on Tinian.
- Over the past three years, in official classified and unclassified communications, DOD has been planning to develop a base on Tinian ... in conjunction with the status negotiations to make the Marianas a commonwealth of the United States ... subject to successful negotiations and Congressional approval.
- A high level of public interest in the base plans, both from a positive and negative viewpoint, has made it necessary for the US negotiator to brief and discuss in detail with the Mariana's people the general plans for the base.
- To respond to the DPA&E comments on the Tinian base program item, an advanced copy of the ASD/ISA comments on the issue paper are provided at TAB B.
- The earlier directives and guidance from Secretary Laird in June 1972, Deputy Secretary Clements in March 1973, and Secretary Schlesinger in December 1973 are at Enclosures 1, 2, and 3 to TAB B.

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- Additionally, Deputy Secretary Clements has been debriefed in June 1973, January 1974 and June 1974 by Ambassador Williams following formal rounds of Marianas negotiations, and should be familiar with the state of play.
- An advance copy of a talking paper for your use in the July 24 session is at TAB C.

DISCUSSION

- Citing the programming problem outlined above, review the developments to date in regard to the Marianas and Tinian base development plans, and seek his support for approval of this program in the session with Secretary Schlesinger and ASD/PA&E Sullivan on next Wednesday, July 24.

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Tab 2

ISSUE 5: FUTURE PLANS AND FUNDING FOR TINIAN

(U) What facilities does DoD plan to build in Tinian and how should they be funded?

BACKGROUND:

(S) Development of a base on Tinian was first proposed by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense in October 1971. At that time, the primary requirement for a base was as a relocation site for nuclear weapons from Okinawa when it reverted to Japan. However, training and war reserve storage were also included in the requirements. The estimated cost of the facility was \$30 million, to be paid from the Okinawa reversion settlement.

(S) In the spring of 1972 the JCS requirement was expanded to include SIOP reflex and mobility aircraft thrupt capabilities and the estimated cost increased to \$114 million. SecDef authority to request funds in the FY 74 programming cycle was granted in June 1972 with the provisions that individual mission requirements would be reviewed in the normal programming cycle and that the facility would be funded within fiscal guidance. The Air Force was designated Executive Agent for the project.

(U) Only \$2 million to partially fund land acquisition was requested in FY 74, and this request was denied during the OSD budget review. No funds were requested in the FY 75-79 Air Force POM. The current Air Force POM includes funds for Tinian -- now estimated at \$322 million including \$22 million for land acquisition -- above the line, of which \$10 million is for FY 76 and a total of \$198 million during the FY 76-80 program.

(U) The mission requirements, submitted by CINCPAC and CINCSAC, have been validated by the JCS. The individual requirements have never been explicitly reviewed and approved by OSD. Implicit approval might be inferred from a number of actions including: (1) DepSecDef endorsement of a March 1973 NSC Under Secretaries Committee study on Mariana's negotiations and (2) a Secretary of Defense letter in December 1973 to Ambassador Williams confirming DoD's commitment to the Tinian project and our intention to request the necessary funds from Congress.

(U) Plans to build a base on Tinian were first made public during the Marianas' negotiations in May-June 1973. Since that time the people of the Marianas have been led to expect substantial benefits including access to base utilities, jobs on the base, stimulation of the local economy by the presence of military personnel and their dependents, and impacted areas school funds to offset the disadvantages of having a base on Tinian. They have also been assured of continued access to harbor and airfield facilities once these are taken over and improved for military use.

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DISCUSSION:

(S) JCS-stated requirements now include an airfield for SIOP activities, mobility aircraft thruput, P-3 operations, and support of aircraft for training; a port for delivery of supplies to the island and support of USMC training; a training area for brigade-sized maneuvers; and a logistics complex for conventional and nuclear weapon and other war reserve storage. Except for Marine training, all of these functions are currently being performed on Guam (100 nm southwest), and there is at present no proposal to transfer activities from Guam to Tinian. However, Guam's single port could become a bottle-neck if, in the short term, it became necessary to transship (either in or out) large quantities of munitions. On the other hand, Marine training could be conducted on Tinian even if a major base were not built.

(S) Construction of an additional B-52 capable base would provide SAC some added dispersal capability, although basing capacity is not needed as they do not plan to increase the number of B-52s deployed to WESTPAC. However, the added survivability provided by the additional base is minimal as SLBMs could reach both bases before any bombers could be launched.

(S) Nuclear weapon storage on Tinian would be necessary for SIOP activities, and the requirements include space to meet the JCS-stated shortfall between space available and deployments authorized on Guam (265 weapons), as well as space for the weapons previously authorized on Taiwan (47 weapons). The Tinian requirements include facilities for storage of conventional war reserves, although Service POMs report no shortfall of storage in WESTPAC for which construction is not already planned in locations other than Tinian. However, there is currently no comprehensive, integrated plan for war reserve and other materiel storage in the Western Pacific that is tailored to current U.S. strategic thinking and based on realistic assumptions about likely future base availability in that area.

(S) A base on Tinian might be useful in a major deployment to Asia if use of bases on Japan were denied us. In that case, all aircraft would then have to fly mid-Pacific routes and Guam might become a chokepoint. However, we know of no analysis which has addressed base requirements under this consideration.

(U) Regardless of the utility of the proposed facilities, we have made a commitment to the people of the Marianas. Member of the Marianas Delegations have specifically questioned Ambassador Williams on the firmness of DoD's plans and on the extent of Congressional approval, and have received assurance of our determination. Perhaps the only acceptable reason we could offer for a change of plans would be the substantial increase in cost shown in the POM -- almost 125% over the last figure reported to OSD.

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ALTERNATIVES:

(U) Alternative 1. Accept the POMs which include no funds for Tinian; cancel plans for any near-term development of Tinian.

(U) Alternative 2. Approve the current JCS/Service plans.

A. Add the necessary funds to the Air Force program for FY 76-80.

B. Add funds to the Air Force program for FY 76 only, and direct that requirements be funded within fiscal guidance in the FY 77-81 POMs.

(U) Alternative 3. Add to the FY 76 Air Force program the funds requested for facility design based on the current JCS-stated requirements, but conduct a joint OSD/JCS review of mission and facility requirements on Tinian to determine (1) the minimum essential set for DoD purposes and (2) those activities which might best fulfill our commitment to the people of the Marianas. This reexamination of DoD requirements on Tinian should be done in conjunction with a comprehensive examination of DoD materiel storage requirements throughout the Western Pacific.

A. Plan to add funds as determined by this review to the Air Force program before issuing fiscal guidance for FY 77-81.

B. Direct that any requirements validated during the review be funded within fiscal guidance in the FY 77-81 POMs, with no increase in fiscal guidance for that purpose.

COSTS OF ALTERNATIVES:

(U)	FY 76		FY 76-80
	TOA	Outlays	TOA
Alternative 1 (POM funding)	0	0	0
Alternative 2A	+\$10M	+\$9M	+\$198M
Alternative 2B	+\$10M	+\$9M	+\$10M
Alternative 3A	+\$10M	+\$9M	Unknown
Alternative 3B	+\$10M	+\$9M	+\$10M

DECISION:

Alternative \_\_\_\_\_

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ASD (ISA) Comment: As a basis for decision by the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense the paper on Issue 5 is considered to be misleading. As written it takes a negative approach to a request to fund a multi-service base on Tinian and does not highlight adequately the fact that DepSecDef on 29 March 1973 and SecDef on 5 December 1973 approved the development of a base, including its general missions. Consequently, during the Marianas Negotiations the President's Personal Representative for these negotiations has publicly committed the US to the development of such a base over the next 7-10 years.

Therefore I recommend Alternative 3, but with a new sub-alternative to direct that user Services fund proportionate amounts in their FY77-81 POMs.

DETAILED COMMENTS - NEXT PAGE

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

\* Enclosure to JCS 2326/38-5  
\*\* Enclosure A to JCS 2326/38-7  
\*\*\* Enclosure to JCS 2326/38  
\*\*\*\* Enclosure A to JCS 2430/207-4

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: U. S. Military Base Complex in the Mariana Islands

- REFERENCES:
- (a) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum dated February 28, 1972, subject: Early Development of a U. S. Military Base Complex in the Mariana Islands (JCSM-78-72)\*
  - (b) Vice Director, Joint Staff memorandum dated March 22, 1972, subject: Military Basing in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (JCSM-126-72)\*\*
  - (c) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum dated October 18, 1971, subject: Military Basing in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (JCSM-456-71)\*\*\*
  - (d) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum dated May 9, 1972, subject: Storage of PACAF Tactical Bombs at or Near Andersen Air Force Base (JCSM-212-72)\*\*\*\*

The fourth round of the Future Political TTPI Status Talks, recently completed with the Micronesians, established the fact that separate negotiations will be conducted with the Marianas. It is, therefore, no longer considered necessary to delay planning and programming actions for U. S. military facilities on Tinian. Accordingly, as recommended in reference (a), the appropriate Military Departments may proceed with classified facility programming actions for the near-term Tinian requirements, as defined in reference (b), for initial inclusion in their Military Construction (MILCON) Program commencing in FY 1974 in accordance with normal procedures. The total near-term requirements defined in reference (b) consist of construction for a B-52 reflex capability, a cargo aircraft throughput capability, a logistics complex, a port complex and the development of a maneuver area. This new base complex would be manned by the Air Force with approximately 940 military personnel and by the Navy with approximately 49 military and 15 civilians.

The foregoing is not intended to indicate approval of the individual near-term project requirements indicated in reference (b) since this must await the normal detailed review of such requirements and the justification therefor both within the Military Departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense during the normal MILCON programming cycle. No special programming arrangements will be made by this office to include these requirements in the FY 1974 MILCON Program since each Military Department will be responsible for programming its own requirements within the dollar guidance provided for the FY 1974 and future MILCON Programs.

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definitive cost analyses and evaluation of contractor support requirements can be practicably made only by, or in close concert with, the Construction Agent. It is, therefore, essential, in order that proper budget estimates can be made and an efficient programming sequence established, that the Construction Agent be brought into the planning and programming cycles without delay. Failure to establish meaningful participation by the Construction Agent at this time will lead to unrealistic estimates and will jeopardize the success of this difficult program.

Since no Marine Corps personnel will be stationed at Tinian under the near-term plan and that Service will only use the maneuver area for periodic training, it is assumed that only the provision of minimum facilities are contemplated, if any, to meet such training requirements.

All facility programming actions related to Tinian development will remain classified and all reasonable efforts shall be made by all concerned to prevent premature disclosure which would jeopardize future negotiations once the project documents are made available outside the Department of Defense.

As recommended in reference (b), no action will be taken on the long-term Tinian development plans prior to a future strategic determination by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the basing requirements in the Guam/TIPI area. This will also have to await the outcome of the Project Gateway\* review.



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\* Enclosures 1, 2, and 3 to  
Attachment to JCS 1231/98-5

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However, in line with the previous request of the Secretary of the Air Force and in order to ensure coordinated base development of the near-term Tinian facility requirements, the Secretary of the Air Force is designated Executive Agent for the Department of Defense for the near-term Tinian facility requirements development. As Executive Agent, the Air Force should include in the initial program package funding for the land acquisition required at Tinian in accordance with the previously established land requirements. This designation of Executive Agent does not include the functions of the Construction or Land Acquisition Agent for this area since those will continue to be the responsibility of the Navy. The Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Secretary of the Navy, should prepare and provide as soon as possible a proposed Charter for review and approval by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) which will delineate his responsibilities as Executive Agent for near-term Tinian facility requirements development. This Charter should also include the proposed programming responsibilities for these near-term requirements. Upon completion, the near-term Tinian base requirements development plan, together with proposed project phasing identified by Military Department, fiscal year and estimated costs, will be submitted to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) for review and approval.

It is noted from reference (b) that the current cost estimate for the near-term facility requirements on Tinian amount to over \$114 million which is in excess of the \$30 million originally estimated in reference (c). While it is recognized that the current estimate includes additional requirements from those envisioned in reference (c), it is considered that the large increase in cost will require multi-year programming for the near-term Tinian requirements by the Military Departments. In this regard, the concerned Military Departments should determine the order of priority for the project requirements within their own FY 1974 and future MILCON Programs. Based upon the urgent minimum requirements submitted by reference (c), it appears that these should be considered for first priority programming. Such action would then also include the PACAF nuclear weapons storage facilities recommended by the Chairman, JCS in reference (d). However, with the lessening of requirements for SAC nuclear weapons storage at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, allowed by the provision of similar storage facilities on Tinian, some PACAF weapons could be stored at Andersen. This would afford PACAF a dispersal similar to that SAC would obtain through use of Tinian facilities. In addition, all projects programmed shall be consistent with and an integral part of the approved future development.

Involved agencies must recognize the extraordinary problems inherently associated with initiating a major program at a new and isolated construction site. Many determinations, such as engineering decisions,

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