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JCS FOR J-5

OSD/JCS REVIEW OF TINIAN BASE REQUIREMENTS (U)

A. JCS 131312Z SEPT 74 (S)

B. PROGRAMMING PLAN 73-1, CRESTED ISLE, DTD 15 SEPT 73

1. (S) IAW REQUEST CONTAINED REF A, A THOROUGH REVIEW OF MARINE CORPS NEAR TERM OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR TINIAN HAS BEEN COMPLETED. MARINE CORPS REQUIREMENTS AS STATED REF B REMAIN VALID. BRIEFLY STATED THESE ARE:

A. A TRAINING AREA CAPABLE OF ACCOMMODATING UP TO MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE (MAB) SIZED EXERCISES TO INCLUDE AMPHIBIOUS, VERTICAL ENVELOPMENT, AND GROUND MANEUVERS.

B. AN AIRFIELD CAPABLE OF PROVIDING EXPEDITIONARY SUPPORT OF USMC AVIATION UNITS DEPLOYED FOR TRAINING TO INCLUDE 16 FIXED WING AND 24 ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT.

C. A PORT FACILITY CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING USMC REQUIREMENTS DURING A MAB-SIZED EXERCISE.

D. A LOGISTIC STORAGE AREA CAPABLE OF ACCOMMODATING TRAINING SUPPLIES AND CONTINGENCY MATERIEL.

2. (S) SUPPORTING RATIONALE.

A. THE III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE (III MAF) IS THE PRIMARY AIR/GROUND FORCE FORWARD DEPLOYED AND IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE TO CINCPAC FOR THE EXECUTION OF CONTINGENCY PLANS/TASKS; E.G., DEFENS

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E NORTHEAST ASIA, DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS, EVACUATION OF U.S. NATIONALS/NON-COMBATANTS FROM THREATENED AREAS (PHNOM PENH), ETC. ACCORDINGLY, THE TRAINING OF III MAF ELEMENTS TO MAINTAIN A HIGH DEGREE OF COMBAT EFFICIENCY AND READINESS BECOMES IMPERATIVE AND VITAL TO OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC.

B. DURING THE PAST FEW YEARS, PRIMARILY DUE TO POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS, WE HAVE WITNESSED A CONTINUAL DECLINE IN THE NUMBERS AND TYPES OF AREAS AVAILABLE FOR TRAINING ELEMENTS OF III MAF. AREAS IN COUNTRIES WHICH HERETOFORE HAVE BEEN READILY AVAILABLE; E.G., IN TAIWAN, THAILAND, KOREA, PHILIPPINES AND JAPAN ARE NOW ESSENTIALLY CLOSED OR, AT BEST, ARE AVAILABLE ONLY FOR LIMITED, LOW VISIBILITY TRAINING EXERCISES THAT ARE POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE. THE LATEST INDICATION OF THE POLITICAL SENSITIVITY ATTACHED TO MARINE CORPS TRAINING EXERCISES IS THE RECENT, 21 AUGUST 1974, DISAPPROVAL OF A BATTALION EXERCISE SCHEDULED FOR KOREA IN LATE SEPTEMBER-EARLY OCTOBER 1974, COINCIDING WITH THE TIME OF THE 29TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION.

C. TINIAN, WITH ITS GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC, UNDER U.S. CONTROL AFTER TERMINATION OF THE UN TRUSTEESHIP STATUS, AND ITS POTENTIAL OF PROVIDING SUFFICIENT AREA FOR THE EXERCISE OF A MAB, PROVIDES AN ASSURANCE OF THE AVAILABILITY OF A TRAINING SITE FOR AIR/GROUND ELEMENTS OF III MAF WITHOUT POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS.

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