

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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RUEKJCS

ZNY TTTTT ZFD RUEK

PP RUEKJCS

CIR271

PYTYZYUM RUKHQGA0027 3190253-TTTT-RUEKJCS.

ZNY TTTTT

P 150137Z NOV 74

FM CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

INFO RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

RUEA11A/CNO WASHDC

RUEO11A/CNO WASHDC

RUEADND/CSA WASHDC

RUNTERA/CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NE

ZEN/COMNAVBORBASESPAC CAMSMH HI

RUEO11A/NOACSS FT MEADE MD

RUNNSAA/CINCPACREP GUAM/TYPI

RUNRB00/DCAPAC KUNIA HI

P 220450Z OCT 74

FM CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI/XO

TO RUNR004/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

INFO RUEFHGA/CSAF DC/XOX/PRP

RUNH11A/CINCPACFLT MAKALAPA HI

RUNHRGA/CH OF STAFF USARPAC FT SHAFTER HI

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FRD CINCPAC FOR J-5

SECTION 1 OF 2

SUBJ: OSD/JCS REVIEW OF TINIAN BASE REQUIREMENTS (U)

REF: A. CINCPAC (S) 110300Z OCT 74 (NOTAL CSAF)

B. CINCPAC (U) 020207Z OCT 74 (NOTAL CSAF)

C. JCS (S) 010316Z OCT 74

D. CINCPACAF/YO (TS) 190600Z SEP 74

1. (S) PACAF LONG-TERM REQUIREMENTS FOR TINIAN REMAIN THE SAME AS NEAR-TERM REQUIREMENTS OUTLINED IN REF D IF PROGRAMMED FORWARD BASING POSTURE IS NOT CHANGED.

2. (S) REGARDING DENIAL OF BASING RIGHTS, U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN SELECTED FORWARD AREAS IS THE CORNER STONE OF U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR ASIA. ANY MAJOR DEGRADATION IN OUR CAPABILITY TO RETAIN U.S. FORCES IN A FORWARD BASING POSTURE


FACE 2 RUVAAA0433 TOP SECRET FRD CINCPAC FOR J-5  
WOULD REQUIRE COMPLETE RE-EVALUATION OF POLICY CONCEPTS FOR THE PACIFIC. SPECIFICALLY, PACAF CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT CINCPAC CONTINGENCY PLANS WOULD BE SERIOUSLY DEGRADED.

3. (TS-FRD) DENIAL OF BASING RIGHTS IN WESTPAC WOULD RESULT IN ADDITIONAL LONG RANGE TINIAN REQUIREMENTS AND WOULD HAVE AN

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FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA  
Handle as RESDAT in Foreign  
Dissemination-Sub Sect 144b  
Atomic Energy Act of 1954



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CJCS	J-6	MCFB	PA	H&E	CIA	NSA
DJS	FRSC	UCHM/CLO	DJRE	SA	CSA	FILE(1)
SJCS	CMC/DJ	SECDEF	ADMA	ASO/T	CNO	
J-1	JRC	ADM	CCRP	VJEG	CSAF	
J-3	EWSS	ISA	JA	VJH	CMC	
J-4	DAS	ML	200	STATE	NSC	
J-5	SASA	G/C		DIR	NIC	TOTAL

IMPACT ON PACAF CAPABILITIES AS FOLLOWS:

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A. (S) WRM: REVIEW OF THE POSSIBLE STORAGE ROLE FOR TINIAN INDICATES THERE ARE UPPER LIMITS TO TOTAL WRM THAT CAN BE STORED THERE IF IT IS TO BE EFFECTIVELY UTILIZED UNDER SCENARIOS OF EXISTING CONTINGENCY PLANS.

(1) MUNITIONS: IF REQUESTED GUAM FACILITIES ARE CONSTRUCTED, ANDERSEN AFB WILL STORE APPROXIMATELY 40 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL PACAF MUNITIONS REQUIREMENT SUBSEQUENT TO 1978. CONSIDERING THE 50,000 SHORT TONS (ST) UPPER LIMIT ESTABLISHED FOR TINIAN, THESE TWO LOCATIONS (100 MILES APART) WOULD EVENTUALLY STORE APPROXIMATELY 60 PERCENT OF ALL PACAF PREPOSITIONED MUNITIONS.

(2) WAREHOUSING: TINIAN UPPER LIMIT ESTABLISHED AT 170,000 SQ FT.

(3) POL: TINIAN UPPER LIMIT ESTABLISHED AT 500,000 BBL. PAGE 3 RUHVAAA9433 T O P S E C R E Y FRD CINCPAC FOR J-5 GUAM HAS A 500,000 BBL STORAGE CAPACITY IN ADDITION TO A REFINERY CAPABLE OF PRODUCING ONE MILLION BARRELS PER MONTH.

(4) THESE UPPER LIMITS WERE PREDICATED ON THE UNDESIRABILITY OF STORING A LARGER PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL PACAF WRM WITHIN A 100-MILE AREA AS WELL AS REAL ESTATE AVAILABILITY ON TINIAN, PORT CAPABILITY, TRANSPORTATION AVAILABILITY AND POSITIONING OF AIRLIFT/SEALIFT. PACAF WRM STORED ON TINIAN AND GUAM MUST BE SHIPPED TO A FORWARD AREA ON IMPLEMENTATION OF CONTINGENCY PLANS. UPON REACHING A CERTAIN STORAGE LEVEL, ASSETS CAN BE SHIPPED JUST AS QUICKLY FROM CONUS TO THE OPERATIONAL THEATER AS THEY CAN FROM GUAM OR TINIAN.

(5) TO MEET CONTINGENCY PLAN REQUIREMENTS, ALL PACAF WRM MUNITIONS MUST BE MOVED FROM TINIAN AND GUAM IN A 55-DAY PERIOD. THE TINIAN PORT MUST BE CAPABLE OF HANDLING APPROXIMATELY 1000 ST PER DAY TO MOVE THE 50,000 ST TO BE STORED THERE. THE MAJORITY OF PACAF POL STORED AT GUAM AND TINIAN WOULD REQUIRE MOVEMENT WITHIN A 35-DAY PERIOD. THE MAJORITY OF ASSETS STORED IN WAREHOUSES REQUIRE MOVEMENT WITHIN THE FIRST TEN DAYS OF WAR PLAN IMPLEMENTATION. THESE FACTORS MAKE FURTHER PAGE 4 RUHVAAA9433 T O P S E C R E Y FRD CINCPAC FOR J-5 EXPANSION OF TINIAN WRM FACILITIES IMPRACTICAL.

(6) LOSS OF FORWARD BASES WOULD CAUSE A DELAY OF 20 TO 30 DAYS BEFORE COMBAT FORCES COULD BE LOGISTICALLY SUPPORTED. DEPENDING ON WHICH CONTINGENCY PLAN WAS IMPLEMENTED, THE COMBAT FORCES REQUIRE UP TO SEVERAL THOUSAND TONS OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT PER DAY. MOVEMENT OF THIS MAGNITUDE MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED PRIMARILY BY SEALIFT WHICH REQUIRES 20 TO 30 DAYS TO BEGIN DELIVERIES TO THE OPERATING AREA.

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CICS	J-6	MOEB	PA	HQE	CIA	NSA
DJS	FMDC	DMRGLD	DRRE	SA	CSA	FILE(1)
SJCS	DMRGLD	SECDEF	ADVA	ASST	CRG	
J-1	JRC	ADM	COMF	WSEG	CSAF	
J-3	EWSD	ISA	LA	WFI	CRG	
J-4	DAS	I/L	ADJUT	ASST	RST	
J-5	SAGA	G/C	ADVA	DIA	RIC	TOTAL

(7) THE MATRIX BELOW REFLECTS TINIAN STORAGE REQUIREMENTS ASSUMING LOSS OF KOREA, JAPAN, TAIWAN OR PHILIPPINE BASING RIGHTS. ALSO REFLECTED IS HRM THAT WOULD BE RELOCATED TO OTHER PACOM BASES AS WELL AS THAT TO BE RETURNED TO THE CONUS. FIGURES ARE NOT ADDITIVE.

OPTION	TINIAN RQMT	OTHER PACOM BASES RQMT	CONUS OVERFLOW
<b>LOSS OF KOREA:</b>			
MUNITIONS (S/T)	50,000	NONE	NONE
WAREHOUSE (SQ FT)	60,000	20,000	30,000
POL (BBLs)	200,000	100,000	100,000
<b>LOSS OF JAPAN</b>			
PAGE 5 RUHVAAA9433 T O P S E C R E T FRD CINCPAC FOR J-5 (INC OKINAWA):			
MUNITIONS (S/T)	45,000	NONE	30,000
WAREHOUSE (SQ FT)	120,000	30,000	30,000
POL (BBLs)	500,000	200,000	110,000
<b>LOSS OF TAIWAN:</b>			
MUNITIONS (S/T)	40,000	NONE	NONE
WAREHOUSE (SQ FT)	70,000	20,000	NONE
POL (BBLs)	500,000	200,000	50,000
<b>LOSS OF PHILIPPINES:</b>			
MUNITIONS (S/T)	35,000	NONE	NONE
WAREHOUSE (SQ FT)	170,000	30,000	60,000
POL (BBLs)	425,000	200,000	NONE

B. (S-FRD) TACTICAL AIRLIFT FORCES: C-130 AIRCRAFT CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO PACAF WILL BE REASSIGNED TO MAC IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THEREFORE, PACAF COMMENTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN LIGHT OF STATED MAC REQUIREMENTS FOR TINIAN. CURRENT PROGRAMMED BEDDOWN OF PACAF TACTICAL AIRLIFT IS THREE SQUADRONS AT KADENA AIR BASE. ANY BEDDOWN CONCEPT SHOULD LOCATE THE FORCE AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO POTENTIAL CONTINGENCY AREAS AND/OR CUSTOMERS. FOR THIS REASON, LOCATING TACTICAL AIRLIFT ASSETS AT TINIAN OR ANDERSEN SHOULD OCCUR ONLY IF THERE ARE NO OTHER SUITABLE WESTPAC FORWARD BASING ALTERNATIVES.

(1) DENIAL OF TAIWAN, KOREA, OR PHILIPPINE BASES WOULD NOT IMPACT ON CURRENT PROGRAMMED AIRLIFT BEDDOWN.

(2) DENIAL OF JAPANESE BASES (INCLUDING OKINAWA) WOULD REQUIRE RELOCATION OF AIRLIFT ASSETS. THE FIRST OPTION WOULD BE BEDDOWN OF AFFECTED SQUADRONS AT CLARK. SECOND OPTION WOULD BE ONE OR TWO SQUADRONS AT CLARK WITH THE REMAINDER AT TINIAN/GUAM. THE LAST OPTION WOULD BEDDOWN ALL SQUADRONS AT TINIAN/GUAM.

(3) AIRLIFT BASING AT TINIAN/GUAM COULD JEOPARDIZE

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CJCS	J-6	MCCEB	PA	ECCE	CIA	NSA
DJS	NSCC	USMC10	DDRE	SA	CSA	FILE(1)
SJCS	USMC10	SECDEF	7.00A	ASST	CNO	
J-1	J-6	7.00A	DDMP	MCCEB	GSAF	
J-3	IN/3B	IA	7.00A	WH	CSG	
J-4	DAS	7/L	7.00A	STATE	NSC	
J-5	SABA	C/C	7.00A	DIA	III	TOTAL

THE CAPABILITY TO MEET OBLIGATIONS LEVIED BY CINCPAC FOR EMERGENCY WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. ARMY NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM KOREA (PACAF OPLAN 5002).

C. (TS-FRD) FIGHTER/RECONNAISSANCE FORCE: PACAF IS PROGRAMMED TO HAVE THREE F-4 WINGS WITH ONE EACH LOCATED IN KOREA, JAPAN (OKINAWA) AND THE PHILIPPINES. ONE RF-4 SQUADRON IS PROGRAMMED FOR OKINAWA. THE PREFERRED BEDDOWN OPTION IF BASING RIGHTS ARE DENIED IN ANY OF THE ABOVE COUNTRIES IS RELOCATION TO REMAINING WESTPAC FORWARD BASES. THE FIGHTER/

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BEFORE SUPPORTING BBN COULD BE MOVED INTO ENVISIONED CONTINGENCY AREAS. TINIAN/GUAM COULD BE USED AS A STAGING BASE FOR THE PAGE 2 RUHVAAA0434 T O P S E C R E T PRD CINCPAC FOR J-5 DEPLOYING FORCES.

(1) SIOP: THE JCS AND HQ USAF NEAR-TERM REQUIREMENT TO STORE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT TINIAN APPEARS TO REMAIN A VALID LONG-TERM REQUIREMENT. CURRENT SIOP SORTIES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS STORAGE LOST BY DENIAL OF FORWARD BASES ARE:

LOCATION	SORTIES	WEAPONS
KOREA:		
8 YFW	22	197
OKINAWA:		
18 YFW	29	0

(18 YFW SORTIES LOAD AND LAUNCH FROM KOREA; THEREFORE, WILL BE LOST BY DENIAL OF EITHER KOREA OR JAPAN BASES.)

PHILIPPINES:

3 YFW	11	226
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D. (S) SUPPORT OF CONTINGENCY PLANS: LOSS OF BASING RIGHTS IN ONE OF THE SPECIFIED COUNTRIES CAN SERIOUSLY DEGRADE THE CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN ANOTHER COUNTRY. FOR EXAMPLE, THE LOSS OF JAPAN BASES WOULD SERIOUSLY IMPACT ON KOREAN OPERATIONS. LIMITED BEDDOWN SPACE IN KOREA CURRENTLY PRECLUDES TOTAL UTILIZATION OF USAF TACTICAL FORCES AVAILABLE PAGE 3 RUHVAAA0434 T O P S E C R E T PRD CINCPAC FOR J-5 FOR A NEA SCENARIO AND LOSS OF JAPANESE BASES WOULD IMPOSE ADDITIONAL CONSTRAINTS. TINIAN, BECAUSE OF ITS LOCATION, COULD NOT FAVORABLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BEDDOWN OF TACTICAL CONTINGENCY FORCES.

E. (S) COMMUNICATIONS: THE DENIAL OF BASING RIGHTS IN EITHER KOREA, JAPAN (INCLUDES OKINAWA), TAIWAN, OR THE PHILIPPINES WOULD REQUIRE A LARGE REROUTING AND CONFIGURATION CHANGE IN THE DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE OF THE NETWORKS TERMINATING IN KOREA IF BASING RIGHTS IN JAPAN ARE LOST. TINIAN IS TOO REMOTE FROM THE AREAS OUTLINED ABOVE TO CONSIDER ITS USE AS A COMMUNICATIONS RELAY. THEREFORE, THE LONG RANGE COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS FOR TINIAN WOULD CONSIST OF INCREASING LOCAL CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT UNITS RELOCATED THERE AS A RESULT OF LOSING BASING RIGHTS IN OTHER AREAS. IF A CONTINGENCY PLAN IS ACTIVATED IN AN AREA WHERE BASING RIGHTS HAVE BEEN DENIED, MOBILE EQUIPMENT WILL BE REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH AN INITIAL COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY UNTIL FIXED FACILITIES CAN BE ESTABLISHED.

4. (S) PRESENT FACILITY PLANNING FOR PROJECTED NEAR TERM

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TINIAN REQUIREMENTS IS COMPATIBLE WITH PACAF LONG RANGE REQUIREMENTS. THE FACILITY PLAN WAS DESIGNED TO PERMIT EXPANSION TO SUPPORT ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS. HOWEVER, TRADEOFFS WILL BE NECESSARY TO ACCOMMODATE LARGE SCALE ADDITIONAL MISSIONS OR EXPANSION OF EXISTING MISSIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, LARGE AMOUNTS OF LOGISTIC STORAGE WILL SERIOUSLY ERODE THE SIZE OF THE TRAINING AREA. XGDS(2)

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