




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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JCSM-448-74  
19 November 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Near-Term Operational Requirements for Tinian (U)

1. (U) Reference a memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation) (Regional Programs), 26 August 1974, "Joint OSD/JCS Study of DoD Base Requirements on Tinian," which requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff identify the near-term operational requirements for Tinian.
2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the near-term operational requirements for Tinian and continue to support the development of Tinian as a multi-Service base. The near-term operational requirements for an airfield, port facility, and training area cited in Air Force Programming Plan 73-1 (CRESTED ISLE), as amended, are revalidated with the following exceptions:



3. (S) For use in the OSD/JCS review, the revalidated near-term requirements, along with supporting rationale, are outlined in Appendix A. The long-range military requirements for Tinian are being evaluated at this time and will be provided for the review in the near future.

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4. (S) In addition to the near-term operational requirements outlined above, there are strategic requirements in Micronesia which are essential to protect US national interests in the Pacific and have a bearing on near-term development of Tinian. There are requirements for the United States to deny the area for military use of third powers, to maintain control over defense affairs in the area, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In this regard, it is important that the United States take no precipitous action which might jeopardize fulfillment of these requirements. [REDACTED]

5. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense have supported\* the seven-phase development of a multi-Service military base complex on Tinian. Planning for future development and land acquisition (Phase I) would satisfy only the minimum near-term requirement for the multi-Service training area. In consideration of the other near-term operational and strategic requirements, the development of Tinian should continue through Phase I plus appropriate upgrading of the existing harbor and airfield similar to that envisioned in Phase II (site preparation). This will provide an adequate basis for rapid expansion for contingency use and hedge against loss of operating rights in Western Pacific countries. The full seven-phase development at this time cannot be justified. This is due to reevaluated near-term operational requirements and the following considerations:

a. The reversion of Okinawa to Japan, while resulting in operating constraints and the impending loss of Naha Air Base, has not yet caused relocation of forces to the extent thought likely a few years ago. Although it is expected that pressure will continue for a further US withdrawal, current indications are that the present US military presence in Japan/Okinawa will be acceptable to the Government of Japan for the next few years.

b. Base denials, although always a possibility for which the United States must plan, have not occurred to any significant degree in the Western Pacific. The base closures and relocations that have occurred were mainly a result of a tighter budget and the Southeast Asia drawdown.

c. The tightened DOD budget has resulted in a realignment of forces and a reduced capability to fund requirements for basing.

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6. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that: (U)

- a. (S) The development of Tinian as a multi-Service base continue, to include planning for future development and land acquisition (Phase I) and appropriate upgrading of the existing harbor and airfield similar to that envisaged in Phase II (site preparation).
- b. (S) A survey be conducted to determine the level of upgrading of the airfield and port required to provide capability for rapid expansion. To minimize the cost, use of DOD resources for effecting the upgrading should be considered.
- c. (S) As events unfold, DOD continue to review military requirements and pursue further phase development based on evolving requirements.
- d. (S) If the development of Tinian is limited to planning for future development, land acquisition, and appropriate upgrading of the existing port and airfield in the near-term, a letter, substantially like that contained in Appendix B, be forwarded to The President's Personal Representative for the Micronesian Status Negotiations.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



ROBERT N. GINSBURGH  
Major General, USAF  
Deputy Director  
Joint Staff

Attachments

References:

- \* (1) JCS 2043/302004Z Jan 74
- (2) Letter from the Secretary of Defense to The President's Personal Representative for the Micronesian Status Negotiations, 5 December 1973

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APPENDIX A

NEAR-TERM OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR TINIAN (U)

1. (S) Airfield capable of supporting the following missions: (U)


a. (S) Providing expeditionary support of the US Marine Corps aviation units deployed for training to include 16 fixed-wing and 24 rotary-wing aircraft.

Rationale. Requirement has high priority because it is vital to support of US Marine Corps air-ground team training. Changing political situations in the Western Pacific underscore the need for alternative training sites for Marine air-ground team operations. The need for the training area is discussed in detail in paragraph 4 below.

b. (S) Serving as alternate airfield for aircraft on trans-Pacific flights diverted from Guam and other islands in Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and for aircraft carriers operating offshore.


Rationale. Capability to accept aircraft from carriers operating in the area is desirable. Traffic density on Guam and joint civilian aviation use of Naval Air Station, Agana, reinforce the need for an alternate airfield for high performance military aircraft.

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2. (U) A port facility capable of:


- a. Berthing a T-5 class tanker and cargo ship simultaneously.
- b. Offloading, storage, and transfer of cargo.
- c. Transferring of POL.
- d. Supporting training requirements.
- e. Accommodating containerized cargo handling.

Rationale for Port Facility. Only remnants of a harbor remain from World War II to support the current civilian population on Tinian. Substantial harbor upgrade and construction will be necessary to develop the harbor to support the Tinian base development and to support the future base operations (airfield, logistics storage, and

training area). The only feasible way to support the  
Tinian base development and to support its operations on  
a sustained basis is to transport the materiel and cargo  
to Tinian via ships.

3. (S) A logistics storage area to accommodate the  
following missions: (U)


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\* Based on mission requirements listed in Programming  
Plan 73-1, CRESTED ISLE

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d. (S) Storage of designated war reserve materiel and pre-positioned war reserve stocks, including materiel to support multi-Service Tinian training.

Rationale. Storage is required as a result of theater relocation needs resulting from base closures. Multi-Service training (primarily by Marine Corps) will require logistics storage.

4. (S) A multi-Service training area permitting the maneuver of a Marine amphibious brigade (MAB) in amphibious and vertical exercises and ground maneuvers.

Rationale

a. The III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) is the primary air/ground force forward-deployed and immediately available to CINCPAC for the execution of contingency plans/tasks; e.g., defense of Northeast Asia, disaster relief operations, evacuation of US nationals/noncombatants from threatened areas (Phnom Penh), etc. Accordingly, the training of III MAF elements to maintain a high degree of combat efficiency and readiness becomes imperative and vital to US national interests in the Western Pacific.

b. During the past few years, primarily due to political considerations, the United States has witnessed a continual decline in the numbers and types of areas available for training. Areas in countries which heretofore have been readily available, e.g., in Taiwan, Thailand, Korea,

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the Philippines, and Japan, are now essentially closed or, at best, are available only for limited, low-visibility training exercises that are politically acceptable. The latest indication of the political sensitivity attached to Marine Corps training exercises is the recent (21 August 1974) disapproval of a battalion exercise scheduled for Korea in late September - early October 1974, because it coincided with the time of the 29th UN General Assembly Session.

c. Tinian--with its geographical location in the Western Pacific, under US control after termination of the UN trusteeship status, and its potential of providing sufficient area for the MAB--provides an assurance of the availability of a training site for air/ground elements of III MAF without political constraints.

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APPENDIX B

DRAFT

Honorable Franklin Haydn Williams  
The President's Personal Representative  
for Micronesian Status Negotiations  
Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations  
Washington, D. C. 20204

Dear Ambassador Williams:

(C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff and I have determined that the developments outlined below dictate a modification in the position regarding the time-phased development of a joint-use base on Tinian.

(S) Military interest in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands was stimulated a few years ago as basing agreements in the Western Pacific began to appear more tenuous. Military requirements were defined for a multi-Service military base complex on Tinian that would:

- Support the surveillance and defense of Micronesia and the lines of communication in the Pacific.
- Provide for combined air-land training.
- Preserve an alternative location in the Western Pacific for US Forces in the event of base denial in more forward areas.
- Provide for a military complex in the Marianas Islands not subject to the increasing political pressures and urban encroachments of Guam.

(S) Recently the position of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to support the seven-phase development of Tinian has been reevaluated in light of some changing circumstances:

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- The reversion of Okinawa to Japan, while resulting in operating constraints and the impending loss of Naha Air Base, has not yet caused the relocation of forces to the extent thought likely a few years ago. Although it is expected that pressure will continue for a further US withdrawal, current indications are that the present US military presence in Japan/Okinawa will be acceptable to the Government of Japan for the next few years.

- Base denials, although always a possibility for which the United States must plan, have not occurred to any significant degree in the Western Pacific. The base closures and relocations that have occurred were mainly a result of a tighter budget and the Southeast Asia drawdown.

- The increasingly tight DOD budget has resulted in a realignment of forces and a reduced capability to fund requirements for basing.

(S) Accordingly, reevaluated near-term military requirements for Tinian and the above considerations do not justify the full seven-phase development at this time. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and I conclude that at this time it would be more appropriate to proceed through Phase I (planning and land acquisition) and accomplish a level of upgrading of the existing port and airfield which would provide a basis for rapid expansion for contingency use and a hedge against base denials in Western Pacific countries. As events unfold, we will continue to review military requirements and will pursue further development based on evolving requirements.

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Appendix B

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(S) We recognize that this change may present problems in the negotiating arena; however, fact-of-life budgetary constraints must be recognized, and, in view of continuing base rights in the Western Pacific, the lessened urgency for full development of Tinian must be taken into account in the allocation of available funds. We regret that this anticipated level of near-term development will fall short of the expectations of the people of the Marianas, and we will be available to assist you in any way we can in formulating the negotiating strategy for presenting the change to the Marianas.

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