

March 13, 1974

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U.S. ACTIONS - TINIAN REFERENDUM

Situation

1. The Tinian leadership has decided to sponsor a referendum on April 7, 1974 that calls for the voters to:

a. Decide on whether they agree to relocate the village of San Jose;

b. Choose between options for military land use on Tinian as follows:

(1) none

(2) 1/3 of the island

(3) 2/3 of the island

(4) other.

2. There appears to be a growing cohesive effort on the part of anti-U.S., anti-Commonwealth, anti-military and various radical elements toward blocking the U.S. from its objectives on Tinian. Although this effort has been extensive, there is no tangible evidence of degree of influence on the vote. There are indications, however, that the voter is confused and would welcome more straight information. (As reported by CDR Westlake and the AF Survey Team recently on Tinian).

Assumptions

1. That the United States will make some efforts to get the correct U.S. position to the Tinianese prior to the referendum.

2. That the United States recognizes the hazards of open U.S. interference but is willing to accept some degree of political risks that may be involved with low key or discrete efforts to provide factual information.

3. That the referendum is not purely an effort to provide the Tinian leadership (and possibly the MPSC) with additional negotiating leverage.

Basic Positions that the U.S. could adopt in their approach toward influencing the Tinian Referendum

1. No Direct Involvement. Herein, the election campaign, the interpretation of trends and the development of actions to counter adverse trends would be left exclusively to the pro-U.S. Tinian leadership and the MPSC. -- However, to help accomplish the basic U.S. objective of an accurate dissemination of available facts the following indirect and discreet steps might be taken:

Step 1. Provide the MPSC and Tinian leadership with adequate copies of the U.S. Land Position Summary (MPSC has received copies and 50 copies have been given to Joe Cruz/Mayor Borja).

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- Step 2. Provide the pro-U.S. Tinian leadership (must include MPSC) with adequate translated copies of the above summary. (CDR Westlake and COMNAVMAR is now having the translation accomplished).
- Step 3. Provide these leaders responsive support for any available factual data they may need and request. (i.e., experience statistics on military/civil activities on Guam, that may relate to similar issues on Tinian).
- Step 4. Provide these leaders with illustrative graphs and pictures to assist their presentation efforts. These may include store-window displays and smaller handouts (such graphics are now being prepared in DOD and will be available by 15 March).
- Step 5. Provide a talking paper, with the above illustrations, that would explain their purpose and at the same time clarify the U.S. purpose and flexibility (paper is being prepared by DOD)
- Step 6. Develop and then announce the basic elements of a U.S. plan for lifting the moratorium (see separate Scott analysis of moratorium problem) - pass copies of the announcement to Tinian leaders ahead of time so they can build their prestige with early dissemination. -- These elements would include:
- a. Reaffirmation of U.S. intent to lift the moratorium as soon as details can be worked out (in consultation with both the Tinian people and the MPSC).
 - b. Statement on priorities to be given those who want to exchange their northern homesteads for land in the south (U.S. must ascertain how many and where).
 - c. Statement on priority to be accorded existing applicants.
 - d. Statement of U.S. intent to minimize any short-term impact on the Ken Jones Ranch operations - Particularly until base development and employment opportunities are well advanced -- (reiterating U.S. guarantee of employment to any Tinian citizen losing his job due to U.S. caused dislocations).
- Step 7. Inform the Chairman of the MPSC (Eddie Pangelinan) of the U.S. efforts to cooperate and encourage a more active participation effort on their part.
- Step 8. Develop with Eddie Pangelinan (presumably during the March meeting) a public statement to the effect that he has discussed the matter with Ambassador Williams who agrees (with Eddie) that while the referendum will be useful and helpful to the negotiating parties, it cannot be considered binding on these negotiations which involve both the interests of all the people of the Marianas and security needs of the United States.

2. Indirect and Discreet Involvement: This position carries a greater (but not necessarily significant) degree of risk in having the U.S. connected with trying to influence the election. -- It envisages, in addition to the above steps, other selective and discreet efforts to provide factual information. These efforts could involve U.S. personnel in the Marianas whose job normally includes such activities as they may be required to undertake. They include:

Step 9. Discreetly encouraging support of the church leadership in the area (Father Flores et.al.) for both relocation and military presence. Such action could best be done by a prestigious native Chamorro of Guam or TTPI. (i.e., Colonel Vince Blas). -- Review for the church leaders the full range of advantages to the church.

- a. New facilities.
- b. Full use of old church
- c. New cohesive community.
- d. Improved educational standards, (quickly).
- e. Expanded jobs to keep young people on island.
- f. Improved standard of living.
- g. Modern no-slum community.

Step 10. Early coordination and discussions should be effected with Ken Jones - aimed not necessarily at gaining his support but at stopping his active opposition.

- a. Mr. Bernie Dove, Ambassador Williams, or Mr. Jim Wilson; along with Colonel Smith, Captain Scott, Colonel Kenty or Captain Whelan visit Ken Jones on Guam (COMNAVMAR Admiral Morrison would be an excellent media for making the initial contact and feeling out Mr. Jones' initial reactions). -- OMSN is preparing draft letter to Admiral Morrison requesting such action.
- b. Explain to him the near-term and long-term probabilities.
- c. Emphasize to him DOD desire to co-exist as long as practicable (well into base development time frame).
- d. Discuss with him trade-off options (more grazing in northern 2/3 and less in south central area) that could be worked out.
- e. Appeal to his patriotism and ask his cooperation.

f. As a last resort (if he is uncooperative) pressure can be hinted at, or applied, for example:

(1) Early termination of his Tinian lease (with-in next year).

(2) Cancellation (by Executive Order) of his Pagan permits.

(3) Minimal cooperation in his future TTPI efforts.

Step 11. Ambassador Williams could discuss with Eddie Pangelinan in Honolulu, the immediate activation of the Joint Civil/Military Community Planning Council. (See separate analysis on this issue)

a. Agree on the make-up (membership) of the council.

b. Announce the activation in the Joint Communique.

c. Purposes may include;

(1) Plan around possible problem areas.

(2) Recommend alternative sites for new village.

(3) Plan property exchanges on Tinian (Northern 2/3 to Southern 1/3).

(4) Establish priorities and locations for present homestead applicants, etc.

Step 12. To implement a series of statements and/or news releases (which could be circulated on Tinian) by the SLNO, CDR Westlake (MPL0), and TTPI/Interior officials (as appropriate) to set the record straight - address only one or two issues per statement.

Step 13. For the SLNO and MPL0 to volunteer to make themselves available to small citizens groups on Tinian (in conjunction with, and only at the behest of, Joe Cruz et.al.) to answer questions on specific issues.

Step 14. To the extent practicable, each AF Planning (Survey) Team that is scheduled for Tinian could "carry the message" to and discuss problems with the people. In this regard announce (ahead of time), and initiate, a series of scheduled (periodic) visits by USAF/DOD executive agent experts. -- These people would be visiting as part of the overall planning effort but while there, would be willing to bring everyone up to date.

- a. Brief everyone ahead of time on current U.S. positions.
- b. Allow these U.S. personnel to seek and discuss alternative locations, facilities, and housing with the people.
- c. Permit them to quietly discuss the issues.

Step 15. Have the TTPI Government begin an immediate effort to identify the desires of the existing Tinian homesteaders who must leave the northern 2/3. -- Publicly assure existing applicants that their priority will follow the needs of existing residents and the relocated community. (Pro U.S. Tinian leadership should be provided this information ASAP --- Mr. Berg of DOTA is working on the problem).

Step 16. Involvement of U.S. banking and business interests to put pressure on the dissidents or anti-U.S. (While practicable, this step should be considered principally as a possible follow-on):

- a. Banks could announce their intent to support loans for prospective concessionaires.
- b. They may even imply that because their business would be enhanced by a large DOD presence, loan money would be more readily available to pro-U.S. entrepreneurs. (Bank of America Manager on Saipan has offered to help).
- c. Businessmen currently involved in, or planning for, entertainment/service oriented enterprises could be recruited to help.

Step 17. As a method for influencing business opinion the U.S. might make clear, through pro-U.S. Tinianese, that the U.S. Base Concessions and sub-contracts are more likely to go to those who have supported the U.S. presence and that there will be far less contracts if there is no requirement to build a new community with its supporting facilities. The message could be disseminated by a newspaper article written by a friend (however, such action should be considered only as a follow-on action as part of a well planned U.S. program).

3. Direct but Discrete Involvement: (SLNO and MPLNO are opposed to such moves)

Step 18. Early publicizing of the forthcoming Marine maneuver.

Step 19. Request DOD to provide Civic Action advance parties to their scheduled Marine exercise. -- Group (or groups) would also be permitted to encourage support for selected elements of the U.S. position.

Step 20. A visit by Ambassador Williams or other OMSN personnel (possibly as an adjunct to a Saipan visit for another purpose).

4. Conclusions and Recommendations

The U.S. could effect a positive influence on the upcoming Tinian referendum without a direct involvement, principally by taking many of the steps listed above (through 16) and by utilizing U.S. representatives currently on the scene, to support the vocal pro-U.S. elements in the campaign.

Al Smith