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To: Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subj: Civil-Military Relations Seminar

Ref: (a) DCS 3650/261855Z APR 74

Encl: (1) Executive Summary Report of Civil-Military Relations Seminar

1. Last year CMC approved PACOM's request to conduct a seminar on "Civil-Military Relations in the Pacific Area." The enclosed report records the conclusions and recommendations. Limited by necessity to a close look at the Trust Territories Pacific Islands (TTPI), the seminar matched six senior academicians with six military, all of them knowledgeable about the area. The group advanced some thoughtful recommendations and created a good base for future Civil-Military Seminars on similar issues.

2. Because of the free-wheeling nature and "academic freedom" enjoyed by seminar participants, the report contains sharp commentary toward some Pacific nations and our own federal departments. For that reason, the report is marked "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY" and will be made no outside distribution.

W. H. McChesney
W. H. McCHESNEY
Rear Admiral, USN
Director for Plans

* Reference (a)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS SEMINAR ON BASING U.S. FORCES ON ANESEL ISLANDS, 30 JULY - 2 AUGUST 1974, MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

The seminar agreed that in establishing any military installations in Micronesia the United States will have to make more provision for dealing with induced change in the local society than has normally been the case. To the maximum extent possible the inevitable change must be at the initiation of, under the control of, and with the approval of the host society. It was felt that complete isolation of the military from the civilian populace was not possible.

The seminar recommended that the civilian side be actively considered in military planning and decisions; that community relations councils, particularly at the working level, be immediately established even in those areas where there is no immediate planned development of military installations. A military presence, even if only a part-time office, should be immediately established on Tinian and in Palau. In this respect, it was pointed out that the concept of "option" applied to land use has little meaning to Palauans and a land option not backed up with specific provisions, active use, and continued presence may become meaningless to the local inhabitants. Civil-military problems must be considered within the context of comprehensive economic and social planning. The civilian leaders must be encouraged to plan for the change induced by the military presence. Areas of control by the host society and military agency should be specified and clearly understood at the outset. In this regard, Status of Forces type of agreements should be concluded as soon as possible. Specific recommendations have been provided by the seminar for Tinian in terms of control of utilities, public access to the base, development of inter-island water transportation, and the obtaining of civilian labor.

The seminar recommended that contact and cooperation among all federal agencies involved with the islands be increased, that a senior American representative resident be established in each governmental unit and that the military, where present, should be incorporated into that "country team." This senior federal representative would provide the interface between the local government and the federal government thus providing a "civilian buffer" for the military. One concern of the federal government would be to ensure that American interests in Micronesia are not undermined by Japanese economic and psychological influences.

The seminar presented many specific recommendations concerning internal programs and policies for the military. Included are recommendations for establishing a data bank on the effects of U.S. military presence on local populations, civil-military relations training, assignment criteria, tour lengths, inter-cultural indoctrination, acquisition of interpreters, liberty and off-base recreation and joint military-civilian use of service facilities.

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REPORT

SEMINAR ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN AREA

Contents

I.	Introduction	Page 1
II.	Summary	Page 3
III.	The Political, Economic and Social Context for Civil-Military Relations in the Pacific Ocean Area	Page 5
IV.	Recommendations on the Political, Economic and Social Context for Civil-Military Relations in the Pacific Ocean Area	Page 16
V.	Recommendations on the General Area of Civil-Military Relations in the Pacific Ocean Area	Page 23
VI.	Recommendations Dealing with the Specific Civil-Military Situations of Possible Basing Activities on Tinian and in Palau	Page 41
Tab A	Initial Statement: "Civil-Military Relations in the Pacific Ocean Area: The Garrisoning of Troops on Small Islands"	
Tab B	Seminar Participants	
Tab C	Agenda	
Tab D	Remarks by Admiral Noel Gayler, USN	
Tab E	Remarks by Rear Admiral G. S. Morrison, USN	

I. INTRODUCTION

The concept of a Civil-Military Relations Seminar, composed of representatives of the military services and civilian academic experts, to consider the problems of basing U.S. forces on small islands was proposed in 1973 and, after discussion, approved by CINCPAC and JCS in early 1974. The proposal envisaged the Seminar as a mechanism to shed new light and ideas upon the problems of establishing and operating such bases during peacetime, and in such a way that minimal problems would be posed for interaction with local residents, for disruption of local cultures, and for support and welfare of U.S. personnel.

The mandate of the Seminar was provided to each participant at the time of invitation (Tab A). Military participants were selected for their knowledge of civil-military relations, their experience with the operation of military bases in the Pacific, and their awareness of developments in process with regard to negotiations for the most probable new basing sites, in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Civilian participants were selected for knowledge of problems of civil-military relations, of the cultures and peoples of the Trust Territory and other Pacific areas, and of the U.S. military establishment. A civilian reporter-editor was employed to assist with the recording of the proceedings and the drafting of the report. A listing of the participants, including qualifications, is provided at Tab B.

The actual planning and operation of the Seminar was delegated by CINCPAC to the Commander U.S. Naval Forces Marianas and Commander in Chief Pacific Representative to Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

Rear Admiral George S. Morrison, USN. The Seminar itself was held at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, during the period 30 July to 2 August 1974. The proceedings were tape recorded, and extensive summary transcripts of the sessions were produced. For five of the eight working sessions, the participants were able to review the transcripts prior to departure from Monterey. All sessions were held in an UNCLASSIFIED environment. The Seminar was characterized by an open and serious working spirit and an intensive presentation and exchange of views. There were no significant disagreements among the participants at the conclusion of the seminar.

II. SUMMARY

The Seminar was presented with an agenda of questions to be considered (Tab C). This agenda was covered in its entirety, although not always in the order indicated. The focus was primarily on basing problems and related matters in the Trust Territory, although broader considerations were discussed and similar consideration was given to other Western Pacific areas.

The working mandate was provided during the first session in statements by Admiral Noel S. Gayler, Commander in Chief Pacific (Tab D) and by Rear Admiral Morrison (Tab E).

In considering the issues presented by these statements as well as by the written agenda, the participants in the Seminar found it useful to discuss overall U.S. strategy and interests in the Pacific, the current status of the negotiations with the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the nature of the peoples and cultures of the Trust Territory, and the history of U.S. relations with the Trust Territory and with other Western Pacific locations. The participants in the Seminar believed that more light could be shed on immediate questions if they were considered in such a larger context.

As a result of the discussion, which ranged from general considerations of national interest and strategy to intensive examination of very specific objectives and problems, the Seminar defined a series of recommendations which were in large measure based upon the specification and acceptance of a set of principles governing U.S. policy and goals in this particular situation. The recommendations can be grouped generally under three major rubrics: the general context of the U.S. position in the Pacific Ocean area;

Section II

general considerations of civil-military relations; and application of those civil-military considerations to the specific cases of Palau and Tinian.

Section III presents the principles upon which the Seminar participants explicitly or implicitly agreed. The subsequent sections present the recommendations derived, with supporting discussion, as follows:

Section IV: Recommendations on the Political, Economic and Social Context for Civil-Military Relations in the Pacific Ocean Area.

Section V: Recommendations on the General Area of Civil-Military Relations in the Pacific Ocean Area.

Section VI: Recommendations Dealing with the Specific Civil-Military Situations of Possible Basing Activities on Tinian and in Palau.

Unless otherwise stated, the recommendations, principles and discussion represent the consensus of the Seminar participants as a group and should not be attributed to any single individual.

III. THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT FOR CIVIL MILITARY
RELATIONS IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN AREA

III-1: There has been, is, and will continue to be a stated need on the part of the United States Government for a United States military presence and capability in the Western Pacific, specifically including all or part of Micronesia.

Since the United States has, and will probably continue to have, limited forces in the Western Pacific, they require the best positions and flexibility in mission and infrastructure. Such forces will be required in order to ensure stability and peaceful evolution in the Western Pacific; to damp down strife and friction; to prevent domination of the Western Pacific by unfriendly powers; to signal continued U.S. political concern over the developments in and status of the region; to deter aggression; to enable the U.S. to exercise a degree of control in the region; to provide for possible withdrawal from other, more forward, positions; to provide for surveillance of the Western Pacific and adjacent areas; to provide assurance to U.S. allies of our continued determination to assist in safeguarding the security of the region; and to provide flexibility to allow for future contingencies.

In accepting the necessity for a military presence and capability so defined, the Seminar noted the critical nature of the Western Pacific region, and particularly the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Micronesia), at the present time and the likelihood that it will increase in the future. It was observed that earlier failures to exercise the U.S. strategic interest in this part of the Pacific cost us heavily, and that

Continued...

the value of the region in strategic terms has recently been reinforced by its role in supporting U.S. military activities in advanced areas on the mainland of Asia.

III-2: If there is to be a military presence, it will be most effective if there is a friendly and supportive local population and local political structure.

A friendly and supportive local situation can make significant contributions to the achievement of the mission of U.S. forces stationed in the area. U.S. self interest thus seems to indicate the long term need for friendly governmental entities in the Pacific. In this sense, civil-military relations, as well as political and economic relations at higher levels, are mission support activities. As importantly, they help fulfill command responsibilities toward military personnel and their dependents.

The participants in the Seminar noted that local governmental entities oriented toward the United States and with sufficient economic strength to be self-sustaining without primary reliance upon either U.S. economic aid or upon the economic benefits of a large U.S. military presence best serve the United States strategic interest. The United States would thus benefit from the development and maintenance of an economically strong and politically friendly Micronesia, exercising maximum feasible internal autonomy. The Seminar did note, however, that there could be a conflict between the principles of strategic interest and those of maximum self-government and autonomy for Micronesia.

III-3: Because of factors of history, politics, self-interest, legality, and morality, the United States has a responsibility for the Trust Territory islands and their inhabitants which is unique among U.S. relationships in the Pacific.

There is an historical, moral and legal obligation which the United States cannot avoid and which must be considered when implementing the strategic mission. The United States has no desire to prescribe the social, moral, legal, or governmental systems of the inhabitants of Pacific islands where there may be military bases, but the establishment of bases and the presence of forces will have effects on the local situation, and will incur costs in a variety of areas.

The Seminar participants agreed that the United States needs to acknowledge its moral obligation to operate on principles of humanity and ethics in dealing with the Trust Territory. This obligation mandates that the United States keep the needs and desires of the Micronesians at the forefront of consideration.

There is a danger that an excessive amount of care and assistance provided to the local populations could have negative effects through inhibiting development of local political and economic institutions and through creating an excessive reliance upon the benefits of the military presence. While past mistakes in many cases should be rectified, care must be taken to avoid the creation of perpetual reliance on U.S. largesse in any form. However, it must also be recognized that any significant military presence may be so comparatively large that military decisions could exert a major, if not controlling, effect upon the economy, social structure, and political

life of at least the immediately surrounding areas

Such complicating impacts would occur in a situation in which the United States is committed to a policy of a high degree of internal autonomy for the Micronesians. Because of this position, in conjunction with a potential major role of the military in the economy of the islands, in establishing any military installations in this area the United States will have to make more provision for dealing with induced change in the local society than has normally been the case in the past.

It was pointed out that while the current planning foresees a policy of internal autonomy short of independence, and this appears acceptable and desirable to the Micronesians, the possibility of full independence at some future time, at least for the districts other than the Northern Marianas, remains a real one.

III-4: All intentions and desires to the contrary notwithstanding, the Seminar recognizes the inevitability of change, perhaps negative in effect in some cases, in the region.

There have already been massive changes in Micronesia which have unalterably changed the culture and life style of the inhabitants. There will be further changes. Some of these may be brought about by a military presence in specific cases; some may be controllable or modifiable by U.S. action; some will occur in spite of everything. Since major change has already taken place, and since there will continue to be change and perhaps a significant military impact, the question is really that of the rate and direction of change, how we may be able to control and manipulate it, and the extent to which we should do so.

The Seminar recognized that a major military presence will mean that military decisions will have a major effect upon local societies. The problem will be to minimize the rate of undesirable change from that source and to avoid negative impacts as much as possible. For example, some participants in the Seminar questioned the wisdom of imposing U.S. educational standards on the island societies; but others pointed out that following the determination of a new political status for Micronesia, the failure to provide such education could set up a double standard.

The Seminar concurred that to the maximum possible extent change must be at the initiation of, under the control of, and with the approval of the host society. Yet in specific local situations the U.S. impact may be so great as to make that very difficult. There will be inevitable selective borrowing of each culture from the other, and sometimes this will be highly negative. There will be inevitable friction at all levels. While, for example, Micronesia already has a highly pluralistic and adaptable culture, maintenance of pluralism (selecting or retaining that which is best from both cultures) will be difficult, and some Seminar participants questioned its possibility. In order to assist the local societies to accommodate the outside impacts, the U.S. and the military may have to use persuasion and diplomacy to guide local desires and policies; some change, even when desired by the local inhabitants, can have very heavy costs.

It was pointed out by participants familiar with the societies of Micronesia that there is already a very deep degree of acculturation to a monetary/consumer economy (particularly in district centers), with a

concomitant decline in fishing, farming, and traditional skills. Alcohol is a major problem, and drugs may pose an even greater threat. Changing the educational system to promote a work ethic making it possible for local inhabitants to maximize their economic benefits from U.S. military presence will at the same time destroy elements of the local cultures. There is major in-migration from the outer islands to the district centers, and this will continue and may be accentuated by the establishment of new U.S. activities which provide opportunities for economic and other perceived benefits.

It seems clear that drastic change will occur with a new political status even if there is no U.S. military presence. The U.S. is thus faced with the double problem of managing that change and the change which may be added by its military activity. The current situation is such that the average Micronesian probably wants a continued U.S. presence which will provide maximum economic benefits. At the same time, the average Micronesian would prefer minimum change. There is no resolution of this dilemma; efforts must therefore be directed toward minimizing the discontinuity.

III-5: The Seminar recognizes that in the current and future situation it is probably unrealistic to plan a base providing complete isolation of the military from the civilian populace, and that it is impossible to avoid some degree of integration.

Since isolation appears to be impossible, the question is one of how much integration will occur and whether it should be limited to some areas of

life rather than bringing about the absorption of the complete indigenous societies and cultures. In this sense Micronesia may be in a better position to maintain significant elements of traditional culture than many other societies because of the existing pluralism. It was also recognized, however, that given the relatively small size of the population (particularly in any one locale) and the limited economic resources, an intentional or unintentional reliance on the United States for economic development and economic support may force a major degree of integration and absorption. In some situations a high degree of integration may be the most desirable and beneficial course.

III-6: The Seminar recognizes that what we are doing in Micronesia may appear, or be made to appear, as colonialism in other parts of the world.

This situation may pose considerable political difficulty at all levels. If change appears to be colonial, the United States will be subject to criticism in international forums and may encounter problems when the time comes to terminate the Trust. In some areas the Trust Territory is currently viewed as a second-class, colonial area. This situation exists despite the fact that at this time the peoples of the Trust Territory probably do not want full independence.

We are therefore currently negotiating for a unique status: something less than independence in a world where "independence" has acquired an almost irrational value. We must thus be aware of the context in which a changed status will occur and in which we will be establishing a strategic military presence. We will be building new military bases in a

situation where others, including our potential enemies, will closely watch and may sharply criticize what we do.

III-7: The Seminar observes that Micronesia is currently subject to local factionalism and fragmentation, and that this situation will probably continue.

The tendency of some districts to go different ways (the Marianas) or to use the threat of separatism as a bargaining weapon (the Marshalls), coupled with pluralism among and growing rifts within leadership elites, makes all relationships difficult.

Contributing strongly to fragmentation in the area has been the success achieved by the Micronesians in relations with the United States to date; the desires of the U.S. military to use only limited portions of the Trust Territory, thereby depriving Micronesians of a common issue; and an unequal distribution of past, current and anticipated future wealth among the six districts. Where we have stated no basing aspirations, the people feel left out; they may not want a U.S. military presence but they would like the chance to say "no." The allocation of basing requirements to Palau, the Marianas, and the Marshalls has created a division between the "haves" and the "have nots" and has exacerbated friction and fragmentation. A significant portion of the anti-military sentiment currently expressed by some leaders may not be rooted in anti-military convictions but rather be a tactic, based on such considerations, to gain comparable or offsetting benefits, both from the United States and from other districts, in the bargaining now in process.

In addition, there is a strong, although not dominant, current which

desires independence of the United States rather than any other status. This current could be strengthened by subsequent events or by exploitation of certain sensitive issues such as nuclear weapons.

A change in status along with an increased U.S. military presence in some districts will cause more political/economic hickering over land holdings, more active political parties, and greater general sources of conflict and instability. It may exacerbate an existing and growing lack of popular confidence in the current active leadership.

While it is true that Micronesia is very diverse, participants in the Seminar stressed that this diversity should not be overemphasized; many of the present and future problems are common ones which assume slightly different manifestations in different local situations.

III-8: The Seminar believes there may be significant commonalities of problems and situations with other areas, and that a significant body of information relevant to problems in the Western Pacific may be available if there is a method to draw upon it.

Many of the problems the Seminar was asked to consider are common problems of behavior, political relations, and planning in the context of a particular situation. That situation is one in which a strong society imposes itself, by invitation or otherwise, on a weaker and smaller one; where generalized problems of dependency and economic development are being confronted; and where there is concern with the establishment of stable and friendly self-government. There may be much to be learned from the efforts of other outside powers to inject the ideals, practices and

establishing close ties to Japan.

A further concern is provided by the possibility of the provision of nuclear weapons facilities on any bases which may be established in Micronesia, whether in the near future or at a later time because of contingencies not now foreseeable. The Japanese concern with this issue should not be underestimated. It is useful to remember, for example, that the nuclear attacks on Japan were launched from Tinian. Japan might find this issue one which could be used to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Micronesia.

Thus, in its considerations, the Seminar tended to view the relationship between the U.S. and the Western Pacific in all its details within the context of a triangular pattern including Japan and Micronesia.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT FOR
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN AREA

RECOMMENDATION IV-1: In the Western Pacific, U.S. planning both military and civilian should include the contingency that there will be a movement toward full independence for Micronesia at some point, and that steps will have to be taken to safeguard the U.S. strategic position and U.S. bases and facilities. Although current negotiations envisage a commonwealth status for the Northern Marianas and "free association" for the rest of Micronesia, the experimental nature of the latter arrangement and the strength of the current independence movement in some districts suggest the possibility that an independent status may be established at some future time. It cannot be assumed that such a parting with the United States will necessarily be on the best of terms. In this connection, some consideration might be given to whether negotiation of the specifics and detailed conditions of a Mutual Defense Treaty should be delayed until such time as a decision to terminate free association may be taken.

RECOMMENDATION IV-2: The United States should make a statement clearly defining the purpose, duration, and limitations of the U.S. military presence. Historically, and particularly in the Western Pacific, the United States has assumed a temporary presence when in fact a long term permanent presence has been strategically justifiable and has resulted in fact. An adequate statement should include specification of alternative contingencies which may affect force levels, force location, or time scheduling. Even if major bases are not immediately

scheduled for new construction, we should plan as if they were. Similarly, the U.S. should consider whether planning should not provide for acquisition of contingency rights to areas other than those now under consideration, since needs change over time and it may be easier to get contingent facilities now to support a permanent presence in the future.

RECOMMENDATION IV-3: To the maximum degree possible, the local civilian side should be actively considered in continuing military decisions so that there is a balance between military needs and those of the local inhabitants. This will be easier in some situations than in others, and there is a possibility of a conflict between civilian needs or desires and military requirements. To the maximum degree feasible, changes in the socio-cultural fabric of the host society should be held to the minimum or as desired by the host society. The host society will have preferences for relative integration or isolation with respect to residential housing, employment, access to goods and services (including commissary, schools, health services, public services, law and order, etc.) which need to be accommodated to the preferences of the military agency as much as possible. The U.S. should insure, however, that these host desires are accurately defined and truly desired by all sectors of the population. Past events have shown that stated desires of some leaders may not reflect the true wishes of the people and the result is a deleterious effect on civil-military relations generally.

RECOMMENDATION IV-4. Unless the host society is to be totally dependent on U.S. economic assistance or a military-dominated economy, there must be serious consideration given to problems of economic development. While it is true that in the last analysis the key decisions about economic development rest with local leaders, it is also true that the U.S. presence in some areas has been and will be so great as to exert a disproportionate effect on the economy. The U.S. thus has an obligation, both to the people and to its own strategic self-interest, to take the most active possible role in shaping future economic development through the exercise of influence and the controlled provision of assistance. It seems important to avoid a situation in which, for example, a termination of the U.S. military presence in Micronesia could cause an economic collapse due to the removal of defense and related economic inputs, leading to an economic orientation away from the U.S. which might hinder future American access to and use of Micronesia. Even though in the future the U.S. may retain responsibility for foreign affairs and defense matters for the Trust Territory, these must include consideration of major economic development problems, which are increasingly tied to questions of foreign relations in areas such as access to resources, transportation and communications, and defense spending. The Seminar understands that substantial steps have been taken to implement this concept in the Status Negotiations and recommends that such steps be continued with as much energy as possible.

RECOMMENDATION IV-5: The immediate questions of a military presence in any specific area and resulting civil-military problems must be

considered within the context of comprehensive economic and social planning. Such planning appears necessary, as a part of any economic development effort, in order to take the maximum steps toward a diversified, self-sustaining economy strongly tied to the United States. The Seminar recognizes that comprehensive planning for economic development is not something which can be done only, or even primarily, by the military, although the development of bases should be tied naturally into an overall development concept.

RECOMMENDATION IV-6: Consideration should be given to various cultural and sociological characteristics and nuances that might assist the United States in any discussions concerning land acquisition or political status. For example, the concept of "option" applied to land use has little meaning to Palauans and is largely untranslatable. A land option not backed up with specific provisions, active use, and continued presence may become meaningless to the local inhabitants.

RECOMMENDATION IV-7: With regard to specific basing needs, areas of control by the host society (off base) and the military agency (on base) should be specified and clearly understood at the outset. Similarly, decisions with regard to access to various services and opportunities should be clearly specified from the beginning, since the results of initial agreements may be overtaken by political and economic developments. Problems arising subsequently should be formally resolved by the coordinated action of a civilian-military council established for that purpose in the particular situation. Things are more likely to go along

smoothly if they are spelled out in greatest possible detail initially, if mechanisms are provided for continued adaptability and flexibility, and if agreements are supplemented with "think U.S." programs to reinforce the agreements and to keep outside interests from becoming dominant in key sectors.

RECOMMENDATION IV-8: Interpreting may be a crucial factor in all relationships now and in the future, but it has not received the attention it deserves. We have had little capability for interpretation in the Western Pacific, and thus have generally been forced to rely on interpreters provided by the other side. This situation can make us the captives of our interpreters. Particularly in the Western districts of Micronesia, Japanese is a more common language than English for the established leaders, and there are close ties with Japan. Provision of a Japanese language competence in the appropriate situations might help alleviate some problems.

RECOMMENDATION IV-9: The ultimate status of the Trust Territory should provide for a senior civilian American representative resident in each governmental unit, with the necessary staff to represent the coordinated interests of the Federal Government Departments in the territory as a whole and in each significant subdivision. The military, where present, should be incorporated into that "country team," but the senior U.S. representative should always be a civilian. This recommendation is tied to the necessity for an overall integrated policy and thus an integrated U.S. inter-agency hierarchy. It represents a response to a

problem unique to Micronesia, for in other localities the U.S. deals with independent entities and utilizes the normal representative forms and structures. The comparable structure in Micronesia would have as one of its most important roles the representation of the military executive agency in non-defense matters and the facilitation of the relationship between the military and the local community. This "country team" in each instance, whether in the Northern Marianas or in the other parts of Micronesia, should be headed by an individual of rank and stature. We suggest that the appropriate parent authority may be the Executive Office of the President, and an appropriate title might be "Resident United States Counselor," or "Federal Representative," or "Presidential Representative." Implementation of this recommendation should be such as to eliminate the very difficult situation where the military base or area commander is the senior representative of the Federal Government in any locality, as is presently the situation in Guam and Kwajalein. The Seminar understands that an exchange of representation is provided for in the draft Compact with the Trust Territory, but wishes to underline the necessity for a paramount civilian representative on the U.S. side, the importance of adequate rank and stature, and the requirement for an integrated "country team" concept.

RECOMMENDATION IV-10: In the case both of the Northern Marianas and the rest of the Trust Territories there needs to be provision for local residents to enlist in the U.S. military. For the Northern Marianas we gather there should be no problem due to the anticipated commonwealth status. For the rest of Micronesia the situation appears somewhat unclear.

but since the U.S. will have defense responsibility and since the citizens will specifically be exempt from any draft, it seems both logical and desirable that some method for voluntary service be provided. Some participants in the Seminar suggested that this access also be tied to specific slots in the service academies and in ROTC units. One objective of this recommendation is to assist the services in building up a basic language and area capability among the officer corps and the enlisted ranks for service in Micronesia.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE GENERAL AREA OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN AREA

RECOMMENDATION V-1: Short indoctrination or training courses or seminars, of perhaps a week in length, should be provided to prospective overseas base and area commanders and other key personnel prior to taking up the post. Such training should emphasize cultural relations and civil-military relations. While the Seminar believed it unnecessary, and perhaps impossible, to establish special long term training or career progressions for base commanders, it was believed that some initial orientation emphasizing local culture, economics, and politics, and provided by the most informed civilian and military personnel available, would be of considerable value.

RECOMMENDATION V-2: The military community should generally broaden its professional officer career spectrum to include some training in the civil-military relations rubric, especially emphasizing this with those selected for base or area command. This should include maximum inter-agency exchange, contact, cooperation and education. While the participants in the Seminar do not question the basic capability of the officer corps to respond to problems in the civil-military area, it was believed that some deeper inculcation of essential principles and procedures in this general area would produce officers perhaps more able to deal effectively with situations such as those which may arise on overseas peacetime bases. Similarly, the Seminar believed that greater efforts are needed for inter-service and inter-agency exchange of information and experiences.

RECOMMENDATION V-3: The military services should continue to exercise careful selection of personnel assigned to bases in the Western Pacific to minimize possible subsequent personnel problems

RECOMMENDATION V-4: The military services must have a flexible policy on tour lengths and other provisions for personnel assigned to small islands. The need for such flexibility is even more acute when the services are all volunteer. However, the Seminar believes that current assignment policies, carefully applied, may be adequate for this purpose. Consideration could also be given to assigning only accompanied personnel to such bases.

RECOMMENDATION V-5: Provision should be made for a mid-tour break off island for both accompanied personnel (at the end of one year) and unaccompanied personnel (at the end of 6 months). Experience in other areas has proved the value of such an R&R or EM&L policy. The situation is more critical on smaller islands (such as Kwajalein) than on larger ones (such as Okinawa). In a case such as Tinian, insuring adequate transportation between Tinian-Saipan-Guam might alleviate the necessity for such a policy. Consideration might also be given to rotating personnel between small island bases and larger installations in the vicinity where possible.

RECOMMENDATION V-6: There will inevitably be problems with liberty and off-base recreation in any situation where large numbers of military personnel are concentrated on a small island. Careful consideration

should be given to means of minimizing or alleviating this problem.

In the course of discussion on this issue, a variety of points were raised. Some participants in the Seminar argued that the worst expectations produce the worst results, and that emphasis should be placed on reinforcing acceptable behavior rather than applying sanctions for unacceptable behavior. Others argued that the problems would exist in any event and that the issue is one of control as well as of minimization. Specific ideas suggested included the following:

- (a) Provision of R&R flights or other off-island transportation.
- (b) Dispersal of recreational facilities on and off base to minimize large gatherings of people.
- (c) Use of American military police off base in cooperation with local authorities.
- (d) Inclusion of consideration of specific problems on the agenda

_____ of a subsequent conference of base commanders (See Recommendation areas has proved the value of such an R&R or EM&L policy. The situation is more critical on smaller islands (such as Kwajalein) than on larger ones (such as Okinawa). In a case such as Tinian, insuring adequate transportation between Tinian-Saipan-Guam might alleviate the necessity for such a policy. Consideration might also be given to rotating personnel between small island bases and larger installations in the vicinity where possible.

RECOMMENDATION V-6: There will inevitably be problems with liberty and off-base recreation in any situation where large numbers of military personnel are concentrated on a small island. Careful consideration