

File 

April 11, 1975

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MEMORANDUM FOR MESSRS. WILLENS AND HELFER

Subject: Carnegie Institute Study on Micronesian Status
(Draft 3/24/75)

As you know, I regard the current draft of the Carnegie Study as a mixed blessing: on balance, the Study is a confusing and slightly shrill document; and yet, it could have been much harder on the Marianas. My specific comments are set forth below:

1. The frequent references to the Marianas as our "Nambia" (see e.g., page 20 of the chapter on Self-determination) are both offensive and inaccurate. It should be clear to anybody that a majority of the people of the Marianas are in favor of a separate status and that this preference has been freely and consistently expressed. The plebiscite, to which U.N. observers have been invited, should put this issue to rest. (The Study does not imply that the plebiscite will be rigged as to this basic issue.) The fact that fragmentation may serve U.S. interests is beside the point.

2. The study gratuitously accuses the U.S. of downplaying the U.N.'s role in the development of a new political status for the Marianas. This ignores: trips to the U.N. by the Commission to explain the views of the Marianas people on their future political status, coordination with the Visiting Mission in 1973, and the invitation

to the U.N. to observe the plebiscite. The Study also ignores the last Visiting Mission report and the Trusteeship Council deliberations which appear to accept the inevitability, if not the legitimacy, of a separate status for the Marianas. (It is interesting that the Carnegie Study is harder on fragmentation than the Report of the Visiting Mission.)

3. The discussion of the general subject of fragmentation is infused with the paternalistic assumption that a united Micronesia would be "good for the people." While one can debate what is good and bad about fragmentation, the Study pays too little attention to the reality of the genuine grass roots political forces pulling against a united Micronesia. Also, the Study downplays the causes which underly this sentiment (other than alleged U.S. machinations): geography, culture and religious differences, etc.

If ever a case could be made for fragmentation of Trust Territory, Micronesia is it. One senses that the Carnegie Study's premises would fall away if the Marianas had a more substantial population and that, at bottom, the case for a united Micronesia is merely an argument for efficiency in administration.

I think you should suggest a more self-conscious and balanced approach to the fragmentation issue which pays as much attention to the political, cultural and

geographic realities as it does to abstract political and economic theories.

In particular, the Introduction (see page 9) could stand a slight change in emphasis to present a more balanced view of the fragmentation issue--particularly as regards the special case of the Marianas. (Note that the "common" characteristics of Micronesians listed on page 9 of the Introduction are not shared by most residents of the Marianas.)

The only other issue that we might address in this connection is the problem of drawing the line at a separate status for the Marianas. The legitimate cultural differences referred to above, as well as the long history of the movement for a separate Marianas status, serve to distinguish the Marianas from the other districts of Micronesia. Furthermore, despite the recent requests for separate status talks from other districts, there is little indication that these districts desire a status qualitatively different from that sought by the Joint Committee.

4. The chapter on "Guam and Others" is particularly naive. At page 24, the study criticizes the U.S. for "the necessity to entertain changes for U.S. territories as a result of the Marianas Covenant and the Micronesian Compact." In fact, one of the principal benefits of the

Marianas Covenant is that it provides a basis for "improving" and rationalizing the status of other U.S. territories.

The Study seems to ignore or contradict the following:

- a. The Micronesian Compact is not, realistically, a meaningful precedent for any other U.S. territory, including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico whose residents are U.S. citizens.
- b. The Marianas Covenant is such a precedent precisely because the relationship between the Marianas and the U.S. is analogous to that of other U.S. territories and yet the Covenant contains major U.S. concessions on issues which have been the subject of long-standing petition and complaint in these other territories.
- c. The Marianas Covenant provides for a progressive and evolving relationship and is, perhaps, the greatest advance in U.S. territorial relationships since the acquisition of "unincorporated" territories in 1898.

In general, the Study seems preoccupied with the fact that the U.S.-Marianas relationship is essentially "colonial" and thereby ignores the pragmatic advances toward meaningful local self-government for offshore dependencies that are embodied in the Covenant.

5. I think we should try to deal with the allegations that members of the Commission have engaged in land speculation on Tinian. (Page 46 of the chapter on the Marianas.) We should try to secure deletion of the reference to the Oberdorfer article on the grounds that it is a gratuitous (and unsupported) slander unworthy of inclusion in the Study. We should also try to delete the entire paragraph on land speculation since it is based on hearsay and inuendo. Points we can make are: (a) Eddie has denied "speculation"; (b) Tinian has been open to "homesteading" for years; (c) many residents of Saipan have invested in land on Tinian--anticipating the spread of tourism to that island; and, (d) there is no basis for the unstated assumption that any Commission member acted on "inside" information concerning U.S. intentions on Tinian--the plans to build a base on Tinian were known generally prior to commencement of the separate status talks.

J.F.L.

