

... which occurred will not be repeated, and that the unbridled exercise of executive power in the future will have been forestalled.

Without Mr. Nixon's own version of events, taken under conditions comparable to the testimony of all the other conspirators in the White House, the public record and the legacy of Watergate remains incomplete.


## Planting the Flag

The United States is poised on the verge of a questionable new economic and military commitment thousands of miles overseas, without as yet even a semblance of serious Congressional consideration.

By executive branch decision and planning, the Mariana Island chain of the western Pacific has been offered commonwealth status under the formal sovereignty of the United States. If carried through, this would become the first territorial annexation by this country since 1925.

Even if such a historic transaction were straightforward and without controversy, it would have seemed proper for the Congress to be consulted and involved from the early planning stages. As it happens, the proposed annexation of the Marianas is far from straightforward and it is surrounded by controversy.

The United States may already be in defiance of the United Nations in drawing a political separation between the Northern Marianas and the broader Micronesia Trust Territory, which the U.N. assigned as a single unit to United States administration in 1948. As local authorities across Micronesia began to agitate for eventual independ-



ence, the United States singled out the more docile Marianas for special treatment. American negotiators agreed to provide some \$140 million in development funds annually for seven years, announced plans for a lucrative new naval base and presented the islands' 15,000 residents with a take-it-or-leave-it choice. A plebiscite this month produced the expected result, a vote of nearly 80 per cent in favor of commonwealth status and the prospect of becoming United States citizens.

The strategic reasons for extending United States sovereignty deep into the Pacific, 3,300 miles west of Hawaii and alongside the established base at Guam, may have merit—but this may well be vitiated by the increased responsibilities and exposure. That is a decision which the Pentagon or the White House cannot be allowed to make on their own.

When all the relevant decisions are finally submitted to Congress, as President Ford said they will be soon, legislators need feel no obligation to give the rubber-stamp approval that is apparently expected of them. Here is one opportunity for the Congress to consider

make the plutonium and enriched uranium from such facilities chemically unsuitable for weapons use. This is the plea that the West German Government rejected.

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## ...Halting Wider Danger

West German manufacture of uranium-enrichment and plutonium-separation plants and a complete nuclear fuel cycle will mean the existence of a nuclear weapons capability in West Germany as well as Brazil. Suspicion about this capability already is being voiced by Russians and other Europeans and it is unlikely to be totally allayed by the international inspection West Germany's adherence to the non-proliferation treaty involves.

Signature of the Brazilian accord does not necessarily make the German sale irreversible in all its aspects. No equipment or technology is to be transferred until control and supervision agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna permit the I.A.E.A. to be certain that neither the fuel, the facilities nor the technology "shall be used for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

But how can the I.A.E.A. with its tiny budget and small staff of inspectors, lacking satellite reconnaissance and other advanced means of detection, be certain that it could detect evasion in a country as large as Brazil? Even West German officials acknowledge that, once Brazilian scientists are trained, there is no way to be sure that German technology will not be used to duplicate the dangerous facilities.

Moreover, if West Germany sells plutonium-separation and uranium-enrichment facilities to Brazil, which has not adhered to the non-proliferation treaty, chances will be much reduced for discouraging France from the negotiations now under way to sell plutonium-separation plants to Pakistan and South Korea. If South Korea goes nuclear, will Japan long refrain? The Diet has just again delayed ratification of the non-proliferation treaty.

What is needed is a moratorium on such transfers and an accelerated drive to establish safe, regional, multinational centers as an alternative before the German-Brazilian deal passes the point of no return.

## The Day's Eye

Daisies come to bloom, whiten the roadsides and dapple the old pastures. Some people call them oxeye daisies, which is a redundancy, since the word "daisy" is no more than "day's eye" in the old English. Botanically the name is *Chrysanthemum leucanthemum*, which perpetuates another old English common name, White-flower or Whiteweed. One old back-country name in New England is Farmer's Curse.

Weekenders and newcomers to the country pick daisies for bouquets. Farmers consider the daisy a pesky weed. But as long as it grows at the roadside it will grow in the meadow. It will grow in an ash heap, in a pile of rubble, in a crack in the city pavement.

The daisy is tough as an urchin, insistent as a beggar. And really a beautiful flower, unless one happens to be a farmer.

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## Mr. Nixon's Testimony

Less than a year has passed since the mysteries of doctored White House transcripts and erratic tape recordings were uppermost among the concerns of American public life. The collapse of the Nixon Presidency and the conviction of conspirators in high—if not the highest—office naturally tended to close the book on Watergate as an all-consuming public obsession.

It is far more than a footnote to history, however, that former President Nixon has at last submitted to his first interrogation under oath before a Watergate grand jury. The questioning took place discreetly over two days last week, near San Clemente, by two members of the last remaining of the three grand juries which spearheaded the most momentous criminal investigation in American political history.

\* \* \*

Lawyers long ago discovered that cross-examination is the only practical legal technique for attempting to sort out contradictions and conflicts in inconclusive testimony. As the nation saw, one-sided personal statements under controlled and advantageous conditions permitted lies and distortions to be perpetuated and further compounded. Even the memoirs of the leading participants, including Mr. Nixon, composed long after the heat has gone out of the controversy, cannot replace expert and minute cross-examination by persons knowledgeable in the details of the case.

The grand jury testimony remains sealed, of course, even though both Mr. Nixon and the special Watergate prosecutor, Henry S. Ruth, asked the court to make the fact of the interrogation public. There is no way of knowing for the present how specific and probing the interrogation was, or whether any new information was elicited about alleged crimes that remain unsolved.

Whatever conclusion the grand jury reaches before its term expires July 7, a way should be found to make this testimony available to the public. Nor should remaining loose ends in the Watergate tangle be dropped just because they are no longer of the acute public interest they once were.

\* \* \*

The real issue goes beyond the fate of particular individuals, their personal futures or their roles in history. When crimes are committed, incomplete judgments may be worse than no judgments at all. Punishment for some crimes, of some of those who transgressed the law, cannot be an adequate answer when other crimes and other transgressors are overlooked merely because the society is relieved to forget what happened.

If the Watergate nightmare through which this country was dragged is to have a redeeming element, it must be that of insuring as certainly as possible that the abuses which occurred will not be repeated, and

carefully a possible new American commitment in all its implications—political, economic and military—before discovering a *fait accompli*.

## Bonn's Atomic Sale . . .

Bonn's signature of an agreement to sell Brazil a complete multibillion-dollar nuclear industry, including technology that would permit production of atomic bombs as well as electricity, is a tragedy for West Germany as well as mankind as a whole.

Not the least tragic are the implications for democracy in Germany of the behavior of the Bonn Government, which concealed the deal for months, then, when it became known, belittled American concern, attributed it to commercial jealousy and rushed ahead with the pact's signature without permitting the thorough debate by the West German Parliament and the public that the true facts deserved.

The clearest and most authoritative public statement of American concern on this issue was made by Dr. Fred C. Iklé, the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in an interview earlier this month in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. Dr. Iklé said that American concern did not stem from commercial interests, including West Germany's sale to Brazil of eight huge power reactors, which make up the bulk of the deal. The reactors can be placed under secure international safeguards, which is not true of some of the other technology to be sold.

"Our problem," Dr. Iklé said, "is with the reprocessing equipment which, in treating the spent fuel of reactors, can produce plutonium for weapons. We also have a problem with the uranium-enrichment equipment, which can make weapons-grade uranium. American firms have not been permitted to sell this type of equipment abroad."

Brazil has no need for this type of equipment for civilian pursuits, Dr. Iklé said, adding: "In the United States, at the present time, there are over fifty nuclear power reactors in operation, but not a single commercial reprocessing facility in operation or likely to be in the near future. . . . American industry has not been permitted [by the United States Government] to promote reactor sales abroad by offering also to provide, as a 'sweetener,' enrichment and reprocessing facilities."

The United States has proposed that these dangerous facilities be kept out of the hands of national governments and confined to regional, multinational centers. There was wide support for this idea at the recent 69-nation conference in Geneva to review the operation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

"We need a little more time" to achieve this goal, Dr. Iklé pleaded, as well as for a research project to