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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

The issues before this committee are important ones, and they go much further than the details of Senate Joint Resolution 107. What the Senate does on this legislation creates new territorial policies for the United States and may seriously impair our relations with the United Nations. Furthermore, the Congress has not yet examined the foreign policy implications of acquisition of the Marianas. That these questions will be raised before this committee is indeed gratifying for those who have doubts that haste in this matter is required by circumstances, ^{It is also dangerous} ~~or less than hazardous~~ to the interests of the people of the Marianas, Micronesia and the United States.

As you will see in my prepared statement, the matters yet to be resolved are many, but the principal one is to insure that this body is not stampeded into uncritical acceptance of what the Administration has offered in this bill. Most of you have no doubt been assured as I have by delegations of Marianas citizens and administration lobbyists that the Senate is being asked to do no more than accept the freely expressed will of the people of the islands. We are also assured that what the Administration and a group of islanders has agreed on will be accepted without question by the United ^{Nations} ~~States~~ when the time comes to present it to that body. Since that event is scheduled to take place 5 or 6 years from now, no one can predict how the electorate of the Marianas, much less an altered Security Council and Trusteeship Council, may view it.

More important, however, is the validity of the entire premise that it is best to dismember Micronesia even if the Marianas seem more willing than the rest of the islands to become part of the United States. I am pleased that your committee has invited elected representatives from the Micronesian Congress to testify about the expected consequences of uncritical approval of S.J. Res. 107. No doubt they will tell you their views of the legality of separate treatment of the Marianas and of their concern that the United States is moving with undue haste in this matter.

There are alternatives to the provisions of the covenant as it is now written. We know what they are because the United Nations

has outlined them on several occasions:

1. Political integration into another nation. This demands complete equality of citizenship for the former trust territory inhabitants and for the people of the absorbing country. The covenant does not meet this requirement.

2. Free association, which is a limited form of independence, leaving defense and foreign policy matters in the hands of the former administering authority. Free association requires provision for unilateral termination. The Marianas were not offered this option.

3. Independence. This option is clearly a UN preference, but it was not an option offered to the Marianas.

It is important to note that none of these customary options would, if offered and accepted, in any way endanger US security interests in the mid-Pacific. Micronesia is too small, too remote and too underdeveloped to make a major contribution to our defenses. Our security objective in these islands is denial, that is, to block in some way any other nation from getting a foothold. As one authority has noted, the islands are to the military like nuts to squirrels, something to be tucked away in case of need. It is a fact, however, that denial of this strategic backwater can be assured by any future status agreement our government might reach with Micronesia. This is so because we can control foreign and military policy if free association is chosen or we can conclude security agreements and treaties with an independent nation.

It may well be that the Marianas will forever favor union with the United States, but to allow this to be accomplished in isolation from the future status of the rest of Micronesia, which represents 90% of the land and population of the Trust Territory, is a piecemeal approach which cannot best serve all concerned. Before the Senate approves this covenant, it should obtain the acceptance of it by the Congress of Micronesia. Following this, a plebescite should be held by the UN in which the Marianas would be provided all the options given the other island groups. Then we shall have a package which can properly be presented to the UN.

As you all know, the UN will not consider the Marianas separately, so there is no reason for undue haste approving

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S.J. Res. 107 in total isolation from the rest of the package, particularly now, so many years before the Administration intends to terminate the Trusteeship. It is a fact that Micronesia is better prepared for self-government than has been any other Pacific territory already granted independence. Indeed, the citizens of the Trust Territory are probably further along in political sophistication than a large number of new states in the United Nations. However, Micronesia has less self-government than most Pacific territories, even those remaining under the domination of some other power. Part of what S.J. Res. 107 will accomplish is much needed, not only in the Marianas, but also in the far larger, other island groups. However, to give Micronesians more responsibility for their own affairs does not require immediate passage of S.J. Res. 107. Self-government, in particular policy-making and budget matters, should be in the hands of Micronesians, and these important responsibilities can be given them through existing US government machinery. In short, the very system which has denied self-government to Micronesia for more than a quarter of a century can be used to turn things around.

Before the Senate approves legislation such as S.J. Res. 107, it should require the Administration to establish self-government in Micronesia. This can be done through Secretarial orders; legislation is not needed. A self-governing Micronesia can reach agreement in principle with the United States in regard to future status. This can be different or identical for the various island groups. The second step should be UN approval and, finally, passage of appropriate legislation by Congress. In the meantime, the Congress should be generous in allowing the Congress of Micronesia the necessary financial support to create the beginnings of a viable economy. Preferably, the Micronesian legislators should deal directly with the US Congress, an ideal way to educate members of this body on a subject which has long suffered from neglect.

I ask you to recommend delay of S.J. Res. 107. Perhaps it might be a part of the Micronesia future status agreement which has yet to be drawn up. But it should be delayed anyway because conditions will certainly change before 1980 or 1981 when the package will go to the UN. There is a definite danger that rapid

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approval of S.J. Res. 107 will be the first step toward a showdown with the United Nations which will leave our nation no stronger but possibly internationally damaged.

I ask your committee to consider how S.J. Res. 107 aids the nation, helps our national security or improves our foreign relations. From my point of view, all of these interests are compromised, not helped. It is time Congress became a part of Trust Territory negotiations so that whatever is done with the islands of Micronesia has passed the tests ordinarily required by our system of government. If we let the opportunity for congressional participation slip away by perfunctory examination of the covenant, we do a disservice to the people we have sworn to protect in the United States as well as Micronesia. The Trust Territory has to be put on the road to self-government, and the Trusteeship must be terminated. Let it be done by the Executive in partnership with Congress. Our lessons from the past have been clear enough: Commitments grow from little-noticed events. This is one time when we have a chance to be cautious.

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