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U. S. POLICY TOWARD MICRONESIA: PART I - FUTURE STATUS (U)
1. (C) SUMMARY: THIS IS THE FIRST OF THREE MESSAGES OUTLINING
STATUS AND VIEWS ON US POLICY TOWARD MICRONESIA, IN CONTEXT OF CURR-
ENT POLICY REVIEW. THIS MESSAGE URGES CAREFUL SCRUTINY TO DETERMINE
REAL US INTERESTS IN MICRONESIA AND SUGGESTS WAYS IN WHICH BASIC US
INTERESTS CAN BE PROTECTED WHILE SATISFYING MANY OF THE DEMANDS OF
PAGE 24 RUMSS336106 C O N F I D E N T I A L
THE SEVERAL STATUS FACTIONS IN MICRONESIA.

2. (C) SEVERAL BASIC ASSUMPTIONS UNDERPIN RECOMMENDATIONS PRE-
SENTED IN THIS MESSAGE: (A) THE PRINCIPAL MOTIVATION BEHIND
MICRONESIAN DESIRE FOR ASSOCIATION WITH US IS DESIRE FOR SUBSTANTIAL
FINANCIAL SUBSIDIES. (B) WITH ASSURED US ACCESS TO NORTHERN
MARSHALLS, REASONABLE US SECURITY INTERESTS IN MARSHALLS AND
CAROLINES ENTAIL CONTINUED USE OF KMR, DENIAL OF AREA TO THIRD
NATIONS AND POSSIBLY SOME CONTINUED OPTIONS IN PALAU. (C) THEREFORE,
ONLY STABLE, ENDURING RELATIONSHIP TO WHICH BOTH SIDES COULD BE
FIRMLY COMMITTED WOULD BE ONE WHICH COVERS ONLY BASIC INTERESTS OF
EACH LISTED (A) AND (B) ABOVE. (D) ANY AGREEMENTS COVERING SUBJECTS

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OTHER THAN THESE BASIC FACTORS WILL BE INHERENTLY UNSTABLE AND UNRELIABLE, IF NOT UNATTAINABLE IN FIRST INSTANCE.

3. (C) SEVERAL CONCLUSIONS CAN BE DRAWN FROM REASONING IN PARA 2 WHICH DIFFER FROM PRESENT US POLICIES. FIRST, COMPLETE USG CONTROL OF ALL ASPECTS OF MICRONESIAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS IS NOT NECESSARY TO PROTECT BASIC US SECURITY INTERESTS AND THUS CANNOT BE ADEQUATELY JUSTIFIED TO MICRONESIANS. CONSEQUENTLY PROBLEMS OF HOLDING MICRONESIANS TO THIS LINE WOULD BECOME INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT ONCE TERMINATION OCCURS, AS IT ALREADY IS UNDER TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENT.

PAGE 13 RUMHSGG6176 C O N F I D E N T I A L

SECOND, US WILLINGNESS TO GO ALONG WITH INSISTENCE BY SOME MICRONESIANS ON A FAIRLY TIGHT UNITY IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE GIVEN US INTERESTS. OUR REQUIREMENTS ARE STABLE, FIRM TIES WITH EACH COMPONENT PART OF MICRONESIA, WHETHER CHANNLED THROUGH A FEDERATION, CO-FEDERATION OR SEPARATELY. THIRD, AS DISCUSSED IN IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING MESSAGE, US CAN AND SHOULD BEGIN IMMEDIATELY TO IMPLEMENT FULL SELF-GOVERNMENT, ESPECIALLY AT DISTRICT LEVEL, AS US WILL HAVE NO LEGITIMATE RIGHT TO INTERFERE ANYWAY, FOLLOWING TERMINATION. IT WOULD THUS SEEM BEST TO BEGIN DEVELOPMENT OF STABLE, SELF-RELIANT GOVERNMENTS AT DISTRICT AND CENTRAL LEVELS AS BEST GUARANTEE AGAINST AN INCREASINGLY UNPREDICTABLE AND DEPENDENT MICRONESIA WHOSE INSTABILITY WOULD THREATEN US SECURITY INTERESTS.

4. (C) MOST IMMEDIATE POLICY QUESTION FACING USG IS WHETHER TO CONTINUE EFFORTS ALONG PAST POLICY LINES--I.E., A FINAL TRY TO COMPLETE DRAFT COMPACT--OR TO ADOPT SOME NEW APPROACH. THE ALTERNATIVES TO THE COMPACT WOULD SEEM TO BE (A) OUTHRIGHT INDEPENDENCE, (B) INDEPENDENCE (PERHAPS UNDER ANOTHER NAME) AS MODIFIED BY A PREVIOUSLY NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT SAFEGUARDING BOTH SIDES' INTERESTS AS DEFINED IN PARA 2 ABOVE. OUTHRIGHT INDEPENDENCE WOULD NOT SAFEGUARD U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS (THOUGH NEITHER WOULD IT NECESSARILY THREATEN

PAGE 24 RUMHSGG6126 C O N F I D E N T I A L

THEM); MOREOVER, IT IS APPARENT THAT NOT EVEN A LOOSE FORM OF UNITY WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH FULL INDEPENDENCE. OUR CHOICES THUS APPEAR TO BE ONE BETWEEN THE COMPACT AND A TREATY OR OTHER AGREEMENT DEFINING A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN US AND AN EFFECTIVELY INDEPENDENT MICRONESIA.

5. (C) ON CLOSE EXAMINATION, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT US INTERESTS COULD BE PROTECTED AS WELL BY A TREATY RELATIONSHIP AS BY COMPACT, AS PANAMA EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN, EVEN A GROSSLY UNEQUAL TREATY CAN BE BINDING FOR PROLONGED PERIODS. IN PRACTICE, THE ONLY EFFECTIVE

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CAN BE FOUND. THIS WOULD MEAN DELAY UNTIL MID-1979, OR EVEN LONGER

IF - AS IS VERY PROBABLE - CONSTITUTION IS DEFEATED.

17. (C) IT APPEARS TO ME FEASIBLE AND DESIRABLE TO CONSULT MICRONESIAN LEADERS ABOUT FOREGOING PROPOSALS AS SOON AS USG POLICY REVIEW IS COMPLETED, PROBABLY AT ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE PROPOSED IN REFTEL. IT SHOULD THEN BE ANNOUNCED THAT PLAN WILL BECOME EFFECTIVE ON OR ABOUT 1 JANUARY 1978. SPECIAL SESSION OF COM THIS SUMMER COULD THEN ENACT LEGISLATION FOR SELECTION OF MICRONESIAN CHIEF EXECUTIVE; IF HE IS TO BE ELECTED, ELECTION COULD THEN BE HELD IN NOVEMBER.

MEANWHILE, THE CAREFUL DRAFTING WHICH WOULD BE NECESSARY IN DEFINING PRECISE POWERS OF HICOM SHOULD BE TAKING PLACE IN CON-

PAGE 02 RUMHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI CONFIDENTIAL

SULTATION WITH APPROPRIATE MICRONESIAN LEADERS. AT SAME TIME, THE PROCESS OF DRAFTING DISTRICT CHARTERS (PART II ABOVE) WOULD BE UNDER WAY. CHARTERS WOULD BE APPROVED BY COM AND NEW MICRONESIAN CHIEF EXECUTIVE IN JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1978, WOULD THEN BE SUBJECT TO VETO OR MODIFICATION BY HICOM ON GROUNDS INDICATED IN PARA 13 ABOVE, AND WOULD GO INTO EFFECT LATER THAT YEAR OR 1 JANUARY 1979. BENNETT GDS-83

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INEVITABLE EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CONFRONTATIONS WHICH DO NOT INVOLVE US INTERESTS. MICOM, ASSISTED BY A SMALL STAFF, WOULD HAVE (I) VETO POWER OVER LEGISLATION OR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION DIRECTLY AFFECTING FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENSE, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR USG FUNDS, AND ANY OTHER MAJOR USG INTERESTS; (II) POWER TO REQUIRE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION IN THESE SAME FIELDS; (III) CAREFULLY CIRCUMSCRIBED POWER TO INTERVENE IN MAJOR EMERGENCIES (PARA 6 ABOVE); (IV) RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF DOINGS OF MICRONESIAN GOVT; (V) REPORTING AND MISCELLANEOUS RESPONSIBILITIES CURRENTLY EXERCISED BY STATUS LNO (MICOM MIGHT PAGE 25 RUMSGGG6976 C O N F I D E N T I A L

USEFULLY SERVE AS DEPUTY TO PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL REP FOR STATUS NEGOTIATIONS). HE WOULD HAVE DIPLOMATIC STATUS, AND ORGANIZATIONALLY HIS OFFICE WOULD SOMEWHAT RESEMBLE A SMALL EMBASSY, OR THE REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE ENVISAGED BY COMPACT AFTER TERMINATION. AN ASSISTANT MICOM IN EACH DISTRICT WOULD HAVE POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN DISTRICT ANALOGOUS TO THOSE OF MICOM AT CENTRAL LEVEL.

14. (C) THIS STRUCTURE WOULD MAXIMIZE MICRONESIAN RESPONSIBILITY, NOTABLY IN CONNECTION WITH POINTS A-C OF PARA 2, AND CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE BRANCH SCUABBLES NEED NOT INVOLVE USG. IT WOULD BE MAJOR STEP FORWARD FROM UNTC VIEWPOINT. MICRONESIAN CHIEF EXECUTIVE, INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE, WOULD BE INTERLOCUTEUR VALABLE FOR USG ON STATUS, LOS AND OTHER ISSUES WHICH ARE LIKELY TO INCREASE IN NUMBER AS TERMINATION NEARS. DIS-ADVANTAGES: (I) THERE WOULD BE SOMEWHAT MORE ADMINISTRATIVE DISLOCATION IN IMPLEMENTING THIS THAN A SIMPLER SCHEME, WHICH WOULD BE PARTICULARLY CONFUSING IF RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF CONSTITUTION FOLLOWED SOON AFTER (AS IS UNLIKELY). (II) THERE WOULD BE MODEST ADDITIONAL COSTS IN ESTABLISHING MICOM, ASST MICOMS AND STAFF SEPARATE FROM ADMINISTRATION, THOUGH THESE WOULD BE PARTIALLY PAGE 26 RUMSGGG6976 C O N F I D E N T I A L OR WHOLLY OFFSET BY MORE EXPEDITIOUS REDUCTION IN NUMBER OF AMERICANS IN ADMINISTRATION.

PART IV

15. (C) WHATEVER APPROACH IS TAKEN TOWARD INCREASING MICRONESIAN RESPONSIBILITY FOR GOVERNMENT, IT SHOULD BE ADOPTED AND IMPLEMENTED ON OWN MERITS, NOT AS A PAWN IN STATUS NEGOTIATIONS. IN FIRST PLACE, ITS TRANSITIONAL AND SHORT-TERM NATURE MAKE IT A BARGAINING COUNTER OF LITTLE VALUE. IT MAY EVEN BE UNWELCOME TO PRO-INDEPENDENCE POLITICIANS BECAUSE OF ITS POTENTIAL FOR REDUCING NUMBER OF POINTS

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OF FRICTION BETWEEN MICRONESIANS AND USG. MOREOVER, AN ATTEMPT TO WITHHOLD, OR TO CONDITION, AN OTHERWISE FEASIBLE MOVE TOWARD GREATER SELF-GOVERNMENT WOULD IMPAIR OUR POSITION IN UN AND WITH ELEMENTS OF CONGRESS AND PUBLIC SYMPATHETIC TO MICRONESIAN ASPIRATIONS IN THAT DIRECTION.

18. (C) TIMING OF THE MOVE HERE PROPOSED MAY AROUSE SOME CONTROVERSY. PRO-CONSTITUTION MICRONESIAN ELEMENTS MAY FAVOR MAINTAINING STATUS QUO TILL AFTER CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM. IN HOPES THAT THE SHIFT TOWARD INCREASING MICRONESIAN RESPONSIBILITY CAN BE LINKED TO ESTABLISHMENT OF GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE PROVIDED FOR IN CONSTITUTION. HOWEVER, UNLESS SOME MEANS OF HOLDING REFERENDUM BEFORE JULY 1978

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(AS PROVIDED FOR IN PL 6-130) OF SECTIONS WHICH ATTEMPT TO FORECLOSE FUTURE STATUS OPTIONS (E.G., PROBABLE MARSHALLESE ATTEMPT TO DRAFT "CONSTITUTION" WHICH WOULD SERVE AS BASIS FOR UNILATERAL ASSERTION OF SEPARATE STATUS).

10. (C) THERE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE DIFFERENCES IN THE JURISDICTIONAL SCOPES VIS-A-VIS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CLAIMED BY VARIOUS DISTRICTS. SOME, FOR INSTANCE, MAY WISH TO REGULATE ELEMENTARY EDUCATION; OTHERS, TO LEAVE IT TO CENTRAL GOVT AS PROVIDED IN INDICATIVE DEVELOPMENT PLAN. I BELIEVE WE CAN AFFORD TO ACCOMMODATE MANY SUCH DISCREPANCIES AND ADMINISTRATIVE UNTIDINESSES IN THE INTERESTS OF A WORKING AND HOPEFULLY PERMANENT RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE DISTRICTS.

PAGE 02 RUMSGG6976 C O N F I D E N T I A L
IN SOME CASES, SUCH DIFFERENCES MAY BE POSITIVELY DESIRABLE. CONSIDER, FOR EXAMPLE, PROCUREMENT OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES. THERE ARE OBVIOUS SAVINGS IN TIME AND MONEY IF DISTRICTS SUCH AS YAP, PALAU, SAIPAA, BUT IT MAKES MUCH LESS SENSE TO SHIP SUCH SUPPLIES TO SAIPAA, THEN BACK TO MAJURO. GREATER AUTONOMY FOR ONE OR MORE DISTRICTS THAN FOR OTHERS WOULD HENCE BE JUSTIFIED. (WITH A MOVE OF HEADQUARTERS TO PONAPE, GEOGRAPHICAL BASIS FOR SUCH DIFFERENCES WOULD OF COURSE CHANGE.)

PART II
11. (C) SEVERAL OPTIONS ARE AVAILABLE FOR INCREASING MICRONESIAN RESPONSIBILITY AT CENTRAL LEVEL. (A) ONE WOULD BE TO APPOINT A MICRONESIAN NICO. AND POSSIBLY DEPUTY NICO. THIS HAS MERIT OF BASE
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AND SIMPLICITY, WOULD RETAIN FINAL CONTROL SAFELY IN USG HANDS, AND WOULD WIN SOME FLEETING GOOD WILL. UNFORTUNATELY, IT WOULD DO NOTHING TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS OUTLINED PARA 2 ABOVE, AND MIGHT COMPLICATE THEM. USG PERCEIVED INTERESTS ARE BOUND TO CONFLICT AT CERTAIN POINTS WITH WHAT MICRONESIANS SEE AS THEIRS; IN SUCH SITUATIONS, MICRONESIAN HICOM WOULD BE FORCED TO CHOOSE BETWEEN, ON ONE HAND, INSUBORDINATION AND RESIGNATION OR REMOVAL, AND BEING SEEN BY OWN PEOPLE AS A RENEGADE. MOREOVER, AS SHOWN ABOVE, ONE BASIC PROBLEM IS APPORTIONMENT OF POWER BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND SAIPAN; THE RETENTION OF FINAL AUTHORITY IN WASHINGTON WOULD BE EVEN HARDER TO TAKE IF HICOM WERE MICRONESIAN. FINALLY, AFTER INITIAL EUPHORIA, A MICRONESIAN HICOM WOULD QUICKLY BECOME VULNERABLE TO INTER-DISTRICT AND PERSONAL JEALOUSIES WHICH WOULD TEND TO BACKFIRE ON USG.

12. (C) (B) A SECOND POSSIBILITY WOULD BE TO DELEGATE INCREASED DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY FROM WASHINGTON TO HICOM, WHO WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH MICRONESIAN ADVICE ON ALL MATTERS EXCEPT THESE SPECIFICALLY RESERVED BY USG - DEFENSE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ETC. - I.E., RATHER LIKE THE GOVERNOR OF A SELF-GOVERNING BRITISH COLONY, THIS WOULD REPRESENT A GENUINE STEP TOWARD GREATER MICRONESIAN RESPONSIBILITY, PRESENTABLE AS SUCH AT UN, AND WOULD MAKE IT FEASIBLE GRADUALLY TO CURTAIL THE LIST OF USG RESERVED POWERS AS TERMINATION OF TRUSTEESHIP APPROACHES. NEVERTHELESS, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND AND IMPLEMENT IN A POLITICAL SYSTEM WHICH HAS DEVELOPED ALONG US RATHER THAN BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL LINES, AND IN ANY CASE IT SEEMS UNWORKABLE WITHOUT A PARLIAMENTARY FORM OF GOVERNMENT. HICOM COULD HARDLY BE BOUND BY ADVICE EITHER FROM NON-ELECTED DEPARTMENT HEADS, OR MAJORITY OF THEM, OR FROM COM LEADERSHIP LACKING ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY. NOR WOULD THIS MORE OR LESS FIGUREHEAD ROLE BE WELCOME TO MOST PROSPECTIVE HICOMS.

13. (C) (C) A PREFERABLE OPTION WOULD BE RETENTION OF CERTAIN FUNDAMENTAL POWERS IN HANDS OF AN AMERICAN HICOM, UNMISTAKABLY RESPONSIBLE ONLY TO USG, AND TRANSFER OF ALL OTHERS TO A MICRONESIAN CHIEF EXECUTIVE (INDIVIDUAL OR COLLEGIATE) ELECTED DIRECTLY BY PEOPLE OR INDIRECTLY BY COM. USG WOULD CONTINUE TO PERFORM THOSE FUNCTIONS (E.G., FOREIGN AFFAIRS) WHICH IT NOW PERFORMS FOR TT GOVT. MICRONESIAN CHIEF EXECUTIVE WOULD HAVE THE EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY AND WE-TO POWERS NOW EXERCISED BY HICOM, AND WOULD BE PROTAGONIST IN

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4. (C) ON THE WHOLE, I AGREE WITH THE MICRONESIAN POSITIONS STATED IN PARA 2 ABOVE. OUR ADMINISTRATION OF IT HAS BEEN AT BEST A MIXED BAG OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND FAILURES, AND IT IS NOW DRAWING TO A CLOSE. IT SEEMS APPROPRIATE FOR US TO ACCOMMODATE MICRONESIAN DESIRES FOR GREATER RESPONSIBILITY CLOSER TO HOME.

5. (C) IT IS ALSO IN OUR OWN INTERESTS. MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE REAL AND IMAGINARY DEFICIENCIES OF OUR ADMINISTRATION HELP TO AROUSE RESENTMENT AND HOSTILITY AMONG MICRONESIAN LEADERS WHICH ARE TRANSLATED INTO DEMANDS COMPLICATING STATUS NEGOTIATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, IT IS CLEAR THAT OVERCENTRALIZATION IS ONE FACTOR (BY NO MEANS THE ONLY ONE) WHICH HAS FUELED MARSHALLESE SEPARATISM. WE CANNOT WHOLLY ELIMINATE THIS PROBLEM DURING TRUSTEESHIP (OR INDEED AFTER TERMINATION, IN ANY LIKELY SCENARIO), BUT WE CAN REDUCE IT BY A CONSPICUOUS TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY FROM AMERICANS IN WASHINGTON OR SAIPAN TO MICRONESIANS IN MICRONESIA.

6. (C) THERE ARE SEVERAL OTHER ADVANTAGES TO SUCH A TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY. IT WOULD ALLOW US TO CONCENTRATE OUR ATTENTION ON ESSENTIAL USG INTERESTS IN MICRONESIA, WITHOUT BECOMING BOGGED DOWN IN ADMINISTRATIVE DETAIL. IT WOULD PROVIDE A VALUABLE TRANSITION PERIOD TO FULL SELF-GOVERNMENT, DURING WHICH USG WOULD RETAIN (AS UNDER COMPACT IT WOULD NOT) RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN CASE OF MAJOR EMERGENCY OR BREAKDOWN OF ADMINISTRATION OR LAW AND ORDER (LATTER BEING CURRENTLY A REMOTE BUT NOT UNIMAGINABLE CONTINGENCY IN TRUK). IT WOULD REPRESENT FURTHER EVIDENCE PRESENTABLE TO UNTC OF PROGRESS UNDER TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENT. IT WOULD HELP MAKE CLEAR TO US CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS WHO FOR SECURITY REASONS ARE UNWILLING TO RELINQUISH CONTROL OF MICRONESIA, AND WHOSE ACQUIESCENCE IN EVENTUAL STATUS AGREEMENT WILL BE NEEDED, THE REALITIES OF CURRENT SITUATION. FINALLY, IT WOULD HELP TO IMPROVE THE STANDARD OF MICRONESIAN POLITICAL LIFE BY INTRODUCING A DEGREE OF RESPONSIBILITY TO AN ELECTORATE WHICH MOST MICRONESIAN POLITICIANS HAVE HITHERTO MANAGED TO EVADE.

7. (C) PROBLEM OF TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY FALLS NATURALLY INTO TWO PARTS: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO DISTRICTS, AND USG TO MICRONESIAN LEADERSHIP.

PART II

8. (C) IN FIRST AREA, COURSE HAS ALREADY BEEN RATHER CLEARLY LAID OUT IN BUTA DECENTRALIZATION PLAN 'F 1975, WHICH IN PRINCIPLE APPEARS

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TO HAVE WIDESPREAD MICRONESIAN SUPPORT, AND IN PL 6-13B WHICH PROVIDES FOR DRAFTING DISTRICT CHARTERS. LATTER PROCESS IS GETTING UNDER WAY, BUT WILL BE HINDERED (AND RELATIONS WITH USG UN-NECESSARILY EXACERBATED) BY CAVEAT INCLUDED UPON INSTRUCTIONS IN NICOH'S APPROVAL MESSAGE: NO CHARTER TO BE APPROVED TILL STATUS ISSUES HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. AS ARGUED ABOVE, USG INTERESTS WOULD BEST BE SERVED BY PROMPT APPROVAL AND IMPLEMENTATION OF CHARTERS, SINCE IT IS UNREALISTIC TO REGARD DELAY AS PROVIDING ANY USEFUL LEVERAGE TOWARD AGREEMENT ON STATUS, AND BY ELECTION OF DISTADS. (ON PROBLEM OF MAINTAINING CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY IN DISTRICTS. SEE PARA 13 BELOW.)

9. (C) I THEREFORE RECOMMEND USG POLICY STATEMENT INDICATING THAT CHARTERS WILL BE PROMPTLY APPROVED SUBJECT TO ITEM VETO OR AMENDMENT

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SANCTION FOR MICRONESIAN BREACH OF SUCH A TREATY- WITHHOLDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE-- IS IDENTICAL WITH THAT WHICH WOULD OBTAIN UNDER COMPACT. TYPE OF PAPER, OR LEGAL CONCEPTS OF SOVEREIGNTY INVOLVED, IN DEFINING US-MICRONESIAN RELATIONSHIP WILL NOT BE NEARLY SO IMPORTANT AS SUBSTANCE OF RELATIONSHIP IN DETERMINING ITS DURABILITY. A COMPACT WHICH IS UNPOPULAR WITH SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF MICRONESIAN LEADERSHIP AND WHICH IS CONSTANTLY BEING SNIPED AT WILL BE NO MORE ENDURING THAN A MORE POPULAR TREATY RELATIONSHIP, AND MAY BE MORE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN. ON THE OTHER HAND, ANOTHER SUBSTANTIAL BODY OF MICRONESIAN OPINION EXPLICITLY FAVORS A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP AND WOULD PREFER COMPACT TO TREATY. THESE ELEMENTS WOULD, HOWEVER, BE PAGE 25 RUMGSGG6106 C O N F I D E N T I A L

ATTRACTED BY A DOCUMENT, WHATEVER IT IS CALLED, WHICH CREATES AN EXPLICIT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN U.S. AND EACH DISTRICT AS WELL AS BETWEEN U.S. AND MICRONESIA AS A WHOLE. FINALLY, MANY ELEMENTS OF DRAFT COMPACT REPRESENT GENUINE AREAS OF AGREEMENT WHICH SHOULD BE PRESERVED AS FAR AS POSSIBLE IN ANY NEW NEGOTIATING EFFORT.

6. (C) IN OUR VIEW, THEREFORE, USG CAN READILY ACCEPT EITHER COMPACT OR TREATY DEPENDING ON WHICH IS MORE GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE TO MICRONESIANS. SIMILARLY, WE CAN OF COURSE RETAIN THE TERM "COMPACT" EVEN THOUGH CONTENTS ARE MODIFIED IN DIRECTION OF TREATY RELATIONSHIP.

7. (C) IN ORDER TO SECURE DESIRED SORT OF FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH MICRONESIA, US WILL NEED TO BE PREPARED TO REOPEN NEGOTIATIONS IN SEVERAL BASIC AREAS. STATUS AGREEMENT (HOWEVER STYLED) SHOULD BE MODIFIED TO ALLOW MICRONESIANS COMPLETE FREEDOM IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS EXCEPT IN AREAS AFFECTING US SECURITY INTERESTS IN MICRONESIA. US WOULD HAVE VETO POWER OVER ANY FOREIGN AFFAIRS ACTIVITY WHICH IS DEEMED DAMAGING TO US SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. US WOULD DISASSOCIATE ITSELF COMPLETELY FROM ALL OTHER GOVERNMENT OF MICRONESIA (GOM) FOREIGN AFFAIRS ACTIVITY AND DISCLAIM BEFORE OTHER NATIONS ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS EFFECT ON THEM. US WOULD NOT BE OBLIGATED

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TO PROTECT OR RESCUE MICRONESIA FROM PREDICAMENTS IT MIGHT BRING ON ITSELF, EXCEPT IN EXTREME CASES WHICH THREATEN FUNDAMENTAL STABILITY OF AREA. THIS MOVE WOULD GO FAR TO REMOVE LOS MATTERS AS A STUMBLING BLOCK TO ACHIEVEMENT OF A FINAL AGREEMENT. US WOULD OF COURSE BE ABLE TO PROVIDE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PROTECTION AND SERVICES AS AT PRESENT, AND FACILITATE MICRONESIAN COMMUNICATIONS AND CONTACTS WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS BY RELAYING COMMUNICATIONS FOR GOM TO THESE

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GOVERNMENTS. US NEED NOT AGREE WITH CONTENT OF MESSAGES, PASSING THEM ONLY AS A SERVICE TO GOV BUT IN NO WAY ASSOCIATING ITSELF WITH CONTENTS UNLESS IT SO DESIRES.

2. (C) US SHOULD AGREE TO RENEGOTIATE KMR AGREEMENTS, MAKING RENEGOTIATION AND SUBSEQUENT PAYMENTS CONDITIONAL ON CONTINUED MARSHALLESE PARTICIPATION IN SOME SORT OF UNIFIED MICRONESIA. MARSHALLESE FROM ALL POLITICAL FACTIONS ARE AGREED THAT THESE AGREEMENTS MUST BE REOPENED AND BETTER COMPENSATION GIVEN. NO AGREEMENT APPEARS POSSIBLE WITH MARSHALLS, EITHER SEPARATELY OR IN CONTEXT OF UNITY. IF KMR AGREEMENTS ARE NOT RENEGOTIATED, FURTHER, IT WOULD PROBABLY BE EASIER TO NEGOTIATE WITH LANDOWNERS NOW THAN TO WAIT AND BE FORCED TO RENEGOTIATE WITH PARTICIPATION OF MIPSC OR CFPST. AIMS AND DEMANDS OF LANDOWNERS WILL BE MUCH MORE LIMITED THAN THOSE

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9. (C) SEVERAL COURSES OF ACTION ARE POSSIBLE IN ATTACKING PROBLEMS OF INCOMPATIBILITY OF COMPACT AND CONSTITUTION AND SOME DISTRICTS' OBJECTIONS TO CONSTITUTION. ONE OPTION IS FOR US TO WORK DIRECTLY WITH MICRONESIAN LEADERSHIP TO HOLD A SECOND MICRONESIAN CONCON CHARGED WITH REVISING CFSM SO THAT IT HAS BROADER APPEAL, ESPECIALLY IN MARSHALLS AND PALAU. AREAS TO BE REASSESSED WOULD BE REPRESENTATION, REVENUE SHARING, POWERS OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND OTHERS. MUCH CLOSER COORDINATION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN US AND MICRONESIANS DURING THIS EFFORT THAN WAS CASE FOR FIRST CONCON. COUPLED WITH PROPOSED CONCESSIONS ON COMPACT, SHOULD LEAD TO DRAFTING OF MORE ACCEPTABLE DOCUMENT. IF, AS IS VERY LIKELY, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO CONVINCe MICRONESIANS FROM SEVERAL DISTRICTS TO TRY ANOTHER CONCON, US SHOULD MAKE CRYSTAL CLEAR PRIOR TO HOLDING OF REFERENDUM ON CFSM, THAT IT WILL INSIST ON SOME SORT OF LOOSE CONFEDERATION FOR MICRONESIA INCLUDING EVEN THOSE DISTRICTS WHICH REJECT CFSM. REJECTION OF CFSM WILL OF COURSE MEAN GREATER AUTONOMY FOR A DISTRICT BUT THROUGH FORCEFUL POLICIES AND MORE FLEXIBLE AND ATTRACTIVE COMPACT, US SHOULD BE ABLE TO PERSUADE DISTRICTS TO FORM LOOSE CONFEDERATION. AS A FURTHER INDUCEMENT FOR ACCEPTANCE OF SOME SORT OF UNITY, US SHOULD THEN PRESENT DISTRICTS WITH CHOICE BETWEEN COMPACT (AS MODIFIED ALONG LINES PARAS 7-8) PROVIDING FOR CON-

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FEDERATION AND FULL INDEPENDENCE. NO DISTRICT IN TPI PRESENTLY WANTS IMMEDIATE, FULL INDEPENDENCE (ESPECIALLY NOT PALAU OR EVEN MARSHALLS) AND IT IS THUS SAFE TO ASSUME THEY WOULD OPT FOR CONFEDERATION AND NOT INDEPENDENCE. SUCH A CONFEDERATION SHOULD PROVIDE FOR MAXIMUM DISTRICT AUTONOMY WHILE STILL PROVIDING ALL CONCERNED WITH ESSENTIAL BENEFITS OF UNITY. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WOULD PROVIDE LIMITED SERVICES TO DISTRICTS IN AREAS OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, LOS MATTERS, CONTACT WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ACQUISITION OF FOREIGN EXPERTISE. IT

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WOULD IN ESSENCE BE A SECRETARIAT OF SORTS PROVIDING SERVICES FOR MEMBER ENTITIES. BASIC DECISION-MAKING POWER WOULD REST PRE- DOMINANTLY IN MEMBER "STATES", WHETHER THERE BE THREE OR MORE.

10. (C) SEVERAL OTHER ACTIONS ARE POSSIBLE BY US TO DEFUSE SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS IN PALAU AND MARSHALLS. PROVISION SHOULD BE MADE IN AGREEMENT GOVERNING US-MICRONESIAN RELATIONS AFTER TERMINATION TO ALLOW FOR DIRECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANY DISTRICT AND US AND TO ALLOW THAT DISTRICT TO MAINTAIN TIES WITH US AS LONG AS IT SO DESIRES. AGREEMENT MIGHT ALSO ALLOW A DISTRICT TO ESTABLISH CLOSER TIES WITH US WHICH WOULD BE GUARANTEED TO SURVIVE ANY ACTION BY OTHER DISTRICTS TO LOOSEN THEIR TIES WITH US AT SOME FUTURE POINT. IT SHOULD BE CLEARLY STATED IN NEW DOCUMENTS, WHETHER COMPACT, CONSTITUTION OR CHARTER OF CONFEDERATION, THAT LARGEST PERCENTAGE, SAY 90 PERCENT, OF REVENUE FROM BASE LEASES WILL STAY IN LOCAL DISTRICT. IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT ALL OTHER FUNDING SUPPLIED TO MICRONESIA BY US IS IN NO WAY RELATED TO PRESENCE OF US BASES BUT INSTEAD IS IN RECOGNITION OF SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN US AND MICRONESIA AND IN ORDER TO SECURE DENIAL IN AREA. FURTHERMORE, NEGOTIATIONS ON LAND MATTERS SHOULD BE WITH LOCAL LAND- OWNERS AND DISTRICT LEADERS WITH LOW PROFILE PARTICIPATION BY CENTRAL

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GOVERNMENT. PROVISIONS FOR LAND NEGOTIATIONS IN CFSM SHOULD NOT STAND IN WAY AS IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY CFSM WILL BE RATIFIED IN MARSHALLS OR PALAU, AREAS OF PRIMARY CONCERN ON THIS ISSUE. TO FURTHER REDUCE OBJECTIONS TO UNITY, REPRESENTATION IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, WHETHER IN CONFEDERATION OR UNDER REVISED CONSTITUTION, SHOULD BE ON BASIS OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION FOR EACH DISTRICT. IMPACT OF THIS SHOULD NOT BE GREAT FOR MORE POPULATED STATES SINCE POWER WILL BE AT DISTRICT LEVEL ANYWAY.

11. (C) WITH REFERENCE TO LOS MATTERS, US SHOULD VETO CURRENT

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MARINE JURISDICTION BILL PASSED BY 7TH COM AND SHOULD INSTEAD ESTABLISH A FISHERIES ZONE WHICH IS BASED ON COM BILL EXCEPT FOR MODIFICATIONS TO PORTIONS DEALING WITH TUNA AND CONTACT WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT THIS IS ONLY TO COVER INTERIM PERIOD UP TO TERMINATION. FOLLOWING TERMINATION, MICRONESIA CAN STRUCTURE ITS OWN ZONE IN ANY WAY IT DESIRES SO LONG AS US SECURITY INTERESTS ARE NOT COMPROMISED. USG WOULD OF COURSE BE UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO RECOGNIZE, RESPECT, OR ASSIST IN ENFORCEMENT OF MICRONESIAN CLAIMS NOT JUSTIFIED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW. SINCE THERE IS SOME CONFUSION, USG SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THAT DEFENSE REFERS ONLY TO DEFENSE OF MICRONESIA AGAINST EXTERNAL AGGRESSION AND DOES NOT REFER TO FISHERIES PATROLLING. PROVISION SHOULD BE MADE FOR TRAINING OF A SMALL MICRONESIAN COAST GUARD AND FOR US ASSISTANCE IN AERIAL SURVEILLANCE. THIS WOULD BY NO MEANS PROVIDE MICRONESIA WITH AN AIRTIGHT PATROL CAPABILITY BUT THAT IS NOT ACTUALLY REQUIRED. THIS SYSTEM WOULD ALSO NOT INVOLVE US FORCES IN UPHOLDING LAWS AND REGULATIONS WHICH MIGHT BE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE APPLICABLE IN US WATERS. A PART OF COST OF THIS PROGRAM COULD BE FUNDED FROM REVENUE GENERATED BY ECONOMIC ZONE WITH ANOTHER PART COMING FROM US GRANT FUNDS AND LOCAL REVENUE.

12. (C) WHILE MANY OF ABOVE RECOMMENDATIONS DO COMPLICATE PROCESS OF REACHING FUTURE STATUS AGREEMENT, THEY ARE NECESSARY BECAUSE CENTRIFUGAL FORCES IN TPI ARE MAKING AREA MORE AND MORE COMPLEX AS TIME PASSES. SINGLE, BROAD STROKE SOLUTIONS CANNOT BE EFFECTIVELY APPLIED ACROSS BREADTH OF MICRONESIA. POLICIES MUST BE FLEXIBLE AND RESPONSIVE TO VARIED DEMANDS ORIGINATING FROM MANY SOURCES IN MICRONESIA. MANY OF PROPOSED ACTIONS WILL ALSO BRING FORTH CRITICISM OF US FROM VARIOUS QUARTERS. BUT THIS IS ALREADY THE CASE. SINCE CRITICISM IS A CONSTANT, WHY NOT MOVE FORWARD IN A POSITIVE MANNER TO GAIN NECESSARY US OBJECTIVES AND FULFILL OUR OBLIGATIONS, RATHER THAN CONTINUE TO ABSORB CRITICISM AND HAVE NOTHING TO SHOW FOR IT? BENNETT

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1. (C) SUMMARY: THIS IS THE SECOND OF THREE MESSAGES OUTLINING STATUS LNO VIEWS ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD MICRONESIA, IN CONTEXT OF CURRENT POLICY REVIEW. IN THIS MESSAGE, WE URGE PROMPT ACTION, WITHOUT AWAITING FINAL RESOLUTION OF STATUS ISSUES, TO SHIFT PAGE 02 RUMGSDG:974 CONFIDENTIAL MAXIMUM AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY (A) FROM CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO DISTRICTS AND (B) FROM US APPOINTED TO MICRONESIAN ELECTED OFFICIALS. END SUMMARY
PART I
2. (C) NOTWITHSTANDING THE SERIOUS DIFFERENCES AMONG MICRONESIANS ON ISSUES OF FUTURE STATUS, THERE IS A BROAD CONSENSUS ON A NUMBER OF OTHER BASIC POLITICAL QUESTIONS. AMONG THESE ARE: (A) CONSIDERABLY GREATER DECISION-MAKING AND OPERATING AUTHORITY SHOULD BE SHIFTED FROM HEADQUARTERS TO DISTRICT ADMINISTRATIONS; (B) KEY EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS, ESPECIALLY DISTADS SHOULD BE ELECTED, OR AT A MINIMUM SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO CLOSER SUPERVISION BY ELECTED
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OFFICIALS (COM AND/OR DISTRICT LEGISLATURES); (C) THE TOTAL SIZE OF THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE MARKEDLY REDUCED (THOUGH NOT AT THE EXPENSE OF VOTE-GETTING SERVICES, AND NOT BY GETTING RID OF EMPLOYEES FROM DISTRICT OF WHATEVER LEADER IS TALKING ABOUT THE SUBJECT); (D) DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY SHOULD BE LOCATED IN MICRONESIA, NOT WASHINGTON; AT SAME TIME NEARLY ALL MICRONESIAN LEADERS READILY CONCEDE USG RIGHT NOT TO A MONOPOLY BUT TO FINAL SAY ON QUESTIONS OF, E.G., DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THOUGH THEIR DEFINITIONS OF WHAT IS "FOREIGN" MAY NOT COINCIDE EXACTLY WITH PAGE 03 RUMGSGG6974 C O N F I D E N T I A L

CURS); (E) SOME, THOUGH NOT ALL, EXECUTIVE POSITIONS IN CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION AND IN DISTRICTS NOW HELD BY AMERICANS SHOULD BE ABOLISHED OR FILLED BY MICRONESIANS.

3. (C) MICRONESIANS ARGUE THE FOREGOING POINTS ON SEVERAL BASES. ONE IS SIMPLY IMPROVED GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS AND LOWER COST. A MORE FUNDAMENTAL ARGUMENT IS USG COMMITMENT IN TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENT TO INCREASING SELF-GOVERNMENT. IN POINT OF FACT, US PERFORMANCE ON THIS ISSUE HAS NOT BEEN PARTICULARLY IMPRESSIVE. IN 30 YEARS OF TRUSTEESHIP, IT BOILS DOWN TO TWO FORMS OF PROGRESS AT CENTRAL LEVEL: (A) MANY MICRONESIANS ARE HOLDING JOBS ONCE FILLED BY AMERICANS, AND THIS PROCESS OF MICRONIZATION IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE. HENCE, POINT (E) OF PARA 2 ABOVE IS A RELATIVELY MINOR IRRITANT COMPARED TO THE OTHERS. (B) COM WAS ESTABLISHED 1965 AND EXERCISES LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY SUBJECT TO OCCASIONAL USG REVERSAL ON ISSUES NATURE OF WHICH IS NOT CLEARLY ARTICULATED (EXCEPT FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE) AND WHICH SOMETIMES STRIKE MICRONESIANS AS CAPRICIOUSLY CHOSEN (SUCH AS WHETHER US RESIDENTS OF KWAJALEIN SHOULD PAY 3 OR 4 PERCENT INCOME TAX). A GROWING NUMBER OF MICRONESIANS NOW BELIEVE THAT THIS SECOND ASPECT OF "PROGRESS TOWARD SELF-GOVERNMENT" HAS NOT BEEN A SUCCESS. CRITICISM OF COM DOES NOT STEM FROM RE- PAGE 04 RUMGSGG6974 C O N F I D E N T I A L

JECTION OF CONCEPT OF MICRONESIANS LEGISLATING FOR MICRONESIANS; ONE DOES NOT HEAR SIMILAR CRITICISM OF DISTRICT LEGISLATURES. IT FLOWS INSTEAD FROM FEELINGS ABOUT OVERCENTRALIZATION, PARA 2(A) ABOVE, FROM INTER-DISTRICT RIVALRIES, AND FROM GROWING PRESSURE OF YOUNGER, LESS TRADITIONALLY-MINDED POLITICIANS ON ESTABLISHED POLITICAL FIGURES WHO HAVE NORMALLY DOMINATED COM. COM IN TURN IS IRRESISTIBLY TEMPTED TO DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST SUCH CRITICISM BY SHIFTING BLAME FOR ITS FAILINGS TO USG, AN EASY TASK IN VIEW OF OUR RETENTION OF FINAL CONTROL.

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